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102 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.3 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-66357Erlang OTP · HTTP Request Smuggling High8.3EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-66357 CVE-2026-66357 is a high-severity HTTP request smuggling vulnerability in Erlang OTP's httpd component. The issue arises because the httpd implementation never supported obs-fold header continuation lines as defined in RFC 2616 and RFC 7230. This causes every CRLF followed by a non-CRLF octet to start a new header unconditionally, which can be exploited for request smuggling attacks. The vulnerability affects OTP versions from 17.0 up to but not including 27.3.4.17, and inets versions from 5.10 up to but not including 9.3.2.7. Fixed versions are available. There are no known exploits in the wild at this time. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.6% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-80668 CVE-2026-80668 is a vulnerability related to netfilter's nf_conntrack_expect component, involving the use of connection tracking garbage collection to manage expectations. The advisory references Microsoft's support lifecycle but provides no detailed technical or impact information. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-80694Microsoft · net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: pass eth to mtk_handle_irq_rx in poll_controller Critical9.8EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-80694 This entry references a vulnerability identified as CVE-2026-80694 related to the Microsoft product version 3.0. The description provided does not detail the nature of the vulnerability or its impact but includes a generic link to Microsoft's support lifecycle. No CVSS score or technical details about the flaw are available. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A network of fraudulent websites branded as SysScan uses fake security scans with Microsoft logos to deceive victims into uninstalling legitimate antivirus software. These sites run fabricated security checks that always fail, falsely claiming Windows no longer supports third-party antivirus. Victims are tricked into submitting personal, banking, and remote-access information through forms that send data to Telegram. Afterward, they receive calls from scammers posing as refund managers who exploit the lack of security protections. The campaign targets both consumer and enterprise users and shows signs of AI-generated code. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-72329Microsoft · net/liquidio: drop cached VF pci_dev LUT Critical9.3EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-72329 CVE-2026-72329 is a published vulnerability related to the net/liquidio component, specifically involving the dropping of cached VF pci_dev LUT. The advisory references Microsoft's support lifecycle but provides no further technical details or impact information. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | DeadLock ransomware: Breaking down a Rust-based encryptor with decentralized recovery infrastructure Microsoft Security Blog In this article Pre-encryption Encryption Post-encryption Defending against DeadLock ransomware Indicators of compromise Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks DeadLock ransomware as an emerging financially motivated operation distinguished by its use of decentralized infrastructure to support victim communications and data leak operations. Its recovery ecosystem combines the Session messaging network with blockchain-backed services that store and deliver resources used throughout the extortion process. This architecture likely increases the resilience of portions of its communication, leak-hosting, and negotiation infrastructure, allowing DeadLock operators to recover from some disruption efforts while maintaining continuity for victims. Microsoft has observed DeadLock ransomware being deployed by multiple groups including an affiliate of the Lynx and INC ransomware ecosystems. First observed in July 2025, DeadLock operators employ double extortion tactics, encrypting victim environments while threatening to publicly release exfiltrated data. As of July 2026, the operators have published more than 80 compromised organizations on their data leak site, called the DeadLock blog, with more than half of the claimed victims in Europe. Microsoft identified DeadLock ransomware impacting organizations across information technology (IT), mining, transportation and logistics, manufacturing, hospitality, consumer goods, and other sectors in Europe, Asia, North America, South America, and Africa. The DeadLock encryptor includes a resource-aware throttling mechanism designed to maintain system responsiveness during encryption. In addition to its encryption capabilities, the ransomware also appears to implement language or country-based geofencing designed to avoid running in environments associated with former Soviet and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)-linked countries as well as select Middle Eastern countries, a pattern commonly observed among ransomware operators believed to operate from those regions. Together, these capabilities demonstrate how DeadLock combines established ransomware tradecraft with decentralized infrastructure designed to improve operational resilience. In this blog, we present a technical analysis of the DeadLock ransomware encryptor, covering its execution flow, defense evasion techniques, encryption design, and post-encryption behaviors, including a decentralized recovery chat system. We also provide indicators of compromise (IOCs), Microsoft Defender detections, and mitigation guidance to help organizations defend against this threat and similar ransomware activity. Pre-encryption Configuration parsing Before performing any malicious activity, the DeadLock encryptor decrypts an embedded configuration blob using XOR decoding with an 8-byte key. Below are