Operation BarrelFire: Targeting Kazakhstan Oil & Gas
A threat group dubbed NoisyBear has been targeting Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector since April 2025. The campaign focuses on KazMunaiGas employees, using spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments. The infection chain involves a ZIP file containing a malicious LNK file and decoy document, which downloads a batch script, leading to PowerShell loaders (DOWNSHELL) and ultimately a malicious DLL implant. The threat actor uses various techniques including AMSI bypass, process injection, and reflective DLL loading. Infrastructure analysis reveals the use of sanctioned hosting providers and open-source post-exploitation tools. The group is believed to be of Russian origin based on language artifacts and targeting patterns.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
Operation BarrelFire is a targeted cyber espionage and intrusion campaign attributed to the threat group NoisyBear, believed to be of Russian origin. The campaign has been active since April 2025 and specifically targets Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector, with a focus on employees of KazMunaiGas, the national oil and gas company. The attack vector primarily involves spear-phishing emails containing malicious ZIP attachments. These ZIP files include a malicious LNK (Windows shortcut) file alongside a decoy document to lure victims into executing the payload. Once the LNK file is executed, it triggers a batch script download, which subsequently loads PowerShell-based loaders known as DOWNSHELL. This loader then deploys a malicious DLL implant using advanced techniques such as AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass, process injection, and reflective DLL loading to evade detection and maintain persistence. The threat actor employs a sophisticated infection chain leveraging native Windows tools and scripting (T1218.011 - signed binary proxy execution, T1059.001 and T1059.003 - PowerShell and command-line interface, T1562 - defense evasion, T1055.003 - process injection, T1589.002 - spear-phishing with malicious attachments, T1105 - remote file copy). The use of AMSI bypass and reflective DLL loading indicates a high level of technical capability aimed at evading endpoint security solutions. Infrastructure analysis shows the use of sanctioned hosting providers and open-source post-exploitation tools, suggesting operational security measures to complicate attribution and takedown efforts. The campaign's focus on a strategic sector and use of tailored spear-phishing indicates a targeted espionage motive rather than broad financial gain or disruption.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the direct impact of Operation BarrelFire may be limited given its current targeting of Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector. However, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by NoisyBear demonstrate capabilities that could be adapted to target European energy infrastructure or related supply chains, especially given Europe's reliance on energy imports and strategic interest in Central Asian energy resources. If similar campaigns were directed at European oil and gas companies or critical infrastructure, the potential impacts include unauthorized access to sensitive operational data, espionage on energy production and distribution, disruption of business operations through malware persistence, and potential sabotage. The use of AMSI bypass and process injection techniques could allow attackers to maintain stealthy long-term access, increasing the risk of data exfiltration and operational disruption. Additionally, the use of spear-phishing with decoy documents highlights the ongoing risk of social engineering attacks within European organizations, emphasizing the need for robust user awareness and email security.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Enhance spear-phishing defenses by implementing advanced email filtering solutions that detect and quarantine malicious attachments, especially ZIP files containing LNK shortcuts. 2. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting AMSI bypass attempts, reflective DLL loading, and process injection behaviors. 3. Enforce application whitelisting and restrict execution of scripts and binaries from user-writable directories to limit the execution of unauthorized batch scripts and PowerShell loaders. 4. Conduct targeted security awareness training for employees in critical sectors, focusing on recognizing spear-phishing attempts and suspicious attachments. 5. Implement network segmentation and strict access controls within operational technology (OT) and IT environments to limit lateral movement. 6. Monitor network traffic for unusual connections to sanctioned or suspicious hosting providers and investigate anomalies. 7. Regularly update and patch systems to reduce the attack surface, even though no specific CVEs are linked to this campaign, as attackers often exploit known vulnerabilities in conjunction with social engineering. 8. Employ threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of AMSI bypass, process injection, and PowerShell-based malware to detect early signs of compromise. 9. Collaborate with national cybersecurity centers and industry ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers) to share intelligence and receive timely alerts about emerging threats.
