CVE-2026-61729: socfortress CoPilot · Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality
Affects socfortress CoPilotSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.4 Critical : upgrade to 0.1.76 as a priority.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 14:48 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 3.1 | 9.4 |
|---|
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.1.76
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 30 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade socfortress CoPilot to 0.1.76.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| socfortressCoPilot | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Description
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
References
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/security/advisories/GHSA-x8gc-f8p4-frc2 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/pull/939 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/commit/1b2c3f97243988301285b395ce4239769c66bd9e (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/tree/v0.1.76 (opens in a new tab)