OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-01 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in US. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-01 and 2026-07-01. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in ES. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 162 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-01 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in CN, HK, VN, EG, KR, US, IR, TW. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 10 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-01 and 2026-07-01. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in CN. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 10 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-01 and 2026-07-01. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in CN. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 10 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-07-01 and 2026-07-01. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in CN. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
phpUploader before 2.0.2 contains an unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability that allows remote attackers to access the full contents of the uploaded-files database table by visiting any page of the application. The index model executes an unbounded SELECT query and embeds the complete JSON-encoded result set in an inline script block, exposing uploader IP addresses, Argon2ID key hashes, internal filenames, and SHA-256 fingerprints.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-06-29 and 2026-06-29. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in KR. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 10 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-06-28 and 2026-07-07. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in KR, CN. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 10 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-06-28 and 2026-07-07. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in KR, CN. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-06-28 and 2026-07-06. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in GB, DE. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 6 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-06-24 and 2026-07-04. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in IT, KR, IR. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for motion software, which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 are vulnerable to path traversal in the picture and movie API endpoints, suhc as /picture/{id}/preview/{filename}. Neither the API handlers, nor the mediafiles.py functions such as get_media_preview() check for .. sequences in the filename parameter, except for get_media_content(). This allows an authenticated user with normal (non-admin) privileges to read arbitrary files from the filesystem as the motionEye process user, such as: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, motionEye config files containing password hashes and plaintext passwords, SSH keys, and other cameras' surveillance footage. This issue has been fixed in version 0.44.0.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 38 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-06-24 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in VN, SG, HK, BD, NZ, BR, MO, CN. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors observed this SHA-256 file hash 2,357 time(s) in attacker activity between 2026-06-24 and 2026-07-09. Observed technique: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Seen from attacker infrastructure in IR, IN, MX, JP, BR, TW, PK, TR. File hashes fingerprint a specific malicious payload (a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool) that was staged or delivered during the attack. Match it against files in your environment and your EDR/AV and threat-intel feeds.
## Summary
`parseEfiSignatureList()` in `attest/internal/events.go` does not skip
`SignatureHeaderSize` vendor bytes before reading `EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST`
signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.
## Impact
For `hashSHA256SigGUID` lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.
## Root Cause
After `binary.Read(&signatures.Header)` reads 28 bytes, `buf` points to the start of the `SignatureHeaderSize` vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at `sigOffset := 0` instead of `sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize`, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.
## Affected versions
All versions through commit `f877374` (2026-05-15).
## Fix
Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502
- Add bound check: `SignatureHeaderSize` must not exceed remaining list space
- Skip `SignatureHeaderSize` bytes before both entry loops
- Regression test: `TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize`
A flaw was found in 389 Directory Server. The PBKDF2-SHA256 password storage plugin does not enforce an upper bound on the iteration count extracted from stored password hashes. A privileged attacker who can modify a user's password hash can cause excessive CPU consumption during authentication, resulting in denial of service.
AgentChat version 2.3.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its /api/v1/user/info endpoint. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate user IDs and retrieve sensitive information, including SHA256 password hashes. The vulnerability has a high severity rating with a CVSS score of 7.5. No patch or official remediation has been indicated yet.
Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension uses deprecated SHA-1 hashing for IWF CSAM URL matching (25,020 hashes) and CIPA blocklist matching (12,352 hashes).
Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension exposes multiple publicly accessible endpoints that allow unauthenticated access to sensitive data. The exposed information consists of SHA-1 hashes that are inadequately obfuscated using a simple Caesar cipher, which can be easily reversed to recover the original hash values and access the protected data.