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1,436 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Google is rolling out new privacy controls for Search services and Google Play, giving you more control over saved history and personalized recommendations. [...] | Bleeping Computer | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.7% | High8.7EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-1840 The Aclara Metrum Cellular Web Interface is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to the absence of authentication controls on critical system functions. This weakness exposes essential configuration settings, allowing attackers to alter operational parameters and trigger system restarts without restriction. Such unauthorized changes can disrupt normal functionality and, if performed repeatedly, may lead to a loss of communications to the device. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | SANS ISC Handlers Diary In a previous diary, I talked about stack strings&#;x26;#;x5b;1&#;x26;#;x5d; with a practical example of them. Since my SEC670 class, I&#;x26;#;xe2;&#;x26;#;x80;&#;x26;#;x99;m even more interested&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;in malware obfuscation techniques. I had&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;a look at process names. When you list running processes on a computer, can you trust what you see&#;x26;#;x3f; If you&#;x26;#;39;re facing a rootkit, malicious processes can be simply hidden (the API calls or commands to list processed have been tampered). But a malicious process&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;can also mimic a non-suspicious name by masquerading their name. This technique (T1036 in the MITRE ATT&#;x26;CK framework&#;x26;#;x5b;2&#;x26;#;x5d;) has been used by attackers in many campaigns. A good example of the Velvet Ant Chinese group&#;x26;#;x5b;3&#;x26;#;x5d;. The goal is to hide the &#;x26;#;xe2;&#;x26;#;x80;œmalware&#;x26;#;xe2;&#;x26;#;x80; process name by replacing it with something&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;that won&#;x26;#;xe2;&#;x26;#;x80;&#;x26;#;x99;t attract the Security Analyst&#;x26;#;xe2;&#;x26;#;x80;&#;x26;#;x99;s eyes or defeat security controls.
 | SANS ISC Handlers Diary | |||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 1.1% | High8.1EPSS 1.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54512 jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-54325earendil-works pi · Untrusted Functionality Inclusion Medium4.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54325 # Pi loads project-local extensions without approval Pi before 0.79.0 loaded project-local configuration and resources from a repository's `.pi` directory without first asking the user to trust that repository. This included project-local extensions, which are executable TypeScript or JavaScript modules loaded into the Pi process. An attacker who controls a repository could place Pi-specific project resources in that repository. If a user then started Pi from that working tree, the project-local extension code could run with the same privileges as the local Pi process without the user having a convenient way to make a trust decision. ## Info The affected component is Pi's project resource loading path. Before 0.79.0, startup loaded project `.pi/settings.json`, auto-discovered `.pi` resources, project package-managed resources, and project instruction files as part of normal session initialization. Project-local extensions were included in the same extension set as user/global extensions and were initialized before there was a project trust boundary. Extensions like pi itself are not sandboxed. They run in the Pi process and can register commands, tools, and event handlers. The vulnerable behavior was not a privilege escalation across an operating-system boundary, but it allowed repository-controlled Pi extension code to execute implicitly when a user ran Pi in that repository. ## Impact Exploitation requires user interaction: the attacker must get a user to open or otherwise work in an attacker-controlled repository and start Pi there. The attacker does not need an account on the user's machine or prior privileges in Pi. If exploited, project-local extension code runs with the same permissions as the user running Pi. It can access files, environment variables, credentials available to the process, the network, and local tools available to that user. In CVSS terms, this advisory rates the impact as limited confidentiality and integrity impact without a distinct availability impact because exploitation requires local user action in an untrusted repository and does not cross a privilege boundary. This risk is most relevant for users who run Pi in repositories they have not reviewed or do not trust. Pi's security guidance requires users to trust the codebases they work with, or to use an external sandbox or isolation boundary for untrusted repositories. ## Affected versions - Affected: `< 0.79.0` - Patched: `0.79.0` ## The solution Pi 0.79.0 added project trust gating for project-local inputs. On interactive startup, Pi now asks before loading project-local settings, instructions, resources, package-managed resources, or extensions when a trust decision has not already been saved for the working directory. Non-interactive modes do not prompt. Without a saved trust decision, they ignore project-local inputs unless `--approve` or `-a` is passed. Users can also pass `--no-approve` or `-na` to ignore project-local inputs for a single run even when a project is already trusted. Before trust is resolved, Pi loads only user/global extensions and extensions passed explicitly on the command line. Those extensions can participate in the `project_trust` event; project-local extensions are not loaded until after the project is trusted. ## Recommendations Upgrade `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` to version 0.79.0 or later. After