The vulnerability exists in AWX's webhook status callback processing, where the status callback URL extracted from GitHub pull request webhook payloads is not validated against the expected Git provider host. This URL is stored and later used to send authenticated POST requests with the configured Git PAT in the Authorization header. An attacker with admin privileges on a webhook-enabled job template can read the webhook signing key, forge signed webhook payloads with arbitrary statuses_url values, and cause the system to send status updates to attacker-controlled or internal endpoints. This results in leakage of the Git PAT credential and allows SSRF attacks that can probe internal or loopback services not directly accessible to the attacker. The vulnerability is rated with a CVSS 3.1 score of 7.7 (high severity) and impacts Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 as part of Automation Controller. Red Hat advises restricting admin roles on webhook templates, using minimal-scope Git credentials, implementing network egress filtering, monitoring outbound connections, and rotating credentials until a fix is available.

An attacker with admin role on webhook-enabled job templates can exfiltrate Git Personal Access Tokens by redirecting authenticated status callbacks to arbitrary endpoints. This leads to credential leakage and potential unauthorized access to Git repositories. The SSRF also allows attackers to use the AWX control node as a proxy to access internal or loopback network services that are otherwise inaccessible, increasing the attack surface and risk of internal network reconnaissance or exploitation.

There is no complete mitigation other than applying a future update when available. Until then, Red Hat recommends: 1) Restricting admin role on webhook-enabled job templates to trusted users with legitimate access to Git credentials; 2) Using Git credentials with minimal required scope (e.g., read-only repository access); 3) Implementing network egress filtering on Automation Controller nodes to block outbound connections to non-allowlisted hosts, including loopback (127.0.0.0/8), private (RFC1918), and link-local (169.254.0.0/16) ranges; 4) Monitoring for unusual outbound connections from the Controller node; 5) Rotating Git PAT credentials periodically and after any suspected compromise.