Search: entry.py
177 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | 2.7 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-22690Pdfly · pypdf has possible long runtimes for missing /Root object with large /Size values Low2.7EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-22690 CVE-2026-22690 is a vulnerability in pdfly's pypdf component where crafted PDF files lacking a /Root entry but having a large /Size value can cause long runtimes in non-strict reading mode. This issue affects versions from 0.4.0 up to but not including 0.5.1_5. The vulnerability has a medium severity with a CVSS score of 6.9. It has been fixed in version 0.5.1_5. Users can mitigate the issue by upgrading to the fixed version or by using strict mode when reading or writing PDFs. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-19548Red Hat Hardened Images · Use After Free Medium5.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19548 Multiple Use-After-Free vulnerabilities were found in the add_archive_element function in ld/ldmain.c of the GNU linker (ld), a component of binutils. The root cause is that plugin_maybe_claim() in ld/plugin.c frees the original BFD object via bfd_close/_bfd_delete_bfd when entry->the_bfd->my_archive == NULL, but the caller retains both the original abfd parameter and a shallow copy (orig_input.the_bfd) as dangling pointers. These dangling pointers are subsequently dereferenced at three distinct locations in add_archive_element: 1. Line ~1442: accessing abfd->my_archive via bfd_usrdata(abfd->my_archive) 2. Line ~1493: multiple accesses to abfd and abfd->my_archive in a conditional check and bfd_get_filename call 3. Line ~1525: dereferencing the shallow copy orig_input.the_bfd->my_archive in trace/verbose logging The vulnerability is triggered when LTO plugins are active (link_info.lto_plugin_active is true) and the input object has abfd->my_archive == NULL, which is a valid state for standalone object files. Red Hat builds binutils with --enable-plugins and --enable-lto, confirming the vulnerable code path is compiled in and reachable. An attacker who can supply a crafted object or archive file to a build process using LTO-enabled linking could exploit this flaw to cause a denial of service (linker crash via segmentation fault). Arbitrary code execution is theoretically possible through heap manipulation but is substantially mitigated by hardening measures including stack protector, FORTIFY_SOURCE, ASLR, and PIE. The attack surface is limited to build-time environments — the linker is a development tool not exposed in production runtime. The most realistic exploitation scenario is a supply chain attack introducing a crafted object file as a build dependency in CI/CD pipelines or development environments. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @years18/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-g version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that executes during installation and import. Its postinstall script and main entry fetch and run a Python-based denial-of-service tool (MHDDoS/PyRoxy) from an untrusted source using disabled TLS verification. Additionally, it collects sensitive host environment data, encodes it, and exfiltrates it to a remote server. Both installation and usage trigger this malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-12234zephyrproject zephyr · Memory-safety High7.8EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12234 The userspace syscall verifiers z_vrfy_zsock_sendmsg() and z_vrfy_zsock_recvmsg() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets.c snapshot the caller-supplied struct net_msghdr into a kernel-side copy with k_usermode_from_copy(), but then re-read the still-live user struct for subsequent decisions. The kernel iovec shadow buffer is sized from one read of msg->msg_iovlen, while the population loop is bounded by a second, live read of the same field. Because msg points into ordinary user memory, a cooperating second thread in the same memory domain can inflate msg->msg_iovlen in the window between the sizing read and the loop test (a classic double-fetch / TOCTOU). The population loop then iterates past the number of net_iovec slots actually allocated, writing attacker-influenced iov_base/iov_len values beyond the end of the kernel-heap shadow buffer. The recvmsg verifier has the same defect on both its inbound and result write-back loops. The code is reachable from an unprivileged user thread whenever CONFIG_USERSPACE is enabled and the zsock_sendmsg/zsock_recvmsg syscalls are available. A successful race corrupts kernel-managed heap memory across the user-to-kernel privilege boundary, yielding a local privilege-escalation primitive or, at minimum, a kernel-fault denial of service. The fix copies the header once and derives every size, bound, and gate from the snapshot, copying each iovec entry atomically so its base and length can no longer be raced apart. EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-63134cisagov Malcolm · Path Traversal Medium5.4EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-63134 Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. Prior to version 26.07.0, `safe-extract.py` protects file extraction with libarchive's secure flags, but creates directory entries with a raw `os.makedirs(os.path.join(dest, entry.pathname))` that has no traversal protection. An uploaded malicious archive containing a directory entry with a `../` sequence or an absolute path causes the filebeat processing container to create directories outside the intended extraction directory. Version 26.07.0 fixes the issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-63133cisagov Malcolm · Unthrottled Resource Allocation Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-63133 Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. Prior to version 26.07.0, `safe-extract.py` extracts uploaded archives with no limit on entry count, directory depth, total entries, or output size. A small malicious archive containing a large number of directory or file entries causes the filebeat processing container to create an unbounded number of filesystem objects, exhausting inodes or filesystem metadata and denying service to the processing pipeline and any service sharing the same mount. Version 26.07.0 fixes the issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (79b553d84d7f4dc5347840ddb97f16738eed2e52ac9757b48d2cb31ba1af7122) The package name base65-12x typosquats the popular base-x base-encoding library and reuses base-x's repository as its homepage. Both the CJS entry (index.js around line 116) and the ESM entry (src/esm/index.js around line 114) append an approximately 123 KB top-level obfuscated block after a copy of the legitimate base-x source. The block installs a VM-style dispatcher on globalThis (registries named vmr_3f4688 and vmw_bf472f), manipulates Object.defineProperty and __proto__, and contains multiple fetch references, so a network-capable code path is wired up and runs unconditionally when a consumer requires or imports the package. A base-encoding library has no functional need for a large globalThis-poisoning obfuscated VM with network fetch at module top level; the payload is duplicated across both module systems so it fires for CJS and ESM consumers alike. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4891fcf0d0e6192d9be14faf68411bd475129a1245b5c863a9daaa6f66e66166) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-72909frappe erpnext · Improper Access Control High7.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-72909 ERPNext is a free and open source Enterprise Resource Planning tool. Prior to 15.112.0 and 16.23.0, the ReceivablePayableReport prepare_conditions path in erpnext/accounts/report/accounts_receivable/accounts_receivable.py does not apply Customer and Supplier user permissions to the Payment Ledger Entry dynamic-link party field, allowing any authenticated user to read unauthorized cross-company financial data in Accounts Receivable and Accounts Payable reports. This issue is fixed in versions 15.112.0 and 16.23.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.7% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68159 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE __decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack out-of-bounds write. An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds Write of size 4 ... by task exploit kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833) calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638) __submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394) ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490) ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164) rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899) do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138) ... kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670! [ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ] | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.4 | EPSS 0.2% | High8.4EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68179 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: only unlock nsm_dev on post-lock error paths nsm_dev_ioctl() jumps to the common out label even when the initial copy_from_user() fails before nsm->lock has been taken. The error path then blindly unlocks a mutex that was never acquired. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the miscdevice ioctl entry and the pre-lock copy_from_user(&raw, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)) failure path by issuing NSM_IOCTL_RAW with an invalid user pointer. That failure reaches the shared out label before mutex_lock(&nsm->lock). Lockdep reported: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! exploit/193 is trying to release lock (&global_nsm.lock) at: nsm_dev_ioctl+0x5f/0xcf [vuln_msv] but there are no more locks to release! no locks held by exploit/193. Return immediately on the pre-lock copy_from_user() failure and keep the common unlock label for the post-lock paths only. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68394 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: revalidate LOAD_CONN_PARAM queued update MGMT_OP_LOAD_CONN_PARAM queues conn_update_sync() when a single parameter update changes an existing LE central connection. The queued work currently stores a borrowed hci_conn_params entry from hdev->le_conn_params. A later LOAD_CONN_PARAM request can clear disabled parameters and free that entry before hci_cmd_sync_work() runs the queued callback. Do not keep the borrowed hci_conn_params pointer in queued work. Queue the hci_conn instead and hold a reference until the queued callback completes. When the work runs, revalidate that the connection is still present, look up the current hci_conn_params entry, and cancel the update if userspace removed that entry while the work was pending. Copy the interval values from the current params entry under hdev->lock, then drop the lock and keep using hci_le_conn_update_sync() to issue the update. