XING CPTrans-ME-X is reported to contain multiple vulnerabilities. Specific details about the nature, impact, or affected versions of these vulnerabilities are not provided in the available information.
In Jenkins 2.579 and earlier, LTS 2.568.2 and earlier, Jenkins does not rotate the session when a user is authenticated via the "remember me" cookie, allowing attackers able to serve content on the same site as Jenkins to set a known session cookie in the victim's browser, which after the victim authenticates via the "remember me" cookie, grants the attacker access to Jenkins as that user.
Simple Machines Forum (SMF) through 2.1.7, fixed in commit 6f0dc61, contains an authorization state-confusion vulnerability in the profile loader that allows authenticated low-privileged users to gain administrator access by supplying multiple values for the user parameter. Attackers can exploit the mismatch between Profile::$member and User::$me->is_owner during sequential profile loading to be treated as the owner of an administrator profile, enabling unauthorized password changes and full account takeover.
This content is an Ask Me Anything (AMA) session hosted on Reddit featuring security leaders who transitioned from practitioner roles to vendor positions. It provides insights into their experiences and perspectives on working on the vendor side of cybersecurity. The discussion is intended for informational and community engagement purposes and does not describe a security threat or vulnerability.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (deb78208f7aa932298e92a8c241ed970296c567a273fc21013dd83bb7916e81b)
On `npm install`, package.json's preinstall hook runs index.js which harvests installer host identifiers — os.hostname(), os.userInfo() username, local IPv4 addresses, home directory, INIT_CWD, public IP (fetched from api.ipify.org / icanhazip.com / ifconfig.me), DNS resolver IP/subnet, and the parent project's package.json metadata (name, author, repository, homepage) — and transmits them to the hardcoded Interactsh-style callback host `da51rv0hb2uc72tg4gvgdepinjcallbk1.oast.fun`. Exfiltration uses two channels: an HTTPS/HTTP POST to `/poc/<uuid>` on the callback host, and a hex-encoded DNS covert channel that splits the JSON payload into ≤60-character subdomain labels resolved against the callback host, designed to bypass egress filters that block outbound HTTP but permit DNS. The version number (999.9.12) and package name are consistent with a dependency-confusion probe.
## Source: ossf-package-analysis (d7cde5bd15beab8488f3b3b6bde2f17fff6c148ef2d575613762f337bd1c8281)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'fund-list-filter' @ 999.9.12 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (27ba065e8759299d381ed1c7abd5e7721037b4ea969a384a9e70cfb6bb799e17)
Package declares `scripts.preinstall`: `node index.js`, causing index.js to run automatically on `npm install`. The script collects hostname, username, home directory, INIT_CWD, local IPv4, public egress IP (via api.ipify.org, icanhazip.com, ifconfig.me), DNS resolver IP and client subnet (via o-o.myaddr.l.google.com), and the parent project's package.json fields (name, author, repository, homepage). The collected JSON is exfiltrated to the hardcoded callback host `da51rv0hb2uc72tg4gvgdepinjcallbk1.oast.fun` (Interactsh/OAST) via DNS-chunked queries and HTTPS POST to `/poc/<uuid>`. The unscoped name is published at version 999.9.12 to defeat internal resolvers that fall back to the public npm registry, so any build referencing `fund-portfolio` without a private-registry pin will resolve to and execute this payload.
## Source: ossf-package-analysis (ffad2f6c37441c2924e67b1d506d9c26dc9cb2fae325b74a596102ea5ed403bf)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'fund-portfolio' @ 999.9.12 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (ff42d765d0c2f6af53e4be5a9cf26ef34b3a36accf199acfb7d53af40b8dc2a6)
On npm install, the declared preinstall script runs index.js, which collects the installer's hostname, OS username, home directory, cwd (INIT_CWD of the consuming project), local IPv4 address, egress public IP (fetched from api.ipify.org, icanhazip.com, and ifconfig.me), DNS resolver information, and the parent project's package.json fields (name, author, repository, homepage). The collected data is transmitted to the hardcoded third-party callback host da51rv0hb2uc72tg4gvgdepinjcalbk1.oast.fun via both DNS queries (hex-chunked subdomain lookups) and HTTPS POST to /poc/<uuid>. The package name and version pattern are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal scope; the beacon fires automatically at install time without any caller opt-in. Although the author metadata self-labels this as an authorized proof-of-concept, the code performs the full exploitation shape (auto-exec on install, installer-identifier collection, egress to an attacker-controlled callback) against anyone who resolves this public name.
