EndClient RAT is a newly identified Remote Access Trojan attributed to the North Korean Kimsuky group, targeting human rights defenders. Delivered via a signed Microsoft Installer package disguised as 'StressClear.msi', it uses AutoIT scripts for execution and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and startup folder entries. The malware communicates with its command and control server using a custom protocol with JSON markers, enabling remote shell access, file upload/download, and system reconnaissance. It employs in-memory modules for binary search, Base64 encoding/decoding, and LZMA decompression to evade detection. Detection rates are currently low, increasing the risk of undetected compromise. While primarily targeting North Korean human rights defenders, the malware's capabilities pose risks to any organization with similar exposure or interest. No known exploits in the wild have been reported yet, but the threat is medium severity due to its stealth and persistence mechanisms.
A new two-stage malware named LeakyInjector and LeakyStealer has been identified, targeting cryptocurrency wallets and browser history. LeakyInjector uses low-level APIs for injection to avoid detection and injects LeakyStealer into explorer.exe. LeakyStealer implements a polymorphic engine to modify its memory area at runtime. Both stages were signed with valid Extended Validation certificates. The malware performs reconnaissance on infected machines, targeting multiple crypto wallets, including browser extensions, and searches for browser history files from various browsers. It establishes persistence through registry manipulation and beacons to the C2 server at regular intervals. The malware exfiltrates sensitive data and can execute additional commands received from the C2 server.
This investigation uncovered new tools and techniques used by the Curly COMrades threat actor to establish covert, long-term access to victim networks. The attackers exploited Hyper-V virtualization on compromised Windows 10 machines to create hidden remote operating environments. They deployed a minimalistic Alpine Linux-based virtual machine hosting custom malware for reverse shell and proxy operations. This approach effectively bypassed traditional host-based EDR detections. The threat actor also demonstrated persistence through PowerShell scripts, Kerberos ticket manipulation, and local account creation. International collaboration with the Georgian CERT aided in analyzing the command and control infrastructure.
Tangerine Turkey is a cryptomining campaign that propagates via VBScript worms spread through USB drives, leveraging legitimate system binaries for execution and persistence. The malware employs advanced defense evasion techniques such as registry modification and masquerading malicious files as legitimate system components. It establishes persistence through malicious services and scheduled tasks while attempting to disable Windows Defender. Although its primary objective is unauthorized cryptocurrency mining, its capabilities for persistence and lateral movement pose broader security risks. The campaign uses living-off-the-land binaries and creates mock directories to conceal its activities. No known CVEs or exploits are currently associated with this threat. The medium severity rating reflects the financial motivation and potential for system compromise without immediate destructive impact. European organizations using Windows systems with USB access are at risk, especially those with lax endpoint security controls and high-value targets. Mitigation requires targeted controls beyond generic advice, including USB device management, monitoring for living-off-the-land abuse, and registry integrity checks.
Over the course of three months, Volexity observed UTA0388 using various themes and fictional identities across dozens of spear phishing campaigns. As time passed, Volexity observed UTA0388 broaden their targeting and send emails in a variety of different languages, including English, Chinese, Japanese, French, and German. In most cases, the initial email sent by UTA0388 contained a link to phishing content hosted on a cloud-based service that would lead to malware.
Shuyal Stealer is a sophisticated infostealer malware targeting 19 different browsers. It conducts deep system reconnaissance, collecting detailed hardware information and user data. The malware disables Windows Task Manager, ensures persistence through startup folder insertion, and exfiltrates stolen data via a Telegram bot. Shuyal's capabilities include credential harvesting from multiple browsers, clipboard capture, screenshot taking, and Discord token theft. It employs evasion techniques like self-deletion and uses PowerShell for data compression. The malware's wide-ranging browser targets and extensive data collection make it a significant threat to user privacy and system security.
SORVEPOTEL has been observed to spread across Windows systems through convincing phishing messages with malicious ZIP file attachments. Interestingly, the phishing message that contains the malicious file attachment requires users to open it on a desktop, suggesting that threat actors might be more interested in targeting enterprises rather than consumers. Once opened, the malware automatically propagates via WhatsApp Web, causing infected accounts to be banned due to excessive spam activity.