Affected Countries
Kazakhstan, Russia, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Netherlands
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 0ee3ed9a974ab3e3f93e0f605c7d4423
- hash: 2deda17efed81fcec84028610d3f5a7b
- hash: 42b1c5306dcb8045c03a5604256b9e87
- hash: 5677e3d34337e1927ed49dd344863f9f
- hash: 65d002a30d514d6f6b290360c44493c5
- hash: 680e3e35c898258a8188540329e2864f
- hash: 883002fa9c0274f64a06f64505c1e2af
- hash: a770a67141a36b71cd075c56a575090e
- hash: ba68ca69e36f127122590000bb41c9d5
- hash: e2bab67d0bad6ef6bb3e09a72ff757e3
- hash: fa3658a89c00e5325f2c02d37fdb6633
- hash: 0d84e73ae0d56bbb735b2b78ef6dff62a8ca0637
- hash: 2e551f6d27d55cc4a7fb99f29e2424b4a5f38b97
- hash: 3da1cb52cc213d307739efea27894f6676fe5165
- hash: 4281dbfe357a14cb2546ff5089f27f2936a5f32f
- hash: 435f339cb0bb6f16551226adaa3c31a2c138e7cd
- hash: 4a9f9ab577456af29c87613376f458dbf1d9b8b6
- hash: 4e591a63961e8328ddfe412c33b72ee6fd0b2547
- hash: 94bec829413832bbb2d00ca5d8b60ec8ac4d875f
- hash: d46c7a81fe3ab37f993abc9b5077e3be5b09a6fb
- hash: db4eaf0d77962e846daf83af0fc2cb8384fdc97e
- hash: df35cb225b3b7f5e1bce3ef571fa5881a431887a
- hash: 021b3d53fe113d014a9700488e31a6fb5e16cb02227de5309f6f93affa4515a6
- hash: 1bfe65acbb9e509f80efcfe04b23daf31381e8b95a98112b81c9a080bdd65a2d
- hash: 1eecfc1c607be3891e955846c7da70b0109db9f9fdf01de45916d3727bff96e0
- hash: 26f009351f4c645ad4df3c1708f74ae2e5f8d22f3b0bbb4568347a2a72651bee
- hash: 5168a1e22ee969db7cea0d3e9eb64db4a0c648eee43da8bacf4c7126f58f0386
- hash: 6d6006eb2baa75712bfe867bf5e4f09288a7d860a4623a4176338993b9ddfb4b
- hash: a40e7eb0cb176d2278c4ab02c4657f9034573ac83cee4cde38096028f243119c
- hash: d48aeb6afcc5a3834b3e4ca9e0672b61f9d945dd41046c9aaf782382a6044f97
- hash: da98b0cbcd784879ba38503946898d747ade08ace1d4f38d0fb966703e078bbf
- hash: f5e7dc5149c453b98d05b73cad7ac1c42b381f72b6f7203546c789f4e750eb26
- hash: fb0f7c35a58a02473f26aabea4f682e2e483db84b606db2eca36aa6c7e7d9cf8
- ip: 178.159.94.8
- ip: 77.239.125.41
- domain: wellfitplan.ru
Operation BarrelFire: Targeting Kazakhstan Oil & Gas
Description
A threat group dubbed NoisyBear has been targeting Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector since April 2025. The campaign focuses on KazMunaiGas employees, using spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments. The infection chain involves a ZIP file containing a malicious LNK file and decoy document, which downloads a batch script, leading to PowerShell loaders (DOWNSHELL) and ultimately a malicious DLL implant. The threat actor uses various techniques including AMSI bypass, process injection, and reflective DLL loading. Infrastructure analysis reveals the use of sanctioned hosting providers and open-source post-exploitation tools. The group is believed to be of Russian origin based on language artifacts and targeting patterns.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
Operation BarrelFire is a targeted cyber espionage and intrusion campaign attributed to the threat group NoisyBear, believed to be of Russian origin. The campaign has been active since April 2025 and specifically targets Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector, with a focus on employees of KazMunaiGas, the national oil and gas company. The attack vector primarily involves spear-phishing emails containing malicious ZIP attachments. These ZIP files include a malicious LNK (Windows shortcut) file alongside a decoy document to lure victims into executing the payload. Once the LNK file is executed, it triggers a batch script download, which subsequently loads PowerShell-based loaders known as DOWNSHELL. This loader then deploys a malicious DLL implant using advanced techniques such as AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass, process injection, and reflective DLL loading to evade detection and maintain persistence. The threat actor employs a sophisticated infection chain leveraging native Windows tools and scripting (T1218.011 - signed binary proxy execution, T1059.001 and T1059.003 - PowerShell and command-line interface, T1562 - defense evasion, T1055.003 - process injection, T1589.002 - spear-phishing with malicious attachments, T1105 - remote file copy). The use of AMSI bypass and reflective DLL loading indicates a high level of technical capability aimed at evading endpoint security solutions. Infrastructure analysis shows the use of sanctioned hosting providers and open-source post-exploitation tools, suggesting operational security measures to complicate attribution and takedown efforts. The campaign's focus on a strategic sector and use of tailored spear-phishing indicates a targeted espionage motive rather than broad financial gain or disruption.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the direct impact of Operation BarrelFire may be limited given its current targeting of Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector. However, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by NoisyBear demonstrate capabilities that could be adapted to target European energy infrastructure or related supply chains, especially given Europe's reliance on energy imports and strategic interest in Central Asian energy resources. If similar campaigns were directed at European oil and gas companies or critical infrastructure, the potential impacts include unauthorized access to sensitive operational data, espionage on energy production and distribution, disruption of business operations through malware persistence, and potential sabotage. The use of AMSI bypass and process injection techniques could allow attackers to maintain stealthy long-term access, increasing the risk of data exfiltration and operational disruption. Additionally, the use of spear-phishing with decoy documents highlights the ongoing risk of social engineering attacks within European organizations, emphasizing the need for robust user awareness and email security.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Enhance spear-phishing defenses by implementing advanced email filtering solutions that detect and quarantine malicious attachments, especially ZIP files containing LNK shortcuts. 2. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting AMSI bypass attempts, reflective DLL loading, and process injection behaviors. 3. Enforce application whitelisting and restrict execution of scripts and binaries from user-writable directories to limit the execution of unauthorized batch scripts and PowerShell loaders. 4. Conduct targeted security awareness training for employees in critical sectors, focusing on recognizing spear-phishing attempts and suspicious attachments. 5. Implement network segmentation and strict access controls within operational technology (OT) and IT environments to limit lateral movement. 6. Monitor network traffic for unusual connections to sanctioned or suspicious hosting providers and investigate anomalies. 7. Regularly update and patch systems to reduce the attack surface, even though no specific CVEs are linked to this campaign, as attackers often exploit known vulnerabilities in conjunction with social engineering. 8. Employ threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of AMSI bypass, process injection, and PowerShell-based malware to detect early signs of compromise. 9. Collaborate with national cybersecurity centers and industry ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers) to share intelligence and receive timely alerts about emerging threats.
