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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2025-54572: Ruby SAML DOS vulnerability with large SAML response

Affects ruby-samlSource GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2025-54572· Medium 6.9

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 1.18.1 when convenient.

Data as of 29 Oct 2026, 22:52 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
6.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 4.06.9
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.18.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 30 Jul 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade ruby-saml to 1.18.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
RubyGemsruby-samlAffected
  • <1.18.1
Fixed in
  • 1.18.1

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Description

### Summary A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in ruby-saml even with the message_max_bytesize setting configured. The vulnerability occurs because the SAML response is validated for Base64 format prior to checking the message size, leading to potential resource exhaustion. ### Details `ruby-saml` includes a `message_max_bytesize` setting intended to prevent DOS attacks and decompression bombs. However, this protection is ineffective in some cases due to the order of operations in the code: https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/blob/fbbedc978300deb9355a8e505849666974ef2e67/lib/onelogin/ruby-saml/saml_message.rb ```ruby def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil) return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml) # <--- Issue here. Should be moved after next code block. settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil? if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected") end decoded = decode(saml) ... end ``` The vulnerability is in the execution order. Prior to checking bytesize the `base64_encoded?` function performs regex matching on the entire input string: ```ruby !!string.gsub(/[\r\n]|\\r|\\n|\s/, "").match(BASE64_FORMAT) ``` ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ When successfully exploited, this vulnerability can lead to: - Excessive memory consumption - High CPU utilization - Application slowdown or unresponsiveness - Complete application crash in severe cases - Potential denial of service for legitimate users All applications using `ruby-saml` with SAML configured and enabled are vulnerable. ### Potential Solution Reorder the validation steps to ensure max bytesize is checked first ```ruby def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil) settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil? if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected") end return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml) decoded = decode(saml) ... end ```

References

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