CVE-2026-28499: Leaf kit · LeafKit's HTML escaping may be skipped for Collection values, enabling XSS
Affects github.com/vapor/leaf-kitSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 1.14.2 when convenient.
Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.14.2
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 18 Mar 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade github.com/vapor/leaf-kit to 1.14.2.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| SwiftURLgithub.com/vapor/leaf-kit | Affected
| Fixed in
|
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Description
### Summary LeafKit HTML-escaping is not working correctly when a template prints a collection (Array / Dictionary) via `#(value)`. This can result in XSS, allowing potentially untrusted input to be rendered unescaped. ### Details LeafKit attempts to escape expressions during serialization, but due to [`LeafData.htmlEscaped()`](https://github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/blob/8ff06839d8b3ddf74032d2ade01e3453eb556d30/Sources/LeafKit/LeafData/LeafData.swift#L322)'s implementation, when the escaped type's conversion to `String` is marked as `.ambiguous` (as it is the case for Arrays and Dictionaries), an unescaped `self` is returned. > **Note: I recommend first looking at the POC, before taking a look at the details below, as it is simple.** In the detailed, verbose analysis below, I explored the functions involved in more detail, in hopes that it will help you understand and locate this issue. #### The issue's detailed analysis: 1. Leaf expression serialization eventually reaches `LeafSerializer`'s `serialize` private function below. This is where the `leafData` is `.htmlEscaped()`, and then serialized. https://github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/blob/8ff06839d8b3ddf74032d2ade01e3453eb556d30/Sources/LeafKit/LeafSerialize/LeafSerializer.swift#L60-L66 2. The `LeafData.htmlEscaped()` method uses the `LeafData.string` computed property to convert itself to a string. Then, it calls the `htmlEscaped()` method on it. However, if the string conversion fails, notice that an unescaped, unsafe `self` is returned (line 324 below): https://github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/blob/8ff06839d8b3ddf74032d2ade01e3453eb556d30/Sources/LeafKit/LeafData/LeafData.swift#L321-L328 3. Regarding why `.string` may return nil, if the escaped value is not a string already, a convesion is attempted, which may fail. https://github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/blob/8ff06839d8b3ddf74032d2ade01e3453eb556d30/Sources/LeafKit/LeafData/LeafData.swift#L211-L216 In this specific case, the conversion fails at line 303 below, when `conversion.is >= level` is checked. The check fails because [`.array` and `.dictionary` conversions to `.string` are deemed `.ambiguous`](https://github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/blob/8ff06839d8b3ddf74032d2ade01e3453eb556d30/Sources/LeafKit/LeafData/LeafData.swift#L525-L535). If we forcefully allow ambiguous conversions, the vulnerability disappears, as the conversion is successful. https://github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/blob/8ff06839d8b3ddf74032d2ade01e3453eb556d30/Sources/LeafKit/LeafData/LeafData.swift#L295-L319 5. Coming back to `LeafSerializer`'s `serialize` private method, we are now interested in finding out what happens after `LeafData.htmlEscaped()` returns self. Recall from `1.` that the output was then `.serialized()`. Thus, the unescaped `LeafData` follows the normal serialization path, as if it were HTML-escaped. More specifically, serialization is done [here](https://github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/blob/8ff06839d8b3ddf74032d2ade01e3453eb556d30/Sources/LeafKit/LeafData/LeafDataStorage.swift#L52-L63), where `.map` / `.mapValues` is called, unsafely serializing each element of the dictionary. ### PoC <!-- _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ --> In a new Vapor project created with `vapor new poc -n --leaf`, use a simple leaf template like the following: ```html <!doctype html> <html> <body> <h1>#(username)</h1> <h2>someDict:</h2> <p>#(someDict)</p> </body> </html> ``` And the following `routes.swift`: ```swift import Vapor struct User: Encodable { var username: String var someDict: [String: String] } func routes(_ app: Application) throws { app.get { req async throws in try await req.view.render("index", User( username: "Escaped XSS - <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>", someDict: ["<img src=x onerror=alert(1337)>":"<img src=x onerror=alert(31337)>"] )) } } ``` By running and accessing the server in a browser, XSS should be triggered twice (with `alert(1337)` and `alert(31337)`). `var someDict: [String: String]` could also be replaced with an array / dictionary of a different type, such as another `Encodable` stuct. Also note that, in a real concerning scenario, the array / dictionary would contain (i.e. reflect) data inputted by the user. ### Impact This is a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in rendered Leaf templates. Vapor/Leaf applications that render user-controlled data inside arrays or dictionaries using `#(value)` may be impacted.
References
- github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/security/advisories/GHSA-6jj5-j4j8-8473 (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28499 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/commit/6044b844caa858a0c5f2505ac166f5a057c990dc (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/vapor/leaf-kit (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/vapor/leaf-kit/releases/tag/1.14.2 (opens in a new tab)