Hunting Laundry Bear: Infrastructure Analysis Guide and Findings
This analysis explores the infrastructure of Laundry Bear, a Russian state-sponsored APT group active since April 2024, targeting NATO countries and Ukraine. The investigation expands on initial indicators, using advanced pivoting techniques to uncover additional domains and infrastructure. Key findings include the discovery of multiple lookalike domains, similar registration patterns, and shared hosting infrastructure. The analysis reveals a network of domains with login and account management themes, redirecting to legitimate Microsoft services. The investigation also uncovers connections to other potential malicious activities, including spear-phishing attempts and the use of PDF files for possible malware delivery. The findings demonstrate the extensive infrastructure used by the threat actor and highlight the importance of advanced threat hunting techniques in uncovering related malicious activities.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
Laundry Bear is a Russian state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group that has been active since April 2024. This threat actor primarily targets NATO countries and Ukraine, focusing on espionage and disruption aligned with geopolitical interests. The recent infrastructure analysis reveals a sophisticated and extensive network of malicious domains and hosting infrastructure. These domains employ lookalike or typosquatting techniques, mimicking legitimate login and account management portals, often redirecting victims to authentic Microsoft services to evade detection and increase credibility. The infrastructure supports spear-phishing campaigns, utilizing weaponized PDF files as malware delivery vectors. The group’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) include domain typosquatting (T1583.001), spear-phishing (T1566), use of legitimate services for command and control (T1071.001), and exploitation of user interaction (T1204.001). The analysis highlights the use of advanced pivoting methods to uncover additional domains and infrastructure, indicating a well-resourced and persistent adversary. The campaign’s medium severity rating reflects the moderate but significant risk posed by these activities, particularly given the targeting of high-value geopolitical entities and the use of social engineering to gain initial access.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, especially those affiliated with NATO or involved in Ukraine-related activities, the Laundry Bear campaign poses a substantial espionage and operational risk. Successful spear-phishing attacks could lead to credential theft, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and potential lateral movement within networks. The use of lookalike domains increases the likelihood of user deception, potentially compromising email systems, internal communications, and critical infrastructure. The threat actor’s ability to blend malicious infrastructure with legitimate services complicates detection and response efforts. This could result in data breaches, disruption of operations, and erosion of trust in digital communications. Additionally, the geopolitical context heightens the risk of targeted attacks against governmental, defense, and critical infrastructure sectors in Europe, potentially impacting national security and international cooperation frameworks.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement targeted defenses against Laundry Bear’s tactics. This includes deploying advanced domain monitoring solutions to detect and block lookalike and typosquatting domains, especially those mimicking Microsoft or other trusted services. Email security should be enhanced with robust anti-phishing technologies, including sandboxing of attachments (notably PDFs), URL rewriting, and user behavior analytics to identify anomalous access patterns. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) must be enforced across all critical systems to mitigate credential theft risks. Security awareness training should focus on recognizing spear-phishing attempts and verifying domain authenticity. Network segmentation and strict egress filtering can limit lateral movement and command-and-control communications. Incident response teams should incorporate threat intelligence feeds related to Laundry Bear’s infrastructure and TTPs to enable proactive hunting and rapid containment. Finally, collaboration with national cybersecurity centers and NATO cyber defense initiatives will improve information sharing and coordinated defense efforts.
