CVE-2026-61730: socfortress CoPilot · Information Exposure
Affects socfortress CoPilotSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.3 Critical : upgrade to 0.1.77 as a priority.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 14:48 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 3.1 | 9.3 |
|---|
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.1.77
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 30 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade socfortress CoPilot to 0.1.77.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| socfortressCoPilot | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Description
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. In affected deployments, the unauthenticated `/scoutsuite-report` `StaticFiles` mount in `backend/copilot.py` exposes the `scoutsuite-report` directory even though normal /api routes require JWT authentication. Generated HTML reports and `scoutsuite-results/scoutsuite_results_<name>.js` files disclose AWS, Azure and GCP IAM principals, resource inventories, misconfigurations and findings. Report names derive from caller-selected names with predictable defaults. During an admin- or analyst-initiated GCP scan, `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` saves the uploaded Google service-account JSON key into that same web-served directory. In `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`, `generate_gcp_report_background` removes the key only after the scan finishes. Any anonymous client that can reach the host and request the file path can therefore retrieve the private key during the scan and use the service account's cloud permissions, as well as read retained cloud-security reports. Credential isolation is released in version 0.1.77; a release fully remediating the report-disclosure component has not been established.
References
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/security/advisories/GHSA-pm2w-mmc3-h8hc (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/pull/940 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/commit/bfa630b65d554670c7462a32ce6fd4e3cbd0254c (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/tree/v0.1.77 (opens in a new tab)