Search: api--telegram.ru
50 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f0c3ed879ef15a68d537ad7b6ddb59508aba58eee49c8ca19b916ef59a0c2da6) stella-cli/telegram-bot.mjs hardcodes a Telegram bot API token (BOT_TOKEN = "8923551485:AAFw4wG8ZwOtp5rzFsnguxhu4AH-2_ebSi0") that is controlled by the package author. When the user invokes the /tg CLI command, the package starts a Telegram bot on the installer's machine that receives messages over api.telegram.org and passes them into execSync(`node stella-cli/index.mjs -p "${text}"`), invoking a shell-capable AI agent CLI with attacker-supplied input. Because the messaging channel is bound to a token the author retains, the author observes all bot traffic — including the 4-digit admin authorization code exchanged over that same channel — and can replay it to reach the command-execution path on any installer that enables /tg. telegram-bot.mjs additionally sends os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username to the same author-controlled bot. A hardcoded PREMIUM_CODE = "10102013" acts as a universal activation key that unlocks the remote-control feature-set without payment. package.json sets "main": "stella-cli/index.mjs", whose top-level executes main() and starts the interactive CLI on require/import, extending the reach of the /tg surface beyond the bin entry. There are no install lifecycle hooks; the backdoor fires when the user runs the CLI (or a consumer imports the module) and invokes /tg. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fa992a8f9afcf95d3c0e35b6abc290ff565b450663f6d43511467cd370eefce8) ts-einkle@1.1.3 ships a comprehensive installer-side stealer in its main module `peer-math.js`. On require, `syncSession()` runs a chain (`packProjectBundle`, `packWalletsAndCreds`, `packDeepScan`) that: (1) reads classic credential paths including `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.pypirc`, `~/.docker/config.json`, `~/.git-credentials`, and `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml`; (2) on Windows invokes PowerShell `ProtectedData::Unprotect` (DPAPI) against Chromium `Local State` `os_crypt.encrypted_key` to derive the master key and decrypt the `Login Data` SQLite to plaintext passwords; (3) copies Firefox `key4.db`/`logins.json`, Bitwarden `data.json`, KeePass `.kdbx`, and 1Password SQLite vaults; (4) packs browser wallet extension stores for MetaMask, Phantom, Solflare, OKX, Coinbase, TrustWallet, Backpack, and TronLink; (5) packs Telegram Desktop `tdata`; (6) enumerates home and drives for wallet/seed/mnemonic/key keyword matches; (7) collects browser cookies, clipboard, shell history, and scrapes source trees. Captured data is POSTed to `https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/v1` (overridable via `PSM_API_URL`). `package.json` declares `"postinstall": "node test.js"`, so installation is intended to auto-trigger the chain. Cover-story labels (functions renamed `from_str_1..17`, sentinel files named `data-backup-upload-*.sent`) and a themed name with keywords `polymarket`, `kelly`, `stake` impersonate benign tooling; the README itself refers to the upload endpoint as a "C2 URL". ## Source: ghsa-malware (6dc191a91bfcc0bd37051e540aa2ba32ffe82b577fba8a0e21a4e1d006a16cb6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3975a0998bf76dddc25f0138b1d4b408bb06304b3203dc1e62e0110b2b56425f) InLifeGram distributes a modified copy of the `pyrogram` Telegram client library and installs it into the top-level `pyrogram` import namespace, so `import pyrogram` after installation resolves to this fork. The fork's Client start path has been modified to lazily import a sibling module (`from. import app as secret`) and, when the authenticated account is a bot (`self.me.is_bot`), call `secret.init(self)` wrapped in a bare `except Exception: pass`. The call hands the fully authenticated client object — containing the bot token, api_id/api_hash, and MTProto auth_key — to undocumented code. The receiving `app.py` module consists of a single `exec(zlib.decompress(base64.b85decode(b'...')).decode())` over an ~11KB opaque blob, with no other functionality and an Indonesian-language header threatening anyone who removes 'credits'. The multi-layer obfuscation (base85 → zlib → exec), the silent invocation on bot authentication, and the bare-except suppression are the canonical shape of a session/token-stealing backdoor. README links a sibling project `VLife-Gram` by the same author, indicating a family of trojanized forks. Any program that installs InLifeGram and runs a Pyrogram bot will silently surrender its bot session to the hidden payload on every successful login. ## Source: kam193 (9e2d3483845391abac4b854096ffc1c7767818f9e2b02486d969ee2be0638dc9) The modified version of a Telegram bot library. The obfuscated code, launched when the user starts their own bot application, attaches malicious backdoor commands to the Telegram bot. They allow hardcoded users to execute any commands in the bot's environment. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-inlifegram Reasons (based on the campaign): - clones-real-package - obfuscation - The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine. - rat - target:telegram - action-hidden-in-lib-usage - backdoor | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Group-IB analyzes Millenium RAT version 4.*, a remote access trojan that has undergone significant architectural changes from .NET to native C++, while continuing to leverage Telegram Bot API for command and control without requiring dedicated server infrastructure. The malware is distributed as Malware-as-a-Service by developer 'ShinyEnigma' for $50-90 USD. Active exploitation campaigns are conducted by threat actor cluster 'Y2K Operators' using social engineering tactics including fraudulent utilities, hacking toolkits, software cracks, gaming lures, and trojanized cybercrime tools. The trojan enables exfiltration of sensitive browser and system data, screenshot and audio capture, keylogging, and arbitrary executable downloads. Over 62,000 compromised endpoints across more than 160 countries have been identified, with 39,730 infections occurring in Q1 2026 alone, demonstrating accelerating infection rates. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (048a186e2e59bb0b7d9986c7099e527390e38690292bc49e237578a471c56680) The package advertises itself as a Base58 encoder/decoder but on require() schedules a delayed payload that performs multiple installer-side attacks. After a 72-hour activation delay, code in dist/index.cjs and dist/index.js enumerates installer-owned secret stores — MetaMask extension storage across Chrome/Chromium/Brave/Edge profiles, Telegram Desktop tdata sessions, ~/.ssh keys, ~/.npmrc _authToken values, browser profile inventories, and env/.env crypto secret variables — and POSTs the collected report to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://2.27.62.51:8080/api/health (with:8081 as backup). A setInterval clipboard monitor invokes pbpaste/xclip/PowerShell via child_process every 2.5 seconds, matches BTC/ETH/SOL address regexes plus WIF private keys, BIP39 seed phrases (12–24 words), and 64-hex private keys, rewrites detected wallet addresses to attacker-controlled destinations (bc1qjft978uykglsh0adcyx6xhkes56vqzs3fual3l, 0xd63eD44065eDb1e2ad2519B011c06412dA7B7c5B, A7ajd7W5WYdrnkeaiBRjVoK6uBEDvgnuZcpzQXqo18Ph), writes them back to the clipboard, and exfiltrates matched values and the original clipboard slice to the same endpoint. A persistence routine appends a node -e loader to ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, and ~/.profile that re-invokes the payload on every shell start; on Windows it drops base58-runtime.js into the user Startup folder, keeping the clipboard hijacker and exfil active across reboots and beyond project uninstall. The 72-hour dormancy timer is designed to evade sandbox and CI dynamic analysis. The package name and keywords (bitcoin/solana/wallet/ipfs) impersonate legitimate Base58 libraries to target crypto developers. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e697e341b967e796e17cc132952e12802f5e4e6ce8be1453d0434bf6c308081f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (811002816e7f72588c7c6540b088af5c44b8280574e43dbaeef4701fe377fe9f) Package impersonates the legitimate base-x/base62 library by Daniel Cousens (name `base62-86x`, homepage pointing at cryptocoinjs/base-x, identical source layout). The exported `decode(string)` function in both the CJS build (src/cjs/index.cjs) and the ESM build (src/esm/index.js) has been patched to silently POST every caller-supplied input to a hardcoded Telegram Bot API endpoint. The CJS variant hides the destination behind obfuscator.io string-array rotation that resolves to https://api.telegram.org/bot7837266935:<redacted>/sendMessage with chat_id 7974622428; the ESM variant wraps the same exfiltration in a custom bytecode VM whose base64 constant pool decodes to https://api.telegram.org/bot8880020840:<redacted>/sendMessage with chat_id 7959381237. Because consumers of a base-encoding library typically pass cryptocurrency addresses, private keys, identifiers, and other base-encoded secrets to decode(), every such call leaks the plaintext input to the attacker. Two distinct bot tokens indicate staged campaign or failover infrastructure. Heavy obfuscation of both bodies confirms intent to conceal the relay; there is no opt-in or documented behavior covering this network egress. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3627fca9d507f1dadfa8bb9723265bfbfa34362d3303072c840e38cf57ef4b69) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated Rust-based macOS implant named macOS.Gaslight has been discovered, featuring a novel 3.5 KB prompt-injection payload containing 38 fabricated system messages designed to disrupt LLM-assisted malware analysis. The backdoor communicates via Telegram Bot API with AES-GCM encrypted payloads over certificate-pinned TLS and includes self-redaction capabilities to hide its bot token from logs. It provides operators with an interactive shell, system information collection, and credential stealing capabilities through a bundled Python script that targets browser data, keychains, and command histories. The implant uses runtime-fetched CPython interpreters and establishes persistence through a LaunchAgent masquerading as an Apple system service. This threat is assessed with high confidence to be aligned with DPRK activity and represents a significant evolution in adversarial techniques targeting security analysts rather than sandbox environments. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d5ade836e7f92049242a01dbc0782900900c4e28eb7e08f9d9ebc611aab80762) nodepathbalance54 exports a single function (`nodeaxionweb`) whose implementation is hidden inside a hand-rolled stack-based JavaScript VM in index.js (functions iL/iw with ~200 opcodes, base64-encoded bytecode chunks in array S). Decoding the VM's constant pool reveals a hardcoded Telegram bot token (8604230339:AAE0jcxBc1QC_YV1Um6TT4bvC0mgZGlhoy4), chat id (-1002861294159), the base URL https://api.telegram.org/bot, and a message template prefixed `Private Key: ` followed by getLocalIP / getPublicIP / os.hostname / platform / arch / ISO timestamp fields, posted via axios.post to /sendMessage. Any caller that invokes the exported API with a wallet private key (the package depends on `ethers@5.4` and is named/described in the wallet-tooling family) silently relays that key plus host fingerprinting data to the attacker's Telegram channel. The custom-VM obfuscation has no legitimate engineering purpose in a 100KB utility module and is paired with a numeric-suffix squat cluster (nodepathbalance45/54) where this package also pulls in nodepathbalance45 as a dependency. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cdc355f0a37fdea9334e29b85d8ee4fa970dfc51471cd95d9ebaa5d1f7e7e9ee) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated, modular phishing infrastructure has been identified targeting at least 12 Mexican financial institutions over a three-year period. The operation leverages GitHub Pages for hosting and SheetBest API for credential exfiltration, eliminating the need for dedicated backend infrastructure. Attackers employ obfuscated JavaScript, randomized paths, and dynamic brand selection panels to impersonate legitimate banking portals. Over 100 associated domains were identified, each hosting multiple phishing pages across different paths. Credentials are collected through multi-stage forms mimicking authentic banking authentication flows and exfiltrated in real-time to attacker-controlled Google Sheets. An alternative exfiltration method via Telegram bot was also observed. The campaign demonstrates operational persistence with multiple operator accounts maintaining the infrastructure through continuous commits and updates. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The solana-rpc-pool npm package version 1.0.0 contains malicious code executed during installation. The postinstall script steals credentials from common locations, exfiltrates them via Telegram bot API, drains Solana wallets by transferring funds to an attacker-controlled address, persists via a cron job to run on reboot, and evades sandbox detection to avoid analysis. The package masquerades as legitimate Solana tooling but includes a backdoor script alongside its legitimate API implementation. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (06e89dc9ff0a5d334b67a01c572c036b0740adf6d8669d2fa25c241a0c098116) The package advertises itself as a Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitor but bundles a covert clipboard surveillance daemon in its compiled core module (bittensor_burn_watch/core.cpython-310-*.so). When the user runs the documented `bittensor-burn-alert install` command, the daemon installs persistence across all major operating systems — Windows Task Scheduler, Linux systemd user service, and macOS LaunchAgent — and starts polling the clipboard on every login. Clipboard contents are read via Win32 API on Windows (with a PowerShell fallback), `wl-paste --watch` on Wayland, and `xclip` on X11; the Linux path scrapes DISPLAY/DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS from the active graphical session and auto-installs `wl-clipboard`/`xclip` if missing. Each unique clipboard string (deduplicated via SQLite) is POSTed to `https://api.telegram.org` against a hardcoded bot token (8666228137) and chat ID (8766781014) shipped in `bittensor_burn_watch/defaults.env`. A comment inside the compiled binary explicitly labels these credentials as 'Bundled clipboard Telegram + taostats API (all pip users; not user-editable)' — the exfiltration channel is intentionally separated from the user-facing `BURN_TELEGRAM_*` configuration so installers cannot redirect or disable it. The binary further notes 'no window flash' / 'no taskbar flash' to evade user awareness. The Bittensor-themed naming targets TAO subnet operators, whose clipboards routinely carry wallet seed phrases, addresses, and API keys. ## Source: kam193 (fe199e0ca267ae05d6213339b5d925218af5b5c2d884dfb4c74bc99b81a19c0f) The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. Early versions contain this behavior mentioned in the README. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret phrases. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger Reasons (based on the campaign): - clipboard-stealing - crypto-related | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General This analysis examines Gamaredon's (UAC-0010, Armagedon) advanced espionage operations targeting Ukrainian government, military, and critical infrastructure. The FSB-operated group deploys GammaSteel, a sophisticated stealer operating almost entirely from memory using Windows DPAPI encryption and storing 71 distinct payload functions in the HKCU\Printers registry key. The malware employs three concurrent data acquisition mechanisms: timed drive scans, USB monitoring for air-gapped systems, and real-time file surveillance. Exfiltration occurs via legitimate S3-compatible cloud storage (Tebi.io) with fallback to operator-controlled servers. The infection chain extensively uses VBScript for evasion, Dead Drop Resolvers on platforms like Telegram and Mastodon for C2 configuration, and includes bidirectional backdoor capabilities enabling arbitrary remote code execution. Infrastructure demonstrates high automation with servers rotated approximately every 24 hours. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A solo Russian-speaking threat actor tracked as 'bandcampro' operated a five-year MAGA-themed Telegram channel with approximately 17,000 subscribers, initially forwarding cryptocurrency scam content before pivoting to AI-automated operations in September 2025. The actor utilized jailbroken Google Gemini to generate QAnon-styled posts, deploy infrastructure, manage stolen API keys, and run credential theft operations targeting politically engaged American audiences. The campaign weaponized cultural alignment with QAnon and MAGA communities to facilitate cryptocurrency fraud rather than political influence. Through AI assistance, the actor cracked 29 WordPress admin credentials, infiltrated at least one company, deployed remote access trojans disguised as cryptocurrency wallets, and operated a gamified chatbot called 'QFS 2.0 Terminal'. The operation demonstrates how frontier AI systems enable scalable, low-cost cybercriminal activities by allowing a single actor to perform tasks traditionally requiring enti... | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated Android malware campaign has been identified conducting carrier billing fraud through premium SMS abuse across Malaysia, Thailand, Romania, and Croatia. The operation comprises nearly 250 malicious applications that selectively target users based on their mobile operators, silently subscribing victims to premium services without consent. The malware demonstrates advanced capabilities including precise regional targeting with hardcoded SIM operator validation, automated subscription workflows using WebView manipulation and JavaScript injection, OTP interception via abuse of Google's SMS Retriever API, and Telegram-based exfiltration of device metadata. The campaign impersonates popular applications including Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Minecraft, and Grand Theft Auto to lure victims. Active from March 2025 through January 2026, the operation employs three distinct variants with increasing levels of sophistication, utilizing distributed command and control infrastructure and systematic refer... | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Malicious