Threat database

RuoYi-Vue-Plus versions up to 6.0.0 contain an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that allows authenticated users to delete other users' social login bindings by specifying their socialId. This can remove GitHub, WeChat, or Gitee bindings and stored OAuth tokens, effectively blocking social login for the targeted user. The vulnerability requires authentication and has a low severity score.

RuoYi-Vue-Plus version 6.0.0 contains a vulnerability that allows remote attackers with limited privileges to execute arbitrary code via multiple components related to workflow task completion. The affected components include FlwTaskController.java, FlwTaskServiceImpl.completeTask, CompleteExecuteComponent.process, Warm-Flow TaskService.skip, and the POST /workflow/task/completeTask endpoint. This vulnerability has a high severity rating with a CVSS score of 8.8.

A vulnerability was identified in Dromara RuoYi-Vue-Plus up to 5.6.2. This issue affects the function FlwInstanceController/FlwDefinitionController/FlwCategoryController/FlwSpelController/TestLeaveController of the component Workflow Endpoint. Such manipulation leads to improper authorization. The attack can be launched remotely.

RuoYi-Vue-Plus through 5.6.2, fixed in commit 88d03d9, exposes workflow task management endpoints under /workflow/task (FlwTaskController) without any permission check: the controller declares no class-level or method-level authorization annotation, so the endpoints are gated only by global authentication. Any authenticated user, regardless of assigned role, can therefore reassign workflow approval tasks to arbitrary users via updateAssignee (defeating segregation of duties in the approval process), urge arbitrary tasks, and enumerate all pending and finished tasks via the pageByAllTaskWait and pageByAllTaskFinish listing endpoints. The issue was resolved by adding permission identifiers (SaCheckPermission) to these endpoints.

The snailjob component in RuoYi-Vue-Plus versions 5.5.1 and earlier, interface /snail-job/workflow/check-node-expression can execute QLExpress expressions, but it does not filter user input, allowing attackers to use the File class to perform arbitrary file reading and writing.