Search: t-online.de

motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called "motion," which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.

A reseller account compromise allowed an attacker to access and inject malicious content into dozens of unrelated customer websites hosted on a shared cPanel/WHM server. The attacker used the reseller's credentials to propagate Indonesian online-gambling doorway pages across multiple sites without breaching each site individually. This coordinated parasite-SEO attack affected diverse businesses, highlighting the risk posed by reseller account compromises in multi-tenant hosting environments.

gin-vue-admin is an AI-assisted basic development platform. In version 2.9.1, an authenticated attacker with access to the code-generation feature and MCP management interface can exploit this vulnerability by injecting attacker-controlled Go source code through POST /autoCode/addFunc, and then invoking POST /autoCode/mcpStart to trigger a rebuild and restart of the standalone MCP service. This allows arbitrary operating system commands to be executed on the server with the privileges of the application process. Successful exploitation may lead to remote code execution (RCE), modification of backend source code or runtime logic, deployment of persistent backdoors, access to or manipulation of application data and configuration, and further impact on local resources running under the same service account or privilege context. The risk is highest in deployments that retain the source tree, allow writes to source files, and support local build or startup of standalone MCP components. In environments using binary-only releases, read-only filesystems, or with local build capabilities removed, the exploitability of the full attack chain is significantly reduced. However, once the online code-generation capability and MCP-hosted startup workflow are enabled, the overall security impact may reach high to critical severity. As of time of publication, it is unknown if a patched version is available. As a workaround, enforce strict allowlist validation on path- and identifier-related fields such as `humpPackageName`, `packageName`, `FuncName`, and `Router`, and only permit safe identifier formats.

A large-scale compromise of over 75,000 Fortinet device administrator credentials has been reported. The compromised credentials appear to be recent and include devices that are still online. The data was reportedly obtained from device configuration exports, containing sensitive information visible only from the devices themselves. This incident affects a significant portion of Fortinet firewall devices exposed to the internet, estimated at around 15% based on Shodan polling. The compromised devices include many with fairly recent patches. The source of this information is a Reddit post linking to a LinkedIn profile of a security researcher involved in the discovery.

A security vulnerability has been detected in GL.iNet GL-MT3000 up to 4.4.5. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /usr/bin/one_click_upgrade of the component Online Firmware Upgrade Handler. Such manipulation leads to command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. Upgrading to version 4.7 addresses this issue. Upgrading the affected component is advised. The vendor was contacted early, responded in a very professional manner and quickly released a fixed version of the affected product.

The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'bookly-customer-full-name' cookie in versions up to, and including, 27.2 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. Exploitation requires 'Remember personal information in cookies' setting to be enabled (disabled by default).

Iranian and Russian shadow fleet vessels are utilizing sophisticated online infrastructure consisting of over 36 inauthentic websites to facilitate sanctions evasion. These websites impersonate ship registries, national maritime administrations, seafarer training organizations, protection and indemnity clubs, and classification societies from jurisdictions including Comoros, Benin, Bhutan, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Haiti, Malawi, Nicaragua, and Zambia. The infrastructure operates through three identified clusters designated Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie, which demonstrate technical overlaps suggesting a broader ecosystem supporting multiple sanctions evasion networks. Operators employ tactics including automated document generation, typosquatting, identity spoofing, and mutual endorsement loops between fraudulent entities. Attribution includes links to Indian web development company Oceaniek Technologies and two Syrian nationals. The infrastructure has documented connections to seventeen vesse...

US Federal authorities have seized 13 domains allegedly used in a Chinese intelligence-linked operation to recruit Americans with access to classified government information. The websites posed as legitimate consulting firms, offering vague consultancy and advisory roles to current and former US government employees, military personnel, and security clearance holders. The operation, which began in November 2023, used fake company websites, online job postings, and social media recruiting to approach potential targets. Recruiters offered paid consulting work, then pressured candidates to share confidential insider information. The campaign employed false personas, stolen identities, AI-generated profile photos, encrypted messaging, cryptocurrency, and fake contracts to appear legitimate. Job postings appeared on platforms including Upwork, Expertia AI, and Hubstaff Talent, covering topics aligned with Chinese government interests.

