From a Teams Call to a Ransomware Threat: Matanbuchus 3.0 MaaS Levels Up
Matanbuchus 3.0, a malware loader available as Malware-as-a-Service, has evolved with significant updates. It now employs sophisticated techniques including improved communication protocols, in-memory stealth capabilities, enhanced obfuscation, and support for WQL queries, CMD, and PowerShell reverse shells. The loader collects detailed system data, including information on EDR security controls, to tailor subsequent attacks. It can execute various commands through regsvr32, rundll32, msiexec, or process hollowing. The malware establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry modifications. Recent campaigns have targeted victims through external Microsoft Teams calls impersonating IT helpdesks, leading to potential ransomware compromises.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
Matanbuchus 3.0 is an advanced malware loader offered as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) that has recently undergone significant enhancements, making it a more potent threat in the cybercrime landscape. This loader is designed to facilitate ransomware attacks by first compromising victim systems through sophisticated infection chains. Notably, recent campaigns have leveraged social engineering via external Microsoft Teams calls, impersonating IT helpdesk personnel to gain initial access. Once deployed, Matanbuchus 3.0 employs multiple sophisticated techniques to evade detection and maintain persistence. It uses improved communication protocols for command and control (C2) interactions and incorporates in-memory stealth capabilities to avoid traditional endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools. The malware supports execution of Windows Management Instrumentation Query Language (WQL) queries, CMD, and PowerShell reverse shells, enabling flexible and stealthy command execution. It collects detailed system information, including the presence and configuration of EDR security controls, allowing attackers to tailor subsequent payloads and attack strategies. Execution techniques include leveraging legitimate Windows utilities such as regsvr32, rundll32, msiexec, and process hollowing, which further complicate detection efforts. Persistence is established through scheduled tasks and registry modifications, ensuring the malware remains active across reboots. The combination of social engineering via Microsoft Teams and the technical sophistication of the loader increases the likelihood of successful infiltration and ransomware deployment, posing a significant risk to targeted organizations.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the threat posed by Matanbuchus 3.0 is considerable. The use of Microsoft Teams—a widely adopted collaboration platform across Europe—as an initial attack vector exploits trust in internal communications, increasing the risk of successful social engineering. Once inside, the malware’s ability to evade detection and gather detailed system and security posture information enables attackers to deploy ransomware tailored to maximize damage and disruption. This can lead to significant operational downtime, data loss, financial costs related to ransom payments or recovery, and reputational damage. Critical sectors such as finance, healthcare, manufacturing, and government entities in Europe are particularly vulnerable due to their reliance on Microsoft Teams and the critical nature of their operations. Furthermore, the malware’s persistence mechanisms and use of legitimate Windows processes complicate incident response and remediation efforts. The threat also raises concerns about compliance with European data protection regulations, such as GDPR, given the potential for data breaches and unauthorized data access.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement targeted mitigation strategies beyond generic advice: 1) Enhance user awareness and training specifically addressing social engineering attacks via collaboration tools like Microsoft Teams, emphasizing verification of unexpected IT support requests. 2) Enforce strict access controls and multi-factor authentication (MFA) on Microsoft Teams and related Office 365 accounts to reduce the risk of account compromise. 3) Deploy advanced endpoint detection solutions capable of monitoring and analyzing the use of legitimate Windows utilities (regsvr32, rundll32, msiexec) and detecting anomalous process hollowing or in-memory execution techniques. 4) Implement network segmentation and restrict outbound network traffic to known and trusted domains and IPs, including monitoring for connections to suspicious domains identified in the indicators (e.g., bretux.com, emorista.org). 5) Regularly audit scheduled tasks and registry entries for unauthorized persistence mechanisms. 6) Use threat intelligence feeds to update detection signatures with the provided hashes and indicators of compromise (IOCs). 7) Conduct regular security posture assessments focusing on EDR configurations and ensure they are optimally tuned to detect stealthy malware behaviors. 8) Establish incident response playbooks that include scenarios involving collaboration platform-based social engineering and MaaS loaders.
