Search: ***-gr*up.com
829 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2025-65637Red Hat Security Advisory: skopeo security update High7.5EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-65637 A denial-of-service vulnerability (CVE-2025-65637) affecting the skopeo command in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 has been addressed. The flaw is due to the github.com/sirupsen/logrus component mishandling large single-line payloads. This vulnerability could cause skopeo to become unresponsive or crash when processing specially crafted input. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.9 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-44432Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update High8.9EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-44432 ### Impact urllib3's [streaming API](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.7.0/advanced-usage.html#streaming-and-i-o) is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once. urllib3 can perform decompression based on the HTTP `Content-Encoding` header (e.g., `gzip`, `deflate`, `br`, or `zstd`). When using the streaming API since version 2.6.0, the library decompresses only the necessary bytes, enabling partial content consumption. However, urllib3 before version 2.7.0 could still decompress the whole response instead of the requested portion in two cases: 1. During the second `HTTPResponse.read(amt=N)` call when the response was decompressed using the official [Brotli](https://pypi.org/project/brotli/) library. 2. When `HTTPResponse.drain_conn()` was called after the response had been read and decompressed partially (compression algorithm did not matter here). These issues could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This could result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side. ### Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 versions earlier than 2.7.0 may be affected when streaming compressed responses from untrusted sources in either of these cases, unless decompression is explicitly disabled: 1. A response encoded with `br` is read incrementally with at least two `HTTPResponse.read(amt=N)` or `HTTPResponse.stream(amt=N)` calls while using the official [Brotli](https://pypi.org/project/brotli/) library. 2. `HTTPResponse.drain_conn()` is called after response decompression has already started. ### Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 version 2.7.0 in which the library: 1. Is more efficient for reads with Brotli. 2. Always skips decompression for `HTTPResponse.drain_conn()`. If upgrading is not immediately possible, the following workarounds may reduce exposure in specific cases: 1. For the Brotli-specific issue only, switch from [brotli](https://pypi.org/project/brotli/) to [brotlicffi](https://pypi.org/project/brotlicffi/) until you can upgrade urllib3; the official Brotli package is affected because of https://github.com/google/brotli/issues/1396. 2. If your code explicitly calls `HTTPResponse.drain_conn()`, call `HTTPResponse.close()` instead when connection reuse is not important. ### Credits The Brotli-specific issue was reported by @kimkou2024. `HTTPResponse.drain_conn()` inefficiency was reported by @Cycloctane. | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | 3.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-42195jgraph drawio · Open Redirect Low3.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42195 draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 29.7.9, the draw.io client accepts a ?gitlab= URL parameter that overrides the GitLab server URL used during OAuth sign-in. A crafted link causes the user's click on draw.io's "Authorize in GitLab" dialog to open a popup on the attacker-controlled host instead of gitlab.com. This can lead to credential fishing and session state token exfiltration. This issue has been patched in version 29.7.9. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.2 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.2EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-44694 ### Summary Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery affecting the webhook trigger tools, the n8n API client (`N8N_API_URL`), and per-request URLs supplied via the `x-n8n-url` header in multi-tenant HTTP mode. ### Impact A caller with access to the MCP session can drive HTTP requests from the n8n-mcp host to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints that the SSRF gate is meant to block. The response body is returned to the caller, making internal-service enumeration and credential theft immediate without any out-of-band channel. - **Multi-tenant HTTP deployments** where tenants share an `AUTH_TOKEN`: any tenant with valid credentials can reach the operator's cloud metadata service and exfiltrate temporary IAM / GCP service account / Azure managed-identity credentials. - **Single-tenant deployments**: indirect prompt injection through tool arguments reaches the same surface; an attacker who can influence the LLM's tool calls can read internal services from the n8n-mcp host. - **Stdio deployments** are reachable via the same prompt-injection path. ### Patched Versions Fixed in `n8n-mcp@2.50.2`. **Note for operators:** The same SSRF gate that previously covered webhook URLs now also covers the n8n API client base URL. If `N8N_API_URL` points at `http://localhost:5678` (n8n on the same host) or an RFC1918 address (n8n on the same private network), set `WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MODE=moderate` (allows localhost, still blocks RFC1918 and cloud metadata) or `WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MODE=permissive` (allows RFC1918 too — only safe on a trusted private network). Default `strict` is correct for deployments where n8n is reachable at a public hostname. ### Workarounds For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: 1. **Restrict network egress** from the n8n-mcp host with a firewall, reverse proxy, or cloud security group. Explicitly deny cloud metadata IPs (`169.254.169.254`, `169.254.170.2`, `100.100.100.200`, `192.0.0.192`, and the GCP `metadata.google.internal` resolved IP) and any RFC1918 networks the server does not legitimately need to reach. 