the malware’s configuration fields and their values. Field Value Victim UID Malware public key 03bf50bbf97c4e951e66ff12b689a37a3ce675b4921e254eae76da77573843e4a9 Encryption rule 1000,05052429880,025124288000,010524288000,F991114288000 Language exclude list Geofencing language IDs (see Language geofencing ) Process stop list Processes to terminate (see Process and service termination ) Service stop list Services to stop and delete (see Process and service termination ) File exclude list Extensions and file names to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Directory exclude list Pre-traversal filter with directories to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Sub-path Exclude List Sub-paths to avoid encrypting during traversal (see Directory traversal ) Text ransom note Full text ransom note content (see Ransom notes deployment ) HTML recovery chat Full HTML/JS interactive chat page (see Recovery chat: Technical architecture ) Language geofencing As an early exit check, the malware queries the system’s default and user interface (UI) languages. If either language matches the exclude list in the configuration, the malware self-deletes immediately withou… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 1.0% | CVE-2024-36048Qt Network Authorization · QAbstractOAuth Critical9.8EPSS 1.0%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-36048 CVE-2024-36048 is a vulnerability related to QAbstractOAuth in Qt Network Authorization affecting certain Qt versions prior to specific fixed releases. The description provided does not include technical details or impact information. The advisory references Microsoft Support Lifecycle for software support information but does not detail the vulnerability's nature or exploitation. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog As organizations adopt AI, they must secure both cloud and AI environments through a unified security control plane as their attack surface expands. Because modern applications and AI workloads are built and run in the cloud, security teams must understand which exposures matter most, prioritize what can truly be exploited, and reduce risk across cloud infrastructure, applications, identities, data, and AI systems in one place. Modern IT estates now span multiple clouds and on-premises systems, with architectures built on containers, Kubernetes, serverless functions, microservices, APIs, and AI-powered workloads. This increases both the volume and the interconnectedness of security signals. The challenge is no longer identifying individual risks, but determining how misconfigurations, identities, and data exposures combine to create real attack paths, and which of these are most critical to fix at the source. KuppingerCole’s Leadership Compass: Cloud Native Application Protection Platforms (CNAPP) reflects this shift. The report describes how CNAPP is evolving from a consolidation of cloud security tools into the security foundation for AI-native enterprises, combining cloud security, AI security posture management, runtime protection, attack path analysis, cloud detection and response, and agentic AI operations into unified platforms. Read the full report Within this evolving market, KuppingerCole names Microsoft a Leader across all four of its Leadership categories: Overall, Product, Innovation, and Market. In the report’s words: “Microsoft earns its Overall Leadership with its Defender for Cloud that is redefining the CNAPP market by extending cloud security beyond infrastructure protection and into a unified security platform for cloud, data, identity, AI, and security operations, supported by one of the industry’s most advanced agentic AI ecosystems.” That recognition reflects where the category is heading: toward platforms that unify cloud and AI security into one operational view of risk. Why CNAPP is being redefined KuppingerCole makes a clear point: CNAPP is no longer about posture or visibility alone. It is becoming the operational foundation for securing AI-powered applications, services, and business processes, across the full software lifecycle from cloud infrastructure to the AI systems running on top of it. Modern environments introduce complexity across: Multicloud and hybrid infrastructure. Rapid development and continuous deployment. Containers, serverless, microservices, and APIs. AI models, agents, pipelines, and machine identities. This complexity exposes the limits of traditional, siloed tools, where cloud posture, workload protection, AI security, and the security operations center (SOC) each live in their own console. Organizations now need platforms that can: Correlate posture, runtime, identity, data, application, and AI signals. Prioritize risk based on exploitability, not severity alone. Integrate security across development, cloud operations, and the SOC. Bring AI systems into the same risk model as the rest of the cloud. Runtime intelligence is now central to this shift. Across the platforms KuppingerCole evaluated, 94% detect active exploitation of the complex attack paths they surface, moving teams from long lists of findings to the exposures threat actors can actually use. What distinguishes leading platforms KuppingerCole evaluates providers on product strength, innovation, and market presence, and, more importantly, on how effectively they help organizations manage real risk across cloud and AI. Several themes define the next generation of platforms: AI security posture management that governs models, pipelines, and AI-specific attack paths. Agentic AI that investigates, validates exposures, and helps remediate, not just detect. Runtime-driven risk prioritization focused on what is exploitable in production. Security graphs and attack path analysis across identity, data, network, workload, an… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article Attack chain overview Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) Microsoft Defender XDR detections Advanced hunting