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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-61729: socfortress CoPilot · Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality

Affects socfortress CoPilotSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.4 Critical : upgrade to 0.1.76 as a priority.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 14:48 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.4Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 3.19.4
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.1.76
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 30 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade socfortress CoPilot to 0.1.76.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
socfortressCoPilotAffected
  • <0.1.76
Fixed in
  • 0.1.76

Description

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.

References

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