2. **Run in stdio mode** instead of HTTP if the multi-tenant surface is not needed (no shared `AUTH_TOKEN` to compromise). 3. **Disable workflow management tools** via `DISABLED_TOOLS=n8n_trigger_webhook_workflow,n8n_create_workflow,n8n_test_workflow` if the deployment does not need them. ### Credit Reported by [@fg0x0](https://github.com/fg0x0). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-42282czlonkowski n8n-mcp · Sensitive Data in Logs Medium4.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42282 ### Impact When `n8n-mcp` runs in HTTP transport mode, authenticated MCP `tools/call` requests had their full arguments and JSON-RPC params written to server logs by the request dispatcher and several sibling code paths before any redaction. When a tool call carries credential material — most notably `n8n_manage_credentials.data` — the raw values can be persisted in logs. In deployments where logs are collected, forwarded to external systems, or viewable outside the request trust boundary (shared log storage, SIEM pipelines, support/ops access), this can result in disclosure of: - bearer tokens and OAuth credentials sent through `n8n_manage_credentials` - per-tenant API keys and webhook auth headers embedded in tool arguments - arbitrary secret-bearing payloads passed to any MCP tool The issue requires authentication (`AUTH_TOKEN` accepted by the server), so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger it; the runtime exposure is also reduced by an existing console-silencing layer in HTTP mode, but that layer is fragile and the values are still constructed and passed into the logger. The fix removes the leak at the source. Impact category: **CWE-532** (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File). CVSS 3.1 score: **4.3 Medium** (`AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`). ### Affected Deployments running n8n-mcp **v2.47.12 or earlier** in HTTP transport mode (`MCP_MODE=http`). The stdio transport short-circuits the relevant log calls and is not affected in practice. ### Patched **v2.47.13** and later. - npm: `npx n8n-mcp@latest` (or pin to `>= 2.47.13`) - Docker: `docker pull ghcr.io/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp:latest` The patch routes tool-call arguments through a metadata-only summarizer (`summarizeToolCallArgs`) that records type, top-level key names, and approximate size — never values. The same pattern was adopted earlier for HTTP request bodies in GHSA-pfm2-2mhg-8wpx. ### Workarounds If developers cannot upgrade immediately: - Restrict access to the HTTP port (firewall, reverse proxy, or VPN) so only trusted clients can authenticate. - Restrict access to server logs (no shared SIEM ingestion, no support read-only access) until the upgrade lands. - Switch to stdio transport (`MCP_MODE=stdio`, the default for CLI invocation), which has no HTTP surface and short-circuits the affected log calls. ### Credit n8n-MCP thanks [@Mirr2](https://github.com/Mirr2) (Organization / Jormungandr) for reporting this issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-41495czlonkowski n8n-mcp · Sensitive Data in Logs Medium5.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-41495 ### Impact When `n8n-mcp` runs in HTTP transport mode, incoming requests to the `POST /mcp` endpoint had their request metadata written to server logs regardless of the authentication outcome. In deployments where logs are collected, forwarded to external systems, or viewable outside the request trust boundary (shared log storage, SIEM pipelines, support/ops access), this can result in disclosure of: - bearer tokens from the `Authorization` header - per-tenant API keys from the `x-n8n-key` header in multi-tenant setups - JSON-RPC request payloads sent to the MCP endpoint Access control itself was not bypassed — unauthenticated requests were correctly rejected with `401 Unauthorized` — but sensitive values from those rejected requests could still be persisted in logs. Impact category: **CWE-532** (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File). ### Affected Deployments running n8n-mcp **v2.47.10 or earlier** in HTTP transport mode (`MCP_MODE=http`). The stdio transport is not affected. ### Patched **v2.47.11** and later. - npm: `npx n8n-mcp@latest` (or pin to `>= 2.47.11`) - Docker: `docker pull ghcr.io/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp:latest` ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately: - Restrict network access to the HTTP port (firewall, reverse proxy, or VPN) so only trusted clients can reach the endpoint. - Switch to stdio transport (`MCP_MODE=stdio`, the default for CLI invocation), which has no HTTP surface. ### Credit n8n-MCP thanks [@S4nso](https://github.com/S4nso) (Organization / Jormungandr) for reporting this issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | KEVMirageEPSS 89% | CVE-2026-42208BerriAI litellm · SQL Injection Critical9.3KEVMirageEPSS 89%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42208 ### Impact A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages. ### Patches Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query. ### References - Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable) **Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium6.5EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-25834 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-33816Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update Critical9.8EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-33816 A memory-safety vulnerability (CWE-787) was found in the PostgreSQL driver for Go (github.com/jackc/pgx) affecting Red Hat products. This flaw could allow an attacker to cause denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code by exploiting memory corruption. Red Hat has assessed the impact as high severity but currently does not have a mitigation that meets their criteria for ease of use and deployment. No fixed versions or patches are explicitly stated in the advisory. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2025-61669jupyter_server · Open Redirect Medium6.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-61669 The backend for Jupyter web applications Security Fix(es): Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In jupyter_server versions through 2.17.0, the next query parameter in the login flow is insufficiently validated in `LoginFormHandler._redirect_safe()`, which allows redirects to arbitrary external domains via values such as `///example.com`. An attacker can use a crafted login URL to redirect users to a malicious site and facilitate phishing attacks. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2025-61669) Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, a path traversal vulnerability in the REST API allows an authenticated user to escape the configured root_dir and access sibling directories whose names begin with the same prefix as the root_dir. For example, with a root_dir named "test", the API permits access to a sibling directory named "testtest" through a crafted request to the /api/contents endpoint using encoded path components. An attacker can read, write, and delete files in affected sibling directories. Multi-tenant deployments using predictable naming schemes are particularly at risk, as a user with a directory named "user1" could access directories for user10 through user19 and beyond. A user who can choose a single-character folder name could gain access to a significant number of sibling directories. Version 2.18.0 contains a fix. As a workaround, ensure folder names do not share a common prefix with any sibling directory.(CVE-2026-35397) Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python's re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2026-40110) Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the secret used to sign authentication cookies is persisted to a static file at ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret and is never rotated when a user changes their password. After a password reset and server restart, any previously issued authentication cookie remains cryptographically valid because the signing key has not changed. An attacker who has captured a session cookie through any means retains full authenticated access to the server regardless of subsequent password changes. This affects deployments using password-based authentication, particularly shared or public-facing servers where credential rotation is expected to revoke existing sessions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2026-40934) | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An emerging threat group is conducting a global SEO-poisoning campaign distributing trojanized Microsoft Teams installers that deploy a multi-stage shellcode loader and backdoor designated Lorem Ipsum. Active since February 2026, the campaign targets users searching for Microsoft Teams across six countries, with confirmed targeting of a US healthcare organization. The operators evolved rapidly from minimally obfuscated test builds to sophisticated loaders featuring substitution cipher decoding, XOR-encrypted shellcode, DLL sideloading, and JFIF-disguised C2 traffic. The malware distinctively abuses letsdiskuss[.]com, a legitimate India-based platform, as a dead-drop resolver for C2 infrastructure. Attackers use validly signed MSI installers with three-day Microsoft ID Verified certificates, NameCheap-registered infrastructure weaponized within hours, and per-victim UUID-tracked callbacks. Development velocity suggests possible LLM-assisted tooling, indicating a well-funded mid-tier criminal actor operating... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.3% | High7.5EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-29371 Red Hat Streams for Apache Kafka, based on the Apache Kafka project, offers a distributed backbone that allows microservices and other applications to share data with extremely high throughput and extremely low latency. This release of Red Hat Streams for Apache Kafka 3.2.0 serves as a replacement for Red Hat Streams for Apache Kafka 3.1.0, and includes security and bug fixes, and enhancements. Security Fix(es): * Drain Cleaner, Kafks Exporter - Eclipse Vert.x Web static handler file access denial [amq-st-3.2]"(CVE-2026-1002)" * Drain Cleaner, Kroxylicous - Netty denial of service[amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2026-33871)" * Drain Cleaner, Kroxylicous - Netty request smuggling attacks[amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2026-33870)" * Cruise Control - jose4j denial of service [amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2024-29371)" * Kafka Exporter - golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url [amq-st-3.2]"(CVE-2025-61726)" * Kafka Exporter - golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: golang: Denial of Service due to excessive resource consumption via crafted certificate [amq-st-3.2]"(CVE-2025-61729)" * Kafka Exporter - golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: Unexpected session resumption in crypto/tls [amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2025-68121)" * console UI - Next.js Server-Side Request Forgery in Server Actions [amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2024-34351)" * console UI - com.github.streamshub-console: Next.js: Unbounded next/image disk cache growth can exhaust storage[amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2026-27980)" * console UI - Axios: Server-Side Request Forgery and proxy bypass due to improper hostname normalization [amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2025-62718)" * console UI - React Server Components: Denial of