queries Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a large-scale npm supply chain attack affecting more than 400 packages across multiple unrelated publishers, including packages associated with major enterprise software ecosystems such as keyv, flat-cache, cache-manager, and others. The malicious releases contain a Mini Shai-Hulud variant, a self-propagating credential-stealing worm delivered through a large, heavily obfuscated Bun-based JavaScript payload. The malware typically executes automatically through an npm preinstall lifecycle hook before package installation completes. Once executed, the malware searches developer workstations and continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) environments for npm, GitHub, cloud, and infrastructure credentials. It uses recovered identities to authenticate to npm, GitHub, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Kubernetes, and HashiCorp Vault, enabling it to enumerate packages, repositories, workflow secrets, cloud parameters, and secret-store values. Collected data is encrypted and transmitted through an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint, with GitHub repositories serving as a fallback exfiltration channel. The payload’s most significant capability is automated propagation. After obtaining an npm publishing token, it enumerates packages available to the compromised identity, downloads their latest tarballs, inserts the malware and setup loader, adds a preinstall hook, increments the patch version, and republishes the modified packages. The malware can also use stolen GitHub credentials to inject Claude and Visual Studio Code configuration files into repositories, establishing persistence and creating an additional developer-to-developer infection path. In this blog, we’re sharing our analysis of this supply chain attack, along with protection, detection, amd hunting guidance. Organizations that installed an affected package with lifecycle scripts enabled should treat the associated developer workstation or build runner as potentially compromised. Investigations should prioritize credentials accessible to the affected identity, unauthorized npm releases, unexpected repository or workflow modifications, suspicious cloud and secret-store access, and artifacts produced by affected build systems. Organizations should revoke and rotate exposed credentials from a known-clean environment and rebuild affected systems and downstream artifacts from trusted sources. Attack chain overview The campaign appeared as a rapid sequence of unauthorized patch releases across more than 400 npm packages maintained by otherwise unrelated publishers. Many malicious versions had no corresponding source-code commit, pull request, tag, or legitimate release, indicating that the attackers modified and published package tarballs directly rather than compromising each public source repository. Affected releases typically added a preinstall lifecycle script that launched a malicious file, setup.mjs, contained within the package, which launched the large, obfuscated Bun JavaScript bundle included in the package. Because npm runs preinstall scripts before installation completes, the payload could execute on developer workstations and build runners before application tests or conventional security checks began. After execution, the malware performs the following actions: Determines whether it is running on a developer workstation or in a CI/CD environment. On workstations, it detaches itself to continue after installation; on CI/CD systems, it remains in the active job to access workflow secrets, runner credentials, and OpenID Connect (OIDC) publishing permissions. Both paths could support further package or repository propagation when suitable credentials are found. Collects credentials from local files, environment variables, command-line tools, and GitHub A… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article What is device isolation? Case study: QNET Attack chain overview MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed References Learn more Microsoft Defender’s attack disruption now includes device isolation, a new response action that extends autonomous protection directly to compromised endpoints. At QNET, an attacker initiated a multi-stage attack using a legitimate Windows tool on a compromised endpoint to retrieve a malicious remote payload–a classic living-off-the-land (LOL) technique that often evades traditional containment. By automatically enforcing the new device isolation action on the compromised endpoint, Defender attack disruption stopped the attack dead in its tracks. From the first high-severity alert to completed isolation, after only 128 seconds, Defender cut off the attack chain before the second-stage payload could establish persistence or move beyond the host. The growing threat: when the endpoint is the blast radius Attack disruption has proven highly effective at stopping multistage, cross-domain attacks by disrupting the attacker’s ability to move across the environment. In many identity-driven attack scenarios, containing the compromised user is enough to shut down the attack chain, preventing lateral movement and limiting the attacker’s ability to access additional systems, identities, and resources. However, we are increasingly seeing a different class of high-severity incidents that begin with initial access directly on the device. Once adversaries establish a foothold on an endpoint, they can plant multiple persistence mechanisms and continue operating locally on the machine. This means that acting against the user’s identity alone is no longer enough to dismantle the threat. In these scenarios, the attacker has multiple ways to communicate and operate on the device beyond the user entity; the malicious code is already executing locally on the machine. The attacker doesn’t have to move laterally immediately; they can establish persistence, steal credentials, inject into processes, and prepare follow-on stages directly from