UNG0002 (Unknown Group 0002): Espionage Campaigns Uncovered
UNG0002, an espionage-focused threat group, has been conducting campaigns across Asian jurisdictions including China, Hong Kong, and Pakistan. The group employs sophisticated multi-stage attacks using LNK files, VBScript, and custom RAT implants. Their operations span two major campaigns: Operation Cobalt Whisper and Operation AmberMist, targeting various sectors such as defense, aviation, gaming, and academia. UNG0002 utilizes social engineering techniques like ClickFix and abuses DLL sideloading to evade detection. The group demonstrates high adaptability, evolving from using Cobalt Strike to developing custom implants like Shadow RAT and INET RAT. Attribution challenges persist, but the group is assessed to originate from South-East Asia with a focus on espionage activities.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
UNG0002 (Unknown Group 0002) is an espionage-focused threat actor group conducting sophisticated multi-stage cyber campaigns primarily across Asian jurisdictions such as China, Hong Kong, and Pakistan. The group employs advanced social engineering tactics and technical methods to infiltrate target networks. Their attack vectors include the use of malicious LNK shortcut files and VBScript to initiate payload execution. They leverage DLL sideloading techniques, abusing legitimate Windows functionality to load malicious DLLs stealthily, thereby evading traditional detection mechanisms. UNG0002 has evolved from using publicly available tools like Cobalt Strike to deploying custom remote access trojans (RATs) such as Shadow RAT and INET RAT, indicating a high level of technical capability and adaptability. The campaigns, named Operation Cobalt Whisper and Operation AmberMist, target diverse sectors including defense, aviation, gaming, and academia, reflecting a broad espionage interest. The group also uses social engineering frameworks like ClickFix to trick users into executing malicious content. Despite attribution challenges, intelligence assesses the group’s origin as South-East Asia, with a clear focus on espionage activities. Indicators of compromise include numerous file hashes and a suspicious domain (moma.islamabadpk.site). The group’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) align with multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1566.001 (Spearphishing), T1574.001 (DLL Side-loading), and T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter), among others. No known exploits in the wild or CVEs are associated with this campaign, but the threat remains active and evolving.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the direct targeting by UNG0002 has not been explicitly reported; however, the espionage nature and multi-sector targeting of this group pose a latent risk. European defense, aviation, academic, and gaming sectors could be attractive targets due to their strategic importance and intellectual property value. The use of sophisticated social engineering and custom RAT implants increases the risk of successful infiltration, data exfiltration, and persistent access. Compromise could lead to loss of sensitive information, intellectual property theft, disruption of operations, and reputational damage. The DLL sideloading technique complicates detection, potentially allowing prolonged undetected presence within networks. Given the group’s adaptability and evolving toolset, European organizations must remain vigilant, especially those with partnerships or interests in South-East Asia or those involved in sectors similar to those targeted in Asia. Additionally, supply chain risks exist if European entities interact with compromised partners or vendors in affected regions.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Implement advanced email filtering and spearphishing detection mechanisms to reduce the risk of initial infection via LNK and VBScript payloads. 2. Employ application whitelisting and restrict execution of LNK files and scripts from untrusted sources. 3. Monitor and restrict DLL sideloading by enforcing strict code signing policies and using endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools capable of detecting anomalous DLL loading behavior. 4. Conduct regular threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of compromise such as the provided file hashes and suspicious domains like moma.islamabadpk.site. 5. Enhance user awareness training specifically targeting social engineering tactics like ClickFix to reduce the likelihood of user interaction leading to compromise. 6. Deploy network segmentation and least privilege principles to limit lateral movement if initial compromise occurs. 7. Maintain up-to-date threat intelligence feeds and integrate them into security monitoring to quickly identify emerging TTPs related to UNG0002. 8. Use behavioral analytics to detect unusual command and control (C2) communications consistent with custom RAT implants. 9. Collaborate with regional cybersecurity information sharing organizations to stay informed about potential spillover or targeting of European entities.