Affected Countries
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-barrelfire-noisybear-kazakhstan-oil-gas-sector"]
- Adversary
- NoisyBear
- Pulse Id
- 68bb1b128ef4f3460cf220d4
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash0ee3ed9a974ab3e3f93e0f605c7d4423 | — | |
hash2deda17efed81fcec84028610d3f5a7b | — | |
hash42b1c5306dcb8045c03a5604256b9e87 | — | |
hash5677e3d34337e1927ed49dd344863f9f | — | |
hash65d002a30d514d6f6b290360c44493c5 | — | |
hash680e3e35c898258a8188540329e2864f | — | |
hash883002fa9c0274f64a06f64505c1e2af | — | |
hasha770a67141a36b71cd075c56a575090e | — | |
hashba68ca69e36f127122590000bb41c9d5 | — | |
hashe2bab67d0bad6ef6bb3e09a72ff757e3 | — | |
hashfa3658a89c00e5325f2c02d37fdb6633 | — | |
hash0d84e73ae0d56bbb735b2b78ef6dff62a8ca0637 | — | |
hash2e551f6d27d55cc4a7fb99f29e2424b4a5f38b97 | — | |
hash3da1cb52cc213d307739efea27894f6676fe5165 | — | |
hash4281dbfe357a14cb2546ff5089f27f2936a5f32f | — | |
hash435f339cb0bb6f16551226adaa3c31a2c138e7cd | — | |
hash4a9f9ab577456af29c87613376f458dbf1d9b8b6 | — | |
hash4e591a63961e8328ddfe412c33b72ee6fd0b2547 | — | |
hash94bec829413832bbb2d00ca5d8b60ec8ac4d875f | — | |
hashd46c7a81fe3ab37f993abc9b5077e3be5b09a6fb | — | |
hashdb4eaf0d77962e846daf83af0fc2cb8384fdc97e | — | |
hashdf35cb225b3b7f5e1bce3ef571fa5881a431887a | — | |
hash021b3d53fe113d014a9700488e31a6fb5e16cb02227de5309f6f93affa4515a6 | — | |
hash1bfe65acbb9e509f80efcfe04b23daf31381e8b95a98112b81c9a080bdd65a2d | — | |
hash1eecfc1c607be3891e955846c7da70b0109db9f9fdf01de45916d3727bff96e0 | — | |
hash26f009351f4c645ad4df3c1708f74ae2e5f8d22f3b0bbb4568347a2a72651bee | — | |
hash5168a1e22ee969db7cea0d3e9eb64db4a0c648eee43da8bacf4c7126f58f0386 | — | |
hash6d6006eb2baa75712bfe867bf5e4f09288a7d860a4623a4176338993b9ddfb4b | — | |
hasha40e7eb0cb176d2278c4ab02c4657f9034573ac83cee4cde38096028f243119c | — | |
hashd48aeb6afcc5a3834b3e4ca9e0672b61f9d945dd41046c9aaf782382a6044f97 | — | |
hashda98b0cbcd784879ba38503946898d747ade08ace1d4f38d0fb966703e078bbf | — | |
hashf5e7dc5149c453b98d05b73cad7ac1c42b381f72b6f7203546c789f4e750eb26 | — | |
hashfb0f7c35a58a02473f26aabea4f682e2e483db84b606db2eca36aa6c7e7d9cf8 | — |
Ip
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
ip178.159.94.8 | — | |
ip77.239.125.41 | — |
Domain
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
domainwellfitplan.ru | — |
Threat ID: 68bb3cf16ebe005c8df37a6c
Added to database: 9/5/2025, 7:41:37 PM
Last enriched: 9/5/2025, 7:42:02 PM
Last updated: 9/5/2025, 8:49:27 PM
Views: 4
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