cardsmobile-collection (npm) · Malicious Code
Affects cardsmobile-collectionSource GCVE Database
Malicious package : remove cardsmobile-collection and rotate any secrets on hosts that installed it.
Data as of 6 Aug 2026, 18:24 UTC
Malicious package
Published to npm · OSV MAL-2026-12346
What to do
Remove cardsmobile-collection from every project, lockfile and image that pulls it in. Treat any host that installed it as compromised: rotate the credentials, tokens and keys it could read, from a clean machine.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| npmcardsmobile-collection | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (103c6f5e66de4d466d79c8a4247f46670fad0de2601a93f37fa6280c5491cc41) On require() of the package,./_runtime.js runs a top-level setup() that downloads a platform-specific binary from string-concatenated hostnames (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback that reconstructs the payload from base64 TXT records served by tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, and win.dl.well1.site. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via child_process (spawn('/bin/sh',...) / spawn('cmd',...)). Destination hosts and the child_process module name are assembled at runtime via array-join concatenation (['tin.dl.well','1.site'].join(''); require('child_'+'process')) to evade static analysis, and the code frames itself as 'analytics' with DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK cover-story env-var checks. A sibling module lib/telemetry.js ships the same fetch-write-chmod-spawn primitives as a dormant duplicate. The dropped binary is opaque and unrelated to the package's stated 'native bridge' purpose; the fetched hostnames are not the package's publisher infrastructure. ## Source: ghsa-malware (15aeb34fd00956a381cfd277903462f169170709acd01bb64b68896b4303e81b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.