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in conn_update_sync+0x2a/0xf0 [bluetooth] Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810c697126 by task kworker/u17:0/377 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x5f0 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 conn_update_sync+0x2a/0xf0 [bluetooth] hci_cmd_sync_work+0x187/0x210 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x4fd/0xbc0 worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570 kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Allocated by task 466: hci_conn_params_add+0xa6/0x240 [bluetooth] load_conn_param+0x4e1/0x850 [bluetooth] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x96b/0xf80 [bluetooth] Freed by task 474: kfree+0x313/0x590 hci_conn_params_clear_disabled+0x9b/0xc0 [bluetooth] load_conn_param+0x4bf/0x850 [bluetooth] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x96b/0xf80 [bluetooth] | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | MediumEPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-68169 A use-after-free vulnerability was discovered and fixed in the Linux kernel's Multipath TCP (MPTCP) userspace path manager component. The flaw involves a race condition in the function mptcp_pm_userspace_get_local_id(), where an address entry is accessed after its lock is released, potentially leading to use-after-free. This issue was confirmed by Kernel Address Sanitizer (KASAN) and reproduced under stress testing. The vulnerability affects multiple Linux kernel versions and has been resolved by copying the id while holding the lock to prevent access to freed memory. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.6 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-66484GNU cpio · Path Traversal Medium4.6EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-66484 GNU cpio contains a Path Traversal vulnerability in its tar archive extraction functionality. When extracting a tar archive in copy-in mode with the --no-absolute-filenames option, the extracted file name is normalized but the tar hard-link target is passed to the link_to_name function without equivalent sanitization before calling link function. A tar archive provided by an attacker, containing a hard-link entry whose linkname is set to an absolute path outside the extraction directory, can cause cpio to create a hard link to an existing file outside the intended extraction directory, breaking the expected guarantee of --no-absolute-filenames and allowing archive-controlled linkage to external files. This issue has been fixed in commit e2b9cbdd3354d2b1569b7390d1bc15c1930559ad | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2790159028b31b656c9e704c3a0e4b1a5d114042e0d92c601d133057f760b537) streak-map-kit is advertised as a dependency-free calendar-day/streak math library but ships a Linux ELF at dist/internal/calc-mapping.bin framed as a 'native math accelerator'. The main entry's top-level async IIFE chmods the ELF to 0755 and spawns it as a detached child process whenever the module is imported, so any consumer that requires the package on Linux drops the binary as a running process. The ELF (internally named REDSHELL) beacons to a hardcoded C2 at http://217.60.77.63 and implements a full remote-shell command surface: /sysinfo, /ps, /env, /ls, /cat, /download, /upload, /ssh_keys, /creds, /dbfind, /clipboard, /kill, /spawn, /adduser, /enableuser, /sessions, with unmatched input executed via /bin/sh or /bin/bash. It exfiltrates arbitrary filesystem paths and harvested SSH keys and stored credentials via chunked POSTs to http://217.60.77.63/api/extract-receive (BIGEXTRACT_START, Loot_%s_%s_%s tagging). Second-stage payloads are fetched from http://217.60.77.63/Others/ and http://217.60.77.63/SC/ over plaintext HTTP with no verification, staged in /tmp, and executed; a memfd_create-based fileless-exec path via a python3 syscall(319) trampoline and /dlopen and /stage commands provide arbitrary further code loading. Persistence is installed by writing ~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service (Description='System Update Service', ExecStart=/proc/self/exe, Restart=always) and enabling it via systemctl --user, with cron, bashrc, and xdg autostart alternatives. The beacon also offers a SOCKS5 proxy, arbitrary TCP port-forwarding, and an RC2TUN tunneling protocol that spawns /bin/bash, turning the host into a pivot into reachable internal networks. Cover-story framing (comments describing a 'high-performance streak computation engine', a hardcoded sha256 'integrity verification — critical security gate', a 'Native accelerator loaded and verified' log line, and a README claim that the module performs no side effects on import) is inconsistent with the shipped ELF and the import-time spawn. ## Source: ghsa-malware (94d7354ef39adcf387d7d0a7ff293bf9bea70e2c08fc9e455ad45bfed167b57b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-19082TONYC Imager · Out-of-bounds Read High7.