A coordinated cyber campaign beginning in October 2026 targeted commercial refrigeration systems across multiple European countries. Attackers exploited default configurations, weak passwords, and internet-exposed management interfaces to manipulate refrigeration settings, causing product spoilage and business disruptions. The campaign affected supermarkets, meat-processing facilities, and medical cold-storage systems. Attribution includes Iran's IRGC unit Shahid Kaveh for initial attacks in France and Russian-aligned groups NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest for the broader campaign. The attacks leveraged operational technology vulnerabilities rather than sophisticated malware.
Exposed Dixell/Copeland XWEB PRO refrigeration controllers with unpatched vulnerabilities, notably CVE-2026-25085, are being exploited as part of an SMTP botnet. These industrial control devices, commonly used in supermarkets and cold storage, are abused as tunnel gateways, residential proxy exits, and spam senders. Analysis shows coordinated outbound SMTP traffic targeting overlapping mail lists, indicating organized malicious use. The vulnerable devices lack security monitoring, enabling prolonged exploitation without detection.
Over 100 stores across multiple European countries experienced cyberattacks targeting internet-exposed refrigeration controllers, causing fridges and freezers to heat up and spoil food. The attacks affected stores in Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, and other countries, with some units set as high as 50°C. The incidents resemble a prior wave of attacks in France that disrupted around 700 supermarkets. The compromised devices include legacy Danfoss and Copeland refrigeration controllers, many of which have management interfaces exposed to the internet and lack available patches. The attackers exploited default credentials and internet exposure to force refrigeration units into defrost mode. Physical modifications alongside software updates are needed to fully mitigate the vulnerability. Investigations are ongoing, and no group has claimed responsibility.
Star Blizzard is a Russian espionage group linked to the Federal Security Service Centre 18, targeting government, defense, NGOs, and academia mainly in the UK, US, Ukraine, and NATO countries. The group uses spear-phishing, impersonation, and relationship building to steal credentials and conduct hack-and-leak operations. Since 2024, they have expanded to deploying endpoint malware including SPICA, YESROBOT, MAYBEROBOT, and CosmicPulse backdoors. Their tactics evolved from targeted to bulk phishing campaigns using fake CAPTCHA lures and exploiting iOS devices with the DarkSword exploit kit. They also use compromised WordPress sites for infrastructure and rapidly develop new malware variants after exposure. Recent campaigns have targeted over 100 organizations with the RedFlick delivery chain, showing increased scale and sophistication.
A suspected Chinese-speaking threat actor linked to Red Heron conducted extensive exploitation campaigns from May to September 2026. The attacker exploited multiple vulnerabilities in WordPress (CVE-2026-63030, CVE-2026-60137) to breach a western government organization, stealing over 18,000 sensitive records including credentials and personally identifiable information. Additionally, the actor exploited CVE-2026-7273 in ZyXEL GS1900 switches, compromising 996 devices across 48 countries and exfiltrating configurations and credentials. The adversary demonstrated sophisticated capabilities such as custom tool development possibly using large language models, privilege escalation, and systematic data exfiltration via PowerShell-based techniques.
Manic is a newly discovered Android malware family that steals banking credentials, intercepts sensitive data, and allows remote control of infected devices. It uniquely exfiltrates stolen data even without an internet connection by exploiting Android Accessibility services to capture keystrokes and replay them on targeted apps. The malware targets banking apps, government apps, crypto wallets, and two-factor authentication apps across multiple European countries. Infection vectors likely include unofficial app stores, malicious APKs, and phishing links, with no evidence of distribution via Google Play. Manic abuses Accessibility permissions to spy on users, grant itself additional permissions, and prevent removal. It overlays an invisible keyboard to capture passwords and sensitive input. The malware has been active since at least May 2026 and continues to evolve to evade detection.
A newly identified Android malware family named Manic combines banking malware and mobile spyware capabilities, targeting Ukrainian banks, government services, messaging applications, Russian and European financial institutions, and global fintech and cryptocurrency services. Active since February 2026, Manic enables extensive Device Takeover operations through sophisticated surveillance and remote-control features. It employs advanced PIN stealing techniques without requiring traditional overlay attacks, utilizing Accessibility services as a UI keylogger to capture lock-screen inputs, recovery phrases, and authentication codes. A distinctive feature is its Wi-Fi mesh egress technique, allowing compromised devices to relay stolen data through other infected phones via Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth, or BLE when direct C2 access is unavailable. The malware monitors 169 applications including banks, cryptocurrency wallets, government eID services, and military-focused messengers across multiple countries.
A coordinated smishing operation spanning 19 countries across Europe, the Americas, and the Caucasus has been exposed, originating from fraudulent SMS messages impersonating Romania's government payment portal Ghișeul.ro. Investigation revealed 1,628 malicious URLs linked by a single 128-character campaign identifier, targeting government portals, traffic police departments, postal services including DPD and SEUR, tax authorities, and telecommunications providers like T-Mobile and Vodafone. The infrastructure utilizes 32 backend IP addresses distributed across Tencent Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, Cloudflare CDN, and ALEXHOST Moldova. Threat actors employ two distinct phishing templates: a Vue.js single-page application and a Bootstrap-based clone, executing a four-stage credential harvesting process that collects complete payment card details through fabricated traffic fines, toll payments, and delivery notifications.
An exposed open directory revealed a comprehensive Roundcube exploitation toolkit used by APT28 to target Ukrainian government entities. The toolkit includes XSS payloads, a Flask-based C2 server, CSS injection tools, and a Go-based implant. It enables credential harvesting, persistent mail forwarding, bulk email exfiltration, address book theft, and 2FA secret extraction. The primary target was identified as mail.dmsu.gov.ua, Ukraine's State Migration Service. Technical analysis shows significant overlaps with previously documented APT28 operations, while introducing new capabilities such as CSS-based side-channel attacks and browser credential theft. The toolkit's modular approach and sophisticated evasion techniques demonstrate APT28's evolving tactics in compromising webmail platforms for long-term intelligence gathering.
A new campaign targeting Ukrainian entities has been identified, attributed to actors linked to Russia. The campaign uses judicial and charity-themed lures to deploy a JavaScript-based backdoor called DRILLAPP, which runs through the Edge browser. This backdoor enables various actions including file manipulation, microphone access, and webcam capture. Two variants of the campaign have been observed, with the second variant introducing additional capabilities. The attackers utilize the browser's capabilities to evade detection and gain access to sensitive resources. The campaign shares tactics with a previously reported Laundry Bear operation, leading to a low-confidence attribution to this group.
Google and iVerify analysis reveals a powerful exploit kit originally used by Russian state actors that is now appearing in broader criminal campaigns. The post Nation-State iOS Exploit Kit ‘Coruna’ Found Powering Global Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek .
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North Korean threat actor UNC1069 has evolved its tactics to target the cryptocurrency and decentralized finance sectors. In a recent intrusion, they deployed seven unique malware families, including new tools SILENCELIFT, DEEPBREATH, and CHROMEPUSH, designed to capture host and victim data. The attack utilized social engineering involving a compromised Telegram account, fake Zoom meeting, and reported AI-generated video. UNC1069 has shifted from spear-phishing to targeting Web3 industry entities like centralized exchanges, software developers, and venture capital firms. The intrusion demonstrated sophisticated techniques to bypass macOS security features and harvest credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency information. This marks a significant expansion in UNC1069's capabilities and highlights their focus on financial theft and fueling future social engineering campaigns.
A new hacking group called Punishing Owl has emerged, targeting Russian critical infrastructure. Their first attack on December 12, 2025, compromised a Russian state security agency, leaking internal documents. The group used DNS manipulation, created fake subdomains, and sent phishing emails to the victim's partners. They employed a PowerShell stealer called ZipWhisper to exfiltrate browser data. Punishing Owl's attacks are politically motivated and focus exclusively on Russian targets, including government agencies, scientific institutions, and IT organizations. The group has established a presence on cybercriminal forums and social media, likely operating from Kazakhstan. Experts predict this group will continue to be a persistent threat in the Russian cyberspace.
While both cyberwar and cyberwarfare will increase through 2026, cyberwarfare is likely to increase more dramatically. We hope it will never boil over – but we should be aware of the possibility and its consequences. The post Cyber Insights 2026: Cyberwar and Rising Nation State Threats appeared first on SecurityWeek .
The Contagious Interview campaign, attributed to North Korea, continues to target software developers through fake recruitment schemes. A new technique in their arsenal leverages Microsoft Visual Studio Code task files to execute malicious code when a project is opened. The report documents observations of this vector, presents GitHub-based discovery methods, highlights findings including a new malicious NPM package, and outlines detection opportunities. The campaign exploits VS Code's Task feature, using the runOptions property to automatically execute malicious shell commands when a workspace is opened. Various obfuscation techniques are employed, including hiding commands with whitespace and masquerading payloads as image or font files.
A North Korean malware was discovered in an Upwork cryptocurrency project, leading to a five-day investigation into active Lazarus Group infrastructure. The malware utilized three infection mechanisms: VSCode auto-execution, backend RCE via Function Constructor, and cookie payload delivery. The infrastructure included Vercel-hosted Stage 1 C2 servers and dedicated Stage 2 C2 servers. A timing oracle allowed for token enumeration, revealing three active campaigns. The payload chain consisted of various modules for data extraction, RAT functionality, and cryptocurrency mining. The investigation uncovered sophisticated persistence mechanisms, masquerading techniques, and a custom binary protocol. Real-time defensive responses from the operators were observed during reconnaissance. The infrastructure blended legitimate-looking development projects with malicious activities for cover.
Three malicious npm packages were discovered in November 2025, designed to deliver and install a new RAT malware family named NodeCordRAT. The packages, bitcoin-main-lib, bitcoin-lib-js, and bip40, mimicked legitimate Bitcoin-related libraries to deceive developers. NodeCordRAT uses Discord for command-and-control communication, targets Chrome credentials, sensitive secrets, and MetaMask data. It performs host fingerprinting, executes shell commands, captures screenshots, and exfiltrates data. The malware exploits software supply chain vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of vigilance in package management. Although removed from npm, the incident serves as a reminder of ongoing threats in the software development ecosystem.
Key takeaways Introduction GoBruteforcer is a botnet that turns compromised Linux servers into scanning and password brute-force nodes. It targets internet-exposed services such as phpMyAdmin web panels, MySQL and PostgreSQL databases, and FTP servers. Infected hosts are incorporated into the botnet and accept remote operator commands.  Newly discovered weak credentials are used to steal data, […] The post Inside GoBruteforcer: AI-Generated Server Defaults, Weak Passwords, and Crypto-Focused Campaigns appeared first on Check Point Research .