upgrading, review project trust prompts carefully and only trust repositories whose Pi-specific configuration and extensions you are willing to run. The upgrade makes this trust decision explicit, but it does not change Pi's security model: users should work only in trusted repositories, or use external isolation for untrusted code. Use `--no-approve` for one-off runs where project-local inputs should be ignored. For untrusted repositories or unattended automation, follow Pi's [security guidance](https://pi.dev/docs/latest/security) and run Pi inside an operating-system sandbox, container, VM, or other isolation boundary with only the files and credentials required for the task. ## Workarounds Before and after this change, Pi users should only run Pi in repositories they trust, or in an external sandbox or isolation boundary when working with untrusted code. Pi 0.79.0 adds an explicit trust prompt as a defense-in-depth and user-safety improvement; it is not a sandbox and it does not make untrusted repositories safe. If upgrading is not possible and your workflow already enforces this trust boundary, continue to avoid running Pi directly in untrusted repositories. Inspect and remove project-local Pi configuration and resources before use, especially project-local extensions and package configuration. Disabling extensions and other project resources with command-line flags can reduce exposure, but trusted or isolated execution remains the primary mitigation. ## Timeline - 2026-05-25: Report received. - 2026-06-05: Project trust gating committed. - 2026-06-08: Project trust refi | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.9 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-55736ash · Mass Assignment Medium5.9EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55736 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code. Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set internally (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete. In the regular changeset path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary. An attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation. This issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research A stolen session cookie sat in underground markets for seven weeks before attackers used it to poison 32 Red Hat packages in the npm software registry, an example of the industrial approach behind modern supply chain attacks. Key takeaways Miasma is a self-propagating npm worm derived from Mini Shai-Hulud that TeamPCP open-sourced on May 12. The public release of the full weaponized toolchain means any operator can now replicate structurally identical supply chain campaigns. The Miasma campaign compromised 89-plus npm packages across three waves (June 1-5), affecting Red Hat, Vapi.ai, and Microsoft Azure repositories. The worm produced malicious packages with valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, defeating the highest tier of supply-chain integrity verification. The root cause was a stolen developer credential that sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization. This infostealer-to-supply-chain pipeline is the defining pattern of the Developer Credential Economy. The Miasma campaign’s third wave (June 5) introduced a significant escalation: persistence files that target AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, VS Code), expanding the attack surface from package registries to the developer’s local environment. Relying on execution-layer detection, such as EDR, is insufficient against supply chain threats because EDR tools lack visibility into the ephemeral CI/CD environments where credential theft and weaponization occur. Organizations should treat developer credentials as control-plane infrastructure and adopt a phased Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) approach: harden the generation layer, neutralize harvested secrets in real time, and enforce human-gated publishing controls. Background on the Miasma worm and npm supply chain attack On June 1, the Miasma self-propagating worm compromised 32 official npm packages under the @redhat-cloud-services namespace, delivering a credential-harvesting payload to an estimated 80,000 to 117,000 weekly downloads. Within five days, the campaign escalated through three distinct attack waves and forced GitHub to disable 73 repositories across four Microsoft organizations . The technical details of the Miasma supply-chain attack are alarming: valid Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) provenance attestations on malicious packages; a novel execution technique that bypasses install-script monitoring; and a new persistence mechanism that targets AI coding assistants. But the most important detail is a timestamp. Dark web monitoring firm Whiteintel detected a Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. A second sighting appeared on May 15. The credential sat in underground markets for approximately seven weeks before attackers weaponized it on June 1. That seven-week gap is the signature of an emerging threat model that Tenable’s Research Special Operations (RSO) team calls the Developer Credential Economy , and has been tracking since March 2026. The Developer Credential Economy is a structured black market for highly privileged developer credentials where open-source supply chain compromises function as credential generation infrastructure, underground markets serve as the distribution layer, and multiple threat actors with distinct motivations weaponize the harvested access downstream. The Miasma campaign is the clearest example of this model to date, and it validates a pattern that has been accelerating across the npm, PyPI, and GitHub ecosystems throughout 2026. The three-layer economy, explained through Miasma When it first assessed this pattern in March, Tenable RSO built the analysis around the TeamPCP cascading campaign (Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, Telnyx, and 