Threats affecting pkg:github/ihor-sokoliuk/mcp-searxng

mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.7.1, web_url_read in src/index.ts passes a caller-supplied URL to readUrlContent() in src/url-reader.ts, where checkContentLength() treats a missing Content-Length header as an inconclusive preflight and the normal and error paths then consume the complete body with response.text(). A server that omits Content-Length can therefore bypass URL_READ_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_BYTES and force unbounded memory use. The resulting string is also processed by NodeHtmlMarkdown.translate(), increasing CPU consumption and allowing an unauthenticated HTTP client to cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.1.

mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.7.1, web_url_read receives its caller-controlled URL through src/index.ts and validates only the literal hostname in assertUrlAllowed() within src/url-reader.ts before undiciFetch() performs operating-system DNS resolution. A public-looking attacker-controlled hostname that resolves to a private, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata address therefore passes the lexical check and causes the MCP server to connect to the internal destination. In the default HTTP configuration, an unauthenticated network client can use this path to read internal services, expose credentials or service tokens, and enumerate reachable internal hosts; in STDIO deployments, prompt-influenced tool selection can provide the malicious URL. Direct private IP literals are blocked, and MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS remains an explicit opt-out. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.1.

mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.2.0, web_url_read passes a caller-supplied URL to the server-side fetch path while assertUrlAllowed() in src/url-reader.ts runs only when MCP_HTTP_HARDEN is enabled, even though MCP_HTTP_HARDEN is disabled by default in src/http-security.ts. In the default configuration, an attacker who influences the URL selected by a user or AI agent can make the server fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoint resources and return their contents into the model context. file:// URLs remain rejected, and the separate DNS-resolution and redirect-validation bypasses are outside this record. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.0.

mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.2.0, the web_url_read URL policy in src/url-reader.ts can be bypassed while MCP_HTTP_HARDEN is enabled and MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS is not enabled because redirect targets are not revalidated, 0.0.0.0 is not classified as an internal address, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals canonicalized to hexadecimal form are not recognized. These inputs allow an attacker-influenced tool call to make the MCP server fetch loopback or internal HTTP resources and return content from local services, private APIs, service-mesh endpoints, or cloud metadata endpoints. The separate hostname-to-private-address case addressed by the earlier partial fix is not part of these residual bypasses. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.0.