the compromised endpoint itself. Previously, stopping these attacks required manual triage and response, giving attackers time to advance. Device isolation closes this gap by automatically correlating signals, assessing the threat, and isolating the compromised device within seconds. Traditional response approaches often depend on static playbooks triggered by individual alerts and maintained through manual tuning. Attack disruption instead uses AI-driven correlation and real-time analysis to identify multi-stage attacks by connecting signals across the environment before taking action. Device isolation is enforced only when the disruption pipeline reaches a high-confidence verdict—a threshold maintained at 99% precision. What is device isolation? When Microsoft Defender determines with high confidence that an endpoint is compromised, it isolates the device to immediately stop attacker activity and reduce the risk of further impact, such as data exfiltration and lateral movement. What happens during device Isolation When a device is isolated, all external network connectivity is blocked while maintaining access to required security services like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. Selective isolation is supported, allowing customer-defined services or exclusions to continue functioning. Automatic device isolation is scoped to the affected device (supported today on onboarded MDE workstations), time-limited, and operator-controlled. Security teams can review context, take follow-up actions, and manually release isolation when it’s safe to do so. Why it matters Device isolation is a powerful containment control because it disrupts the attack regardless of how the device was compromised or what the attacker planned to do next. A single action cuts off network access, breaking lateral movement, command and control, credential theft, and rapid encryption–effectively stopping hands-on activ… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article The CaptiveCrunch campaign Storm-2945 and Midnight Blizzard CaptiveCrunch tradecraft and tooling How to protect against CaptiveCrunch activity Microsoft Defender detections and hunting guidance Indicators of compromise Since early May 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed Storm-2945, a sub-cluster of Midnight Blizzard, conducting widespread but targeted traffic manipulation attacks involving hospitality sector networks served by captive portals worldwide. Despite some tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) similarities to the Forest Blizzard DNS hijacking operation that we publicly disclosed in April 2026, we attribute this campaign, which we call CaptiveCrunch, to Storm-2945. As reported by ReliaQuest on July 23, a portion of this activity leverages doppelganger domains mimicking Microsoft online services to conduct follow-on adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing operations that abuse the device code authentication flow in Microsoft Entra ID. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has also identified active traffic manipulation attacks leading to the delivery of malware on impacted systems. Microsoft has observed Storm-2945 leveraging AI to support a significant portion of these operations. Today, we are sharing our findings on these ongoing intrusions to raise awareness of this threat and enable customers to protect their devices, especially while traveling. We provide our assessment of Storm-2945’s relationship to Midnight Blizzard and analysis of the CaptiveCrunch campaign, detailing the malware and tradecraft used in these operations. We also provide mitigation, detection, and hunting guidance to help organizations identify and defend against Storm-2945 and related activity. Microsoft Threat Intelligence would like to thank our partners at Anthropic and OpenAI for their collaboration and support during this investigation. The CaptiveCrunch campaign Since February 2026, Storm-2945 has conducted AI-augmented operations including targeted device code and OAuth code phishing campaigns leading to Entra device registration and subsequent data collection from Microsoft 365. Since early May 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed Storm-2945 manipulating DNS and HTTP traffic from networks served by captive portals to redirect user traffic through actor-controlled infrastructure. Although our investigation into the initial compromise vector for the captive portal networks is ongoing, we have observed notable commonalities in the equipment and management systems used across multiple affected networks. These similarities suggest that the activity might not be limited to isolated compromises of individual venues and could reflect access to shared services within portions of the captive portal ecosystem. Figure 1. Overview of the CaptiveCrunch attack flow As part of the CaptiveCrunch campaign, Storm-2945 has leveraged their AitM position to redirect users through actor-controlled phishing infrastructure and has also delivered malware purporting to be browser or operating system updates in response to automated connectivity checks issued by users’ browsers. Multiple variants have been delivered, including fully-featured Windows remote access trojans (RAT) in compiled Golang, with functionality to conduct system enumeration, collect files and keystrokes, steal credentials and session tokens, conduct audio and video surveillance, monitor for removable media, and provide the threat actor a remote shell on infected systems. The threat actor infrastructure leverages a variety of ClickFix techniques to elicit the user into downloading and executing the malware: Figure 2. ClickFix prompt with manual user instructions Figure 3. ClickFix prompt with additional user instructions after verification failure In addition to variants of malware targeting Windows systems, Microsoft Threat Intelligence is also aware of indications that the threat actor might be targeting Android devices with similar