Threats affecting pkg:github/xerrors/Yuxi

Yuxi is a large-model-based intelligent knowledge base and knowledge graph agent development platform. From 0.6.0.beta1 until 0.7.1, there is insufficient isolation between execution-capable Docker sandboxes and trusted application services. A low-privileged authenticated user who can execute commands in their own sandbox can reach other tenants' sandbox APIs, access their files and secrets, execute commands in active sandboxes, and enumerate, create, or delete sandboxes through the unauthenticated provisioner without knowing administrator, database, or MinIO credentials. Sandboxes can also reach shared internal services; if shipped default service credentials remain unchanged, an attacker can use them, and if the exposed PostgreSQL account is a superuser, obtain command execution in the PostgreSQL container. These paths can disclose or modify cross-tenant data and sandbox state or cause denial of service through sandbox deletion without a container escape or kernel vulnerability. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.1. Existing deployments must separately rotate persisted PostgreSQL, Neo4j, or MinIO credentials that were previously set to documented or shipped defaults because upgrading the Compose files does not automatically rotate them.

Yuxi is a large-model-based intelligent knowledge base and knowledge graph agent development platform. Prior to version 0.6.2, the project's authentication mechanism contains a flaw. In affected versions, the system does not sufficiently validate the identity token in the Authorization header — only performing a validity check. This allows an administrator token generated in another deployment instance or local testing environment to be used to access the backend management interfaces of a different affected instance. An attacker who obtains or constructs an acceptable administrator Authorization token may bypass normal login authentication and gain administrator privileges. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to access system configurations, invoke backend management APIs, create administrator accounts, and ultimately take over the system backend. This issue has been fixed in version 0.6.2. Before upgrading, users are advised to implement the following temporary measures: Set the environment variable `JWT_SECRET_KEY` to a non-default value, and configure a unique, sufficiently strong JWT/authentication key for each deployment instance; and/or avoid exposing backend management interfaces directly to the public network.