Affected Countries
Ukraine, Poland, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia
Indicators of Compromise
- ip: 154.216.18.83
- hash: 2c0fa608bd243fce6f69ece34addf32571e8368f
- hash: 38c47d338a9c5ab7ccef7413edb7b2112bdfc56f
- hash: ade08cd340765e68f65174820b46c0e3d9b52ab4
- hash: f0f3db24af0132755c8a0068dde433f857d8639020deb2817d52d3a1d5d99f35
- ip: 104.36.83.170
- domain: aficors.com
- domain: aoc-gov.us
- domain: app-v4-mybos.com
- domain: avsgroup.au
- domain: bidscale.net
- domain: defraudatubanco.com
- domain: deloittesharepoint.com
- domain: ebsum.eu
- domain: ebsumlts.eu
- domain: ebsummit.eu
- domain: ebsummits.eu
- domain: ebsummlt.eu
- domain: ebsummt.eu
- domain: ebsumrnit.eu
- domain: ebsurnmit.eu
- domain: enticator-secure.com
- domain: it-sharepoint.com
- domain: m-365-app.com
- domain: maidservant.shop
- domain: mail-forgot.com
- domain: max-linear.com
- domain: microffice.org
- domain: micsrosoftonline.com
- domain: miscrsosoft.com
- domain: myspringbank.com
- domain: nticator.com
- domain: onionmail.com
- domain: ourbelovedsainscore.space
- domain: portal-microsoftonline.com
- domain: propescom.com
- domain: redronesolutions.cloud
- domain: refundes.net
- domain: remerelli.com
- domain: spidergov.org
- domain: teamsupportonline.top
- domain: ups-mail.delivery
- domain: usembassyservice.com
- domain: walshhgroup.com
- domain: weblogmail.live
- domain: x9a7lm02kqaccountprotectionaccountsecuritynoreply.com
- domain: ads.it-sharepoint.com
- domain: auth.enticator-secure.com
- domain: css.mpgc10.com
- domain: email.ebsumrnit.eu
- domain: link.walshhgroup.com
- domain: login.maidservant.shop
- domain: login.walshhgroup.com
- domain: ns1.it-sharepoint.com
- domain: outlook-office.micsrosoftonline.com
- domain: static.it-sharepoint.com
Hunting Laundry Bear: Infrastructure Analysis Guide and Findings
Description
This analysis explores the infrastructure of Laundry Bear, a Russian state-sponsored APT group active since April 2024, targeting NATO countries and Ukraine. The investigation expands on initial indicators, using advanced pivoting techniques to uncover additional domains and infrastructure. Key findings include the discovery of multiple lookalike domains, similar registration patterns, and shared hosting infrastructure. The analysis reveals a network of domains with login and account management themes, redirecting to legitimate Microsoft services. The investigation also uncovers connections to other potential malicious activities, including spear-phishing attempts and the use of PDF files for possible malware delivery. The findings demonstrate the extensive infrastructure used by the threat actor and highlight the importance of advanced threat hunting techniques in uncovering related malicious activities.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
Laundry Bear is a Russian state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group that has been active since April 2024. This threat actor primarily targets NATO countries and Ukraine, focusing on espionage and disruption aligned with geopolitical interests. The recent infrastructure analysis reveals a sophisticated and extensive network of malicious domains and hosting infrastructure. These domains employ lookalike or typosquatting techniques, mimicking legitimate login and account management portals, often redirecting victims to authentic Microsoft services to evade detection and increase credibility. The infrastructure supports spear-phishing campaigns, utilizing weaponized PDF files as malware delivery vectors. The group’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) include domain typosquatting (T1583.001), spear-phishing (T1566), use of legitimate services for command and control (T1071.001), and exploitation of user interaction (T1204.001). The analysis highlights the use of advanced pivoting methods to uncover additional domains and infrastructure, indicating a well-resourced and persistent adversary. The campaign’s medium severity rating reflects the moderate but significant risk posed by these activities, particularly given the targeting of high-value geopolitical entities and the use of social engineering to gain initial access.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, especially those affiliated with NATO or involved in Ukraine-related activities, the Laundry Bear campaign poses a substantial espionage and operational risk. Successful spear-phishing attacks could lead to credential theft, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and potential lateral movement within networks. The use of lookalike domains increases the likelihood of user deception, potentially compromising email systems, internal communications, and critical infrastructure. The threat actor’s ability to blend malicious infrastructure with legitimate services complicates detection and response efforts. This could result in data breaches, disruption of operations, and erosion of trust in digital communications. Additionally, the geopolitical context heightens the risk of targeted attacks against governmental, defense, and critical infrastructure sectors in Europe, potentially impacting national security and international cooperation frameworks.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement targeted defenses against Laundry Bear’s tactics. This includes deploying advanced domain monitoring solutions to detect and block lookalike and typosquatting domains, especially those mimicking Microsoft or other trusted services. Email security should be enhanced with robust anti-phishing technologies, including sandboxing of attachments (notably PDFs), URL rewriting, and user behavior analytics to identify anomalous access patterns. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) must be enforced across all critical systems to mitigate credential theft risks. Security awareness training should focus on recognizing spear-phishing attempts and verifying domain authenticity. Network segmentation and strict egress filtering can limit lateral movement and command-and-control communications. Incident response teams should incorporate threat intelligence feeds related to Laundry Bear’s infrastructure and TTPs to enable proactive hunting and rapid containment. Finally, collaboration with national cybersecurity centers and NATO cyber defense initiatives will improve information sharing and coordinated defense efforts.