## Source: ossf-package-analysis (3ade0d327c85a937a9115a25153971f25b66eb6c838a6a82b171e054afc285c6)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'stillm4ddpocs-demo-gadget' @ 999.9.10 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
phpMyFAQ versions prior to 4.1.7 have a vulnerability in the two-factor authentication process where remember-me tokens are issued before the second-factor verification completes. This allows attackers with valid credentials to bypass 2FA by replaying the remember-me cookie, gaining full authenticated access without completing the second-factor challenge.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (69a832d2eb4042899a17a745bac70590844ba320f3e181580314687c664e5159)
The package's package.json declares a preinstall script that runs index.js automatically on `npm install`. index.js shells out via child_process.exec to collect the installer's hostname, current working directory, username, a package marker, and the machine's public IP (fetched via curl to ifconfig.me). The aggregated output is hex-encoded with xxd and split into DNS labels queried via nslookup against subdomains of snurkeburk.com, a DNS-tunnel exfiltration channel that bypasses egress HTTP filtering. Installing this package causes host identifiers and public IP to leave the machine to an attacker-controlled DNS namespace.
This content announces an Ask Me Anything (AMA) session with Arshi Chadha, a leading AI security researcher and co-lead of the OWASP LLM Top 10 project focused on vector and embedding weaknesses. The discussion will cover prompt injection, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) poisoning, embedding attacks, and other AI system vulnerabilities. It highlights ongoing research and public disclosures related to AI security but does not describe a specific vulnerability or exploit. The event aims to educate and engage the community on AI security challenges and mitigation strategies.
Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. “Experiment is the mother of knowledge.” ― Madeleine L'Engle, A Wrinkle in Time “Don't slide down the rabbit hole. The way down is a breeze, but climbing back's a battle.” ― Kate Morton, The Clockmaker's Daughter Hacker Summer Camp has come and gone, which means it’s time for you to start planning next year’s trip. I’m surely going to recap Camp Season, right? Nope. One of the things that I’ve really enjoyed lately is a segment on the Beers with Talos podcast that we call “Make Hazel a Hacker.” If you haven’t listened to it, this is a perfect time to start. Each episode we take a few minutes and pose a security question, term, or concept to Hazel and force her to come up with an idea or explanation on the spot. There are no parameters, so she’s faced with the entirety of information security — past, present, and future. I know, it’s insane. The craziest part is that (I think) Hazel came up with this idea and still volunteered to put herself in the line of fire. As we put Hazel’s feet to the fire, one of my favorite things happens: The rest of us listen in and offer our thoughts during her brainstorming process. Invariably, we’ve got three very different answers, ideas, hints, or directions for her. It’s surely maddening for Hazel, but to me, the best part of the discussion that inevitably follows is that although they’re all different, they’re all correct. For example, this past episode I asked her about a behavioral indicator (regarding “wallpaper.bmp”) that seems benign on its own, but can be interesting to use as a pivot for a threat hunt. We had various interesting angles to consider, backed by years of knowledge and experience. It gave us a good conversation, and that was a .bmp! One of the most nebulous things to learn in this field is that multiple things can be both different and correct. When you are making your decisions this week — whether it’s deciding on a new pivot in your hunting, what devices to prioritize in your patching and updating, or which books or online training to focus on — take a quick second and get a second, third, and fourth opinion. Then try something that’s outside of your normal wheelhouse but sounds good when it’s proposed. None of this is a solo sport. It’s a team game and the best plays come from a mix of perspectives, experiences, and mistakes. The “right” answer can wear many faces, and your ability to hold different truths will lead you to undiscovered territory, the rabbit hole where anomaly lives and breathes. So... welcome back from Vegas. Now go down a rabbit hole on a path you wouldn’t normally take because one of your friends (Joe) or your mortal enemy (Dave) told you that it would work. “She'd been to Narnia, Wonderland, Hogwarts, Dictionopolis. She had tessered, fallen through the rabbit hole, crossed the ice bridge into the unknown world beyond.” ― Anne Ursu, Breadcrumbs The one big thing Cisco Talos recently discovered "JWR," a previously undocumented, real-time phishing framework and likely variant of "The Outsider" phishing-as-a-service platform. JWR uses an open WebSocket connection that allows attackers to monitor keystrokes live and dynamically steer victims through fake checkout and login flows. Currently deployed via SMS lures impersonating regional toll and postal authorities, JWR enables operators to steal payment data, 2FA codes, identity documents, and device fingerprints. Why do I care? Because JWR is operator-driven in real time, attackers can actively bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) by prompting victims for 2FA codes exactly when needed. The sheer volume of collected data gives threat actors a comprehensive identity profile primed for extensive follow-on fraud and network compromise. Furthermore, JWR's seamless integration with legitimate e-commerce platforms like Shopify makes these lures incredibly convincing to the untrained eye. So now what? Prioritize user education around SMS-based phish…
CVE-2026-56750 is a critical vulnerability in Gitea Open Source Git Server versions up to 1.26.4. The flaw involves improper authorization (CWE-284) where the Remember-Me token theft does not invalidate the attacker's session, potentially allowing unauthorized persistent access without user interaction.