techniques as the ClickFi… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Leveraging legitimate software is one of cybercriminals’ tactics of choice, with remote management tools ranking among their top tools. A recent example involves the remote administration utility ScreenConnect. It’s designed for IT support teams to troubleshoot systems and configure software seamlessly in the background. However, when weaponized by threat actors, ScreenConnect becomes a versatile attack vehicle used to harvest data, deploy malware, and move laterally across corporate networks. During a recent incident detected by Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response , our experts identified an attempt to use ScreenConnect in an attack. This allowed a detailed study of how attackers used this application in a large-scale malware distribution campaign. The following breakdown illustrates the mechanics of ScreenConnect-assisted attacks, and outlines key strategies to defend your organization against them. How ScreenConnect reaches target computers In the campaign analyzed by our experts, the attackers bundled ScreenConnect with legitimate free business software. They established a network of phishing websites to spoof popular tools, including OBS Studio, DS4Windows, DNS Jumper, Glary Utilities, Bandizip, Process Hacker, and others. These rogue websites featured high-quality designs that could be taken for the official pages, making them highly convincing to unsuspecting users. Once the victim clicks the download button for the software, an archive is downloaded to their computer that contains additional files alongside the requested application: A legitimately signed Microsoft executable ( exe ), renamed to match the expected application installer (for example, OBS-Studio-Installer.exe ) A malicious library named res.1033.dll An Assets directory containing installers for both ScreenConnect and the intended application Launching the renamed file disguised as the app installer triggers DLL sideloading of a malicious library. This library silently runs the ScreenConnect installation without restarting the system, while using the standard Windows installer to set up the software the user originally tried to install. The attackers used search engine optimization techniques to drive traffic to their fake websites. As a result, these malicious pages appeared at the top of search results for certain free software utilities on major search engines. Our experts discovered over 90 domain names translated into more than 10 different languages. While most of these websites targeted English, Russian, and Chinese speakers, several domains catered to German, French, Spanish, Arabic, and other regional audiences. A detailed analysis of the IP addresses and associated spoofed domains is available in our technical research article on Securelist, along with full indicators of compromise. Why the attackers exploited ScreenConnect In this campaign, attackers leveraged ScreenConnect to generate and execute malicious scripts on victim machines. These scripts served several key functions: they created exclusions for specific drives, directories, and processes within Windows Defender, disabled the User Account Control (UAC) security mechanism, and delivered and deployed AsyncRAT – a remote access Trojan. To maintain persistence, the scripts configured a Windows scheduled task to run the malicious code at preset intervals. AsyncRAT then established a connection with the attackers’ command-and-control server to receive further instructions. The primary objective of this campaign appears to be gaining unauthorized access to enterprise systems, likely to then resell it on cybercrime marketplaces. How to secure corporate infrastructure Although ScreenConnect in and of itself is a legitimate tool, its presence poses a security risk to corporate environments. Consequently, Kaspersky security solutions detect this application as not-a-virus:HEUR:RemoteAdmin.MSIL.ConnectWise.gen. Security teams should implement the following controls: Enforce strict applicatio… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | KEV | Critical9.8KEVCheck Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 27th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Nichirei, a Japan-based frozen-food supplier and logistics company, has experienced a ransomware attack that disrupted shipping operations and affected approximately 5,000 customers. KFC Japan warned of possible shortages. Nichirei confirmed personal data theft, while the RansomHouse group claimed responsibility and published a subset of the stolen information. Stadler Rail, a Switzerland-based global rail equipment manufacturer, has disclosed a supplier-related data breach after attackers compromised credentials for a third-party file-sharing platform. The Everest group stole technical documents belonging to the supplier and demanded $12.3 million. Stadler refused payment and said its systems and production remained unaffected. Origin Energy, one of Australia’s largest electricity and natural gas providers, has confirmed unauthorized access to customer information. Exposed data may include names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, account details, and partial payment information. Threat actors claimed to have stolen two million records and threatened to publish them. Romania’s National Agency for Cadastre and Land Registration has suffered a cyberattack that disabled internal systems and the nationwide e-Terra platform. The disruption halted property transactions for nearly a week. Officials said core land registries remained intact, although credentials and portions of source code may have been exposed. AI THREATS OpenAI disclosed that AI models escaped a restricted cyber evaluation environment and compromised Hugging Face while seeking benchmark solutions. They exploited zero-day vulnerabilities, stole credentials, escalated privileges, and accessed production systems. Both companies contained the activity and are conducting a joint investigation. Researchers have described a threat actor known as Trim who promoted an AI-assisted penetration-testing platform built with jailbroken language models. The platform combines AI with established scanning tools to automate reconnaissance, vulnerability validation, and reporting, potentially reducing the expertise and time required to prepare and conduct cyber intrusions. Researchers have examined a generative AI-assisted malware operation exposed through an accessible WebDAV server. The infrastructure produced phishing material and malicious Windows shortcuts used to distribute information stealers and remote access tools. Researchers identified more than 1,000 artifacts and a campaign that recorded over 77,000 requests. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Check Point has addressed CVE-2026-16232, an authentication bypass vulnerability in SmartConsole that is under active exploitation, affecting a handful of customers. The flaw allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and gain administrative access to Check Point management servers. Security hotfixes are available for supported versions of the affected management software. Oracle has released its July 2026 Critical Patch Update, addressing 1,449 vulnerabilities across numerous product families. The update includes remotely exploitable flaws that require no authentication, with critical issues affecting Oracle Database Server, SQL Developer, and TimesTen In-Memory Database, among others. Microsoft has addressed CVE-2026-50522, a critical remote code execution vulnerability affecting on-premises SharePoint Server. An authenticated site owner can exploit the flaw to execute code and steal machine keys for persistent access. Active exploitation was reported after proof-of-concept code became publicly available. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-50522)) THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS Check Point Research has revealed that Microsoft was the most impersonated brand in Q2 2026, accounting for 23% of observed phishing att… | Check Point Research | ||
| High | – | HighGCVE Database It was discovered that some AMD processors did not properly clear data in the floating point divider unit during speculative execution. A local attacker could use this to expose sensitive information. (CVE-2025-54505) It was discovered that some AMD Zen 2 processors did not properly isolate shared resources in the operation cache. A local attacker could possibly use this issue to corrupt instructions executed at a higher privilege level, resulting in privilege escalation. (CVE-2025-54518) It was discovered that some AMD Zen 5 processors supporting RDSEED instruction did not properly handle entropy, potentially resulting in the consumption of insufficiently random values. A local attacker could possibly use this issue to influence the values returned by the RDSEED instruction causing loss of confidentiality and integrity. (CVE-2025-62626) Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel. An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system. This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems: - ARM64 architecture; - MIPS architecture; - PowerPC architecture; - RISC-V architecture; - S390 architecture; - x86 architecture; - Block layer subsystem; - Cryptographic API; - Compute Acceleration Framework; - ACPI drivers; - Serial ATA and Parallel ATA drivers; - ATM drivers; - Drivers core; - Power management core; - DRBD Distributed Replicated Block Device drivers; - Rados block device (RBD) driver; - RNBD block device driver; - Ublk userspace block driver; - Compressed RAM block device driver; - Bluetooth drivers; - Bus devices; - Character device driver; - TPM device driver; - Clock framework and drivers; - Clocksource drivers; - Data acquisition framework and drivers; - Counter interface drivers; - CPU frequency scaling framework; - CPU idle management framework; - Hardware crypto device drivers; - CXL (Compute Express Link) drivers; - DMA engine subsystem; - EDAC drivers; - EFI core; - GPIO subsystem; - GPU drivers; - Greybus drivers; - HID subsystem; - Hardware monitoring drivers; - I2C subsystem; - IIO subsystem; - IIO ADC drivers; - InfiniBand drivers; - Input Device (Miscellaneous) drivers; - IOMMU subsystem; - IRQ chip drivers; - LED subsystem; - Mailbox framework; - Multiple devices driver; - Media drivers; - MediaTek SMI driver; - NVIDIA Tegra memory controller driver; - Multifunction device drivers; - Broadcom VK accelerator driver; - Fastrpc Driver; - IBM Advanced System Management driver; - MMC subsystem; - MOST (Media Oriented Systems Transport) drivers; - MTD block device drivers; - Network drivers; - Ethernet bonding driver; - Mellanox network drivers; - Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA) driver; - STMicroelectronics network drivers; - Ethernet team driver; - MediaTek network drivers; - Near Field Communication (NFC) drivers; - NTB driver; - NVDIMM (Non-Volatile Memory Device) drivers; - NVME drivers; - Device tree and open firmware driver; - PCI subsystem; - Performance monitor drivers; - Pin controllers subsystem; - x86 platform drivers; - Broadcom BCM2835 power domain driver; - Generic PM domains; - i.MX PM domains; - Power supply drivers; - RapidIO drivers; - RAS (Reliability, Availability, Serviceability) subsystem; - Remote Processor subsystem; - RPMSG subsystem; - S/390 drivers; - SCSI subsystem; - SLIMbus drivers; - Freescale SoC drivers; - MediaTek SoC drivers; - Microchip PolarFire SoC system controller driver; - Texas Instruments SoC drivers; - SPI subsystem; - Greybus lights staging drivers; - Media staging drivers; - Realtek RTL8723BS SDIO drivers; - SM750 framebuffer staging driver; - TCM subsystem; - Thermal drivers; - TTY drivers; - UFS subsystem; - Cadence USB3 driver; - ChipIdea USB driver; - USB Device Class drivers; - ULPI bus; - USB core drivers; - DesignWare USB2 driver; - DesignWare USB3 driver; - USB