Search: SHA-256

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 0dc95fb4077cce0bff19aa1a77109d059dff6503bbf6c1b0dd2f41fc0a4c88e7 was observed 167 times in attacker activity between July 12 and August 1, 2026. The activity involved the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating the file was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in multiple countries including Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Hong Kong, and the United States. This file hash serves as an indicator of compromise (IOC) for detection and response purposes.

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 1dee0949441736015e60e2f4589a8855dbd19fcf9387946cf20ef2fed246ad7a was observed 409 times in attacker activity between July 11, 2026, and August 4, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Great Britain. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security telemetry to detect potential compromise.

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 9f44bf644db7bdaee5ffdbe66b5db29861fe10aa39ce3ed1738b1bc15a5ce6da was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity between July 11 and July 12, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and may represent a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in China, India, Pakistan, and Sweden. This indicator is intended for matching against files in environments and security feeds to detect potential malicious activity.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-09 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in US. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-09 and 2026-07-10. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in TZ, TH. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-09 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in GB. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-09 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in GB. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-09 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in GB. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system. Security Fix(es): * kernel: Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by sco_sock_timeout (CVE-2024-27398) * kernel: Bluetooth: SCO: Fix UAF on sco_sock_timeout (CVE-2024-50125) * kernel: ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr (CVE-2025-68183) * kernel: Bluetooth: SCO: Fix use-after-free in sco_recv_frame() due to missing sock_hold (CVE-2026-31408) * kernel: netfilter: nf_conntrack_helper: pass helper to expect cleanup (CVE-2026-43027) * kernel: ALSA: usb-audio: Add sanity check for OOB writes at silencing (CVE-2026-43279) * kernel: dlm: validate length in dlm_search_rsb_tree (CVE-2026-43125) * kernel: gfs2: Fix use-after-free in iomap inline data write path (CVE-2026-45984) * kernel: wifi: mac80211: drop stray 'static' from fast-RX rx_result (CVE-2026-46152) * kernel: RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path (CVE-2026-46189) Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s): * Kernel panic while shutting down ice driver due to use-after-free [rhel-9.4.z] (JIRA:RHEL-177523) * crypto: testmgr - allow authenc(hmac(sha{256,384}),cts(cbc(aes))) in FIPS mode [rhel-9.4.z] (JIRA:RHEL-182538) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 24 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-07 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in GB. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

pinokio-redis is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' (donimiqueakers@gmail.com). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of pinokio-redis (1.0.127) exists and all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a400b0342add77fd3a58e086334b35e11d79e234b180bb360f48adcd61ec4acd, SHA-1: 04b6035df92ef9eb790d64d425c05c51fce46ca7. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2593226767577439cd32d202e0e5e07ef74a6526f9ad7cb42f4bad087d04aa30) The package name presents as a Redis client for Pinokio, but the shipped tarball contains a credential-harvest and data-relay toolkit that has no relationship to Redis. dist/discordRelayUpload.js issues outbound POSTs and shells out (ping) to relay collected content; dist/hfCredentials.js and dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js decode base64-embedded blobs (Buffer.from(..., 'base64')) at runtime; dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js performs fetch() calls to huggingface.co endpoints under a "secret scan" module name — a shape consistent with harvesting scanned secrets rather than defending them. dist/deploymentDefaults.js and scripts/encode-deployment.mjs carry base64-encoded deployment configuration decoded at runtime, obscuring destination endpoints. scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs runs at npm install (postinstall) and issues network activity (GET, ping) on install without user interaction, providing auto-execution on default install. The combination — install-time auto-executed agent, base64-obfuscated configuration/payloads across multiple files, a Discord upload relay path, and a "secretScan" module that fetches to remote endpoints — describes an installer-side credential and data exfiltration toolkit, not a Redis integration. Name/purpose mismatch, install-time execution, and multi-file obfuscation together satisfy the active-attack shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d8c9c7ad731c0929056de138dff2c461e808854d25aea316f6fe865a3d04d8c0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full co

zredis-typed is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' (donimiqueakers@gmail.com). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of zredis-typed (1.0.127) exists; all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a1853a45bcb561f96e0e7c0dec7f96e640ae53be62e65158880812ff104c9e41, SHA-1: b74170f2d850bfd8d0a9d750af88a03ba2c42e61. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (330bc399769c68aa2a7f09a635bb038680c88c855268cc3643759492ebd96de9) The package name presents as a typed Redis client, but the tarball ships a multi-file exfiltration payload unrelated to any Redis functionality. `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` performs host reconnaissance (ping) and POSTs base64-encoded content to remote endpoints. `dist/relayServer.js` similarly runs ping-based host probing. `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` fetches attacker-controlled URLs on huggingface.co (used here as a data/staging endpoint), and `dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js` performs credential/secret scanning with base64 encoding of results. `dist/hfCredentials.js` handles third-party (Hugging Face) credential material via base64 decode. `dist/deploymentDefaults.js` and `scripts/encode-deployment.mjs` encode/decode deployment payloads via base64. `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` is registered as an install-time agent that performs outbound GET requests and host ping — running automatically on `npm install`. The combination of postinstall-time network activity, host reconnaissance, filesystem secret scanning, base64-encoded payload handling, Discord-labeled relay upload, and hardcoded remote fetch endpoints is unambiguous credential/data exfiltration disguised as a Redis type package. Nothing in the shipped modules implements a Redis client. The traced content also tripped the safety filter on downstream analysis, corroborating the malware shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (73b8d51428450de7f67cb29aa402a94aefd62bdcf03e4f0eee43c554576eec2e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed,

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 53 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-03 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in GB. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-02 and 2026-07-02. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in US. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-02 and 2026-07-02. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in US. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-02 and 2026-07-02. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in US. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-02 and 2026-07-02. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in US. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-02 and 2026-07-02. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in US. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.

The electron-orbit npm package contains malicious code that activates when required in Node.js environments. It establishes a covert network connection using a custom TLS 1.3 implementation to an Azure blob storage endpoint, bypassing standard TLS interception and static inspection. The package collects environment variables related to PATH and the current working directory, sending this data encoded in the request URL to the attacker-controlled server. Activation is conditional, triggered only when a specific environment variable's SHA-256 hash matches a hardcoded value, allowing targeted execution in chosen environments such as CI pipelines. The package's advertised functionality is a pretext; it does not perform legitimate icon fetching or SVG rendering as claimed.

OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-01 and 2026-07-01. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in PL. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.