Skip to main content
VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-106114: ImageSharp · ICC CLUT parsing allocates from unvalidated channel and grid dimensions

Affects SixLabors.ImageSharpSource GCVE Database

0
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-106114· Medium 5.3

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 4.1.2 when convenient.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 25% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.1.2, 3.2.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 6 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade SixLabors.ImageSharp to 4.1.2; SixLabors.ImageSharp to 3.2.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
NuGetSixLabors.ImageSharpAffected
  • >=4.0.0 <4.1.2
Fixed in
  • 4.1.2
NuGetSixLabors.ImageSharpAffected
  • >=1.0.0-beta0001 <3.2.0
Fixed in
  • 3.2.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary A malformed embedded ICC profile can make ImageSharp allocate memory from attacker-controlled CLUT channel and grid dimensions before verifying that the declared CLUT values are present. In published v1 through v3 packages, the public lazy ICC parser allocates approximately 115 MB from the 200-byte test profile before rejecting the truncated tag. In published v4 packages, decoding with ICC conversion enabled requests an 860,934,420-byte managed float array from the same profile. ### Affected package and versions - Package: `SixLabors.ImageSharp` (NuGet) - Affected range: `>= 1.0.0-beta0001, <= 4.1.1` - Commit `0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f` corresponds to release **v4.1.1**. The parser defect is present from the first published NuGet prerelease, `1.0.0-beta0001`, through the latest published release, 4.1.1. The automatic `Image.Load` conversion path used by the main PoC exists in `>= 4.0.0, <= 4.1.1`; earlier versions expose the same parser defect through the public `IccProfile.Entries` accessor. ### Details The reproduced profile has an `A2B0` multi-process-elements (`mpet`) tag with a `clut` element declaring 15 input channels, 15 output channels, and three grid points per input channel. [`ReadClutF32`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/Metadata/Profiles/ICC/DataReader/IccDataReader.Lut.cs#L139-L162) computes `3^15 * 15` and allocates that many floats before reading any CLUT values or verifying that the tag has enough remaining data. The supplied 200-byte profile ends immediately after the CLUT grid descriptor. In v4, the path is reached when an application decodes an embedded ICC profile using `DecoderOptions.ColorProfileHandling = ColorProfileHandling.Convert`. The default setting, `Preserve`, does not parse the profile for conversion. In v1 through v3, `ReadClutF32` uses a jagged representation. Loading an ICC-bearing JPEG and then accessing `decoded.Metadata.IccProfile.Entries` reaches the public lazy parser. The malformed profile allocates the `3^15`-entry outer array before the missing CLUT values are detected. ### Reproduction environment and result The supplied automatic-conversion exploit and control were run against the published NuGet 4.1.1 `net8.0` DLL in Docker on Debian 12 / Linux arm64 with .NET SDK 8.0.424 and .NET runtime 8.0.30. The same conversion fixture was run against published 4.0.0 and 4.1.0 with the same result. Published 1.0.0, 2.0.0, 2.1.13, 3.0.0, and 3.1.12 were tested through public JPEG decode followed by `IccProfile.Entries`; each allocated approximately 114.9 MB, skipped the malformed tag, and exited normally. The published `1.0.0-beta0001` public `IccProfile(bytes).Entries` path allocated 114,813,528 bytes before a catchable managed bounds exception. One exploit decode increased `GC.GetTotalAllocatedBytes(true)` by approximately 861.5 million bytes, then returned `InvalidIccProfileException: Invalid conversion method`. The reader catches the truncated-tag error and drops that tag. The identical input with `ColorProfileHandling.Preserve` completed successfully with roughly 0.5 million allocated bytes in the harness. One complete exploit run produced: ```text mode=exploit profile_bytes=200 requested_float_array=215233605 requested_bytes=860934420 imagesharp_assembly=/work/bin/Release/net8.0/SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll imagesharp_version=4.1.1+0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f observed_exception=SixLabors.ImageSharp.Metadata.Profiles.Icc.InvalidIccProfileException: Invalid conversion method. managed_bytes_allocated=861476416 Docker exit status: 0 ``` The control from the same image produced: ```text mode=control profile_bytes=200 requested_float_array=215233605 requested_bytes=860934420 imagesharp_assembly=/work/bin/Release/net8.0/SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll imagesharp_version=4.1.1+0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f decoded=1x1 icc_present=True managed_bytes_allocated=511888 Docker exit status: 0 ``` The exact allocation counter includes runtime allocations and varies slightly between processes; the requested CLUT array itself is 860,934,420 bytes. No active exploitation is known. ### Impact This report demonstrates a large attacker-controlled transient allocation in the ICC conversion path. It does not demonstrate unhandled process termination: allocation failure is caught while parsing the malformed tag, so the impact should be limited to memory pressure / input-validation failure unless a reproduction demonstrates a stronger result. ### Complete PoC files Program.cs: ```csharp using System; using System.Buffers.Binary; using System.IO; using System.Reflection; using SixLabors.ImageSharp; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Formats; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Formats.Png; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Metadata.Profiles.Icc; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.PixelFormats; static class Program { private const int RequestedFloats = 215233605; // 3^15 * 15 private co

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…