Two Android spyware campaigns, ProSpy and ToSpy, have been discovered targeting users in the United Arab Emirates. These campaigns impersonate secure messaging apps like Signal and ToTok, distributing malware through deceptive websites and social engineering tactics. Once installed, the spyware exfiltrates sensitive data including contacts, SMS messages, files, and device information. The campaigns use persistence mechanisms to ensure continuous operation on compromised devices. ProSpy disguises itself as encryption plugins or pro versions of apps, while ToSpy exclusively mimics the ToTok app. The malware is distributed through unofficial sources, highlighting the risks of downloading apps outside official app stores.
A new campaign is distributing the Oyster (Broomstick) backdoor through trojanized Microsoft Teams installers. Threat actors are using SEO poisoning and malvertising to trick users into downloading fake installers from spoofed websites. The malicious installers deploy a persistent backdoor that enables remote access, gathers system information, and supports additional payload delivery while evading detection. This tactic mirrors earlier fake PuTTY campaigns, showing a trend of abusing trusted software for initial access. The backdoor communicates with attacker-controlled C2 domains and uses DLL sideloading via rundll32.exe for stealthy execution. Organizations are advised to download software only from verified sources and avoid relying on search engine advertisements.
This analysis focuses on a new variant of Lumma Stealer, a malware that reemerged after a brief hiatus following a law enforcement operation. The article details the malware's code obfuscation, evasion techniques, and persistence mechanisms. It describes Netskope's machine learning-based detection approach, which utilizes a Cloud Sandbox enhanced with ML models to analyze runtime behavior, process trees, and other features. The specific sample analyzed is an NSIS installer file that abuses AutoIt for malicious purposes. The malware employs various anti-analysis techniques and establishes persistence through the Windows Startup folder. Netskope's multi-layered threat protection system successfully detected this Lumma Stealer variant.
A new variant of the XCSSET malware, designed to infect Xcode projects, has been identified with key changes in browser targeting, clipboard hijacking, and persistence mechanisms. This variant employs sophisticated encryption and obfuscation techniques, uses run-only compiled AppleScripts for stealthy execution, and expands its data exfiltration capabilities to include Firefox browser data. It also adds another persistence mechanism through LaunchDaemon entries. The malware features a submodule for monitoring the clipboard and substituting wallet addresses. The infection chain consists of four stages, with modifications to the boot function and introduction of new modules. Changes include additional checks for Firefox browser, modified logic for Telegram existence check, and new info-stealer modules targeting Firefox data.
A recent analysis of a suspicious trojan loader reveals similarities to the APT-C-00 (Ocean Lotus) group, a government-backed hacker organization targeting East Asian companies and government agencies. The sample, a DLL file with excellent evasion capabilities, uses hash algorithms to dynamically obtain API functions. It creates a mutex for single-instance execution, validates command-line parameters, adds itself to the registry for persistence, and sets up a VEH exception handler. The loader employs module hollowing to replace code in certmgr.dll with shellcode that reflectively loads the Havoc RAT. The tactics and development environment align with Ocean Lotus' known techniques, including the use of Mingw-w64 and similar initialization processes.
DeerStealer is a sophisticated information-stealing malware that targets a wide range of user and system data. It employs deception techniques, persistence mechanisms, and rootkit-like capabilities to evade detection and maintain stealth on compromised systems. The malware uses signed executables, legitimate DLLs, and multi-stage execution to perform its malicious activities. It establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and employs auto-elevated COM objects to bypass User Account Control. DeerStealer's adaptive design allows it to switch C2 servers and use obfuscated files for effective data exfiltration. The malware is actively sold and supported through dark-web forums and Telegram channels, posing a significant threat to both individuals and organizations.