Affected Countries
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Sweden, Finland
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 2d2dc4dbefa47b9ac563a0f9fd65929f
- hash: 309f84937dc4e489517f5cbe1193538a
- hash: a8a7e7494b9ded05685d6b91b1b7ffa6
- hash: 23382a69715a8e597d7ff605b9e41ef0f64b9897
- hash: 87df9a5dcf7d18816eadff78aff242f0cc7a04cc
- hash: e28ff664767b55373f43c909cab287b471b5a9dd
- hash: 2140adec9cde046b35634e93b83da4cc9a8aa0a71c21e32ba1dce2742314e8dc
- hash: 2bdd086a5fce1f32ea41be86febfb4be7782c997cfcb028d2f58fee5dd4b0f8a
- hash: 2c700126b22ea8b22b8b05c2da05de79df4ab7db9f88267316530fa662b4db2c
- hash: 2df309018ab935c47306b06ebf5700dcf790fff7cebabfb99274fe867042ecf0
- hash: 4b410c47465359ef40d470c9286fb980e656698c4ee4d969c86c84fbd012af0d
- hash: 4c79934beb1ea19f17e39fd1946158d3dd7d075aa29d8cd259834f8cd7e04ef8
- hash: 4ca4f673e4389a352854f5feb0793dac43519ade8049b5dd9356d0cbe0f06148
- hash: 55dc772d1b59c387b5f33428d5167437dc2d6e2423765f4080ee3b6a04947ae9
- hash: 90c9e0ee1d74b596a0acf1e04b41c2c5f15d16b2acd39d3dc8f90b071888ac99
- hash: a31d742d7e36fefed01971d8cba827c71e69d59167e080d2f551210c85fddaa5
- hash: ad97b1c79735b1b97c4c4432cacac2fce6316889eafb41a0d97f2b0e565ee850
- hash: b7f1d82fb80e02b9ebe955e8f061f31dc60f7513d1f9ad0a831407c1ba0df87e
- hash: c3ccfe415c3d3b89bde029669f42b7f04df72ad2da4bd15d82495b58ebde46d6
- hash: c49e9b556d271a853449ec915e4a929f5fa7ae04da4dc714c220ed0d703a36f7
- hash: c722651d72c47e224007c2111e0489a028521ccdf5331c92e6cd9cfe07076918
- domain: moma.islamabadpk.site
UNG0002 (Unknown Group 0002): Espionage Campaigns Uncovered
Description
UNG0002, an espionage-focused threat group, has been conducting campaigns across Asian jurisdictions including China, Hong Kong, and Pakistan. The group employs sophisticated multi-stage attacks using LNK files, VBScript, and custom RAT implants. Their operations span two major campaigns: Operation Cobalt Whisper and Operation AmberMist, targeting various sectors such as defense, aviation, gaming, and academia. UNG0002 utilizes social engineering techniques like ClickFix and abuses DLL sideloading to evade detection. The group demonstrates high adaptability, evolving from using Cobalt Strike to developing custom implants like Shadow RAT and INET RAT. Attribution challenges persist, but the group is assessed to originate from South-East Asia with a focus on espionage activities.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
UNG0002 (Unknown Group 0002) is an espionage-focused threat actor group conducting sophisticated multi-stage cyber campaigns primarily across Asian jurisdictions such as China, Hong Kong, and Pakistan. The group employs advanced social engineering tactics and technical methods to infiltrate target networks. Their attack vectors include the use of malicious LNK shortcut files and VBScript to initiate payload execution. They leverage DLL sideloading techniques, abusing legitimate Windows functionality to load malicious DLLs stealthily, thereby evading traditional detection mechanisms. UNG0002 has evolved from using publicly available tools like Cobalt Strike to deploying custom remote access trojans (RATs) such as Shadow RAT and INET RAT, indicating a high level of technical capability and adaptability. The campaigns, named Operation Cobalt Whisper and Operation AmberMist, target diverse sectors including defense, aviation, gaming, and academia, reflecting a broad espionage interest. The group also uses social engineering frameworks like ClickFix to trick users into executing malicious content. Despite attribution challenges, intelligence assesses the group’s origin as South-East Asia, with a clear focus on espionage activities. Indicators of compromise include numerous file hashes and a suspicious domain (moma.islamabadpk.site). The group’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) align with multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1566.001 (Spearphishing), T1574.001 (DLL Side-loading), and T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter), among others. No known exploits in the wild or CVEs are associated with this campaign, but the threat remains active and evolving.