66+ npm packages) and the Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 Axios compromise . The thesis identified a three-layer structure: credential generation, distribution, and weaponization. Three months later, the Miasma campaign validates each layer with striking clarity. Layer Actor / group Operational focus Primary targets Miasma validation Generation TeamPCP Bulk credential harvesting via tool exploitation Trivy, KICS, TanStack, Red Hat npm scope Miasma's payload sweeps GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and .env files from every infected environment Distribution Underground markets, infostealer aggregators Credential brokering and tooling proliferation Stolen developer credentials; open-sourced worm code Red Hat employee credential sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization; Shai-Hulud source published May 12 Weaponization Sapphire Sleet (DPRK-nexus), LAPSUS$, Miasma operator, copycat actors State-sponsored exfiltration, data theft, cascading supply chain compromise Axios (npm), Mercor AI, @vapi-ai/server-sdk, Azure/durabletask Each Miasma wave generates A fresh credential pool, feeding the next wave and enabling downstream actors Layer 1: Credential generation The Developer Credential Economy’s first layer is extraction. Threat actors compromise developer tooling and open-source infrastructure not primarily to distribute malware to end users, but to harvest the credentials those environments contain, such as GitHub tokens, npm publishing tokens, cloud provider credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and API keys. TeamPCP pioneered this at scale beginning in September 2025 with the original Shai-Hulud worm. Its defining innovation was cascading credential extraction: compromise one trusted tool, harvest the credentials it holds, and use those credentials to compromise the next tool in the dependency chain. The Trivy vulnerability scanner compromise yielded CI/CD runner secrets. Those secrets enabled the KICS compromise . KICS yielded additional cloud credentials. Each link in the chain generated a broader set of privileged access. By May, TeamPCP had refined this into the Mini Shai-Hulud variant, which introduced two capabilities that made the generation layer dramatically more efficient: Wormable propagation : The malware queries the npm registry for every package the compromised identity can publish, and republishes itself across all of them automatically. CI/CD pipeline hijack via OpenID Connect (OIDC) token extraction : Rather than stealing static credentials, Mini Shai-Hulud requests short-lived OIDC tokens through GitHub Actions, enabling it to publish packages with valid cryptographic provenance. In the Miasma supply chain campaign, this generation layer operated through a Red Hat employee’s compromised GitHub account. The worm’s payload swept the infected environment for: GitHub tokens and personal access tokens npm publishing tokens AWS, GCP, and Azure cloud credentials HashiCorp Vault tokens Kubernetes service account tokens SSH private keys Docker registry credentials GPG keys .env files The June variant added dedicated collectors for GCP and Azure cloud identities, going beyond secret extraction to enumerate all cloud access the infected machine holds. Every machine that ran npm install against a compromised @redhat-cloud-services package version became a credential generation node. Layer 2: Distribution The second layer is the marketplace. Stolen credentials flow from the generation layer into underground markets, infostealer log aggregators, and access brokering services, where they become available to any buyer. The Miasma supply chain-attack timeline makes this layer visible in a way previous campaigns did not. Whiteintel detected the Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. That credential was not generated by a targeted supply chain attack against Red Hat; a commodity infostealer harvested it, one of 13.2 million infostealer infections that SpyCloud's 2025 Identity Exposure Report documented as producing an average of 50 credentials per infection. The credential entered the distribution layer as one data point among billions: SpyCloud recaptured 5.3 billion credential pairs, 18.1 million exposed API keys and tokens, and 8.6 billion stolen session cookies from criminal underground monitoring in 2025 alone. For seven weeks, the credential sat in the distribution layer before someone acted on it. That dwell time is the systemic gap that the Developer Credential Economy exploits. Organizations that do not monitor underground markets for exposed developer credentials are operating on the assumption that the generation-to-weaponization pipeline does not exist, or that it operates too slowly to matter. Miasma demonstrates that even a seven-week window, which is long by underground market standards, is more than sufficient for weaponization. The distribution layer was further amplified on May 12, when TeamPCP published the complete Mini Shai-Hulud source code on GitHub under an MIT License with the message “Shai-Hulud: Open Sourcing The Carnage.” The release included CI cache-poisoning scripts, the OIDC token extractor, and the credential stealer with its propagation logic. This is the supply chain equivalent of publishing a working exploit framework: the tooling itself became a distribution channel, lowering the barrier to entry for any operator who wants to run a structurally identical campaign. Layer 3: Weaponization The third layer is operational use. Actors with distinct motivations acquire credentials from the distribution layer and weaponize them against specific targets. In March, the RSO team documented at least three distinct actors operating from the same credential pool : TeamPCP harvested at scale: Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 (DPRK-nexus) operationalized stolen npm tokens for financial gain through the Axios compromise and LAPSUS$ exploited compromised Tailscale VPN credentials from the LiteLLM breach for data theft from Mercor AI. The same credential ecosystem fed all three. Miasma’s weaponization layer continues to evolve, but the trajectory across its three waves demonstrates the pattern: Wave 1 (June 1) used the stolen R | Tenable Research | |||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-53632 ### Summary The `launch-editor` NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking. ### Impact If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the `launch-editor`: - using Windows - NTLM is not disabled ([it is recommended to disable](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/advancing-windows-security-disabling-ntlm-by-default/4489526), while it's still enabled by default) - the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using `launch-editor` - the server that has the middleware using `launch-editor` is running - the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems. ### Details `launch-editor` accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as: ``` \\attacker-host\share ``` On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur. If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password. The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using `launch-editor` to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash. ### PoC From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used [Impacket's smbserver.py](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/smbserver.py), but you could use something like [Responder](https://github.com/lgandx/Responder) for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use `smbserver.py` here. First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share. ``` mkdir /tmp/data echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt ``` Then, start the SMB server. ``` $ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data ``` Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (`vite`). Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use `curl` to achieve the same. ``` curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt' ``` Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of `smbserver.py` and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in. <img width="1916" height="277" alt="2026-01-30_10-58" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f606e8f-c9bb-41dc-b507-ea6606b53368" /> | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-7167Gaudire Assassin game · Information Exposure Medium6.9EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-7167 The vulnerability arises when the system fails to properly validate the 'email' field during the authentication process, allowing unverified or fake email addresses to be accepted. This lack of validation enables the creation of user accounts with fake email addresses, facilitating the mass creation of fraudulent accounts. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an authenticated attacker to carry out various attacks, such as mass spam distribution, system abuse, or bypassing user controls, thereby compromising the security and integrity of the system. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 1.7% | Critical9.1EPSS 1.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-33186 CVE-2026-33186 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in gRPC-Go, caused by improper validation of the HTTP/2 :path pseudo-header. A remote attacker can exploit this by sending malformed :path headers missing the mandatory leading slash, potentially bypassing access controls and exposing sensitive data. The vulnerability affects Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization v4.21 images. Exploitation requires services to implement path-based authorization interceptors with fallback allow rules. Typical Red Hat deployments use strict default-deny policies or mutual TLS, limiting practical attack surface. Mitigation involves normalizing incoming :path headers at the infrastructure level via reverse proxies or API gateways. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12786 A vulnerability has been found in Ezbsystems UltraISO Premium Edition up to 9.76. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality in the library bootpt64.sys of the component Kernel Driver. The manipulation leads to improper access controls. Local access is required to approach this attack. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-12784IM-Magic Partition Resizer · Improper Access Controls High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12784 A weakness has been identified in IM-Magic Partition Resizer up to 7.9.0. This affects an unknown function in the library MDA_NTDRV.sys of the component Kernel Driver. This manipulation causes improper access controls. The attack requires local access. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-12782EaseUS Partition Master · Improper Access Controls High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12782 A security flaw has been discovered in EaseUS Partition Master up to 14.5. The impacted element is an unknown function in the library EUEDKEPM.sys of the component Kernel Driver. The manipulation results in improper access controls. The attack requires a local approach. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The affected component should be upgraded. The vendor explains: "We have confirmed that this issue was present only in older versions of the product. Our product has since been updated, and the issue has been resolved in the latest version, so it no longer exists." EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-12781EaseUS Partition Master · Improper Access Controls High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12781 A vulnerability was identified in EaseUS Partition Master up to 14.5. The affected element is an unknown function in the library epmntdrv.sys of the component Kernel Driver. The manipulation leads to improper access controls. The attack needs to be performed locally. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. You should upgrade the affected component. The vendor explains: "We have confirmed that this issue was present only in older versions of the product. Our product has since been updated, and the issue has been resolved in the latest version, so it no longer exists." EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-12780AOMEI Backupper · Improper Access Controls High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12780 CVE-2026-12780 is a high-severity vulnerability in AOMEI Backupper up to version 8.3.0. It involves improper access controls in the kernel driver component amwrtdrv.sys. The vulnerability requires local access to exploit and has been publicly disclosed. The vendor has not responded to the disclosure, and no patch information is available. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-12779AOMEI Dynamic Disk Manager · Improper Access Controls High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12779 A vulnerability was found in AOMEI Dynamic Disk Manager up to 10.10.1. This issue affects some unknown processing in the library ddmdrv.sys of the component Kernel Driver. Performing a manipulation results in improper access controls. The attack must be initiated from a local position. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-12778AOMEI Partition Assistant · Improper Access Controls High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12778 A vulnerability has been found in AOMEI Partition Assistant up to 10.10.1. This vulnerability affects unknown code in the library ampa10.sys of the component Kernel Driver. Such manipulation leads to improper access controls. The attack must be carried out locally. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | KEV | Critical9.8KEVReddit Cybersecurity A critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-20253) in Splunk Enterprise allows unauthenticated attackers to create or truncate arbitrary files via a PostgreSQL sidecar service endpoint lacking authentication controls. The flaw affects Splunk Enterprise versions 10.2 before 10.2.4 and 10.0 before 10.0.7. Exploitation was confirmed shortly after public disclosure, with proof-of-concept code published. CISA has added this vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and mandated rapid patching for federal agencies. Splunk has released patches to remediate the issue and strongly recommends upgrading to fixed versions. | Reddit Cybersecurity | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-12048pgAdmin 4 · Cross-site Scripting Critical9.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12048 Stored cross-site scripting in pgAdmin 4's error-rendering and plan-node-rendering paths. Text returned by a PostgreSQL server (ErrorResponse messages, including object names quoted back inside relation-does-not-exist errors and inside EXPLAIN Recheck Cond / Exact Heap Blocks fields) was passed verbatim through html-react-parser at every user-facing sink — the notifier toasts, FormFooterMessage / FormInput help and error areas, FormNote, ModalProvider AlertContent and confirmDelete, ToolErrorView, the Explain visualiser's NodeText panel, the SQL editor confirm dialogs, ConfirmSaveContent, PreferencesHelper modal alerts, and SelectThemes helper text. A PostgreSQL server an attacker controls — or any server returning attacker-influenced text such as a table or column name a low-privilege database user can create — could inject arbitrary HTML (including <iframe>) into the pgAdmin DOM the moment the victim's pgAdmin connected to that server or viewed an Explain plan that referenced the crafted object. The injected iframe's srcdoc could fetch attacker-served JavaScript and, by writing to parent.location, redirect the victim's top-level pgAdmin browser tab to an attacker-controlled URL. Because the injection originates from inside pgAdmin's own interface, standard anti-clickjacking controls (X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors) do not mitigate it. A phishing page rendered inside the legitimate pgAdmin window is indistinguishable from a genuine pgAdmin dialog. Fix combines three complementary layers. (1) DOMPurify sanitisation is wrapped around every html-react-parser call site reachable from notifier, alert, form-error, Explain, and SQL-editor flows. (2) A new plain-text rendering contract — SafeMessage / SafeHtmlMessage components plus Notifier.errorText / alertText / warningText / infoText / successText helpers — is introduced; around fifty callers across browser, tools, dashboard, debugger, misc, llm, preferences, schema diff, and the SQL editor that previously interpolated backend-derived strings are migrated to the plain-text variants. (3) Backend HTML-escape is applied at the post-connection-SQL handler (execute_post_connection_sql) via a new sanitize_external_text helper, so third-party JSON consumers (audit logs, API clients) never receive raw markup either; the Explain plan-info renderer is also patched to _.escape Recheck Cond and Exact Heap Blocks at construction (matching every sibling field), giving defence in depth even before DOMPurify runs. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.0 before 9.16. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-56075PraisonAI · Incorrect Authorization High8.7EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56075 PraisonAI versions before 4.5.128 have a vulnerability allowing authenticated users to execute arbitrary shell commands. This occurs because the UI modules hardcode the approval_mode to auto, ignoring the administrator's configuration set via the PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. The flaw enables attackers to bypass manual approval and command sanitization controls. EPSS 0.6%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 |
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