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19082 Imager versions from 0.45_02 before 1.034 for Perl may expose adjacent heap bytes via strlen() over-read from zero-count ASCII EXIF entries in copy_string_tags. copy_string_tags() computes an ASCII EXIF tag's length as `entry->size - 1` to strip the trailing NUL. A zero-count ASCII entry sets `entry->size` to 0, and the derived length reaches i_tags_add() as -1, which is interpreted as a request to call strlen(), scanning past the entry to the next NUL and copying those bytes into the tag. JPEG reaches this path via im_decode_exif(), as does the separate Imager::File::WEBP distribution, which is fixed by upgrading Imager. Any caller of Imager->read() on an attacker-supplied image with such an entry may receive an exif_* tag holding adjacent heap bytes instead of an empty string. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-71327Traefik · Gateway API route identity collision allows cross-namespace backend hijacking High8.2EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-71327 ## Summary There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider. Router and service identities for `HTTPRoute`, `GRPCRoute`, `TCPRoute` and `TLSRoute` objects were built by hyphen-concatenating the route namespace, the route name, the Gateway identity, the entry point and the rule index, a construction that is not injective because Kubernetes names may themselves contain hyphens. Two distinct Routes attached to the same Gateway with equivalent match rules can therefore produce the same identity, and the Route loaded later silently overwrites the earlier one, so a tenant able to create an accepted Route in a colliding namespace/name combination can redirect another namespace's traffic to a backend it controls. All Traefik v3 minor lines are affected; the lines older than v3.6 are no longer maintained and will not receive a patch of their own, so users running them should upgrade to a maintained, patched release. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.25 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.10 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ## Summary Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway provider constructs internal HTTPRoute and GRPCRoute identities by concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entrypoint, and rule index with hyphens. Kubernetes names may themselves contain hyphens, so the construction is not injective. For example, HTTPRoutes `team/a-app` and `team-a/app`, attached to the same Gateway with the same match rule, produce identical router and service keys. During configuration merging, the route loaded later overwrites the earlier route's maps. A tenant that can create an accepted Route in a colliding namespace/name combination can therefore redirect another namespace's traffic to an attacker-controlled backend. The official v3.7.8 binary was reproduced returning the victim backend before the second Route was created and the attacker backend immediately afterward. The victim Route had the earlier creation timestamp and should win the equivalent-match conflict under Gateway API precedence rules. ## Details The HTTPRoute provider creates a route key as follows: ```go routeKey := provider.Normalize(fmt.Sprintf( "%s-%s-%s-gw-%s-%s-ep-%s-%d", strings.ToLower(kindHTTPRoute), route.Namespace, route.Name, gatewayNamespace, gatewayName, listener.EPName, ri, )) ``` `Normalize` replaces non-alphanumeric runs with `-`, but it does not encode field lengths or otherwise preserve component boundaries: ```go func Normalize(name string) string { fargs := func(c rune) bool { return !unicode.IsLetter(c) && !unicode.IsNumber(c) } return strings.Join(strings.FieldsFunc(name, fargs), "-") } ``` These distinct objects therefore have the same normalized key: ```text namespace=team, route=a-app namespace=team-a, route=app httproute-team-a-app-gw-gateway-shared-ep-web-0 ``` `makeRouterName` adds a hash of the routing rule. When the attacker copies the victim's hostname and path, that hash is also identical. Child service and middleware names are derived from the same parent identity. Each Route is built into a temporary configuration and then merged into the provider-wide configuration with `maps.Copy`: ```go maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Routers, from.HTTP.Routers) maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Middlewares, from.HTTP.Middlewares) maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Services, from.HTTP.Services) maps.Copy(to.HTTP.ServersTransports, from.HTTP.ServersTransports) ``` `maps.Copy` replaces an existing value for a duplicate key. No collision is reported, and the resulting router points to the later Route's backend. The GRPCRoute implementation uses the same delimiter-free route-key format and the same HTTP configuration merge path. ### Attack prerequisites The attacker needs permission to create or modify an HTTPRoute or GRPCRoute that the shared Gateway accepts. Exploitation also requires namespace and Route names whose concatenation collides with a victim. The attacker does not need permission to read or modify the victim Route, Service, or namespace. ## Proof of Concept Prerequisites: - a disposable Kubernetes cluster with Gateway API v1.5.1 experimental CRDs; - `kubectl` configured for that cluster; - curl; - local TCP port 18080 available. The following script embeds all objects used by the reproduction. It runs the official `traefik:v3.7.8` image, creates the victim Route first, verifies the victim backend, then creates the colliding attacker Route and repeats the request. ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML' apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: gateway --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: team --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: team-a --- apiVersion: v1 kind: ServiceAccount metadata: name: traefik-audit | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.0 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-66881livebook · Relative Path Traversal High7.0EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-66881 Relative Path Traversal vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows an attacker-authored notebook to write a file with attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary path. A .livemd notebook can declare file_entries metadata, each entry carrying a name. Every path that creates a file entry through the user interface validates that name with Livebook.Notebook.validate_file_entry_name/2, which requires a flat filename of alphanumerics, dashes, underscores and dots, ending in an extension. The import path does not: Livebook.LiveMarkdown.Import.file_entry_metadata_to_attrs/1 in lib/livebook/live_markdown/import.ex takes the name verbatim from the notebook source. For a URL-type file entry, Livebook.Session.file_entry_cache_file/2 in lib/livebook/session.ex resolves that name beneath the session's temporary directory without checking that the result stays inside it, and Livebook.FileSystem.Utils.resolve_unix_like_path/2 collapses parent-directory segments while clamping only at the filesystem root. When the entry's content is requested and no cached copy exists, Livebook fetches the entry's URL and writes the response body to the resolved path, creating parent directories as needed. The attacker therefore controls both the destination and the contents of the written file, which may land anywhere the Livebook process can write. The same missing containment check is present in Livebook.Session.to_attachment_file_entry/2. A victim who opens an attacker-supplied notebook and causes the entry to be fetched triggers the write within their own authenticated session; the attacker needs no account on the target instance. URL-type entries are also not placed under notebook stamping quarantine on import, so no warning is shown. This issue affects livebook: from 0.11.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (16573678cf46c8aabbd843cd3bbbbe258474f3768d15ad6f1178921b6ad964bf) The package presents itself as an Nx stylelint helper but its main entry require()s _platform.js, which on load downloads a platform-specific executable from one of four Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime via array-join concatenation (oob-worker.cf{99-9b3,101-adf,102-baf,103-070}.workers.dev). If HTTPS retrieval fails, it reassembles the payload from base64 chunks served in DNS TXT records under sdk/ext/pkg/net.dl.wel1.ru (reading a chunk count from c.<domain> and concatenating parts from <i>.<domain>). The bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmod 0755, and launched detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp+" &"], {detached:true, stdio:"ignore"}).unref(). A marker file.analytics_state suppresses re-execution. lib/telemetry.js embeds a second copy of the same dropper (base64 chunk decoding, split "chmod"+"Sync" and cp.spawn("/bin/sh",...)) under an analytics-SDK cover story. The exported DevplatformNxStylelint class is a no-op stub; the package's only functional behavior is the dropper. Package naming impersonates the Nx stylelint ecosystem. ## Source: ghsa-malware (17bb3474e482e10720577233ded6d0d01962b5055551dfdb0a98507d09b23d9e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8f27a3b0f4b5c8f210576fe33a1251d774926e6c7405591948c5bc3dfa00e7aa) On require, index.js loads _init.js which selects an OS/arch-specific staging path, downloads a binary payload from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts assembled by joining split character arrays (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback channel across *.well1.site (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site), writes the bytes to disguised paths such as /var/tmp/.cache_<rand> or a Windows Temp/dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe, chmods to 0755, and spawn-detaches /bin/sh (or cmd) to execute the binary in the background. Destination hostnames are obfuscated by array-split-and-join to defeat static scanners; the payload is staged under decoy filenames posing as.NET diagnostics or cache files. A second full copy of the dropper is bundled in lib/telemetry.js (not reached from the current entry graph) using the same base64-decode, chmod 0755, and /bin/sh spawn shape, providing an alternate loader. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3b82b8abbaab89079233a8bd4e99a3a23c618d6bf481e8d0eaeb29805ed52ee1) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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