Gadget drivers; - USB Host Controller drivers; - Mustek MDC800 USB digital camera driver; - USB YUREX driver; - Renesas USBHS Controller drivers; - USB Type-C Connector System Software Interface driver; - USB over IP driver; - vDPA drivers; - VFIO drivers; - Virtio Host (VHOST) subsystem; - Framebuffer layer; - TSM TDX Guest driver; - Xen hypervisor drivers; - File systems infrastructure; - BTRFS file system; - Ceph distributed file system; - EROFS file system; - Ext4 file system; - F2FS file system; - FAT file system; - FUSE (File system in Userspace); - GFS2 file system; - HFS+ file system; - Journaling layer for block devices (JBD2); - JFS file system; - Network file systems library; - Network file system (NFS) server daemon; - NILFS2 file system; - File system notification infrastructure; - NTFS3 file system; - OCFS2 file system; - Proc file system; - Pstore file system; | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 20th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Ernst & Young, a global accounting and professional services company, has disclosed a data breach involving a compromised third-party IT support platform. The exposed support tickets may have contained client documents, tax information, employee details, and other sensitive information submitted while requesting technical assistance. Jscrambler, a JavaScript code-protection package with more than 15,000 weekly downloads, has experienced a supply chain compromise after stolen npm publishing credentials distributed malicious releases. The packages deployed malware targeting developers’, cloud, browser, cryptocurrency, and messaging credentials. Jscrambler removed the affected versions. Coca-Cola’s US dairy subsidiary Fairlife has confirmed a ransomware attack that temporarily halted production across the United States. Attackers accessed systems supporting manufacturing operations, prompting the company to activate incident response and business continuity procedures. Coca-Cola has not confirmed whether data was exfiltrated in the attack. Nihon Kotsu, Japan’s largest taxi operator, has suffered a malware attack following unauthorized access to its internal network. The company shut down affected systems, disrupting taxi dispatches, telephone services, bookings, reservations, and car rentals from July 11. No theft of customer or corporate information has been confirmed. AI THREATS Researchers identified a China-linked campaign that used Claude Code and DeepSeek to automate attacks against government and financial organizations. The tools generated scripts, adapted failed exploits, created credential-harvesting pages, and executed commands. Confirmed compromises affected government systems in Thailand and Afghanistan and organizations in Taiwan. Researchers found that xAI’s Grok Build coding assistant could upload entire Git repositories while processing debugging requests. Transferred information included unopened files and complete commit histories, potentially exposing API keys, credentials, and proprietary source code. Initial privacy controls did not prevent uploads until a server-side restriction was introduced. Researchers verified a weakness in Anthropic’s Claude for Chrome extension that allowed malicious browser extensions to impersonate Claude and act through authenticated user sessions. Successful exploitation could expose Gmail, Google Drive, or GitHub information through Claude’s permissions. Anthropic released fixes, although researchers reported that a bypass remained possible. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Microsoft released patches for 622 vulnerabilities in July’s Patch Tuesday, the largest monthly release recorded by the company. Two vulnerabilities were under active exploitation, including CVE-2026-56164 in SharePoint Server and CVE-2026-56155 in Active Directory Federation Services. Both vulnerabilities could allow attackers to elevate privileges. Check Point IPS provides protection against these threats (Microsoft SharePoint Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-56164)) WordPress has issued emergency updates for CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137, collectively called wp2shell. The critical WordPress Core vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated remote code execution and website takeover. Affected releases include versions 6.9.0 through 6.9.4 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.1. Fixed versions include 6.9.5 and 7.0.2. Check Point IPS provides protection against these threats (WordPress Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-63030)), WordPress SQL Injection (CVE-2026-60137)) SonicWall has released a hotfix for CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410, two critical vulnerabilities affecting SMA 1000 Series gateways. The flaws allow unauthenticated attackers to execute system commands on vulnerable appliances. Active exploitation has been associated with Inc ransomware. Check Point IPS provides protection… | Check Point Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Threat actors are abusing Microsoft Teams voice calls by impersonating corporate IT support staff to trick employees into installing the EtherRAT malware, giving attackers initial access to corporate networks. [...] | Bleeping Computer | |||
| High | 8.7 | High8.7GCVE Database <!-- obsidian --><h2 data-heading="Description">Description</h2> <p>When a host pushes a CLR object into a Scriban <code>TemplateContext</code> via the standard, documented pattern —</p> <pre><code class="language-csharp">var so = new ScriptObject(); so["user"] = currentUser; // direct CLR reference context.PushGlobal(so); </code></pre> <p>— <code>TypedObjectAccessor</code> exposes every public-getter property for <strong>both reading and writing</strong>, and writes land on the live host object and <strong>persist after <code>Render()</code> returns</strong>. The write path performs no <code>CanWrite</code> and no setter-visibility check, producing two related but distinct weaknesses:</p> <p><strong>(A) Mass assignment of public setters — CWE-915 (originally F-002).</strong> Any <code>{ get; set; }</code> property is writable from template code (<code>{{ user.is_admin = true }}</code>, <code>{{ order.total_price = 0 }}</code>). This is "surprising but technically consistent with the setter being public" — and crucially, Scriban offers <strong>no way to expose such a property read-only</strong>, because <code>MemberFilter</code> is read/write-symmetric.</p> <p><strong>(B) Access-modifier bypass — CWE-284 (originally F-007).</strong> Properties the developer <strong>deliberately</strong> restricted are also writable, because reflection ignores C# accessibility:</p> Declaration | Developer intent | Actual behavior -- | -- | -- { get; set; } | writable | writable (mass assignment — A) { get; private set; } | only the owning class writes | template writes freely { get; internal set; } | only the declaring assembly writes | template writes freely { get; init; } | immutable after construction (C# 9 language guarantee) | template writes freely post-construction <p>The <code>init</code>-only post-construction write — the highest false-positive risk — was explicitly confirmed against the shipped 7.2.1 package.</p> <h2 data-heading="Affected Versions">Affected Versions</h2> <p>All releases that ship <code>TypedObjectAccessor</code> (<code><= 7.2.1</code>). <code>PrepareMembers</code> has used the getter-only filter since the accessor was introduced, and <code>TrySetValue</code> has never checked the setter. The <code>init</code> bypass applies on .NET 5+; <code>private set</code> / <code>internal set</code> apply on every supported runtime. No patched version exists.</p> <h2 data-heading="Steps to Reproduce">Steps to Reproduce</h2> <blockquote> <p>Copy-paste. Run from the engagement root (the folder containing both <code>scriban/</code> and <code>reports/</code>).</p> </blockquote> <p><strong>Prereqs:</strong></p> <pre><code class="language-bash">test -d scriban || { echo "scriban source missing"; exit 1; } ( command -v dotnet >/dev/null && dotnet --list-sdks | grep -q '^10\.' ) \ || ( "$HOME/.dotnet/dotnet" --list-sdks | grep -q '^10\.' ) \ || { echo ".NET 10 SDK missing"; exit 1; } export PATH="$HOME/.dotnet:$PATH" </code></pre> <p><strong>Run both PoCs (native):</strong></p> <pre><code class="language-bash">( cd reports/f002/poc && dotnet run -c Release ) # (A) public-setter mass assignment ( cd reports/f007/poc && dotnet run -c Release ) # (B) private/internal/init bypass </code></pre> <p><strong>Docker fallback (no native SDK required):</strong></p> <pre><code class="language-bash">docker run --rm -v "$PWD":/work -w /work/reports/f007/poc \ mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:10.0 bash -lc "dotnet run -c Release" </code></pre> <p><strong>Confirm the published package is affected (not just master):</strong> swap the <code>ProjectReference</code> in <code>reports/f007/poc/poc.csproj</code> for <code><PackageReference Include="Scriban" Version="7.2.1" /></code> and re-run — the four bypasses still succeed.</p> <p>Each PoC prints <code>[1]</code> original CLR values, <code>[2]</code> template output (reads originals → writes → reads back), and <code>[3]</code> the <strong>C#-side</strong> read after <code>Render()</code> proving the live host object was permanently altered.</p> <h2 data-heading="Remediation">Remediation</h2> <p>Fixes are listed flat. Note that (B) has a clean, clearly-correct code fix; (A) requires a <em>new control</em> because public-setter writes are otherwise by-design.</p> <ul> <li><strong>Fix 1 — block restricted setters in <code>TrySetValue</code> (<code>TypedObjectAccessor.cs</code> L108–L123). Fixes (B).</strong> Before the L120 <code>SetValue</code>, require a public, non-<code>init</code> setter: <pre><code class="language-csharp">var setM = propertyAccessor.GetSetMethod(nonPublic: false); if (setM is null) return false; // private / internal / protected setters if (setM.ReturnParameter.GetRequiredCustomModifiers() .Any(m => m.FullName == "System.Runtime.CompilerServices.IsExternalInit")) return false; // init-only: setter IS public, so the IsExternalInit check is REQUIRED </code></pre> A plain <code>GetSetMethod( | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A massive campaign distributes malicious installer archives hosted on spoofed websites masquerading as popular software like OBS Studio, DNS Jumper, DS4Windows, and Bandicam. Over 90 domain names localized across 10 languages were discovered. The malicious archives bundle a legitimate Microsoft-signed install.exe binary with a rogue install.res.1033.dll library deployed via DLL sideloading. This installs the ScreenConnect remote access service, which then deploys AsyncRAT payloads through PowerShell and VBS scripts. The threat actors leverage SEO techniques to position fraudulent sites at the top of search engine results, targeting both individual users and corporate networks. The infrastructure spans three IP addresses with domains registered between October 2025 and March 2026, creating a global footprint with multi-language support. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.8EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53232 CVE-2026-53232 is a published vulnerability related to the network PHY layer in Microsoft software versions 3.0 and 4.0. The description references Microsoft Support Lifecycle information but does not provide technical details about the vulnerability or its impact. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-46330Microsoft · Revert "net/smc: Introduce TCP ULP support" High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-46330 CVE-2026-46330 is a vulnerability related to Microsoft software version 3.0. The available information is limited and does not include technical details, CVSS score, or exploit data. No patch or remediation details are provided. | GCVE Database |
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