The Social Login, Passkeys, Magic Link & Email OTP – Passwordless Login by VentraConnect plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Unverified Provider Email in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.3. This is due to the plugin trusting the unverified email field returned by Spotify's /v1/me endpoint as proof of mailbox ownership — Generic::normalize_common() copies this value into the normalized profile without requiring an email_verified assertion, and User_Links::link_or_login_user() subsequently passes it directly to get_user_by('email', $email) and issues a persistent authentication cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie() without a provider-specific verified-email gate, a local mailbox challenge, or a logged-in approval step. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing WordPress user, including Administrators, by supplying a known target email address through a controlled Spotify OAuth flow, gaining full administrative access to the site.
Audiobookshelf is a self-hosted audiobook and podcast server. Prior to 2.36.0, the jwtAuthCheck function in server/auth/TokenManager.js treats JWTs with the refresh token type as bearer access tokens on API and WebSocket resource endpoints such as /api/me instead of restricting them to /auth/refresh, allowing refresh tokens to authenticate as the associated users. This issue is fixed in version 2.36.0.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (945179057c5bd93b985c3c532baa35379ce9dd9603e26d17e63201beb25868ae)
The preinstall lifecycle script in cdf-tag-commander-helper@3.6.2 runs automatically on `npm install`. It executes `whoami` and `hostname`, retrieves the machine's public IP via ifconfig.me, and issues a plain-HTTP GET to a hardcoded Interactsh-style out-of-band callback subdomain (kwphewvexhjbtfduscqybx6q7c862eh0g.oast.fun), passing the three values as query parameters. The README states that the package makes no network requests, which contradicts the shipped code. The behavior is a reconnaissance beacon consistent with dependency-confusion targeting: on install, an attacker learns which internal build hosts and user accounts have resolved this package name.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (404569337a1e5fc46fff2584e052d2f9f99c3cb8d04e5fb3b5c5d633c178e01c)
The package's preinstall lifecycle script runs on npm install and collects the installer's local username (whoami), hostname, and public IP address (fetched via ifconfig.me), then transmits them as query-string parameters in an HTTP GET request to a hardcoded subdomain of oast.fun (kwphewvexhjbtfduscqybx6q7c862eh0g.oast.fun). oast.fun is an out-of-band interaction/callback service commonly used for reconnaissance and exfiltration in dependency-confusion attacks. The behavior fires automatically on default install with no relation to any documented package purpose.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (83df5c7e17dd2b9a808bddee17deb157e88a12632a632177f7969fce9ccfa7a8)
The package's preinstall lifecycle script runs automatically on `npm install` and executes `whoami` and `hostname`, then fetches the machine's public IP from ifconfig.me and transmits all three values as query-string parameters to a hardcoded out-of-band interaction domain (kwphewvexhjbtfduscqybx6q7c862eh0g.oast.fun) over plain HTTP via curl, with a wget fallback. The domain is an OAST (out-of-band application security testing) collector used to receive exfiltrated reconnaissance data. The behavior fires unconditionally with no first-party relationship, no consent, and no documented purpose consistent with the package name.
A sophisticated scam is spreading through WhatsApp that exploits the platform's legitimate 'Linked devices' feature to take over user accounts. Attackers compromise existing accounts and send messages to contacts asking them to vote for a friend or relative in various online contests. When victims click the provided link, they are redirected through pages appearing to be WhatsApp-related, often using the legitimate wa.me domain. The attack tricks users into authorizing a new linked session, granting attackers full access to read messages, send messages as the victim, and access contacts. The scam is particularly effective because it comes from known contacts and relies on trust and quick reactions. Once compromised, attackers can continue the scam by messaging the victim's contacts, creating a chain of account takeovers without triggering traditional security alerts.
An extortion group is mass-BCC'ing journalists and other contacts to pressure victims by leveraging the recipients as indirect channels of coercion. The tactic involves sending breach claim emails to multiple journalists simultaneously, urging them to publish stories or contact the alleged victim before any proof is provided. This approach weaponizes journalists as pressure points in extortion campaigns without verified evidence of a breach.