A campaign targeting the Google Chrome Web Store has deployed over 100 malicious browser extensions masquerading as legitimate tools like VPNs, AI assistants, and crypto utilities. These extensions, while offering some promised functionality, secretly connect to threat actor infrastructure to steal user information and execute remote scripts. They can modify network traffic, deliver ads, perform redirections, and act as proxies. The campaign, discovered by DomainTools researchers, involves numerous fake domains promoting these tools. The extensions request permissions that enable cookie theft, DOM-based phishing, and dynamic script injection. Risks include account hijacking, data theft, and browsing activity monitoring. Some extensions remain on the Chrome Web Store despite Google's removal efforts.
This analysis examines a phishing campaign targeting Italian and US users, focusing on credential harvesting for Microsoft services and Italy's PEC system. The attackers use Notion workspaces and other cloud platforms to host phishing pages, exfiltrating stolen data via Telegram bots. The campaign, active since 2022, employs simple techniques and off-the-shelf tools, suggesting either low technical expertise or a focus on access brokering. The study demonstrates how intercepting Telegram bot communications can aid in profiling threat actors and provides insights into the campaign's evolution, victimology, and attacker characteristics.
Hazy Hawk, a sophisticated threat actor, exploits abandoned cloud resources of high-profile organizations through DNS hijacking. By identifying and taking over dangling CNAME records pointing to unused cloud services, they create malicious URLs on reputable domains. These URLs lead users to scams and malware via traffic distribution systems. Hazy Hawk employs layered defenses, including domain obfuscation and content theft from legitimate websites, to avoid detection. They also leverage push notifications to maintain persistent access to victims. The attacks have impacted government agencies, universities, and major corporations worldwide since at least December 2023. This campaign highlights the importance of proper DNS management and the growing sophistication of cybercriminals in the affiliate marketing space.
An unknown threat actor has been creating malicious Chrome browser extensions since February 2024, using fake websites to lure users into installing them. These extensions have dual functionality, appearing to work as intended while also connecting to malicious servers to steal user data and execute arbitrary code. The extensions request excessive permissions and use various techniques to bypass security measures. They communicate with actor-controlled API domains, sending encrypted system information and receiving dynamic rules and code. The malicious activities include cookie theft, traffic manipulation, and potential account compromises. Over 100 fake websites and extensions have been deployed, exploiting current trends to attract users. The Chrome Web Store has removed some extensions, but the actor's persistence poses an ongoing threat to users seeking productivity tools and browser enhancements.
A new Dero mining campaign exploits insecurely published Docker APIs to spread through containerized Linux environments. The attack uses two Golang malware implants: 'nginx' for propagation and 'cloud' for cryptocurrency mining. The 'nginx' malware scans for vulnerable Docker APIs, creates malicious containers, and compromises existing ones. It maintains persistence and spreads without a command-and-control server. The 'cloud' miner is based on the open-source DeroHE CLI project, with hardcoded wallet and node addresses. This campaign differs from previous attacks on Kubernetes clusters by actively spreading and compromising more networks. The threat highlights the importance of securing containerized infrastructures and monitoring for malicious activities.
A network of 71 purchase scam websites has been identified, linked to 12 shared merchant accounts used for fraudulent transactions. The scams employ brand impersonation, online ads, and malicious merchants to target victims. The network, operational since February 2025, uses typosquatting and brand logo abuse to impersonate legitimate retailers. Transactions with the identified merchant accounts are likely fraudulent and facilitate card compromise. The network's attribution remains unclear, possibly controlled by a single actor or multiple actors collaborating through dark web services. Mitigation strategies for card issuers and merchant acquirers are provided to reduce financial fraud and compliance risks associated with these scams.
Sarcoma Ransomware, first detected in October 2024, has rapidly become a major cybersecurity threat, targeting high-value companies across industries. It uses advanced tactics like zero-day exploits and RMM tools for network discovery and credential theft. The group has impacted organizations in various countries, with the USA, Italy, and Canada being the most affected. Sarcoma employs sophisticated encryption techniques, combining RSA and ChaCha20, and has versions for both Windows and Linux systems. The malware includes network propagation capabilities and anti-recovery measures for hypervisor systems. Notably, it avoids infecting systems with Uzbek keyboard layouts, suggesting possible origins or affiliations. The group's activities highlight the need for improved cybersecurity measures in organizations worldwide.
A spam campaign targeting Brazilian users, particularly C-level executives and financial/HR accounts, has been identified since January 2025. The campaign exploits commercial remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, specifically PDQ Connect and N-able remote access tools. Attackers use Brazilian electronic invoice system (NF-e) as bait, leading victims to malicious content on Dropbox. The threat actor, likely an initial access broker, abuses free trial periods of RMM tools to gain complete control of target machines. The campaign's objective is to create a network of compromised machines for potential sale to third parties, including ransomware operators and state-sponsored actors. The abuse of commercial RMM tools is increasing due to their digital signatures, full backdoor capabilities, and low cost.
Iranian cyber actors have been identified impersonating a German model agency in a suspected espionage operation. The attackers created a fraudulent website mimicking the authentic agency's branding and content, which triggers obfuscated JavaScript to capture detailed visitor information. This data collection enables selective targeting. The website also replaces a real model's profile with a fake one, likely for social engineering purposes. The operation's complexity and methods suggest involvement of an Iranian threat group, possibly overlapping with Agent Serpens (APT35 or Charming Kitten). This group is known for targeting Iranian dissidents, journalists, and activists abroad. The fake website includes sophisticated data collection routines and dynamic profile alterations, indicating an ongoing and evolving threat.
