CVE-2026-48787: flipped-aurora gin-vue-admin · OS Command Injection
Affects flipped-aurora gin-vue-adminSource CVE Database V5
Public exploit available · CVSS 7.4 High.
Data as of 1 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 48% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:PExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 19 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: evidence found.
CVSS exploit maturity: proof of concept public
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), CVSS vector, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 1 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| flipped-auroragin-vue-admin | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Meanwhile, enforce strict allowlist validation on path- and identifier-related fields such as humpPackageName, packageName, FuncName, and Router to only permit safe identifier formats. Consider disabling or restricting the online code-generation feature and MCP-hosted startup workflow if not required. Deployments using binary-only releases or read-only filesystems reduce exploitability of this vulnerability.
Description
gin-vue-admin is an AI-assisted basic development platform. In version 2.9.1, an authenticated attacker with access to the code-generation feature and MCP management interface can exploit this vulnerability by injecting attacker-controlled Go source code through POST /autoCode/addFunc, and then invoking POST /autoCode/mcpStart to trigger a rebuild and restart of the standalone MCP service. This allows arbitrary operating system commands to be executed on the server with the privileges of the application process. Successful exploitation may lead to remote code execution (RCE), modification of backend source code or runtime logic, deployment of persistent backdoors, access to or manipulation of application data and configuration, and further impact on local resources running under the same service account or privilege context. The risk is highest in deployments that retain the source tree, allow writes to source files, and support local build or startup of standalone MCP components. In environments using binary-only releases, read-only filesystems, or with local build capabilities removed, the exploitability of the full attack chain is significantly reduced. However, once the online code-generation capability and MCP-hosted startup workflow are enabled, the overall security impact may reach high to critical severity. As of time of publication, it is unknown if a patched version is available. As a workaround, enforce strict allowlist validation on path- and identifier-related fields such as `humpPackageName`, `packageName`, `FuncName`, and `Router`, and only permit safe identifier formats.