The 13-country effort, named Operation Ramz, targeted cyber threats in the Middle East and North Africa region. The post 201 Arrested in Crackdown on Cybercrime in Middle East, North Africa appeared first on SecurityWeek .
An exposed command and control server on RouterHosting infrastructure revealed an active Iranian-nexus intrusion campaign targeting twelve Omani government ministries. The operation primarily focused on the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs, deploying custom webshells that provided persistent access through April 2026. Over 26,000 user records containing judicial case data, committee decisions, and registry hives were exfiltrated. The attacker utilized ProxyShell exploits, DotNetNuke vulnerabilities, and custom Python scripts targeting Exchange servers, SQL databases, and Oracle systems. Infrastructure analysis revealed connections to spoofed Iranian diaspora media and censorship circumvention tools, with tactical overlaps indicating MOIS-linked groups such as APT34 and MuddyWater. The campaign specifically targeted judicial records, immigration systems, and citizen identity data across multiple government entities.
In March 2026, a China-nexus threat actor launched a sophisticated campaign targeting countries in the Arabian Gulf region, exploiting renewed Middle East conflict themes within 24 hours of escalation. The attack utilized Arabic-language lures depicting missile strikes and employed a multi-stage infection chain beginning with weaponized ZIP archives containing malicious LNK and CHM files. The campaign deployed a heavily obfuscated PlugX backdoor variant through DLL sideloading, with components using control flow flattening and mixed boolean arithmetic techniques. The backdoor supports HTTPS command-and-control communications, DNS-over-HTTPS resolution, and multiple plugins for system manipulation. Based on tools, techniques, and procedures including specific RC4 decryption keys and rapid geopolitical weaponization, the activity is attributed with medium confidence to Mustang Panda.
A new cybercriminal group, Nasir Security, believed to be associated with Iran, is targeting energy organizations in the Middle East. They focus on attacking supply chain vendors involved in engineering, safety, and construction. The group emerged in October 2025 and has claimed attacks on various energy sector companies, including Dubai Petroleum, CC Energy Development, and Al-Safi Oil Company. However, their claims are likely exaggerated, and the actual breaches appear to be of third-party contractors. The group's tactics include business email compromise, spear phishing, and exploiting public-facing applications. Their activities are seen as part of a broader Iranian strategy to conduct cyberattacks and spread misinformation during ongoing geopolitical conflicts.
A China-nexus threat actor targeted countries in the Persian Gulf region using a multi-stage attack chain to deploy a PlugX backdoor variant. The campaign exploited the renewed Middle East conflict, using an Arabic-language document lure depicting missile attacks. The attack utilized a ZIP archive containing a malicious Windows shortcut file, which downloaded a CHM file leading to the deployment of PlugX. The malware employed various obfuscation techniques, including control flow flattening and mixed boolean arithmetic. The PlugX variant supported HTTPS for command-and-control communication and DNS-over-HTTPS for domain resolution. Based on the tools and tactics used, the activity is attributed to a China-nexus actor, possibly linked to Mustang Panda.
Pro-Iranian hackers are targeting sites in the Middle East and starting to stretch into the United States during the war, raising the risk of American defense contractors, power stations and water plants. The post Iran-Linked Hackers Take Aim at US and Other Targets, Raising Risk of Cyberattacks During War appeared first on SecurityWeek .
The ongoing conflict involving Iran has led to increased cyber espionage activities targeting Middle Eastern governments. Multiple state-sponsored threat actors, including those from China, Belarus, Pakistan, and Hamas, have been observed conducting campaigns using the conflict as a lure. These actors are employing various tactics such as credential phishing, malware delivery, and compromised accounts to target government and diplomatic organizations. The campaigns often use war-themed content to engage targets and gather intelligence on the conflict's trajectory and geopolitical implications. Iranian threat actors continue their traditional espionage efforts alongside disruptive campaigns in support of war efforts. This heightened activity reflects both opportunistic use of topical lures and shifts in intelligence collection priorities for various state-aligned groups.
The ongoing Middle East crisis has given rise to opportunistic online fraudulent activities. Two main strands have been observed: confirmed government-impersonation fraud and suspicious evacuation-themed websites. Fraudsters are exploiting the confusion and urgency surrounding the crisis to launch phishing campaigns and create deceptive websites. A notable example includes an email impersonating UAE authorities, urging recipients to complete a mandatory emergency registration form. Additionally, several newly registered websites offering evacuation services from Dubai and the Gulf region have emerged, displaying characteristics commonly associated with scams. These sites use crisis-related domain names, employ urgent messaging, lack verifiable operator details, and often request unconventional payment methods. The situation highlights the need for increased vigilance and proactive monitoring of emerging digital threats during geopolitical crises.
MuddyWater APT has launched Operation Olalampo, targeting organizations in the MENA region. The campaign involves new malware variants, including a Rust backdoor called CHAR, downloaders GhostFetch and HTTP_VIP, and an advanced backdoor GhostBackDoor. Notably, the group is using Telegram bots for command-and-control, revealing insights into their post-exploitation tactics. The operation, first observed on January 26, 2026, shows tactical and technical overlaps with previous MuddyWater activities. Key discoveries include potential AI-assisted malware development and infrastructure reuse dating back to October 2025. The campaign aligns with ongoing geopolitical tensions and provides valuable information on the threat actor's evolving techniques.
This report analyzes the recent activities of the MuddyWater APT group, which primarily targets organizations in the Middle East. The group employs sophisticated spear-phishing techniques, often impersonating legitimate entities and using malicious documents to gain initial access. Their attacks focus on long-term infiltration and intelligence gathering rather than immediate disruption. The report details several attack cases from 2019 to 2026, highlighting the group's evolving tactics, including the abuse of legitimate remote management tools and the use of Rust-based malware. The analysis emphasizes the importance of endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions in identifying and mitigating these threats, as traditional perimeter-based security measures prove insufficient against such advanced persistent threats.
