NFC relay attacks exploit the Near Field Communication (NFC) technology used in contactless payments by intercepting and relaying communication between a bank card and a payment terminal. The open-source NFCGate tool, originally developed for research and debugging NFC traffic, has been modified by cybercriminals to facilitate these attacks. There are two main attack variants: direct and reverse NFCGate attacks. In the direct attack, victims are socially engineered into installing malicious Android apps disguised as legitimate services, which request NFC and internet permissions. Victims are then prompted to tap their bank cards on their phones, allowing the malware to capture card data and PINs. This data is relayed in real time or used offline by criminals to emulate the victim’s card at payment terminals or ATMs, often with the help of money mules. The reverse attack involves victims installing apps that set themselves as the default contactless payment method, allowing the victim’s phone to emulate an attacker’s card. Victims are then instructed to perform transactions at ATMs using a PIN provided by attackers, unknowingly transferring funds to criminals. These attacks rely heavily on social engineering and user trust rather than technical NFC vulnerabilities. Since late 2023, these attacks have expanded geographically and in sophistication, with malware bundles combining NFC relay capabilities with remote access trojans (e.g., RatOn) and being offered as malware-as-a-service. The attacks are difficult to detect by victims because no physical card theft occurs, and bank alerts can be delayed or intercepted. Indicators include suspicious app installation requests, prompts to tap cards on phones, and instructions to change default NFC payment methods or perform ATM actions under external guidance. Protection involves user education, strict app installation policies, monitoring NFC default payment settings, and using official banking apps and physical cards for transactions.

For European organizations, especially financial institutions and mobile payment service providers, these NFC relay attacks pose a significant risk of financial fraud and reputational damage. End users’ compromised bank cards can lead to unauthorized withdrawals and payments, increasing chargebacks and operational costs for banks. The attacks exploit Android devices, which are widely used across Europe, potentially affecting a large user base. Retailers and ATM operators may face increased fraud incidents, complicating transaction verification and dispute resolution. The malware’s ability to intercept or delay bank alerts can hinder timely fraud detection and response. Additionally, the rise of malware-as-a-service models lowers the barrier for attackers, increasing the frequency and scale of attacks. Organizations may also face regulatory scrutiny under GDPR and PSD2 if customer data or payment security is compromised. The social engineering aspect means that even well-secured environments can be vulnerable if users are not adequately trained. Overall, these attacks threaten the confidentiality and integrity of payment credentials and the availability of secure payment services.

European organizations should implement multi-layered defenses beyond generic advice: 1) Financial institutions must enhance user education campaigns focusing on NFC relay attack tactics, emphasizing never to install apps from unofficial sources or tap cards on phones. 2) Banks should monitor for unusual transaction patterns consistent with relay attacks, such as simultaneous geographically disparate transactions or atypical ATM usage. 3) Mobile payment providers should enforce app integrity checks and restrict NFC access to verified applications only, possibly integrating behavioral analytics to detect suspicious NFC activity. 4) Encourage users to regularly verify and maintain their default NFC payment method settings and promptly remove unknown apps with NFC or accessibility permissions. 5) Deploy endpoint security solutions on Android devices that can detect and block malicious apps exploiting NFCGate or similar frameworks. 6) Collaborate with telecom providers to identify and block command-and-control servers used by these malware variants. 7) ATM operators should implement additional authentication mechanisms beyond NFC taps, such as biometric verification or transaction limits for contactless withdrawals. 8) Financial regulators should issue guidelines on NFC payment security and mandate incident reporting to improve threat intelligence sharing. 9) Organizations should maintain updated threat intelligence feeds to detect emerging NFC relay malware variants and adapt defenses accordingly. 10) Encourage users to use physical cards for ATM transactions and official banking apps for payments rather than third-party apps.