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Operation BarrelFire: Targeting Kazakhstan Oil & Gas

Medium
Published: Fri Sep 05 2025 (09/05/2025, 17:17:06 UTC)
Source: AlienVault OTX General

Description

A threat group dubbed NoisyBear has been targeting Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector since April 2025. The campaign focuses on KazMunaiGas employees, using spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments. The infection chain involves a ZIP file containing a malicious LNK file and decoy document, which downloads a batch script, leading to PowerShell loaders (DOWNSHELL) and ultimately a malicious DLL implant. The threat actor uses various techniques including AMSI bypass, process injection, and reflective DLL loading. Infrastructure analysis reveals the use of sanctioned hosting providers and open-source post-exploitation tools. The group is believed to be of Russian origin based on language artifacts and targeting patterns.

AI-Powered Analysis

AILast updated: 09/05/2025, 19:42:02 UTC

Technical Analysis

Operation BarrelFire is a targeted cyber espionage and intrusion campaign attributed to the threat group NoisyBear, believed to be of Russian origin. The campaign has been active since April 2025 and specifically targets Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector, with a focus on employees of KazMunaiGas, the national oil and gas company. The attack vector primarily involves spear-phishing emails containing malicious ZIP attachments. These ZIP files include a malicious LNK (Windows shortcut) file alongside a decoy document to lure victims into executing the payload. Once the LNK file is executed, it triggers a batch script download, which subsequently loads PowerShell-based loaders known as DOWNSHELL. This loader then deploys a malicious DLL implant using advanced techniques such as AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass, process injection, and reflective DLL loading to evade detection and maintain persistence. The threat actor employs a sophisticated infection chain leveraging native Windows tools and scripting (T1218.011 - signed binary proxy execution, T1059.001 and T1059.003 - PowerShell and command-line interface, T1562 - defense evasion, T1055.003 - process injection, T1589.002 - spear-phishing with malicious attachments, T1105 - remote file copy). The use of AMSI bypass and reflective DLL loading indicates a high level of technical capability aimed at evading endpoint security solutions. Infrastructure analysis shows the use of sanctioned hosting providers and open-source post-exploitation tools, suggesting operational security measures to complicate attribution and takedown efforts. The campaign's focus on a strategic sector and use of tailored spear-phishing indicates a targeted espionage motive rather than broad financial gain or disruption.

Potential Impact

For European organizations, the direct impact of Operation BarrelFire may be limited given its current targeting of Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector. However, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by NoisyBear demonstrate capabilities that could be adapted to target European energy infrastructure or related supply chains, especially given Europe's reliance on energy imports and strategic interest in Central Asian energy resources. If similar campaigns were directed at European oil and gas companies or critical infrastructure, the potential impacts include unauthorized access to sensitive operational data, espionage on energy production and distribution, disruption of business operations through malware persistence, and potential sabotage. The use of AMSI bypass and process injection techniques could allow attackers to maintain stealthy long-term access, increasing the risk of data exfiltration and operational disruption. Additionally, the use of spear-phishing with decoy documents highlights the ongoing risk of social engineering attacks within European organizations, emphasizing the need for robust user awareness and email security.

Mitigation Recommendations

1. Enhance spear-phishing defenses by implementing advanced email filtering solutions that detect and quarantine malicious attachments, especially ZIP files containing LNK shortcuts. 2. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting AMSI bypass attempts, reflective DLL loading, and process injection behaviors. 3. Enforce application whitelisting and restrict execution of scripts and binaries from user-writable directories to limit the execution of unauthorized batch scripts and PowerShell loaders. 4. Conduct targeted security awareness training for employees in critical sectors, focusing on recognizing spear-phishing attempts and suspicious attachments. 5. Implement network segmentation and strict access controls within operational technology (OT) and IT environments to limit lateral movement. 6. Monitor network traffic for unusual connections to sanctioned or suspicious hosting providers and investigate anomalies. 7. Regularly update and patch systems to reduce the attack surface, even though no specific CVEs are linked to this campaign, as attackers often exploit known vulnerabilities in conjunction with social engineering. 8. Employ threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of AMSI bypass, process injection, and PowerShell-based malware to detect early signs of compromise. 9. Collaborate with national cybersecurity centers and industry ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers) to share intelligence and receive timely alerts about emerging threats.