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the direct targeting by UNG0002 has not been explicitly reported; however, the espionage nature and multi-sector targeting of this group pose a latent risk. European defense, aviation, academic, and gaming sectors could be attractive targets due to their strategic importance and intellectual property value. The use of sophisticated social engineering and custom RAT implants increases the risk of successful infiltration, data exfiltration, and persistent access. Compromise could lead to loss of sensitive information, intellectual property theft, disruption of operations, and reputational damage. The DLL sideloading technique complicates detection, potentially allowing prolonged undetected presence within networks. Given the group’s adaptability and evolving toolset, European organizations must remain vigilant, especially those with partnerships or interests in South-East Asia or those involved in sectors similar to those targeted in Asia. Additionally, supply chain risks exist if European entities interact with compromised partners or vendors in affected regions.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Implement advanced email filtering and spearphishing detection mechanisms to reduce the risk of initial infection via LNK and VBScript payloads. 2. Employ application whitelisting and restrict execution of LNK files and scripts from untrusted sources. 3. Monitor and restrict DLL sideloading by enforcing strict code signing policies and using endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools capable of detecting anomalous DLL loading behavior. 4. Conduct regular threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of compromise such as the provided file hashes and suspicious domains like moma.islamabadpk.site. 5. Enhance user awareness training specifically targeting social engineering tactics like ClickFix to reduce the likelihood of user interaction leading to compromise. 6. Deploy network segmentation and least privilege principles to limit lateral movement if initial compromise occurs. 7. Maintain up-to-date threat intelligence feeds and integrate them into security monitoring to quickly identify emerging TTPs related to UNG0002. 8. Use behavioral analytics to detect unusual command and control (C2) communications consistent with custom RAT implants. 9. Collaborate with regional cybersecurity information sharing organizations to stay informed about potential spillover or targeting of European entities.
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://www.seqrite.com/blog/ung0002-espionage-campaigns-south-asia/"]
- Adversary
- UNG0002
- Pulse Id
- 6877c4526c004d0e49615050
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash2d2dc4dbefa47b9ac563a0f9fd65929f | — | |
hash309f84937dc4e489517f5cbe1193538a | — | |
hasha8a7e7494b9ded05685d6b91b1b7ffa6 | — | |
hash23382a69715a8e597d7ff605b9e41ef0f64b9897 | — | |
hash87df9a5dcf7d18816eadff78aff242f0cc7a04cc | — | |
hashe28ff664767b55373f43c909cab287b471b5a9dd | — | |
hash2140adec9cde046b35634e93b83da4cc9a8aa0a71c21e32ba1dce2742314e8dc | — | |
hash2bdd086a5fce1f32ea41be86febfb4be7782c997cfcb028d2f58fee5dd4b0f8a | — | |
hash2c700126b22ea8b22b8b05c2da05de79df4ab7db9f88267316530fa662b4db2c | — | |
hash2df309018ab935c47306b06ebf5700dcf790fff7cebabfb99274fe867042ecf0 | — | |
hash4b410c47465359ef40d470c9286fb980e656698c4ee4d969c86c84fbd012af0d | — | |
hash4c79934beb1ea19f17e39fd1946158d3dd7d075aa29d8cd259834f8cd7e04ef8 | — | |
hash4ca4f673e4389a352854f5feb0793dac43519ade8049b5dd9356d0cbe0f06148 | — | |
hash55dc772d1b59c387b5f33428d5167437dc2d6e2423765f4080ee3b6a04947ae9 | — | |
hash90c9e0ee1d74b596a0acf1e04b41c2c5f15d16b2acd39d3dc8f90b071888ac99 | — | |
hasha31d742d7e36fefed01971d8cba827c71e69d59167e080d2f551210c85fddaa5 | — | |
hashad97b1c79735b1b97c4c4432cacac2fce6316889eafb41a0d97f2b0e565ee850 | — | |
hashb7f1d82fb80e02b9ebe955e8f061f31dc60f7513d1f9ad0a831407c1ba0df87e | — | |
hashc3ccfe415c3d3b89bde029669f42b7f04df72ad2da4bd15d82495b58ebde46d6 | — | |
hashc49e9b556d271a853449ec915e4a929f5fa7ae04da4dc714c220ed0d703a36f7 | — | |
hashc722651d72c47e224007c2111e0489a028521ccdf5331c92e6cd9cfe07076918 | — |
Domain
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
domainmoma.islamabadpk.site | — |
Threat ID: 6877fa7ba83201eaacdddedb
Added to database: 7/16/2025, 7:16:11 PM
Last enriched: 7/16/2025, 7:31:17 PM
Last updated: 7/17/2025, 4:50:01 PM
Views: 6
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