Affected Countries
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Poland
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 6847aa8ea6a8b7eb11d3c139ef0ea898
- hash: 6ea9ef63b75a79f0be704ea1b4e51bcb
- hash: a54fd38b7c6e421a7a0c68e763b69fcb
- hash: a86c153cfb39fc0bbaf573acaef27f93
- hash: 15e5f79a70d9fc6c92931211a09101d892e7cf93
- hash: 1ff08496b459903acaf475ad39d0387e44b4d721
- hash: 6cc7d7e83200f90ed53e01afc1d0305579ef538e
- hash: df8e256d04ca10e52ce21f021f032fd182615f68
- hash: 0f41536cd9982a5c1d6993fac8cd5eb4e7f8304627f2019a17e1aa283ac3f47c
- hash: 19fb41244558f3a7d469b79b9d91cd7d321b6c82d1660738256ecf39fe3c8421
- hash: 211cea7a5fe12205fee4e72837279409ace663567c5b8c36828a3818aabef456
- hash: 2ee3a202233625cdcdec9f687d74271ac0f9cb5877c96cf08cf1ae88087bec2e
- hash: da9585d578f367cd6cd4b0e6821e67ff02eab731ae78593ab69674f649514872
- ip: 94.159.113.33
- domain: bretux.com
- domain: emorista.org
- domain: fixuplink.com
- domain: nicewk.com
- domain: notepad-plus-plu.org
From a Teams Call to a Ransomware Threat: Matanbuchus 3.0 MaaS Levels Up
Description
Matanbuchus 3.0, a malware loader available as Malware-as-a-Service, has evolved with significant updates. It now employs sophisticated techniques including improved communication protocols, in-memory stealth capabilities, enhanced obfuscation, and support for WQL queries, CMD, and PowerShell reverse shells. The loader collects detailed system data, including information on EDR security controls, to tailor subsequent attacks. It can execute various commands through regsvr32, rundll32, msiexec, or process hollowing. The malware establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry modifications. Recent campaigns have targeted victims through external Microsoft Teams calls impersonating IT helpdesks, leading to potential ransomware compromises.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
Matanbuchus 3.0 is an advanced malware loader offered as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) that has recently undergone significant enhancements, making it a more potent threat in the cybercrime landscape. This loader is designed to facilitate ransomware attacks by first compromising victim systems through sophisticated infection chains. Notably, recent campaigns have leveraged social engineering via external Microsoft Teams calls, impersonating IT helpdesk personnel to gain initial access. Once deployed, Matanbuchus 3.0 employs multiple sophisticated techniques to evade detection and maintain persistence. It uses improved communication protocols for command and control (C2) interactions and incorporates in-memory stealth capabilities to avoid traditional endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools. The malware supports execution of Windows Management Instrumentation Query Language (WQL) queries, CMD, and PowerShell reverse shells, enabling flexible and stealthy command execution. It collects detailed system information, including the presence and configuration of EDR security controls, allowing attackers to tailor subsequent payloads and attack strategies. Execution techniques include leveraging legitimate Windows utilities such as regsvr32, rundll32, msiexec, and process hollowing, which further complicate detection efforts. Persistence is established through scheduled tasks and registry modifications, ensuring the malware remains active across reboots. The combination of social engineering via Microsoft Teams and the technical sophistication of the loader increases the likelihood of successful infiltration and ransomware deployment, posing a significant risk to targeted organizations.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the threat posed by Matanbuchus 3.0 is considerable. The use of Microsoft Teams—a widely adopted collaboration platform across Europe—as an initial attack vector exploits trust in internal communications, increasing the risk of successful social engineering. Once inside, the malware’s ability to evade detection and gather detailed system and security posture information enables attackers to deploy ransomware tailored to maximize damage and disruption. This can lead to significant operational downtime, data loss, financial costs related to ransom payments or recovery, and reputational damage. Critical sectors such as finance, healthcare, manufacturing, and government entities in Europe are particularly vulnerable due to their reliance on Microsoft Teams and the critical nature of their operations. Furthermore, the malware’s persistence mechanisms and use of legitimate Windows processes complicate incident response and remediation efforts. The threat also raises concerns about compliance with European data protection regulations, such as GDPR, given the potential for data breaches and unauthorized data access.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement targeted mitigation strategies beyond generic advice: 1) Enhance user awareness and training specifically addressing social engineering attacks via collaboration tools like Microsoft Teams, emphasizing verification of unexpected IT support requests. 2) Enforce strict access controls and multi-factor authentication (MFA) on Microsoft Teams and related Office 365 accounts to reduce the risk of account compromise. 3) Deploy advanced endpoint detection solutions capable of monitoring and analyzing the use of legitimate Windows utilities (regsvr32, rundll32, msiexec) and detecting anomalous process hollowing or in-memory execution techniques. 4) Implement network segmentation and restrict outbound network traffic to known and trusted domains and IPs, including monitoring for connections to suspicious domains identified in the indicators (e.g., bretux.com, emorista.org). 5) Regularly audit scheduled tasks and registry entries for unauthorized persistence mechanisms. 6) Use threat intelligence feeds to update detection signatures with the provided hashes and indicators of compromise (IOCs). 7) Conduct regular security posture assessments focusing on EDR configurations and ensure they are optimally tuned to detect stealthy malware behaviors. 8) Establish incident response playbooks that include scenarios involving collaboration platform-based social engineering and MaaS loaders.