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://www.validin.com/blog/laundry_bear_infrastructure_analysis"]
- Adversary
- Laundry Bear
- Pulse Id
- 68b19acb28e88648ad2c0ff1
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Ip
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
ip154.216.18.83 | — | |
ip104.36.83.170 | — |
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash2c0fa608bd243fce6f69ece34addf32571e8368f | — | |
hash38c47d338a9c5ab7ccef7413edb7b2112bdfc56f | — | |
hashade08cd340765e68f65174820b46c0e3d9b52ab4 | — | |
hashf0f3db24af0132755c8a0068dde433f857d8639020deb2817d52d3a1d5d99f35 | — |
Domain
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
domainaficors.com | — | |
domainaoc-gov.us | — | |
domainapp-v4-mybos.com | — | |
domainavsgroup.au | — | |
domainbidscale.net | — | |
domaindefraudatubanco.com | — | |
domaindeloittesharepoint.com | — | |
domainebsum.eu | — | |
domainebsumlts.eu | — | |
domainebsummit.eu | — | |
domainebsummits.eu | — | |
domainebsummlt.eu | — | |
domainebsummt.eu | — | |
domainebsumrnit.eu | — | |
domainebsurnmit.eu | — | |
domainenticator-secure.com | — | |
domainit-sharepoint.com | — | |
domainm-365-app.com | — | |
domainmaidservant.shop | — | |
domainmail-forgot.com | — | |
domainmax-linear.com | — | |
domainmicroffice.org | — | |
domainmicsrosoftonline.com | — | |
domainmiscrsosoft.com | — | |
domainmyspringbank.com | — | |
domainnticator.com | — | |
domainonionmail.com | — | |
domainourbelovedsainscore.space | — | |
domainportal-microsoftonline.com | — | |
domainpropescom.com | — | |
domainredronesolutions.cloud | — | |
domainrefundes.net | — | |
domainremerelli.com | — | |
domainspidergov.org | — | |
domainteamsupportonline.top | — | |
domainups-mail.delivery | — | |
domainusembassyservice.com | — | |
domainwalshhgroup.com | — | |
domainweblogmail.live | — | |
domainx9a7lm02kqaccountprotectionaccountsecuritynoreply.com | — | |
domainads.it-sharepoint.com | — | |
domainauth.enticator-secure.com | — | |
domaincss.mpgc10.com | — | |
domainemail.ebsumrnit.eu | — | |
domainlink.walshhgroup.com | — | |
domainlogin.maidservant.shop | — | |
domainlogin.walshhgroup.com | — | |
domainns1.it-sharepoint.com | — | |
domainoutlook-office.micsrosoftonline.com | — | |
domainstatic.it-sharepoint.com | — |
Threat ID: 68b1c49cad5a09ad00790032
Added to database: 8/29/2025, 3:17:48 PM
Last enriched: 8/29/2025, 3:33:36 PM
Last updated: 9/1/2025, 10:32:18 AM
Views: 14
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