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Technical Details

Author
AlienVault
Tlp
white
References
["https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-barrelfire-noisybear-kazakhstan-oil-gas-sector"]
Adversary
NoisyBear
Pulse Id
68bb1b128ef4f3460cf220d4
Threat Score
null

Indicators of Compromise

Hash

ValueDescriptionCopy
hash0ee3ed9a974ab3e3f93e0f605c7d4423
hash2deda17efed81fcec84028610d3f5a7b
hash42b1c5306dcb8045c03a5604256b9e87
hash5677e3d34337e1927ed49dd344863f9f
hash65d002a30d514d6f6b290360c44493c5
hash680e3e35c898258a8188540329e2864f
hash883002fa9c0274f64a06f64505c1e2af
hasha770a67141a36b71cd075c56a575090e
hashba68ca69e36f127122590000bb41c9d5
hashe2bab67d0bad6ef6bb3e09a72ff757e3
hashfa3658a89c00e5325f2c02d37fdb6633
hash0d84e73ae0d56bbb735b2b78ef6dff62a8ca0637
hash2e551f6d27d55cc4a7fb99f29e2424b4a5f38b97
hash3da1cb52cc213d307739efea27894f6676fe5165
hash4281dbfe357a14cb2546ff5089f27f2936a5f32f
hash435f339cb0bb6f16551226adaa3c31a2c138e7cd
hash4a9f9ab577456af29c87613376f458dbf1d9b8b6
hash4e591a63961e8328ddfe412c33b72ee6fd0b2547
hash94bec829413832bbb2d00ca5d8b60ec8ac4d875f
hashd46c7a81fe3ab37f993abc9b5077e3be5b09a6fb
hashdb4eaf0d77962e846daf83af0fc2cb8384fdc97e
hashdf35cb225b3b7f5e1bce3ef571fa5881a431887a
hash021b3d53fe113d014a9700488e31a6fb5e16cb02227de5309f6f93affa4515a6
hash1bfe65acbb9e509f80efcfe04b23daf31381e8b95a98112b81c9a080bdd65a2d
hash1eecfc1c607be3891e955846c7da70b0109db9f9fdf01de45916d3727bff96e0
hash26f009351f4c645ad4df3c1708f74ae2e5f8d22f3b0bbb4568347a2a72651bee
hash5168a1e22ee969db7cea0d3e9eb64db4a0c648eee43da8bacf4c7126f58f0386
hash6d6006eb2baa75712bfe867bf5e4f09288a7d860a4623a4176338993b9ddfb4b
hasha40e7eb0cb176d2278c4ab02c4657f9034573ac83cee4cde38096028f243119c
hashd48aeb6afcc5a3834b3e4ca9e0672b61f9d945dd41046c9aaf782382a6044f97
hashda98b0cbcd784879ba38503946898d747ade08ace1d4f38d0fb966703e078bbf
hashf5e7dc5149c453b98d05b73cad7ac1c42b381f72b6f7203546c789f4e750eb26
hashfb0f7c35a58a02473f26aabea4f682e2e483db84b606db2eca36aa6c7e7d9cf8

Ip

ValueDescriptionCopy
ip178.159.94.8
ip77.239.125.41

Domain

ValueDescriptionCopy
domainwellfitplan.ru

Threat ID: 68bb3cf16ebe005c8df37a6c

Added to database: 9/5/2025, 7:41:37 PM

Last enriched: 9/5/2025, 7:42:02 PM

Last updated: 9/5/2025, 8:49:27 PM

Views: 4

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