Service via specially crafted HTTP requests [amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2026-23864)" * console UI - Axios: Remote Code Execution via Prototype Pollution escalation [amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2026-40175)" * console UI - lodash: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input in template imports [amqst-3.2]"(CVE-2026-4800)" | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Malicious npm package published by user `shetty123` as part of a Telegram account hijacking framework targeting Indian Telegram users. All 502 published versions (1.0.1 through 1.3.207) are malicious. Pairs with `ams-ssk`, which provides the operator's server-side AMS/CMS infrastructure. `common-tg-service` performs full Telegram account takeover at runtime when the service is initialized (no install-time hooks, which lets it bypass scanners that gate on preinstall/postinstall lifecycle scripts). Behavior includes: implanting a hardcoded 2FA password (`Ajtdmwajt1@`) and recovery email on hijacked accounts; polling an operator-controlled Gmail inbox over IMAP (`imap.gmail.com`) to auto-submit 2FA confirmation codes; revoking all device authorizations except the attacker's session; harvesting OTP codes by monitoring Telegram chat 777000 and forwarding them to the operator; running SRP ownership checks against managed accounts and flagging rotated 2FA as unrecoverable; and fetching remote JSON configuration from `npoint.io` so operators can change behavior without re-publishing. Blocked outbound requests are laundered through a relay at `helper-thge.onrender.com`. Stolen accounts and updates are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled Telegram channels (`-1001801844217` and `-1001972065816`). Operator infrastructure includes `paidgirl.site`, `cms.paidgirl.site`, `report-upi.netlify.app`, and `promoteClients2.glitch.me`. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e769b4a4ea131df52366622b66d63dfbc7c1f5642ac8478c37f86d6c25477bb8) The package presents itself as a generic 'Common Telegram service for NestJS applications' but functions as one party's production application published as a library. Multiple installer-harming behaviors are present: 1. Authentication backdoor. AppModule registers AuthGuard as a global APP_GUARD. dist/guards/auth.guard.js line 84 accepts the literal string 'santoor' as a valid x-api-key (or apiKey query parameter) and grants access to any route. Any NestJS service that imports AppModule from this package exposes every endpoint to anyone who sends `x-api-key: santoor`. The same value is baked into the shipped Swagger UI as the default auth value. 2. Silent relay of consumer outbound HTTP. dist/utils/fetchWithTimeout.js (used package-wide) automatically POSTs the original request (URL, method, headers, body, params) to https://helper-thge.onrender.com/execute-request whenever an upstream call returns 403 or 495, unless the consumer overrides process.env.bypassURL. The relay endpoint is author-controlled and authenticated with the same 'santoor' shared secret, so the author can read every mirrored request — including any auth headers or bodies the consumer's service was sending to its own upstreams. 3. Default proxy and IP-management routing through author infrastructure. dist/components/Telegram/utils/generateTGConfig.js line 97 defaults PROXY_API_URL to https://cms.paidgirls.site/ip-management and PROXY_API_KEY to 'santoor'. With proxying enabled, all MTProto traffic for the consumer's Telegram sessions is routed through SOCKS5 proxies chosen by the author, who can intercept, drop, or correlate the consumer's Telegram identities. 4. Remote zip drop into the consumer's working directory. dist/cloudinary.js line 87 fetches https://cms.paidgirls.site/folders/<folderName>/files/download-all, writes the response to process.cwd()/temp.zip, and calls zip.extractAllTo(process.cwd(), true) — overwriting any files in the consumer's working directory with whatever the author's server returns. There is no hash check, signature, or version pinning, and the destination is mutable. If extracted files land where the consumer's process later loads code or config, this is full RCE in the consumer's environment. 5. Hardcoded couplings that are not disclosed. dist/guards/auth.guard.js lines 15-26 hardcode ALLOWED_IPS and ALLOWED_ORIGINS for paidgirls.site, zomcall.netlify.app, and tgchats.netlify.app, and the package wires logging notifications to specific Telegram channels owned by the author. Taken together, importing AppModule from this package gives the author master authentication on the consumer's API, a persistent traffic-mirroring channel, control of the consumer's Telegram proxy path, and an ability to write arbitrary files into the consumer's process CWD on demand. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3e16628ad8dc1e6a6c98044a97ae5b72aec56f8a5a5bbc5bdff50bdaf51d978e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 10.0 | EPSS 0.4% | Critical10.0EPSS 0.4%GCVE Database Shopizer versions up to 2.16.0 contain a critical path traversal vulnerability in the /content/images/add endpoint. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary files to any writable location on the server by sending a crafted POST request. The vulnerability has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 10.0, indicating maximum severity with complete confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium6.3EPSS 0.4%GCVE Database A resource injection vulnerability exists in Xuxueli xxl-job versions prior to 3.4.0 in the logDetailCat function of the Execution Log Handler component. This flaw allows improper control of resource identifiers via manipulation of the logId argument. The vulnerability is remotely exploitable but considered difficult to exploit and has low severity. A public exploit is available. Upgrading to version 3.4.0 addresses the issue. | GCVE Database |
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