Threat Intelligence Database

oasdiff-action is a GitHub Action that detects breaking changes in OpenAPI specs and post a review on every pull request. Before version 0.0.51, the oasdiff actions resolved external $refs in the OpenAPI spec by default (allow-external-refs: true). When an action runs on a pull request whose spec is attacker-controlled — most importantly fork pull requests on public repositories — a $ref in that spec is fetched/read on the runner with no interaction required, enabling SSRF and disclosure of structured files on the runner. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.51.

When Ethernet bridging is enabled (CONFIG_NET_ETHERNET_BRIDGE), eth_bridge_input_process() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/bridge/bridge_input.c decides how each frame received on a bridge member interface is handled. For frames that must also be delivered to the local stack, the code called eth_bridge_handle_locally() and returned NET_OK. That helper does not consume the packet — it only calls bridge_iface_recv() (via virtual_recv()), which returns NET_CONTINUE without taking ownership of pkt. The NET_OK verdict then propagates through ethernet_recv() up to processing_data() in subsys/net/ip/net_core.c, where NET_OK is interpreted as "the packet was consumed, do not free it." Because no consumer actually took ownership, the RX net_pkt is never returned to the pool and is leaked. The concretely reproducible leak occurs for frames whose EtherType has no registered L3 handler when CONFIG_NET_ETHERNET_FORWARD_UNRECOGNISED_ETHERTYPE is set (default y when CONFIG_NET_SOCKETS_PACKET is enabled): the fall-through L3 dispatch does not overwrite the NET_OK verdict, so ethernet_recv() returns NET_OK and the buffer is never released. Any device on a bridged L2 segment can emit broadcast/multicast frames carrying an arbitrary EtherType with no authentication. Each such frame permanently consumes one buffer from the finite RX pool (CONFIG_NET_PKT_RX_COUNT), so a brief broadcast flood exhausts the pool and the device can no longer receive traffic until it is rebooted — a persistent denial of service. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact. The fix makes eth_bridge_handle_locally() propagate the real net_verdict and return NET_CONTINUE for locally-kept frames, writing the bridge interface back through a new dst_iface out-parameter so the packet follows the normal receive path and is unreferenced exactly once.

EngineRed: Asymmetric AI Warfare Source: https://sma-das.blog/blogs/enginered-asymmetric-ai-warfare?share=7

A vulnerability was found in FLVMeta up to 1.2.2. Affected is the function amf_string_new of the file src/amf.c of the component AMF String Processing. The manipulation of the argument length results in heap-based buffer overflow. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is identified as f412a33b9a84c2d1a9dee145a868feddbf64879e. A patch should be applied to remediate this issue. The project maintainer doubts the security impact: "While I acknowledged the bugs and provided fixes, I have yet to see any way to exploit these alleged vulnerabilities."

A vulnerability was determined in FLVMeta up to 1.2.2. Affected by this vulnerability is the function amf_object_get of the file src/amf.c of the component AMF Object Parsing. This manipulation causes null pointer dereference. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. Patch name: 52642f7dfb76ec7334016622dde60b1ae963d79b. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The project maintainer doubts the security impact: "While I acknowledged the bugs and provided fixes, I have yet to see any way to exploit these alleged vulnerabilities."

The LwM2M JSON content formatter's get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_rw_json.c copies a parsed JSON string into a caller-supplied buffer and NUL-terminates it. The length guard used if (string_length > buflen), which accepts a string whose length is exactly buflen. After memcpy() fills the whole buffer, buf[string_length] = '\0' then writes one byte past the end of the buffer (CWE-787). The string value and its length are taken directly from the incoming CoAP payload during a LwM2M WRITE: do_write_op_json() parses the payload obtained from coap_packet_get_payload(), and get_string() is invoked from lwm2m_write_handler() (engine_get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_message_handling.c) for a LWM2M_RES_TYPE_STRING resource. The destination buf/buflen is either the resource instance's fixed data buffer (res_inst->data_ptr/max_data_len) or the engine validation buffer (msg->ctx->validate_buf). A LwM2M server (the client's DTLS peer) can therefore write a string resource with a value whose length equals the target buffer size and force a one-byte overflow. The overflow is a single out-of-bounds write of the constant byte 0x00 immediately past the resource or validation buffer, corrupting the adjacent byte in memory. It is not an information leak and the written value is fixed, so it is not a direct code-execution primitive, but it can corrupt adjacent state (an adjacent resource value, a length/flag field, or a struct field) and cause data corruption or a crash. Triggering the write is deterministic; the resulting impact depends on memory layout. The fix changes the guard to string_length >= buflen, rejecting the exact-length case and aligning the JSON formatter with the other content formatters (lwm2m_rw_plain_text.c, lwm2m_rw_oma_tlv.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_json.c, lwm2m_rw_cbor.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_cbor.c), which already used the correct boundary check.

A vulnerability was determined in dibo-software diboot 3.8.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /api/iam/tenant/resource of the component Tenant Resource Assignment Handler. Executing a manipulation of the argument tenantId can lead to improper access controls. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

The I3C IBI subsystem in drivers/i3c/i3c_ibi_workq.c hands out statically-allocated work nodes through a free-list i3c_ibi_work_nodes_free implemented as a plain sys_slist_t, which provides no synchronization. The allocation helpers (i3c_ibi_work_enqueue, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_target_irq, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_hotjoin, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_controller_request, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_cb) called sys_slist_get() directly from ISR context, while the workqueue handler i3c_ibi_work_handler() returned nodes with sys_slist_append() from the workqueue thread, with no lock on either side. Because sys_slist_get() and sys_slist_append() are neither atomic nor interrupt-safe, an IBI interrupt that fires while the workqueue thread is mid-append (or a truly parallel access under CONFIG_SMP) races on the shared list. This corrupts the list linkage: a node may be handed to two consumers, a node may be lost, or the head/tail pointers may be left inconsistent so sys_slist_get() returns a stale or garbage pointer. In the double-hand-out case the subsequent memcpy(ibi_node, ibi_work, sizeof(*ibi_node)) overwrites a node still in flight; a garbage pointer turns the same memcpy into an out-of-bounds write. The race is driven by I3C bus traffic — IBIs, hot-joins, and controller-role requests originate from target devices on the bus, and I3C supports hot-joining devices. An attacker controlling an I3C peripheral on the board's chip-to-chip bus can generate high-frequency interrupts timed to collide with the free operation. Exploitation requires physical access to the bus and winning a narrow timing window; the most realistic impact is a crash or hang (denial of service), with memory corruption possible but hard to control. The fix wraps all free-list sys_slist_get()/sys_slist_append() operations in the new ibi_work_alloc()/ibi_work_free() helpers, each guarded by a k_spinlock (ibi_work_lock), closing the race across ISR and thread contexts.

A vulnerability was found in dibo-software diboot 3.8.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /admin/ of the component Tenant Administrator Management API. Performing a manipulation of the argument tenantId results in improper access controls. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability has been found in dibo-software diboot 3.8.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /api/ai-session/ of the component AI Session Endpoint. Such manipulation leads to authorization bypass. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.