Threats affecting pkg:cpan/CallBackery

CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow session cookie forgery via a signing secret generated with rand(). The secret that signs session cookies is built from two calls to the built-in rand(), which is seeded with 32 bits. The secret therefore has at most 2**32 possible values, and one signed cookie is enough to test each candidate offline. An attacker who obtains a single session cookie can recover the secret and sign cookies for any user, including an administrator.

CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl accept session cookies of any age sent in the X-Session-Cookie header. cookieConf() rejects a cookie older than 300 seconds only when it arrives in the xsc query parameter. The same cookie sent in the X-Session-Cookie header is accepted however old it is. A session cookie that leaks through a log, a Referer header or browser history authenticates as its user indefinitely.

CallBackery versions prior to 0.62.0 for Perl create a temporary configuration database dump in /tmp with insecure permissions. The dump file is world-readable and not removed after creation, exposing sensitive data including password hashes. A local user can exploit this by reading the dump or redirecting it via a symlink to a file of their choosing.

CallBackery versions prior to 0.62.0 use an insecure method to encrypt configuration backups by deriving the AES key directly from a padded password without salt or key derivation. This allows an attacker who obtains a backup to perform fast offline password guessing at raw AES speed, potentially recovering all credentials stored in the backup.

CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl contain an OS command injection vulnerability. This occurs because the restoreConfigBlob() function feeds a database dump from a backup to the sqlite3 shell, which executes lines starting with a dot as shell commands. An attacker who can supply a backup to be restored can execute arbitrary OS commands as the application user.

CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl contain a vulnerability that allows denial of service via inefficient regular expression complexity. The issue arises from unquoted interpolation of the request path as a regular expression in the before_dispatch hook, which processes PATH_INFO from client requests under CGI, FastCGI, and PSGI environments. An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request with a backreference in the path that causes exponential backtracking, tying up server worker processes for extended periods.

CallBackery versions prior to 0.62.0 for Perl contain a log injection vulnerability due to improper output neutralization of control characters in login names. The login RPC method does not require authentication, allowing an attacker to inject forged log entries by including newline characters in the login name. This can result in misleading log records, such as fake successful administrator logins from arbitrary IP addresses.

CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl contain a permissive regular expression vulnerability in the createRxValidator function. The function is intended to anchor patterns strictly but fails to group alternations properly, allowing unintended values to pass validation. This flaw permits authenticated users to submit values that should be rejected, potentially leading to unsafe data being written into generated configuration files.

CallBackery versions prior to 0.62.0 for Perl improperly expose sensitive information through the getUserConfig function. Non-administrative users can access their own password hash and administrator-only notes, which should be restricted. This flaw allows attackers with a session token to retrieve password hashes and potentially crack them offline.

CallBackery versions prior to 0.62.0 for Perl use unsalted HMAC-SHA1 hashes without a key to store user passwords. This hashing approach lacks a salt and computational work factor, making password hashes vulnerable to fast offline guessing attacks if the user table is obtained. The vulnerability is fixed in version 0.62.0.

CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route. Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC. Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file.