npm package published by user `shetty123` as part of a Telegram account hijacking framework targeting Indian Telegram users. All 502 published versions (1.0.1 through 1.3.207) are malicious. Pairs with `ams-ssk`, which provides the operator's server-side AMS/CMS infrastructure. `common-tg-service` performs full Telegram account takeover at runtime when the service is initialized (no install-time hooks, which lets it bypass scanners that gate on preinstall/postinstall lifecycle scripts). Behavior includes: implanting a hardcoded 2FA password (`Ajtdmwajt1@`) and recovery email on hijacked accounts; polling an operator-controlled Gmail inbox over IMAP (`imap.gmail.com`) to auto-submit 2FA confirmation codes; revoking all device authorizations except the attacker's session; harvesting OTP codes by monitoring Telegram chat 777000 and forwarding them to the operator; running SRP ownership checks against managed accounts and flagging rotated 2FA as unrecoverable; and fetching remote JSON configuration from `npoint.io` so operators can change behavior without re-publishing. Blocked outbound requests are laundered through a relay at `helper-thge.onrender.com`. Stolen accounts and updates are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled Telegram channels (`-1001801844217` and `-1001972065816`). Operator infrastructure includes `paidgirl.site`, `cms.paidgirl.site`, `report-upi.netlify.app`, and `promoteClients2.glitch.me`. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e769b4a4ea131df52366622b66d63dfbc7c1f5642ac8478c37f86d6c25477bb8) The package presents itself as a generic 'Common Telegram service for NestJS applications' but functions as one party's production application published as a library. Multiple installer-harming behaviors are present: 1. Authentication backdoor. AppModule registers AuthGuard as a global APP_GUARD. dist/guards/auth.guard.js line 84 accepts the literal string 'santoor' as a valid x-api-key (or apiKey query parameter) and grants access to any route. Any NestJS service that imports AppModule from this package exposes every endpoint to anyone who sends `x-api-key: santoor`. The same value is baked into the shipped Swagger UI as the default auth value. 2. Silent relay of consumer outbound HTTP. dist/utils/fetchWithTimeout.js (used package-wide) automatically POSTs the original request (URL, method, headers, body, params) to https://helper-thge.onrender.com/execute-request whenever an upstream call returns 403 or 495, unless the consumer overrides process.env.bypassURL. The relay endpoint is author-controlled and authenticated with the same 'santoor' shared secret, so the author can read every mirrored request — including any auth headers or bodies the consumer's service was sending to its own upstreams. 3. Default proxy and IP-management routing through author infrastructure. dist/components/Telegram/utils/generateTGConfig.js line 97 defaults PROXY_API_URL to https://cms.paidgirls.site/ip-management and PROXY_API_KEY to 'santoor'. With proxying enabled, all MTProto traffic for the consumer's Telegram sessions is routed through SOCKS5 proxies chosen by the author, who can intercept, drop, or correlate the consumer's Telegram identities. 4. Remote zip drop into the consumer's working directory. dist/cloudinary.js line 87 fetches https://cms.paidgirls.site/folders/<folderName>/files/download-all, writes the response to process.cwd()/temp.zip, and calls zip.extractAllTo(process.cwd(), true) — overwriting any files in the consumer's working directory with whatever the author's server returns. There is no hash check, signature, or version pinning, and the destination is mutable. If extracted files land where the consumer's process later loads code or config, this is full RCE in the consumer's environment. 5. Hardcoded couplings that are not disclosed. dist/guards/auth.guard.js lines 15-26 hardcode ALLOWED_IPS and ALLOWED_ORIGINS for paidgirls.site, zomcall.netlify.app, and tgchats.netlify.app, and the package wires logging notifications to specific Telegram channels owned by the author. Taken together, importing AppModule from this package gives the author master authentication on the consumer's API, a persistent traffic-mirroring channel, control of the consumer's Telegram proxy path, and an ability to write arbitrary files into the consumer's process CWD on demand. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3e16628ad8dc1e6a6c98044a97ae5b72aec56f8a5a5bbc5bdff50bdaf51d978e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated multi-stage malware operation was identified through an exposed C2 panel at 103.241.66[.]238:1337, combining cryptocurrency clipboard hijacking across eight chains, BIP-39 seed phrase theft, browser credential exfiltration, ransomware module (crpx0), and Java RAT builder managed via FastAPI-based panel with license key system. The operation targets Windows and macOS using FedEx and OnlyFans-themed social engineering lures, with complete source code exposed in open directories. The ransomware component communicates with three Russian .ru domains resolving to 31.31.198[.]206 at REG.RU hosting, operating under the identity DataBreachPlus with Telegram, qTox, and ProtonMail contacts. Ten cryptocurrency wallet addresses spanning Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Dogecoin, Litecoin, Solana, Ripple, and Bitcoin Cash were extracted from configurations, indicating a Malware-as-a-Service operation with tiered licensing. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General In March 2026, trojans represented 21% of attachment-based threats, while phishing attacks using fake pages dropped from 42% to 15% month-over-month. Script-based malware increased significantly, with HTML at 14% and JavaScript at 11%. Compressed files including ZIP (14%), RAR (8%), and 7Z (5%) were common distribution methods. Document-based threats utilized PDF (13%), XLS (5%), and DOCX (2%) files. Attackers impersonated courier services like FedEx and DHL, as well as financial institutions including Hana Bank and Woori Bank. Distribution methods included HTML scripts and PDF hyperlinks leading to credential-stealing pages. Notable malware families included RemcosRAT and AgentTesla, with command-and-control infrastructure utilizing Telegram API tokens and external mail servers for data exfiltration. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A coordinated campaign of 108 malicious Chrome extensions operated through shared command-and-control infrastructure at cloudapi[.]stream has been identified, collectively accounting for approximately 20,000 installations. The campaign spans multiple threat categories: 54 extensions steal Google account identities via OAuth2, one extension actively exfiltrates Telegram Web sessions every 15 seconds, and 45 extensions contain a universal backdoor enabling arbitrary URL execution on browser startup. Published under five distinct publisher identities (Yana Project, GameGen, SideGames, Rodeo Games, and InterAlt), these extensions masquerade as legitimate tools including Telegram sidebar clients, slot games, YouTube and TikTok enhancers, and translation utilities. All extensions route stolen credentials, user identities, and browsing data to servers controlled by the same operator, with infrastructure confirming a Malware-as-a-Service business model. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General APT37 conducted a sophisticated social engineering campaign utilizing Facebook accounts claiming locations in Pyongyang and Pyongsong, North Korea, to conduct reconnaissance and build trust with targets. After establishing relationships through Facebook Messenger, the threat actor migrated conversations to Telegram and employed pretexting tactics, claiming to share encrypted PDF documents containing military weapons information. Victims were persuaded to install a tampered Wondershare PDFelement installer that executed embedded shellcode for initial compromise. The attack chain delivered follow-on commands through a JPG-disguised payload hosted on a compromised Japanese real estate website. The malware abused Zoho WorkDrive OAuth2 APIs as C2 channels, exfiltrating screenshots, documents, system information, and audio files. The campaign employed multiple evasion techniques including code cave injection, process hollowing into legitimate dism.exe, XOR encryption layers, and fileless in-memory execution. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Hydra Saiga, a suspected Kazakhstani state-sponsored threat actor, has been actively targeting government, energy, and critical infrastructure in Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East since 2021. The group is known for using Telegram Bot API for C2 communication and employing a mix of custom implants and 'Living off the Land' techniques. Their activities align closely with Kazakhstan's geopolitical interests, particularly in water and energy sectors. The group has compromised at least 34 organizations across 8 countries, with reconnaissance extending to over 200 additional targets globally. Hydra Saiga's operations demonstrate a clear focus on water infrastructure linked to major regional rivers and gas distribution systems, reflecting strategic intelligence collection efforts. | AlienVault OTX General |
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