A large-scale watering hole campaign attributed with moderate-to-high confidence to APT29 targets mobile devices by compromising legitimate websites, impersonating high-profile domains, and supply-chain compromising a Ukrainian analytics service. The campaign uses injected JavaScript to profile devices and deliver platform-specific n-day exploits against iOS and Android. Exploited vulnerabilities include multiple CVEs from 2024 to 2026. The final payloads exfiltrate sensitive data such as browser cookies, Wi-Fi passwords, and device information without establishing persistence, consistent with intelligence-gathering objectives.
A suspected Chinese-speaking threat actor linked to Red Heron conducted extensive exploitation campaigns from May to September 2026. The attacker exploited multiple vulnerabilities in WordPress (CVE-2026-63030, CVE-2026-60137) to breach a western government organization, stealing over 18,000 sensitive records including credentials and personally identifiable information. Additionally, the actor exploited CVE-2026-7273 in ZyXEL GS1900 switches, compromising 996 devices across 48 countries and exfiltrating configurations and credentials. The adversary demonstrated sophisticated capabilities such as custom tool development possibly using large language models, privilege escalation, and systematic data exfiltration via PowerShell-based techniques.
VectraRAT is a previously undocumented Malware-as-a-Service platform active since August 2022. It consists of a Go-based control server (VectraHub) and a native C++ Windows implant. The malware offers capabilities including hidden desktop control, keylogging, clipboard hijacking with cryptocurrency address replacement, browser credential theft, and a UAC bypass that elevates privileges without user prompts. It is distributed via Amadey loader and ClickFix campaigns using tax-themed lures. Victims include corporate Windows users, including Windows Server 2025, across multiple countries such as the United States, Russia, and Germany. Infrastructure analysis revealed exposed operational panels and directories across various hosting providers.
Manic is a newly discovered Android malware family that steals banking credentials, intercepts sensitive data, and allows remote control of infected devices. It uniquely exfiltrates stolen data even without an internet connection by exploiting Android Accessibility services to capture keystrokes and replay them on targeted apps. The malware targets banking apps, government apps, crypto wallets, and two-factor authentication apps across multiple European countries. Infection vectors likely include unofficial app stores, malicious APKs, and phishing links, with no evidence of distribution via Google Play. Manic abuses Accessibility permissions to spy on users, grant itself additional permissions, and prevent removal. It overlays an invisible keyboard to capture passwords and sensitive input. The malware has been active since at least May 2026 and continues to evolve to evade detection.
This analysis examines infrastructure used by multiple Russian cyber espionage clusters targeting individuals in academia, think tanks, and organizations across Europe and the United States. The investigation expands on three threat clusters (UNC6293, UNC7005, and UNC5976) that employed OAuth phishing, Microsoft device code phishing, and WhatsApp targeting. UNC6293 utilized lure domains impersonating the Council on Foreign Relations and government portals, with possible Evilginx configurations. UNC7005 demonstrated lower sophistication with poor operational security, using domains like my-invite[.]org for phishing campaigns. UNC5976 employed Google Drive impersonation domains for OAuth phishing. The analysis leverages historical DNS data, CSS hash similarities, favicon analysis, registration patterns, and certificate information to identify additional infrastructure and tracking methods for discovering related malicious domains and IP addresses.
A newly identified Android malware family named Manic combines banking malware and mobile spyware capabilities, targeting Ukrainian banks, government services, messaging applications, Russian and European financial institutions, and global fintech and cryptocurrency services. Active since February 2026, Manic enables extensive Device Takeover operations through sophisticated surveillance and remote-control features. It employs advanced PIN stealing techniques without requiring traditional overlay attacks, utilizing Accessibility services as a UI keylogger to capture lock-screen inputs, recovery phrases, and authentication codes. A distinctive feature is its Wi-Fi mesh egress technique, allowing compromised devices to relay stolen data through other infected phones via Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth, or BLE when direct C2 access is unavailable. The malware monitors 169 applications including banks, cryptocurrency wallets, government eID services, and military-focused messengers across multiple countries.
WindRelay is an Android NFC relay malware used in combination with the SpyNote remote administration tool (RAT) to steal live payment card data and commit financial fraud. Attackers socially engineer victims to install SpyNote disguised as a legitimate app, granting remote access to their device. Subsequently, WindRelay is installed to relay NFC card data in real time, enabling attackers to perform fraudulent transactions including taking out loans and making purchases using the victim's card. The attack relies heavily on social engineering and occurs rapidly, often within minutes. Targeting appears focused on Czechia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Users are advised to avoid sideloading apps from untrusted sources and be cautious with apps requesting NFC or accessibility permissions.
A new NFC relay malware family called WindRelay has been discovered operating in combination with SpyNote RAT to enable sophisticated contactless payment fraud. The scheme uses live social engineering phone calls where fraudsters impersonate bank employees and guide victims to install personalized RAT malware labeled with the victim's own name. Once installed, the RAT enables silent deployment of WindRelay, which captures contactless payment card data via NFC when victims tap their cards to their phones. The captured data is relayed in real-time to fraudster-controlled terminals for immediate cash-out through physical purchases or ATM withdrawals. The operation employs dual monetization, combining RAT-driven digital loan fraud with NFC-based card-present transactions. Group-IB identified 23 WindRelay samples targeting victims in Czechia, Slovakia, and Slovenia between November 2025 and July 2026.
