The vulnerability arises because AWX does not validate the target host of the status callback URL extracted from GitHub pull request webhook payloads. An admin user on a webhook-enabled job template can read the webhook signing key and forge signed webhook payloads with arbitrary statuses_url values. This causes AWX to POST status updates to attacker-specified endpoints, including the Git PAT in the Authorization header, leaking credentials. This crosses trust boundaries by exposing encrypted credentials and enabling SSRF to internal or loopback services not directly accessible to the attacker. The affected code is part of Automation Controller in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8. Red Hat rates the impact as Important and advises restricting admin access and applying mitigations until a fix is released.

An attacker with admin privileges on a webhook-enabled job template can exfiltrate Git Personal Access Tokens by redirecting authenticated status update requests to attacker-controlled or internal URLs. This can lead to credential leakage and unauthorized access to internal network services via SSRF. The vulnerability breaks trust boundaries by exposing credentials that should be encrypted and inaccessible through the API. In managed service deployments, it also allows probing internal service mesh endpoints, increasing risk.

Red Hat advises there is no complete mitigation other than applying the update when available. Until then, reduce exposure by: 1) Restricting admin role on webhook-enabled job templates to trusted users with legitimate Git credential access; 2) Using Git credentials with minimal required scope (e.g., read-only repository access); 3) Implementing network egress filtering on Automation Controller nodes to block outbound connections to non-allowlisted hosts, including loopback, private, and link-local IP ranges; 4) Monitoring for unusual outbound connections from the Controller node; 5) Rotating Git PAT credentials periodically and after suspected compromise.