SmokeLoader, a modular malware loader active since 2011, has resurfaced with new versions in 2025 after Operation Endgame suppressed its activity. The latest variants, 2025 alpha and 2025, include bug fixes and improvements to evade detection. Key changes include a new mutex check in the stager, modified mutex name generation, and updates to the main module. The network protocol has been slightly adjusted in version 2025, and the scheduled task name for persistence has been updated. These versions fix performance issues and include additional anti-analysis measures. Despite efforts to dismantle it, SmokeLoader continues to evolve and is used by multiple threat groups.
A new malware campaign called EvilAI is spreading globally by disguising itself as legitimate AI-enhanced productivity tools. The malware uses AI-generated code and professional interfaces to evade detection, targeting organizations across sectors like manufacturing, government, and healthcare. It exploits Node.js to execute malicious JavaScript, establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry modifications, and communicates with command-and-control servers using encrypted channels. EvilAI enumerates installed software, terminates browser processes, and duplicates credential data. It employs sophisticated obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques to hinder reverse engineering. The malware acts as an initial access vector, potentially deploying additional payloads. This campaign highlights how AI is being weaponized to create increasingly stealthy and adaptive malware threats.
ChillyHell is a sophisticated macOS backdoor discovered in 2021 that has evaded detection by antivirus vendors. It is a modular C++ malware targeting Intel architectures, using multiple persistence mechanisms and communication protocols. The backdoor performs host profiling, establishes persistence through LaunchAgents, LaunchDaemons, or shell profile injection, and communicates with command and control servers via DNS or HTTP. ChillyHell's modular structure allows for various capabilities, including reverse shell access, self-updating, payload execution, and local password cracking. The malware's flexibility, stealth techniques, and notarization status make it a significant threat in the macOS landscape.
Salat Stealer, a sophisticated Go-based infostealer targeting Windows systems, has been identified. It exfiltrates browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet data, and session information while employing advanced evasion techniques. The malware uses UPX packing, process masquerading, registry run keys, and scheduled tasks for persistence and evasion. Operated under a Malware-as-a-Service model by Russian-speaking actors, it leverages resilient C2 infrastructure. The stealer targets multiple browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, and Telegram sessions. It communicates with its C2 server using UDP and HTTPS, with multiple fallback domains for redundancy. The control panel supports real-time interaction through WebSockets and includes features for remote command execution and system manipulation.
This analysis examines a campaign distributing Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS), targeting macOS users through fake 'cracked' applications. Attackers use two main delivery methods: malicious .dmg installers and terminal commands that bypass Gatekeeper protection. AMOS employs rotating domains to evade detection and steals a wide range of sensitive data, including credentials, browser information, cryptocurrency wallets, and system files. The campaign demonstrates sophisticated tactics, adapting to macOS security improvements and leveraging social engineering. The report emphasizes the importance of comprehensive endpoint detection, user education, and defense-in-depth strategies to combat such threats.
LAB52 has identified a new backdoor called NotDoor, attributed to APT28, a Russian intelligence-linked threat group. NotDoor is a VBA macro for Outlook that monitors incoming emails for specific trigger words, enabling data exfiltration, file uploads, and command execution on victim computers. The backdoor is deployed via Microsoft OneDrive.exe using DLL side-loading, and it establishes persistence by modifying registry keys. NotDoor employs obfuscation techniques and a custom string encoding method. It can execute commands, exfiltrate files, and upload files to the victim's machine. The malware demonstrates APT28's continuous evolution in bypassing defense mechanisms, posing a significant threat to NATO member countries across various sectors.
TinkyWinkey is a sophisticated Windows-based keylogger that combines persistent service execution, low-level keyboard hooks, and comprehensive system profiling. It captures all keystrokes, including special keys and multi-language input, alongside detailed system metrics such as CPU, memory, OS version, and network identifiers. The malware uses DLL injection into trusted processes and service-based persistence for stealth. It creates a log file in the user's temp directory, recording system reconnaissance details and user activity data. First observed in June 2025, TinkyWinkey exemplifies the evolving threat landscape, leveraging advanced programming techniques to maintain stealth and maximize data capture. Organizations should monitor for unusual service activity, unexpected DLL injections, and persistent logging patterns to mitigate this threat.
