# HMAC validation bypass via multiple `.replace()` calls when removing URL signature
## Summary
Thumbor’s HMAC validation can be bypassed due to the use of Python’s `.replace()` when removing the signature from the URL before validation. Since `.replace()` removes **all occurrences** of the substring, an attacker can insert the same signature multiple times in the URL and manipulate the final URL used for validation.
This allows crafting URLs where the validated string differs from the actual requested resource, enabling loading images from unintended domains or paths.
## Details
Thumbor signs URLs using **HMAC-SHA1** to prevent abuse such as loading arbitrary external images or invoking filters without authorization.
During request validation, Thumbor removes the signature from the request URL before recalculating the HMAC. The relevant code:
```python
url_signature = self.context.request.hash
if url_signature:
signer = self.context.modules.url_signer(
self.context.server.security_key
)
try:
quoted_hash = quote(self.context.request.hash)
except KeyError:
self._error(400, f"Invalid hash: {self.context.request.hash}")
return
url_to_validate = url.replace(
f"/{self.context.request.hash}/", ""
).replace(f"/{quoted_hash}/", "")
valid = signer.validate(
unquote(url_signature).encode(), url_to_validate
)
```
The issue is that `.replace()` removes **every occurrence** of the substring in the URL, not just the first one.
Because the signature itself appears in the URL, an attacker can **inject additional copies of the signature** elsewhere in the path. When Thumbor performs `.replace()`, these extra occurrences are also removed, resulting in a different `url_to_validate` than the original request.
## Example
Valid request:
```
/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/300x200/s3.glbimg.com/v1/.../image.jpg
```
By injecting the same hash inside the URL:
```
/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/300x200/s3.glbimg.co/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/m/v1/.../image.jpg
```
After `.replace()` removes all occurrences of the hash, the URL used for validation differs from the effective request path. This allows manipulation of the upstream host or path.
Further manipulation is possible due to the **second `.replace()` for the URL-encoded hash (`%3D`)**, enabling more precise path manipulation.
Example:
```
/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/300x200/s3.glbimg.com/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc%3D/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po/v1/...
```
## Impact
This behavior may allow attackers to:
- Bypass HMAC URL validation
- Load images from arbitrary domains
- Abuse Thumbor deployments as an open proxy / image fetcher
- Circumvent domain restrictions intended by the signed URL mechanism
## Root Cause
Use of `.replace()` without limiting the number of replacements when removing the signature from the URL.
Since the signature is part of the request path, using a global replacement allows attackers to place additional occurrences of the same substring to influence the validated string.
## Suggested Fix
Remove only the first occurrence of the signature or explicitly parse the URL components instead of performing global string replacement.
Example:
```python
url.replace(f"/{self.context.request.hash}/", "", 1)
```
Alternatively, reconstruct the unsigned URL deterministically from the parsed request components.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: kam193 (ba38202b0196fc58518ffc2cb0c0cd9067da9fec70d6bb371119b8175893b416)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
---
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: kam193 (d3479f5a67e780468835828895609215d82aa5a273dfc152e4bae5a12f21a245)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
---
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
## Source: ossf-package-analysis (f6374657adeacc8c32b7973bed105f6733f6cb8da7c9ec7c62eba4804c5fa0d1)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'asdk-plugin-alphagen' @ 9999.0.0 (pypi) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: kam193 (65dd9dd087b805a16fb5d68c92cf2be0ec28fec162d75bb0eb81bb8d9bcfb61a)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
---
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in Innotim Software, Telecommunications and Consulting Trade Ltd. Co. Logsign SIEM allows Code Injection.
This issue affects Logsign SIEM: before 6.4.115.
Security experts have been sounding the alarm for years about the risks of using generic TV boxes that promise unlimited content streaming for a one-time fee, warning that they secretly rent the user’s Internet connection out to strangers. But a groundbreaking new analysis finds these devices also routinely spoof themselves as mobile phones clicking ads on AI-generated websites as part of a sprawling operation that seeks to defraud online merchants and advertising networks. Pedro Falé is a threat researcher with the security firm Bitsight . Falé told KrebsOnSecurity he was able to peer inside a vast and complex ad fraud network by registering an expired domain name that was used to coordinate fake ad clicks across a particularly popular brand of these streaming devices known as H96 . An H96 TV streaming device currently advertised for sale on Amazon. Falé said the domain he scooped up was previously used for telemetry, periodically collecting full hardware information and the entire list of installed apps from tens of thousands of H96 streaming sticks plugged into television sets around the globe. But upon inspecting the traffic being funneled to the domain, he discovered nearly all of the TV boxes transmitting data claimed to be mobile phone models from a variety of manufacturers, including Samsung, Vivo, Huawei, and Xiaomi. “We noticed something was wildly wrong,” Falé said. “Multiple devices reporting to this factory Android TV Box backdoor were ‘phones.'” Image: Bitsight. The researcher found all of the devices reported having the same two apps installed, and that those apps were made by a company called Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Ltd , an entity founded in 2019 in mainland China which operates an ad-publishing portfolio under the name Fengwo Group . Further investigation into the Fengwo Group revealed it has registered multiple patents that match the inner workings of these apps. “Bitsight TRACE identified several Hong Kong, Singapore, and single person ‘legal’ shell identities used to collect the monetization and traced the operation back to a mainland China company known as Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Co., Ltd, which operates under the Fengwo Group,” Falé wrote in a report released today about their findings. Falé said an analysis of the apps shows they help to coordinate an ad fraud network that uses these H96 devices as a captive traffic source to click on ads at AI-generated websites operated by the Fengwo Group. Bitsight discovered the websites contain machine-generated news articles and graphics across a range of categories, including finance, health, education, gaming, music and food blogs. But they also found none of those sites displayed ads unless the device visiting the page matched the spoofed mobile profile of these H96 devices. AI DIGITAL HUMANS The domain for the Fengwo Group — fwgcloud[.]com — claims the company is “redefining the boundaries of human-AI interaction,” and that it has created more than 120,000 “AI digital humans” available to rent for everything from emotional companionship to 24/7 customer service and creative design. The homepage for fwgcloud dot com. Falé said the Fengwo Group’s domain shared its SSL certificate data with other domains associated with the apps found on H96 devices, specifically the phone spoofing mechanism. He noted the domain also has an internal wiki platform that directly ties the Fengwo Group to a proprietary implementation of a Google-built visual programming language called Blockly , which was originally designed to help kids learn how to write software. According to Bitsight, the Fengwo Group’s employees use Blockly to build the sham websites, allowing low-skilled operators to drag blocks of code together in their Blockly editor — without any need to understand what the underlying code blocks do or how they work. The Blockly homepage. “An operator can drag blocks together in their Blockly editor, to define each fraud routine, given a task type,” reads Bitsi…
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