Affected Countries
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://www.morphisec.com/blog/ransomware-threat-matanbuchus-3-0-maas-levels-up"]
- Adversary
- null
- Pulse Id
- 687a0d5dc93942c183eddbf5
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash6847aa8ea6a8b7eb11d3c139ef0ea898 | MD5 of da9585d578f367cd6cd4b0e6821e67ff02eab731ae78593ab69674f649514872 | |
hash6ea9ef63b75a79f0be704ea1b4e51bcb | MD5 of 211cea7a5fe12205fee4e72837279409ace663567c5b8c36828a3818aabef456 | |
hasha54fd38b7c6e421a7a0c68e763b69fcb | MD5 of 19fb41244558f3a7d469b79b9d91cd7d321b6c82d1660738256ecf39fe3c8421 | |
hasha86c153cfb39fc0bbaf573acaef27f93 | MD5 of 0f41536cd9982a5c1d6993fac8cd5eb4e7f8304627f2019a17e1aa283ac3f47c | |
hash15e5f79a70d9fc6c92931211a09101d892e7cf93 | SHA1 of da9585d578f367cd6cd4b0e6821e67ff02eab731ae78593ab69674f649514872 | |
hash1ff08496b459903acaf475ad39d0387e44b4d721 | SHA1 of 0f41536cd9982a5c1d6993fac8cd5eb4e7f8304627f2019a17e1aa283ac3f47c | |
hash6cc7d7e83200f90ed53e01afc1d0305579ef538e | SHA1 of 19fb41244558f3a7d469b79b9d91cd7d321b6c82d1660738256ecf39fe3c8421 | |
hashdf8e256d04ca10e52ce21f021f032fd182615f68 | SHA1 of 211cea7a5fe12205fee4e72837279409ace663567c5b8c36828a3818aabef456 | |
hash0f41536cd9982a5c1d6993fac8cd5eb4e7f8304627f2019a17e1aa283ac3f47c | — | |
hash19fb41244558f3a7d469b79b9d91cd7d321b6c82d1660738256ecf39fe3c8421 | — | |
hash211cea7a5fe12205fee4e72837279409ace663567c5b8c36828a3818aabef456 | — | |
hash2ee3a202233625cdcdec9f687d74271ac0f9cb5877c96cf08cf1ae88087bec2e | — | |
hashda9585d578f367cd6cd4b0e6821e67ff02eab731ae78593ab69674f649514872 | — |
Ip
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
ip94.159.113.33 | CC=RU ASN=AS49531 netcom-r llc |
Domain
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
domainbretux.com | — | |
domainemorista.org | — | |
domainfixuplink.com | — | |
domainnicewk.com | — | |
domainnotepad-plus-plu.org | — |
Threat ID: 687a0dd5a83201eaacf1730e
Added to database: 7/18/2025, 9:03:17 AM
Last enriched: 7/18/2025, 9:16:42 AM
Last updated: 7/18/2025, 9:16:42 AM
Views: 2
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