CVE-2026-106118VulnerabilityPublished 7 Oct 2026Updated 26 Oct 2026

SixLabors.ImageSharp · ImageSharp: Tiled fax TIFF: tile buffer sized by TileWidth but fax decompressor writes scanlines of ImageWidth — heap

Affects SixLabors.ImageSharpSource GCVE Database

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-106118· High 7.5

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 4.1.1 soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

7.5High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 48% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 4.1.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: None
Integrity: None
Availability: High

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: High: There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 6 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade ImageSharp and SixLabors.ImageSharp to 4.1.1.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
NuGetImageSharp	Affected >=4.0.0 <4.1.1	Fixed in 4.1.1
NuGetSixLabors.ImageSharp	Affected >=4.0.0 <4.1.1	Fixed in 4.1.1

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary When decoding a tiled TIFF with fax compression (T4/T6/MH), `DecodeTilesChunky` allocates each tile buffer from **TileWidth** (`ceil(TileWidth*bpp/8)*TileLength` bytes) but constructs the fax decompressor with **frame.Width**: `TiffDecompressorsFactory` ignores the `isTiled/tileWidth/tileHeight` parameters entirely. The T4/T6/MH decompressors treat the full image width as the scanline length and advance (and really write, via read-modify-write bit ops) `frame.Width` bits per row, with no bounds check against the tile buffer. The very first tile therefore writes linearly out of bounds — about `ImageWidth/8` bytes per row × TileLength rows into a `TileWidth`-sized buffer. With ImageWidth=4,000,000, TileWidth=16, TileLength=16 this writes ~2 MB past a 32-byte buffer and kills the process deterministically; a T6 all-white variant advances the bit offset by >512 MB silently, showing an alarm-free heap-corruption window for the same defect. A crafted file fully controls the OOB length per tile and works with perfectly legal per-row run codes (no overlong runs needed). Verified at commit `5cd4d0d26a82a9549f297a237aea9cf665bddff8` (main; latest release v4.1.0, the supported major). ## Details Root cause: a size mismatch between tile buffer allocation and decompressor width, because the factory drops the tile parameters. - Allocation: [TiffDecoderCore.cs#L792-L794](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/5cd4d0d26a82a9549f297a237aea9cf665bddff8/src/ImageSharp/Formats/Tiff/TiffDecoderCore.cs#L792-L794) — `bytesPerTileRow = RoundUpToMultipleOfEight(tileWidth*bitsPerPixel)`; tile buffer = `bytesPerTileRow*tileLength` bytes (32 bytes in the PoC) - Mismatch: [TiffDecoderCore.cs#L797](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/5cd4d0d26a82a9549f297a237aea9cf665bddff8/src/ImageSharp/Formats/Tiff/TiffDecoderCore.cs#L797) — `CreateDecompressor<TPixel>(frame.Width, ..., isTiled: true, tileWidth, tileLength)` passes the full frame width - Factory drops tile params: [TiffDecompressorsFactory.cs#L56-L64](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/5cd4d0d26a82a9549f297a237aea9cf665bddff8/src/ImageSharp/Formats/Tiff/Compression/TiffDecompressorsFactory.cs#L56-L64) — T4/T6/MH decompressors receive only `width` (= frame.Width); `isTiled/tileWidth/tileHeight` ignored - OOB write sink: [T4TiffCompression.cs#L69-L119](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/5cd4d0d26a82a9549f297a237aea9cf665bddff8/src/ImageSharp/Formats/Tiff/Compression/Decompressors/T4TiffCompression.cs#L69-L119), `T6TiffCompression.cs#L76-L108` — per-row advance of `this.width` bits via `BitWriterUtils.WriteBits` with no buffer-length check ([BitWriterUtils.cs#L51](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/5cd4d0d26a82a9549f297a237aea9cf665bddff8/src/ImageSharp/Formats/Tiff/Compression/BitWriterUtils.cs#L51)); note `TiffDecoderCore.cs:829-831` later reads the buffer in `bytesPerTileRow` strides, confirming the protocol expects tile-width rows Attack surface: `Image.Load(stream)` on an attacker-supplied tiled TIFF (`TiffDecoderCore.DecodeImageWithTiles` → `DecodeTilesChunky`). Default configuration; only requirement is a standard tiled TIFF header (TileWidth=16, TileLength=16) + Compression=3 (T4; T6 also constructible). **Suggested remediation:** 1. Short-term: when `isTiled`, construct the T4/T6/MH decompressor with `tileWidth` (not frame width), or clip row writes to the caller-provided buffer length. 2. Root fix: bound the write side of `BitWriterUtils` (pass remaining bits), and validate every fax row advance against buffer capacity on both tiled and strip paths. 3. Regression tests: Compression=2/3/4 × tiled with TileWidth < ImageWidth, including a T6 black-pixel row (forces real `WriteBit`). ## PoC Full PoC posted as the first comment below: `Program.cs` (driver), `poc-tiled-t4.tif` (crafted file, ~9.8 KB, base64 inline), README. 1. Build a small console project referencing `src/ImageSharp/ImageSharp.csproj` and run it against the crafted file (or call `Image.Load` on it from any host). 2. Observed with ImageWidth=4,000,000, TileWidth=16, TileLength=16, T4 with 400 makeup codes + EOL per row: ``` tile payload 9642 bytes; rows write ~2,048,000 bytes into a 32-byte buffer Fatal error. System.AccessViolationException: Attempted to read or write protected memory. at SixLabors.ImageSharp.Formats.Tiff.Compression.BitWriterUtils.WriteBits(Span`1<Byte>, IntPtr, IntPtr, Byte) at ...T4TiffCompression.WritePixelRun(...) at ...T4TiffCompression.Decompress(...) Aborted (core dumped); exit=134 ``` 3. Controls: the same file with Compression=None decodes normally (container is fine); a T6 all-white-rows variant advances >512 MB of bit offset without a real write (silent corruption window) before tripping on a directory-level TileOffsets count check. ## Impact - **What it is:** out-of-bounds write (CWE-787). For any service decoding untrusted tiled TIFFs: remote, default-configuration, deterministic pro

CWE-787Out-of-bounds Write (opens in a new tab)
Base weaknessLikelihood of exploit: HighCWE Top 25 (2025): #5
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
Requirements · Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Architecture and Design · Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Operation · Build and Compilation · Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index…
OWASP Cheat Sheets
XML Security (opens in a new tab)
Mass Assignment (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V13.3.1 (opens in a new tab)
V5.1.4 (opens in a new tab)
V5.1.3 (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).

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Exploitation evidence

What to do

Affected software

Description

WeaknessesCWE-787

Technical details

References

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