Tomorrowland Belgium 2026, spanning two weekends in July at De Schorre in Boom, sold out rapidly, creating opportunities for cybercriminals. Investigation uncovered approximately a dozen fraudulent websites impersonating the festival brand to target ticket seekers and travellers. These scams include fake ticket shops mimicking official sales with countdown timers and fraudulent biometric checks, travel sites offering bogus accommodation and transport packages, and affiliate schemes. The operations harvest complete identity data, payment credentials, and personal information through sophisticated social engineering. Victims lose money with no recourse, face identity theft risks, and ultimately receive invalid or non-existent tickets. The scammers exploit high demand, tight supply, and rushed purchasing decisions, with sites registered weeks in advance and pushed hardest when official tickets are sold out.
A sophisticated cyber-espionage campaign attributed to China-linked actors targets officials and citizens in Czech Republic and Taiwan through spearphishing attacks. The operation deploys malicious ZIP archives containing dual infection paths that ultimately deliver AZUREVEIL, an Adaptix C2 agent. The campaign uniquely leverages Microsoft Azure Blob Storage as a dead-drop command-and-control channel, bypassing traditional C2 infrastructure. A multi-stage infection chain employs RUSTCLOAK, a Rust-based loader implementing triple-layer encryption using modified RC4, Base64, and SM4-CBC algorithms. The final payload supports 36 post-exploitation commands including Beacon Object File execution in memory, file system manipulation, process control, network pivoting, and data exfiltration. Lure documents impersonate official communications from Taiwanese research institutions and Czech Social Security Administration, demonstrating targeted social engineering tailored to each region.
The ShinyHunters hacker group claimed to have stolen over 350GB of information from European Commission cloud systems. The post European Commission Reports Cyber Intrusion and Data Theft appeared first on SecurityWeek .
The attacks included a destructive infiltration of Poland's energy system in December and was suspected of originating in Russia. The post Poland Faced a Surge in Cyberattacks in 2025, Including a Major Assault on the Energy Sector appeared first on SecurityWeek .
In his last two diaries, Xavier discussed recent malware campaigns that download JPEG files with embedded malicious payload[1,2]. At that point in time, I've not come across the malicious “MSI image” myself, but while I was going over malware samples that were caught by one of my customer's e-mail proxies during last week, I found another campaign in which the same technique was used.
The report details a malware attack on a large Polish organization involving fake CAPTCHA techniques. It describes the initial infection vector, where users were tricked into running malicious code through a Windows+R shortcut. The analysis covers two main malware families: Latrodectus (version 2.3) and Supper. The report provides technical details on the malware's functionality, communication protocols, and persistence mechanisms. It also includes indicators of compromise, such as C2 server IP addresses and file hashes. The authors emphasize the importance of employee education and monitoring for unusual events to mitigate such threats.
As nation-state actors, ransomware groups, and aging infrastructure collide, organizations must rethink how they defend critical operations through resilience, visibility, and modern security strategies. The post Cyber Insights 2026: The Ongoing Fight to Secure Industrial Control Systems appeared first on SecurityWeek .
Poland’s CERT has published a report on the recent attack, providing new details on targeted ICS and attribution. The post Default ICS Credentials Exploited in Destructive Attack on Polish Energy Facilities appeared first on SecurityWeek .
ESET researchers provide technical details on a recent data destruction incident affecting a Polish energy company. They identified new data-wiping malware named DynoWiper, attributed to the Russia-aligned threat group Sandworm with medium confidence. The tactics, techniques, and procedures observed during the DynoWiper incident resemble those seen earlier in an incident involving the ZOV wiper in Ukraine. Sandworm has a history of destructive cyberattacks, targeting various entities including energy providers. The DynoWiper samples focus on the IT environment, with no observed functionality targeting OT industrial components. The attackers deployed additional tools and attempted to use a SOCKS5 proxy. The incident represents a rare case of a Russia-aligned threat actor deploying destructive malware against an energy company in Poland.
Sandworm/Electrum hackers targeted communication and control systems at 30 sites. The post ICS Devices Bricked Following Russia-Linked Intrusion Into Polish Power Grid appeared first on SecurityWeek .
10 years after disrupting the Ukrainian power grid, the APT targeted Poland with data-wiping malware. The post Russian Sandworm Hackers Blamed for Cyberattack on Polish Power Grid appeared first on SecurityWeek .
In late 2025, Poland's energy system was targeted by a major cyberattack, now attributed to the Russia-aligned APT group Sandworm by ESET Research. The attack involved data-wiping malware named DynoWiper, detected as Win32/KillFiles.NMO. While the full impact is still under investigation, researchers noted the attack's timing coincided with the 10th anniversary of Sandworm's 2015 attack on Ukraine's power grid. Sandworm continues to target critical infrastructure, particularly in Ukraine, with regular wiper attacks. The group's history of disruptive cyberattacks and the similarities in tactics, techniques, and procedures led to a medium-confidence attribution of this latest incident to Sandworm.
