An Iran-nexus spear-phishing campaign masquerading as the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs targeted global governments in August 2025. Attributed to Iranian-aligned operators linked to the Homeland Justice group and MOIS, the campaign used compromised mailboxes to send emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments. The documents contained VBA macros that decoded and deployed malware payloads. The multi-wave operation targeted diplomatic and governmental entities across multiple regions, including the Middle East, Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Americas. The campaign utilized social engineering lures, anti-analysis techniques, and a reconnaissance-focused malware called sysProcUpdate. The attackers aimed to gain initial access, map internal networks, and prepare for further exploitation in diplomatic and industrial organizations.
The ClickFix social engineering technique has gained popularity among threat actors, targeting thousands of devices globally. It tricks users into executing malicious commands on their devices by exploiting their tendency to solve minor technical issues. The technique often impersonates legitimate brands and combines with delivery vectors like phishing and malvertising. ClickFix campaigns typically lead users to a visual lure, such as a landing page, instructing them to run commands in the Windows Run dialog. This user interaction element helps bypass conventional security solutions. Various malware, including infostealers and remote access tools, are delivered through ClickFix attacks. The technique has evolved to target macOS users and is being sold as part of malware kits on hacker forums.
SentinelLABS and Beazley Security uncovered a series of infostealer campaigns delivering the Python-based PXA Stealer. The malware, which first appeared in late 2024, has evolved to incorporate sophisticated anti-analysis techniques and a hardened command-and-control infrastructure. Over 4,000 unique victim IP addresses from 62 countries were identified, with South Korea, the United States, and the Netherlands being the most targeted. The stolen data includes passwords, credit card records, and browser cookies. The threat actors, linked to Vietnamese-speaking cybercriminal circles, monetize the stolen data through a subscription-based underground ecosystem that automates resale via Telegram's API. The campaign showcases the growing trend of weaponizing legitimate infrastructure for large-scale information theft and monetization.
This report examines recent activities attributed to the XDSpy threat actor, focusing on an ongoing campaign targeting Eastern European and Russian governmental entities using the XDigo malware since March 2025. The investigation stemmed from analyzing a vulnerability in LNK files, leading to the discovery of a multi-stage infection chain. The report provides analysis of the XDigo implant and its connections to previous XDSpy activities. It also details the exploitation of LNK parsing issues and infrastructure used across different campaigns. The research uncovered additional, more recent XDSpy activity employing an alternative infection chain. Targets include government entities in Eastern Europe, with a confirmed victim in Belarus.
An investigation into domains associated with the LummaC2 infostealing-malware campaign revealed a broader network of nearly 500 domains with highly malicious risk scores. These domains share similar registration patterns, including the use of Eastern European names and the inbox[.]eu email domain. The domains predominantly advertise technical education courses, but are likely lures for malware delivery. Four domains were identified as LummaC2 login panels. The campaign's infrastructure uses specific TLDs, naming conventions, and a Hong Kong address linked to OFAC-sanctioned entities. Security teams are advised to monitor for similar domain patterns, scrutinize suspicious training sites, and educate users about the risks.
The UNC1151 threat actor is conducting a spearphishing campaign exploiting a critical vulnerability (CVE-2024-42009) in the Roundcube webmail client. Malicious JavaScript embedded in phishing emails installs a stealthy Service Worker in victims' browsers upon opening the email, intercepting login credentials and exfiltrating them without further user interaction. A second vulnerability (CVE-2025-49113) may be chained to increase persistence and impact. Stolen credentials enable attackers to access mailboxes, harvest address books, and propagate phishing internally, facilitating lateral movement. The campaign primarily targets Polish organizations but also threatens neighboring Central European countries with significant Roundcube deployments. Organizations are urged to patch vulnerabilities, monitor for unusual Service Worker activity, enforce multi-factor authentication, and enhance email filtering to mitigate risks.
A destructive attack on Ukrainian critical infrastructure using a new wiper malware called 'PathWiper' has been observed. The attack, attributed to a Russia-nexus APT group, utilized a legitimate endpoint administration framework to deploy the wiper across connected endpoints. PathWiper overwrites file system artifacts with random data, targeting physical drives, volumes, and network shared drives. Its capabilities are similar to HermeticWiper, previously used against Ukrainian entities. The malware's sophisticated approach to identifying and corrupting connected drives and volumes distinguishes it from earlier wipers. This attack underscores the ongoing threat to Ukrainian infrastructure despite the prolonged conflict with Russia.
International law enforcement agencies have taken additional actions in Operation Endgame, targeting cybercriminal organizations, particularly those behind DanaBot. DanaBot is a powerful modular malware family written in Delphi, capable of keylogging, capturing screenshots, recording desktop videos, exfiltrating files, injecting content into web browsers, and deploying second-stage malware. It operates as a Malware-as-a-Service platform, enabling various attacks. DanaBot has been used in targeted attacks against government officials in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and for DDoS attacks against Ukrainian servers. The malware implements a custom binary protocol encrypted with RSA and AES, and uses hardcoded C2 servers with Tor as a backup communication channel. Over 50 nicknames have been associated with DanaBot affiliates.