Campaign#job platforms#security clearanceUnited States

To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6c30f8b1a160c72529e2671b81be13ea671302e9bc3915ee84bd2212e0fdd5a3) The package name and module structure impersonate the official `openai` Python SDK (the package even rewrites exported classes' `__module__` attribute to `"openai"` in `openai_mcp/__init__.py`). Alongside the cloned SDK, it ships `openai-setup.pth`, which Python auto-loads on every interpreter start. The.pth file contains a single-line, heavily aliased `exec()` payload (single-letter names like `_O`, `_T`, `_u`, `_s`, `_b`, `_z`) that: (1) checks a one-shot guard `/tmp/.bun_ran`, (2) downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-<platform>-<arch>.zip` to `/tmp/b/bun` and chmods it executable, (3) locates a sibling `_index.js` on `sys.path`, and (4) runs `bun run _index.js`. Because.pth files execute at every Python startup (not just at install), every `python` invocation after `pip install openai-mcp` downloads an alien runtime and executes the package's JavaScript payload through it — an alternate-runtime dropper that evades Python-only scanners. The obfuscation, one-shot guard, identity spoofing, and runtime-laundering together establish clear malicious intent. ## Source: kam193 (f7597f40e5a7af25ae5f07e34310df24ac3284b9e0cadcb013a9c155384e9100) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an embedded infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collects all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ae87e0c65760999b8ff4e28d11505b15a71a1a46dd8d761122e3d9d8e2cd85b6) The package is published as 'tlask', a single-character edit of the widely used 'flask' package on PyPI. Metadata and module contents are copied verbatim from Pallets' Flask: METADATA Summary reads 'A simple framework for building complex web applications.', Project-URLs point to flask.palletsprojects.com and github.com/pallets/flask, and entry_points.txt declares 'flask=flask.cli:main'. The source files under tlask/ match Flask's own modules. No installer-harmful payload was identified — no network I/O, no exec/eval, no install or import-time hooks, no credential reads, and no lifecycle scripts that would execute attacker-controlled code on `pip install`. The risk is name-confusion: a developer who types `pip install tlask` rather than `pip install flask` receives a near-identical Flask clone they did not intentionally select, and the entry_points.txt also installs a `flask` console script that could shadow the real Flask CLI in some environments. Because the package contains no exfiltration, dropper, silent-relay, or credential-distribution behavior, naming-similarity alone is a subjective signal that warrants human review rather than an automatic block. ## Source: kam193 (2b3ae446f7b8d808b84c157ec455883e0bc45e4f4180e51c5cd42ff9852712a2) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (89a034f9ba4356799034d728884eccecf5c53779d85280556419cda38e671a30) The package name 'rlask' is a single-character edit of the popular 'flask' package. METADATA declares 'Maintainer-email: Pallets <contact@palletsprojects.com>', and entry_points.txt registers 'flask=flask.cli:main' rather than an rlask-specific entry — indicating the distribution is a verbatim repackaging of Flask 3.1.x source while falsely advertising Pallets maintainership. The exported API (Flask, Blueprint, Config, request, session, etc.) mirrors Flask's surface. No exfiltration, install-time hooks, subprocess execution, credential reads, or outbound network I/O were observed in the shipped code. The risk is name confusion plus forged maintainer identity: a developer who mistypes 'pip install flask' as 'pip install rlask' receives a package that shadows the real Flask, controlled by an author who is not Pallets and could push a malicious update at any time. Routing to human review per the typosquat handling discipline — name-confusion judgments and impersonated-maintainer attributions should be confirmed by a human before publication. ## Source: kam193 (baacd735e23c83962845507427fa53c89bdc2e8e0456dbbce6f00a91bf4fe002) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e2041887c315474d0722cbf717e189ec1260e209c5f00da5ca3a52a60c6aebb2) The package name `rsquests` is a single-character insertion typo of the top-100 PyPI package `requests`. Package metadata and source are a verbatim copy of upstream `requests`: `rsquests/__version__.py` sets `__title__ = "requests"`, METADATA lists `Author-email: Kenneth Reitz <me@kennethreitz.org>`, and `top_level.txt` declares the top-level package as `requests` (so `import requests` after installing `rsquests` resolves to this package's bundled copy, shadowing the real upstream if it isn't installed). The full public API (get/post/put/delete/Session/...) is replicated, so a developer who mistypes `pip install requests` as `pip install rsquests` gets working behavior and may not notice the substitution. No exfiltration, RCE, dropper, credential harvest, or silent-relay payload is present in this version — the install-time and import-time code paths match the upstream library. The risk is name-confusion plus future-version risk: the squatted name normalizes the typo and provides a vector if a later release introduces a malicious payload. Routing to human review per typosquat-without-payload policy — name-similarity is a subjective signal and the absence of a current payload means this does not meet the bar for an automated block. ## Source: kam193 (b32959e10bc6b1df57d105a5e5d74cbe7b69660cb7a1e78185d3f5e0e0f07e10) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (34db1950ee9bdf9c75ae9bb2436085bbb443107321d8d7056a0bf3b8fae36978) The package is published as 'nhmpy' on PyPI but its contents are a verbatim copy of NumPy 2.4.6: the same source tree, docstrings, and license files. The distribution metadata falsely identifies the package as authored by 'Travis E. Oliphant et al.' and maintained by 'NumPy Developers <numpy-discussion@python.org>', with Project-URL pointing at https://numpy.org. Internal modules still import from the real 'numpy' namespace (e.g., nhmpy/__init__.py line 788: `from numpy._pytesttester import PytestTester`), so the package masquerades as numpy and depends on numpy being installed alongside it. The current 2.4.6 contents do not execute install scripts, perform network I/O at import, or contain obfuscated code — there is no active exfiltration or RCE payload in this version. However, the name is a one-character edit from 'numpy' (a top-tier PyPI package) and the metadata is deliberately deceptive about authorship, which is the precondition for a future malicious release under the same name. Routing for human review of the name-confusion claim and possible registry takedown. ## Source: kam193 (0b2d6b794431c52ef6b905eb676d70274a792cbca1b266a3405734a7a900860b) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions

A vulnerability was determined in code-projects Online Music Site 1.0. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /Frontend/Search.php. This manipulation of the argument Category causes sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.

CVE-2026-11489 is a SQL injection vulnerability in code-projects Online Music Site version 1.0. It affects the /Administrator/PHP/AdminDeleteAlbum.php file where the ID argument can be manipulated to perform SQL injection. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication. The exploit has been publicly disclosed. The CVSS 4.0 base score is 6.9, indicating medium severity.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4241e99d1053712e6909db44c939421695dff66556055a93058f9a55f8694929) The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code ## Source: kam193 (6806267ad399a4b51411f5176e26470cccb7803dff5f0f6f1e3dca6e6c82170c) Versions 0.4.4, 0.4.5 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6db8a103a73261cd6de8f763fa639d1bd148124ca661893e9d3ab73cd76ab50b) instructor-mcp 1.15.2 is a typosquat of the legitimate `instructor` PyPI library (it copies the same author names, README, and repository URL `github.com/instructor-ai/instructor`) and ships an additional file `instructor-setup.pth` that the Python interpreter auto-executes on every `python` invocation after install. The.pth file uses an obfuscated single-line `exec(...)` with mangled aliases (`_o,_s,_u,_p,_y,_h,_g`) to bypass the `.pth` rule that only `import` lines execute. The exec body downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip` to `/tmp/b/bun`, chmods it executable, then searches `sys.path` for a file named `_index.js` and runs it via `bun run _index.js`. Execution is gated by `/tmp/.bun_ran` so it fires once per host. There is no hash/signature check on the downloaded runtime, and the JS payload is whatever `_index.js` happens to be present on `sys.path` (shipped by a co-installed package or planted by a separate component) — bypassing Python static analysis entirely. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern: arbitrary attacker-controlled JS is executed under a freshly downloaded non-Python runtime, with persistence via the.pth auto-load mechanism. ## Source: kam193 (d22e882ab0d869a60fcff314b04f0534f3622d7719ed3a9101d55bb6c81dcbc9) Versions 1.15.2, 1.15.3 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5c765c6eef25d18c5a10057d62908ac3bc1ece86e39a9807683834fb7f896b52) The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code ## Source: kam193 (d2fc000f15b66037b67d503cef346f32d400b0cc704417b28ff6c559c9924d8f) Versions 6.0.1 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7d9526ae43236ac15964b307175384455975ace26d8157ef3c41ed8db8192562) The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code ## Source: kam193 (6b28e6bb345bcdb4726198079a56fcbbb0e73d4d2309c1927c0c8803d515232f) Versions 3.3.2 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions