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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-58170: HKUDS Vibe-Trading · Path Traversal

Affects HKUDS Vibe-TradingSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.3 High : upgrade to 0.1.10 soon.

Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 12:10 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
8.3High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 3.18.3
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 4.07.2
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 46% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.1.10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 30 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade HKUDS Vibe-Trading to 0.1.10.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
HKUDSVibe-TradingAffected
  • <0.1.10
Fixed in
  • 0.1.10
GitHubVibe-Tradingpkg:github/Vibe-TradingOther threatsAffected
  • <0.1.10
Fixed in
  • 0.1.10

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, restrict or monitor file upload capabilities and validate or sanitize proposal identifiers to prevent path traversal sequences. Avoid using unsanitized user input in file path construction.

Description

Vibe-Trading before 0.1.10 builds the proposal file path by joining a caller-supplied proposal identifier onto the broker proposals directory without sanitization (agent/src/live/mandate/commit.py). A proposal identifier containing path traversal sequences causes the application to load an attacker-controlled JSON file as an authoritative live trading mandate. Combined with the file upload endpoint, an admitted caller can write a JSON file to a known location and traverse to it, and because the ceilings validation is skipped when ceilings are absent, the attacker fully controls the committed mandate.

References

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