Twenty is an open-source CRM (customer relationship management) platform. Prior to 2.9.0, Twenty was vulnerable to a cross-workspace insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in the AI agent monitor's AgentTurnResolver, in packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/ai/ai-agent-monitor/reso lvers/agent-turn.resolver.ts. The agentTurns(agentId) query and the evaluateAgentTurn(turnId) mutation looked up rows by agentId or id only; although AgentTurnEntity has a workspaceId column, it was not included in the WHERE clause, and the class-level guards only checked that the caller was authenticated in some workspace rather than that the requested object belonged to it, with the same flaw present in agent-turn-grader.service.ts. As a result, any authenticated user with the AI settings flag, a workspace owner by default, could target any other workspace on the same instance given the victim's agentId or turnId: agentTurns returned the victim's full chat history including message parts such as raw chat text, tool calls, and tool outputs, while evaluateAgentTurn inserted an agentTurnEvaluation row with the victim's workspaceId and fed the victim's turn into the default LLM. The agentId and turnId are non-guessable UUIDs but are exposed in the URL of the settings page. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. From 1.11.1 until 1.14.1, userId/workspaceId scoping to the parsed-files read/delete paths was added. However, the POST /api/workspace/:slug/embed-parsed-file/:fileId flow still deletes the target file by primary key only, with no ownership check, inside two finally{} blocks that run even when the ownership-checked read fails. As a result a manager or admin (multi-user mode) can delete any other user's parsed file in any workspace — including workspaces they are not a member of — by enumerating integer fileIds. The server even returns "File not found" while still deleting the file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.14.1.
Daytona is a secure and elastic infrastructure runtime for AI-generated code execution and agent workflows. Prior to 0.185.0, Daytona's organization role update and delete endpoints authorized the caller as an owner of the organization named in the request path, but resolved and mutated the target role by its identifier alone, without verifying the role belonged to that organization. An authenticated user who owns any organization (organizations are self-service) could therefore modify the permissions of, or delete, a role belonging to a different organization, given that role's identifier. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.185.0.
Daytona is a secure and elastic infrastructure runtime for AI-generated code execution and agent workflows. Prior to 0.185.0, a cross-tenant authorization flaw in Daytona's notification WebSocket gateway allowed any authenticated user to subscribe to another organization's realtime notification channel and passively receive that organization's events. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.185.0.
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to 1.9.0, Langflow's /api/v1/monitor router exposes 7 endpoints that perform read, write, and delete operations on user-owned resources — messages, sessions, build artifacts, and LLM transaction logs — without verifying that the authenticated requester owns the targeted resource. Any authenticated user can read, modify, rename, or permanently delete another user's data by supplying the target's resource ID or flow_id. This is a classic IDOR/BOLA vulnerability. Notably, the same source file (monitor.py) contains one correctly-implemented endpoint that uses an ownership check, demonstrating the correct pattern was known but inconsistently applied. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.9.0.
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to 1.9.1, an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in /api/v1/responses endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim's flow ID in the request. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.9.1.
n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to 1.123.43, 2.22.1, and 2.20.7, the OAuth1 and OAuth2 credential reconnect endpoints authorized access using credential:read rather than credential:update. An authenticated user with read-only access to a shared credential could initiate an OAuth reconnect flow and overwrite the stored token material for that credential with tokens bound to an external account they control. Workflows relying on the affected credential would subsequently execute under the attacker's OAuth identity, enabling data exfiltration to attacker-controlled external services and persistent takeover of shared integrations. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.123.43, 2.22.1, and 2.20.7.
Pega Platform versions 8.3.0 through Infinity 25.1.2 are affected by an authorization weakness that may allow authenticated users to access certain additional data via crafted URLs.
The Frontend File Manager Plugin WordPress plugin through 23.6 does not properly enforce its nonce check on the file download handler, allowing unauthenticated attackers to download files uploaded by any user through the Frontend File Manager Plugin WordPress plugin through 23.6 by iterating identifiers.
Filament is a collection of full-stack components for accelerated Laravel development. From filament/actions 4.0.0 until 4.11.4 and 5.6.4 and from filament/tables 3.0.0 until 3.3.51, the recordSelectOptionsQuery() method may be used to scope the options available in the Select field for AttachAction and AssociateAction. However, the built-in validation rule for these fields did not apply the same scope. As a result, a user who can trigger these actions could tamper with the Livewire component's state and submit an out-of-scope value. This vulnerability is fixed in filament/actions 4.11.4 and 5.6.4 and filament/tables 3.3.51.
gonic is a music streaming server / free-software subsonic server API implementation. Prior to version 0.21.0, the Subsonic API endpoints `/rest/deletePlaylist.view` and `/rest/getPlaylist.view` perform no per-resource authorization. Once authenticated as any user (admin or not), an attacker can delete any playlist owned by any other user (including admin) by passing its `id` and read the full contents (name, comment, song list) of any other user's **private** (non-public) playlist by passing its `id`. The Subsonic playlist `id` is `base64url("<userID>/<filename>.m3u")`. Because filenames are user-supplied or time-derived and the `userID` is a small integer, IDs are guessable and frequently exposed (e.g. a previously-public playlist that was later made private still has the same ID). This breaks the multi-user trust boundary of gonic: a low-privileged user can wipe an administrator's curated playlists, and a user can exfiltrate any private playlist they obtain an ID for. The issue was fixed in commit `6dd71e6a3c966867ef8c900d359a7df75789f410`, which is part of version 0.21.0.
gonic is a music streaming server / free-software subsonic server API implementation. The maintainer's fix in commit `6dd71e6a3c966867ef8c900d359a7df75789f410` added an ownership check based on `playlist.UserID`. However, `playlist.UserID` is derived from the first path segment of the attacker-controlled playlist ID, with no path containment on the resolved file path. Any authenticated Subsonic user can therefore bypass the ownership check and read any other user's playlist, delete any other user's playlist, and probe arbitrary file paths on the host for existence/readability. This is a bypass of the boundary the `6dd71e6` fix is trying to enforce; it is closely related to the original GONIC-1 IDOR but uses a different primitive (path traversal in the `id` parameter rather than direct cross-user access). Commit 0824bed88f6bbc490ba28bf09d28e5dfeb07b445 in version 0.21.0 fixes the issue.