A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via /proc/<pid>/root/ paths using net.Dial() without symlink protection. These socket paths reside in qemu-owned directories writable by the virt-launcher user. An attacker with namespace edit and pods/exec permissions can replace a migration proxy socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket. Because virt-handler runs as root in the host mount namespace, absolute symlink targets resolve against the host filesystem, and the bidirectional io.Copy proxy relays attacker-controlled bytes to the container runtime, enabling full node compromise.
A vulnerability (CVE-2026-27136) exists in golang.org/x/net/html used by the OpenShift File Integrity Operator, allowing attackers to bypass HTML sanitization mechanisms. This can lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks resulting in information disclosure or arbitrary code execution. The OpenShift File Integrity Operator version 1.4.1 includes bug fixes and enhancements addressing this and other issues. No direct patch for the golang.org/x/net/html flaw is currently available that meets Red Hat's criteria for mitigation. Exploitation requires user interaction with malicious HTML content.
A security flaw was found in the golang.org/x/net/html package used by the Red Hat OpenShift Workload Availability Operator. This vulnerability allows specially crafted HTML to bypass input sanitization during parsing and rendering, enabling Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. Such attacks could lead to arbitrary code execution in applications that process untrusted HTML content using the affected component without additional protections. The Node Health Check Operator, part of Red Hat OpenShift Workload Availability, deploys a controller that identifies unhealthy nodes and remediates them using various remediation providers. This vulnerability affects this operator if it processes untrusted HTML without proper sanitization or output encoding. Red Hat has issued an advisory but has not yet released a fix for this vulnerability.
Two denial of service vulnerabilities affect the rhc-worker-playbook component in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10.0 Extended Update Support. These issues stem from the Go net package's handling of long CNAME DNS responses (CVE-2026-33811) and the Go crypto/x509 package's excessive processing of DNS Subject Alternative Name entries (CVE-2026-27145). The rhc-worker-playbook is a worker for yggdrasil that executes Ansible playbooks locally. Red Hat has issued security updates addressing these vulnerabilities.
The PSA Protected Storage credential backend (subsys/net/lib/tls_credentials/tls_credentials_trusted.c) declared its credential-store mutex as a plain zero-filled static struct k_mutex credential_lock; and never called k_mutex_init() on it. A statically zero-filled k_mutex has an uninitialized wait queue (its dlist head/tail are NULL instead of the self-referential sentinels that k_mutex_init/K_MUTEX_DEFINE install). The uncontended lock path does not touch the wait queue, so the defect is latent and serialized use behaves correctly.
When two execution contexts contend on the lock, k_mutex_lock() pends the blocking thread on the wait queue via z_pend_curr(), which calls sys_dlist_append() on the zeroed list and dereferences a NULL tail pointer (tail->next = node), faulting the kernel. The lock is held during TLS handshake credential loading and by all credential add/get/delete operations, so a deployment performing concurrent TLS handshakes (for example a server handling multiple simultaneous connections from a remote peer) or a credential-management operation concurrent with a handshake can trigger the dereference.
The impact is a denial of service: a deterministic kernel panic / device reset on the first contention. There is no memory corruption beyond the NULL dereference and no confidentiality or integrity impact; mutual exclusion on the fast path remains correct. Exposure is limited to builds with CONFIG_TLS_CREDENTIALS_BACKEND_PROTECTED_STORAGE enabled (PSA Protected Storage / TF-M platforms); the default volatile RAM backend initializes its lock correctly and is unaffected.
The fix initializes the mutex statically with K_MUTEX_DEFINE(credential_lock), providing a valid wait queue so the contended path no longer touches a NULL list.
The npm package sme-rko-finance-front-payments-currency-payment-actions-operations-repeat-impl version 35.8.1 contains malicious code that downloads and executes an unsigned native binary from dynamically constructed Cloudflare Workers subdomains and a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback. The binary is saved to temporary directories with names mimicking legitimate Microsoft.NET diagnostic tools and executed detached from the main process. The code attempts to disguise its behavior as telemetry with opt-out flags, but this is inconsistent with its actual malicious activity. No signature or integrity verification is performed on the downloaded binary, and the destination hosts are unrelated to the package's stated purpose.
The npm package dolyame-ui-contextmenusearchable version 35.8.1 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a platform-specific binary from anonymous Cloudflare Workers domains. The binary is saved to temporary directories, disguised as a .NET diagnostic file, and executed in a detached process. The package uses string concatenation to hide dangerous API calls and has multiple execution paths that trigger this behavior upon import. The fetched binary's purpose is opaque, and the package falsely advertises itself as a data transformation and analytics utility.
The npm package dolyame-ui-inputsearch version 35.8.1 is identified as a malicious dropper disguised as a UI input search component. Upon requiring the package, it loads obfuscated code that downloads a platform-specific binary from multiple suspicious endpoints without verification. The binary is saved to hidden paths and executed detached from the main process. The dropped file impersonates .NET diagnostics tooling, but its actual purpose is unknown and unrelated to the advertised functionality.
Contiki-NG's MQTT client parse_publish_vhdr() in os/net/app-layer/mqtt/mqtt.c sets topic_len_received=1 before checking topic_len against the 64-byte limit, so an over-length topic returns early but leaves the flag set. On the next TCP segment, tcp_input() re-invokes the parser with topic_received==0, and the persisted topic_len_received==1 skips the length-reading block containing the guard, falling through directly to a memcpy() that uses the unvalidated 16-bit topic_len as the copy length. The 65-byte topic[] destination overruns into adjacent struct fields including the payload_chunk pointer, which subsequent MQTT code dereferences, giving a compromised or attacker-controlled broker an arbitrary-pointer-write primitive. Contiki-NG's MQTT implementation has no TLS support so the connection is plaintext. Impact ranges from information disclosure and denial of service to remote code execution on embedded targets without memory protection.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (a34add291ef7584aec7041449cb2e80d36ae98f93c2725e1aa018707e3334119)
On bin start, @xiaohhhh1/canvas-agent opens an outbound WebSocket to the hardcoded relay wss://canvas.xiaohhhh1.com/api/agent-relay and treats inbound messages as HTTP requests to its own loopback API at 127.0.0.1:17371. The bridge unconditionally injects the local agent token (x-canvas-agent-token) into forwarded requests, so remote 'request' messages satisfy token authentication and can invoke /agent/codex/turn and /agent/claude/turn, which spawn the Codex app-server and Claude CLI locally with attacker-supplied prompts and a caller-controlled permissionMode. Codex/Claude are autonomous coding agents that can write files in the workspace and, when permissionMode is widened to danger-full-access, execute arbitrary shell commands. The same code path also bypasses the loopback server's browser-Origin allow-list: the origin gate is populated only after token validation, and the relay bridge presents the valid token without any user-consented browser Origin, so remote-originated calls pass the token+origin check the README advertises. The net effect is a network-to-local-agent-to-shell control path from a hardcoded author-controlled server into the installer's machine and any repository it is run against.