RansomHouse is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation managed by the threat actor group Jolly Scorpius. The recent upgrade focuses on its Mario ransomware component, which now employs a more complex two-stage encryption process. This process likely involves an initial encryption phase followed by a secondary encryption or obfuscation step, enhancing the difficulty of forensic analysis and decryption efforts. The ransomware also features improved memory management, reducing its footprint and detection likelihood, and dynamic file processing that adapts to different file types or system environments. The attack chain includes the MrAgent component, which handles deployment logistics, particularly in virtualized environments such as VMware ESXi servers. MrAgent facilitates lateral movement and payload delivery, while Mario executes the encryption of victim files. The use of virtualization-specific tactics and techniques (noted by MITRE ATT&CK tags like T1489, T1082, T1562.004, T1021, T1222, T1016, T1083, T1078, T1486, T1498, T1105, T1490) indicates a focus on compromising hypervisor environments to maximize impact. Although no active exploits are reported, the sophistication of the encryption upgrade suggests a higher resilience against reverse engineering and automated detection tools, potentially increasing ransom success rates and complicating incident response. The campaign is tagged as medium severity, reflecting its enhanced capabilities but lack of widespread exploitation evidence to date.

For European organizations, the upgraded RansomHouse ransomware poses a significant threat to virtualized infrastructure, especially VMware ESXi environments commonly used in enterprise data centers. Successful compromise can lead to widespread encryption of virtual machines and critical data, causing severe operational disruption and potential data loss. The two-stage encryption and improved memory management increase the difficulty of detection and remediation, potentially prolonging downtime and increasing ransom payment likelihood. Sectors reliant on virtualization for critical services—such as finance, healthcare, manufacturing, and government—face elevated risks. The ransomware's resilience to analysis may delay incident response and forensic investigations, complicating recovery efforts. Additionally, the ransomware-as-a-service model lowers the barrier for attackers, potentially increasing attack volume and targeting diversity across Europe. The medium severity rating reflects a balance between the threat's sophistication and the current absence of active widespread exploitation, but the potential impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability remains substantial.

1. Harden virtualization platforms by applying the latest security patches and updates to VMware ESXi and related management tools to reduce attack surface. 2. Implement strict access controls and multi-factor authentication for hypervisor management interfaces to prevent unauthorized deployments by MrAgent. 3. Monitor network traffic and system logs for indicators of compromise, including hashes associated with MrAgent and Mario components, and unusual activity consistent with lateral movement or file encryption. 4. Employ behavioral detection tools capable of identifying multi-stage encryption and memory manipulation techniques. 5. Maintain offline, immutable backups of virtual machines and critical data to enable rapid recovery without paying ransom. 6. Segment virtualized environments from general IT networks to limit ransomware propagation. 7. Conduct regular security awareness training focused on phishing and social engineering tactics that may be used to initiate ransomware deployment. 8. Develop and test incident response plans specifically addressing ransomware attacks on virtualized infrastructure. 9. Collaborate with threat intelligence providers to stay updated on emerging RansomHouse variants and tactics. 10. Restrict use of legacy protocols and services that could be exploited for initial access or lateral movement.