A recent campaign attributed to APT36 has been observed spoofing India's Ministry of Defence to deliver cross-platform malware. The attackers used a ClickFix-style infection chain, mimicking government press releases and leveraging a compromised .in domain for payload staging. The campaign targeted both Windows and Linux users, employing clipboard-based execution techniques. On Windows, the attack utilized mshta.exe to execute a heavily obfuscated HTA file, while on Linux, it attempted to execute a shell script. The tradecraft observed, including government-themed lures, HTA-based delivery, and decoy documents, aligns with known APT36 tactics. This activity demonstrates the continued evolution of ClickFix techniques in new contexts.
Socket's research team discovered a supply-chain attack targeting Go developers through three malicious modules: prototransform, go-mcp, and tlsproxy. These modules used obfuscation techniques to deliver a disk-wiping payload, exploiting the open nature of Go's ecosystem. The attack leveraged namespace confusion and array-based string obfuscation to appear legitimate. Upon execution, the payload fetched a destructive shell script that irreversibly overwrote the entire primary storage device with zeros, causing complete data loss and system failure. This attack highlights the critical need for proactive security measures in software supply chains, especially for projects relying on external open-source dependencies.
An APT group named Earth Kurma is actively targeting government and telecommunications organizations in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia. The campaign, which dates back to November 2020, employs advanced custom malware, rootkits, and cloud storage services for data exfiltration. Earth Kurma utilizes sophisticated tools like TESDAT, SIMPOBOXSPY, KRNRAT, and MORIYA, demonstrating adaptive malware toolsets and complex evasion techniques. The attackers focus on lateral movement, persistence, and data collection, using various utilities to scan infrastructures and deploy malware. They also employ rootkits to maintain stealth and bypass detection. The group's primary objective appears to be cyberespionage, with a high risk of sensitive data compromise and prolonged, undetected network access.
Earth Kasha, an APT group believed to be part of APT10, has launched a new campaign in March 2025 targeting government agencies and public institutions in Taiwan and Japan. The campaign uses spear-phishing to deliver an updated version of the ANEL backdoor, potentially for espionage purposes. Key updates include a new command to support BOF execution in memory and the use of SharpHide for persistence. The second-stage backdoor, NOOPDOOR, now supports DNS over HTTPS for C&C communications. The attack chain involves compromised email accounts, malicious Excel files, and various evasion techniques. This campaign demonstrates Earth Kasha's continued evolution and poses significant geopolitical implications.
TheWizards, a China-aligned APT group, employs Spellbinder, a lateral movement tool for adversary-in-the-middle attacks through IPv6 SLAAC spoofing. This technique allows them to intercept network traffic and redirect legitimate Chinese software updates to malicious servers. The group targets individuals, gambling companies, and entities in Southeast Asia, UAE, China, and Hong Kong. Their malware chain includes the WizardNet backdoor and utilizes DNS hijacking to deliver malicious updates. Evidence links TheWizards to Sichuan Dianke Network Security Technology Co., Ltd. (UPSEC), suggesting it may be a digital quartermaster for this APT group. The attackers use sophisticated tools and techniques to evade detection and maintain persistence on compromised systems.
A sophisticated multi-stage carding attack on a Magento eCommerce website has been uncovered. The malware used a fake gif image file, local browser sessionStorage data, and a malicious reverse-proxy server to steal credit card data, login details, cookies, and other sensitive information. The attack targeted an outdated Magento 1.9.2.4 installation, exploiting its lack of support and security vulnerabilities. The malware injected JavaScript code disguised as Bing tracking code and utilized a tampered payment file to create a user-specific attack. This advanced technique allowed the attackers to intercept and manipulate all website traffic while remaining undetected by victims and administrators.
North Korean cybercrime activities heavily rely on Russian IP ranges in Khasan and Khabarovsk, utilizing extensive anonymization networks. The Void Dokkaebi group, linked to North Korea, employs fictitious companies like BlockNovas to target IT professionals through fraudulent job interviews, aiming to steal cryptocurrency and potentially engage in espionage. Their tactics involve using VPNs, proxies, and RDP connections to obscure their origins. Instruction videos suggest the involvement of less-skilled foreign conspirators. The primary focus remains cryptocurrency theft, but there's potential for expanded espionage activities and possible cooperation between North Korean and Russian entities.
This investigation delves into information operations conducted by Russian actors known as Doppelgänger, focusing on their activities from early June to late-July 2024. It examines their tactics, associated infrastructure, and motivations, particularly in relation to the unexpected snap general election in France during this period. The analysis reveals a persistent and complex effort to disseminate disinformation through social media, impersonating legitimate news websites and employing intricate redirection chains. The operations primarily target conservative and nationalist sentiments, aiming to destabilize Western democracies by exploiting existing societal and political divisions.
Today we are introducing the second actor in this series, Prolific Puma. For four years, maybe longer, Prolific Puma has operated in the shadows, unrecognized by defenders. While we don’t know their origin story, we can detect Prolific Puma through DNS and get a glimpse into their character via their domain name registration choices. What’s in the name? Prolific comes from the simple fact that this is a network that is continually expanding, with new domains registered almost daily. As for Puma, well… we’ll share more about the inspiration later in this paper.
