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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-63725: nuxsmin sysPass · OS Command Injection

Affects nuxsmin sysPassSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.2 High.

Data as of 5 Nov 2026, 00:01 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.2High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 38% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 6 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 5 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
nuxsminsysPassAffected
  • >=3.0.0 <=3.2.11
Fixed in–
GitHubnuxsmin/sysPasspkg:github/nuxsmin/sysPassOther threatsAffected
  • =3.0.0
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until a fix is available, restrict administrative access to trusted users only and avoid using untrusted input in backup path configuration. Monitor for updates from the vendor regarding an official fix or workaround.

Description

sysPass's FileBackupService::doBackupFiles() in lib/SP/Services/Backup/FileBackupService.php around line 388 builds a tar shell command by string-concatenating the backup directory path $this->path directly into the command line ('tar czf ' . $backupFileApp . ' ' . BASE_PATH . ' --exclude \"' . $this->path . '\" 2>&1') and passes the result to PHP's exec() with no application of escapeshellarg() and no validation of the path against a safe character set. The $this->path value is read from the sysPass configuration, which is persisted in the database and writable through the admin settings API and the admin UI. An administrator (or an attacker who has obtained an admin API token or admin session) can therefore store a backup path containing shell metacharacters and trigger a backup operation to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server process user (typically www-data or apache). Because sysPass is a password manager whose sole purpose is to hold credentials for other systems, code execution as the web-server user permits reading sysPass's master password and encryption key from memory or configuration files, decrypting every stored credential in the database, exporting the entire password vault, pivoting to internal systems using the disclosed credentials, and installing persistent backdoors on the password-manager host.

References

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